SOVIET METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN AUSTRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000100180002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 23, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

rl.
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SECRET
AS`' TANT DIRECTOR Ic
FOR RESEARCH AND REPORTS
50X1
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOVIET METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION
IN AUSTRIA
CIA/RR 15
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C
S-E-C L-E-T
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOVIET METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN AUSTRIA
C IA/RR 15
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-E-E-T
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,
0
C ON'IE
Summ3.ry . . . . . . . . . . . C 0 . . 0 . . . 0 0 0
1, Basis of the Soviet Economic Position
in Austria . . . . . . , . . 2
2, Soviet Industrial Operations in Austria , , ,
a, Oil Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
b, Factory Production . F 0 , 0 . 0 . . , . 4
c, 'Removal of Goods from Austria , , , , , , 5
3, Soviet Financial. Operations in Austria 5
4, Soviet Commercial Operations in Austria 0 , 6
a. Retail Operations . , , 0 . . . A . 6
b, Extension of Operations Beyond
the Soviet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ADT)endixes
Appendix A. Commentary on the Chart of the
Probable Organization of USIA
Illustrations
~ ~Q lOF.~Rxz
Probable Organization of USIA '(Chart) . . . . . . , 14
Austria, 1947 (Map) . . . . . . . . .
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C IA/RR 15
(ORR Project 91-51)
SS0V 'T METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN AUSTRIA*
The Soviet method of penetrating the economy of Austria differs from
the method used in the Satellite countries in that it does not rely on a
Communist government or on a large Communist Party but is based directly
on Soviet control of East Austria and of part of Vienna under Four Power
occupation. An important part of Austrian industry, including the oil
fields, is concentrated in the Soviet Zone, so that much of the Austrian
economy remains vulnerable to Soviet exploitation during continued
occupation.
Under a unilateral interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, which
turned over German assets in East Austria to the Soviet government, Soviet
authorities have seized and exploited a large segment of the economy of
Austria, with the probable intention of integrating certain phases of this
economy into the Soviet Bloc.
USIA (T a leniye Sovetsko_go Imushchestva Avstrii), the central
organization set up by the USSR to administer the seized properties, has
become an important economic command post for the USSR in Vienna, since
it also includes the Soviet mineral oil administration in Austria and
control of all transportation.in and out of the Soviet Zone. The deficit
financing of industry by the Soviet Military Bank is an important factor in
USIA operations. By forcing USIA enterprises to liquidate their capital
and operate on funds supplied by the bank, the USSR has acquired a mort-
gage on much of the industry of East Austria. USIA facilities are used to
promote East-West trade through the use of intermediaries and to acquire
materials for the Soviet Bloc from Western Europe by way of Austria.
USIA trade channels are also used by the USSR for such miscellaneous
activities as buying dollar and sterling currency. An expanding retail
organization is being built up by USIA to dispose of certain of its
products and imports, which it does by underselling Austrian stores.
This operation also serves as a propaganda device.
This report contains information available to CIA as of 1 April 1952.
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1. -Basis of the Soviet Economic Position in Austria.
The framework of Soviet penetration of the Austrian economy differs
from that found in the Satellite countries in that it does not rely on a
Communist government or on a large Communist Party but stems directly from
Soviet control of East Austria and of part of Vienna under Four Power
occupation.* There is a Communist Party in Austria, but it is small and
polls only about 5 percent of the popular vote. /** One of the objec-
tives of Soviet economic penetration in Austria is the creation of con-
fusion and crisis in Austrian political and economic life in order to
increase the influence of the Communist Party. Such an objective may
account, in part, for Soviet delay in agreeing to a treaty of restoration.
Austria was occupied by Allied forces in 1945, and an occupation zone
was assigned to each of the four occupying powers, although zonal demarca-
tions have been irregularly enforced, except by the USSR. Vienna, like
Berlin, was divided into four sectors. Prewar boundaries were restored,
separating the country from Germany, and a central Austrian government
similar to the one before 1934 was reestablished. Unlike occupied.
Germany, and in accordance with the Moscow Declaration, Austria was to be
considered a liberated rather than a conquered country.
An Allied Control Council and other Allied agencies to deal with post-
war problems were set up. The Control Council was organized along the
lines of the Austrian government and was originally a supervisory instru-
ment. Although it has served a useful purpose, it has now become little
more than a sounding board for differences between the Western Allies and
the Soviet government. The agenda have come to consist mainly of attempts
to compromise on secondary developments rather than to consider primary
political and economic matters.
In Austria, approximately 35 percent of the working population is
employed in trade and industry. Finishing and processing industries are
located mostly in and around Vienna, in the Soviet-occupied northeast part
of the country, where the majority of Austria's 7 million people are
located. Therefore, although there are other centers of industry in
* The division of Austria under the Four Power agreement is indicated
on a map following p. 20.
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Austria, some of the most important segments of Austrian economic life re-
main subject to dislocation, if not to control, by the-USSR. 3.1
At present the Soviet position in the Austrian economy is based on the
Soviet interpretation of that section of the Potsdam Agreement which states:
"The Governments of the UK and the USA renounce all claims in respect to re-
parations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern
Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria." !,/ The question
of Soviet action involves both the Soviet unilateral interpretation of
German foreign assets and the manner in which the Soviet authorities have
organized and exploited those assets.
The legal status of much German property in Austria, particularly that
arising from the German occupation, has never been established. The
Austrian government claims that "not only the decision of the four allies
but also generally accepted legal principles demand the invalidation of all
transfers of Austrian property to the Germans carried out under pressure."
The USSR has treated all property in Austria which was in German hands at
the end of the war as "German foreign assets," and the Soviet government has
seized and is administering some 350 enterprises in its zone. This area of
the Austrian economy is being exploited with the probable intention of in-
tegrating certain phases of it into the Soviet Bloc and currently as a means
of tapping Western resources. W
The apparatus set up by the USSR to administer the confiscated
properties in Austria is known as USIA* (Upravlenive Sovetskogo
Imushchestva L Vos tochnov Aystrii -- Administration of Soviet Properties
in L Eastern-/** Austria). Until 1947 the allegedly Germanforeign assets
seized by the Soviet government were handled in a somewhat haphazard fash-
ion and without a central administration. It was the necessity for
controlling and correlating these heterogeneous enterprises that led to the
establishment of USIA. This main administration, which also controls the
SMV (Sowietische Mineraloelverwaltung -- Soviet Mineral Oil -Administration
in Austria); Tusch r seht1ans*** (the Soviet transportation agency which
#
For details of the organization of USIA, see Appendix A.
##
The word "Eastern" has been dropped.
#
German transliteration of the Russian Yuzhvneshtrans (Yuzhno-
yp~shniv Tyr .nsport -- Southern Foreign Transport) ; also referred to in
German as Transport- and Speditionskontor (Transport and Despatching
Office).
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handles all goods requiring Soviet clearance); and the DDSG (Don u
DamDfschiffahrts Gesellschaft -- Danube Shipping Company), has be-
come a significant economic cogmand post in Vienna.
The effect of USIA on the industrial economy of Austria is twofold.
It not only takes from Austria the products of the confiscated industries
but also has established the USSR, through its banking operations, as the
creditor of those industries. Both goods and capital, therefore, are being
taken from Austria through USIA.
2. Swint Industrial Opera ons in Austria.
a. Oil Production.
The oil fields of Austria, the production of which is surpassed
only by those of Rumania and equals the combined output of the rest of
Western Europe, are located entirely within the Soviet Zone. y Before
the war, production of crude oil in Austria was centered around
Zistersdorf and was controlled by British and US interests. When the
area fell under Soviet control after the war, exploitation begun by the
Germans was continued under Soviet auspices. Beginning in 1949, the
production area was extended southward to Matzen. The fields in the
Matzen area now produce approximately 60 percent of all Austrian crude
oil, estimated to have reached 2,400,000 metric tons in 1951. It is be-
lieved that intensive and uneconomical exploitation of the fields by the
USSR may lead to premature decline in production. Close spacing of
wells and excessive production rates, which rapidly deplete the deposits,
are being used. Such a depletion causes a rapid decline in production
rate and may reduce the ultimate recovery of oil and result in the
closing down of the fields within 10 years.
b. Factory-Production.
One important and partially achieved objective of USIA is the
incorporation of much of its output into Soviet production plans for
the USSR. Large-scale Soviet orders have been filled from USIA
factories, including diesel-driven winches, giant excavators, corrugated
steel barracks, and many other items from USIA enterprises manufacturing
electrical appliances and equipment., Some factories export more than half
of their total output to the USSR. These deliveries are made according
to Soviet plans and are intended to fill requirements for planned
industrial development inside the USSR. S/ Factories within the USIA
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combine which cannot produce goods of direct benefit to the USSR or
whose sole market is in Austria are neglected, and no large investments
are made in such plants.
c. Removal of Goods from Austria.
Recapitulation of USIA activities from January 1947 through June
1951 indicates that these Soviet-controlled industries have shipped
approximately 824.2-million worth of Austrian-produced goods to the USSR
and the Satellite countries. At least x'100 million of this sum were in
petroleum products, and the ratio of petroleum products to other goods,
is increasing. This sum is in addition to the ~20Q-million worth of\
machinery and equipment dismantled and removed in 1945 and 1946 by-the
USSR. An Austrian government estimate sets the replacement cost of
machines and equipment removed at $1 billion. Other Austrian losses-are
included in the Soviet profits from control of British and US oil prop-
erties in the Soviet Zone and from operations of the Danube Shipping
Company. 10
3. Soviet Financial Operations i Austria.
In 1951, USIA firms were indebted to the Soviet Military Bank, or
Gosbank (Gosudarstvennvv Bank SSSR -- State Bank of the USSR), to the
extent of approximately 475 million schillings. Soviet operating
methods and accounting practices have increased the obligations of many
enterprises beyond the possibility of repayment. This indebtedness was
forced on the firms taken over by USIA by the USSR assuming title to
German claims against them and then demanding payment of the claims in
cash or bond. The indebtedness was then increased by forcing the sale
of finished products through USIA sales channels, wherein the factory is
paid minimum production costs and at the same time is charged a USIA
management fee averaging 10 percent of the production cost. No funds
are allowed for the amortization of USIA loans. Any reserves over and
above 5 percent, of the cost of production which the firms may have
accumulated from previous operations are confiscated. With no funds for
rehabilitation of capital assets, most firms, since they are required to
continue production at full capacity, are forced to operate on deficit
financing and must borrow further from the Soviet Military Bank to do so.
The loans, although made in a legal manner, have been necessitated by the
extralegal withdrawal of the assets of USIA firms through exorbitant
administrative fees and excessive withdrawal of profits.
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In the event of a treaty settlement, the status of the loans remains
to be determined. They have reached such magnitude that repayment of
them within any time limit would impose serious strain upon the
financial stability of entire sections of industry. As matters stand
now, the USSR holds a mortgage on a sizable segment of the Austrian
economy. il/
4. Soviet Commercial Open t o s in Austria.
a. Retail Operations.
Conjointly with its control of Austrian oil production, trans-
port facilities, and some 350 industrial and commercial enterprises,
USIA has extended its economic penetration into the retail field.
The growing USIA retail complex consists of grocery, clothing, and
general merchandise stores dealing in foodstuffs, textiles, and household
items -- in some cases imported from the Satellite countries and Western
Europe -- and also wine shops, restaurants, and even barber shops. 1'
The growth in the number of these stores (the ultimate aim is to have at
least one shop in each town) and the manner in which they are operated
are threatening normal trade in the Soviet Zone. / It has been re-
ported that USIA has also attempted to establish what are called
"camouflaged contractual. relationships" with a number of retail con-
cerns in the British and US Zones. 12/
The essential characteristic in the USIA retail organization
lies in its extraterritoriality, an imperialistic extension of the
Potsdam Agreement by the Soviet government. Goods imported from the
East as Soviet shipments, and allegedly for exclusive use of military and
personal requirements of the occupation power, enter Austria without
payments of customs duties or other taxes and, in the case of tobacco and
alcoholic beverages, in violation of state monopolies. The USIA organiza-
tion is also used for shipping goods to the East. / On the sales level,
again by virtue of extraterritoriality, USIA retail stores avoid payment
of turnover taxes, financing fees, and corporation and sales taxes.
Austria has thereby lost an estimated 1.4 billion schillings since 1945,
according to the Austrian government. IV The USIA shops also ignore
sanitation requirements and violate legal operating hours and other re-
strictions on sales by excluding Austrian enforcement officers from the
stores.
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In addition to depriving the Austrian government of millions
of schillings in revenue, USIA stores are also able to undersell
ordinary Austrian stores by an average of 20 percent, forcing shop-
keepers into bankruptcy and upsetting the prevailing price structure. L8/
Under Communist management the entire operation, moreover, is exploited
as a propaganda device, with emphasis placed on cheap prices, particu-
larly for food. The retail stores also supply USIA with an outlet for
many manufactured goods and services which offer the USSR an additional
source of schillings. Some of the funds thus obtained are used to
finance propaganda in the trade union fields. Another method of pene-
trating the trade unions is the tendency to make Communist Party member-
ship the price of employment in Soviet-controlled enterprises.
b. Extension of Operations Beyond the Soviet Zone.
From the position gained through control of Austrian enterprises,
Soviet economic penetration has been extended beyond the Eastern Zone.
The Soviet Trade Delegation in Vienna has been active since 1948 in
obtaining equipment, goods, and materials from all zones of Austria.
Purchases are made from Austrian firms as well as from USIA enterprises
and are paid for in schillings. Zany Austrian suppliers are careful to
handle these sales with discretion, often camouflaging them as domestic
sales and failing to report the transactions to the Austrian Trade
Ministry. Austrian taxes and export regulations are evaded in these
transactions by utilizing Soviet extraterritoriality as an occupation
power. 20
Soviet trade representatives have also explored possibilities of
selling Soviet goods to Austria and from Austria to other Western
countries. Offers have been made by the Soviet government and'through
Satellite intermediaries to sell such materials as grains, manganese ore,
asbestos, and leather. The Soviet Trade Delegation has also tried through
Viennese intermediaries to obtain cotton and wool on the international
commodity market. Few of these transactions have materialized, mainly be-
cause the Austrian nationalized banks have been unable to finance them.
Other USIA activities include buying dollar and sterling currency
for the USSR / from profits of USIA sales and contributing funds to the
Communist Parties of both Austria and East Germany. USIA facilities also
serve for transit and transshipment of strategic materials from the West
to the Soviet Bloc. This gateway through the Iron Curtain has become more
important with the altered position of Yugoslavia, which reduced the use
of Trieste as a transshipment point.
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Satellite as well as Soviet agencies make use of USIA facilities.
A permanent Bulgarian purchasing mission in Vienna procures essential
machinery and other merchandise abroad through USIA purchasing and
trade channels. Across the Hungarian border in Sopron, USIA goods are
stored free from jurisdiction of the Hungarian government in what
amounts to a free trade area for reshipment'to Satellite countries. 22
The USSR has resorted to various means in order to maintain its
position. Occasional threats have been used to tighten interzonal trade
controls. / Permits which are required for the shipment of goods out
of the Soviet Zone are occasionally used as instruments of political
pressure. They are obtained through a forwarding agency which
collaborates with Juschwneschtrans, the Soviet transportation agency.
In addition to establishing a monopoly over interzonal shipments, this
device also supplies the Soviet Trade Delegation with a source of
schillings to cover their purchases.
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APPENDIX A
COMMENTARY ON THE CHART OF THE PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF USIA#
The chart of the probable organization of USIA was compiled on the
basis of information supplied for the most part by Austrian defectors.
It is not complete and does not indicate the relative importance of
various production administrations within the main divisions of USIA.
The organizational structure is not precise, and the chain of command
is not always apparent even to USIA employees. The word_"branch" is
used in the chart to indicate the main divisions of the USIA Directorate.
The Soviets do not use the term but have a system of numbers to designate
departments, or simply refer to a department by the name of its chief.
Throughout the organization, Austrians hold various offices, but
executive and policy-controlling positions are hold by Soviet representa-
tives, and more importance is attached to the person than to the office
which he holds.
1. Directorate.
The USIA Directorate is divided into three main branches: the
Technical Branch, the Commercial Branch, and the Personnel Branch. The
relationship between branches is not clear; each has considerable autonomy
but in certain respects is subject to control by the other branches.
Command channels from the branches to the production administrations are
not clear. Each branch of the Directorate issues general instructions in
its sphere of interest to its corresponding unit in the administration, but
controversial matters usually go to Moscow for decision. The Directorate
apparently exercises more authority in matters of finance, commercial
policy, and personnel than in plant management.
a. Technical Branch.
(1) The Planning Department works in close coordination with
the Quality Control Office. It issues general directives to production
administrations but cannot enforce compliance except through Moscow. The
branch exercises limited supervisory control over the administrations.
* A chart of the probable organization of USIA follows p. 14.
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(2) The Quality Control Office sets quality standards for
USIA production and with the assistance of the production administrations
tests products of USIA plants for quality.
(3) The Accounting Department checks and approves budgets for
the various production administrations and keeps financial records for
all USIA plants in conjunction with the Soviet Military Bank. The Chief
Accountant, one of the most important officials of USIA, controls
finances in the Directorate as well as in the production administrations.
Since the chief accountants of all administrations report to him, he may
be the comptroller.
(4) The Financial Department, a section of the Accounting
Department, studies production costs in USIA plants.
b. Commercial Branch.
(1) The Central Commercial Bureau (CCB) is the largest and
most important department of the Directorate. It is directly responsible
to the Deputy for Commercial Matters. The chief of the CCB is responsible
for the approval of every shipment scheduled to leave USIA plants or ware-
houses. The CCB also functions as an independent broker, purchasing from
USIA plants and selling on its own account, chiefly to export companies.
An important function of the Bureau is said to be to discover ways and means
of circumventing Austrian commercial and foreign exchange regulations. The
relationship between the CCB and sales and purchasing offices of individual
production administrations is not entirely clear. In general, they are
competent only in matters pertaining to their enterprises, such as con-
tracting for raw materials and equipment and marketing the products. Such
operations are carried on within the framework of instructions issued by
the Commercial Branch of the Directorate to the Commercial Department of the
individual production administration. The function of the Commercial Depart-
ment within each individual administration appears to consist mainly of
adapting general commercial policies issued by the Commercial Branch to the
needs and problems of the administration concerned.
(2) Economic Research Department keeps records of black-market
and world prices for goods and foreign currency and supplies the information
to USIA departments and plants. It also performs economic intelligence
functions in that it maintains records of Marshall Plan deliveries to
Austria as well as data on non USIA plants in Austria.
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c. Personnel Branch.
(1) The Labor Regulations Section, usually calledd
(the Soviet term for labor), issues labor policy directives for all
USIA plants. Final appeal in labor disputes are addressed to the
director of this section.
(2) The Central Bookkeeping Section (AXO) handles salaries
for all USIA employees.
(3) An Austrian Personnel Section maintains liaison between
USIA and the Austrian Communist Party (KPOe).
(4) The Administrative and Services Section is in charge of
repair and maintenance crews in USIA buildings. There is also a chief
shop steward in this section whose duty it is to act as intermediary
between the trade union in USIA and the Directorate.
2. Auxiliary Administrations.
. The departments under this heading form a separate category of USIA
organization. Each is relatively independent, headed by a director
general. In general, they perform research and legal functions with, re-
gard to German property and patents in Austria which are of interest to
USIA. Functionally these departments are responsible to the Technical
Branch of the Directorate. They have administrative relations with the
Personnel Branch, as. indicated by broken lines on the chart.
a. The Survey of German Properties Department makes surveys of firms,
plants, and properties in Austria in order to determine the percentage of
German ownership on which firms have German creditors. Decisions on per-
centage of German ownership is based on study of questionnaires answered
by the firms. The figure on which the value was determined (in 1949) was
the assets figure in the 1945 balance sheet, and, in the case of real
estate, the value of the property as indicated by the Austrian cadastral
records (Grundbuch), expressed in 1945 schilling values.
b. The Legal Department passes on the legality.of decisions reached
by the German Properties Department and tries USIA cases in Austrian courts.
For the latter purpose it engages the service of pro-Soviet Ais trian law
firms. This department also supervises the work of young Soviet lawyers who
are placed in various departments for training.
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c. The Patent Department studies records of USIA plants in order to
decide which patents can be claimed by the Soviets as German-owned.
3. Production Administra ions.
The production administrations which direct the activities of USIA
plants assigned to them are semiautonomous. Their structure is similar
to the Directorate in that each administration has technical, commercial
(policy making and coordinating), and personnel sections. Each administra-
tion also has a sales and purchasing office. Directors of production
administrations report directly to the Diractor General of USIA and his
three deputies, as indicated by the solid red line on the chart. Informa-
tion is presently available on only three production administrations.
a. Machine Construction Administration.
(1) The Heavy Industry Section directs some 40 USIA enterprises,
primarily heavy machinery plants and bridge construction firms. The sales
and purchasing office has offered prompt delivery on machine tools and
dies, agricultural machinery, cigarette na chines, bridge and other steel
structures, tank cars, locomotives, and various machine parts.
(2) The Automotive and Fine Mechanics Department, known as
A ode o, handles all USIA vehicle construction and repair facilities as
well as five industries producing fine mechanical devices such as
electrical measuring instruments..
Very little has been reported on this administration other than
that it has a special sales office for textiles which sells leather and
low-grade flannel.
c. Construction and Building Materials Administ ar tion.
This administration has a central sales'and purchasing office
which handles the products of six firms producing window glass, reed pro-
ducts, bricks, sand and gravel, building. hardware, and iron pipe. It has
been pointed out that this list illustrates the lack of system in assigning
plants to various administrations.
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4. Inden ndent Organizations Associated with USIA.
(1) Juschwneschtrans* is a Soviet-controlled shipping firm which
handles the clearance of all goods shipped from the Soviet Zone beyond the
demarcation line or out of Austria. Since independent Austrian merchants
as well as USIA units must obtain clearance for shipment through this agency,
Juschwneschtrans has established a virtual monopoly over Soviet Zone trans-
port. This organization is registered with the Austrian Trade Registry and
may retain a transport monopoly to the East even though a treaty is con-
cluded. Juschwneschtrans extends its control to Danube shipping through
DDSG, the Soviet-controlled Danube Shipping Company.
(2) The Soviet Military Bank holds all funds of USIA branches,
administrations, and sales offices. It grants credits and performs all
normal banking services for USIA plants.
(3) The Soviet Trade Delegation, which represents the Stankov
Agency, a. central Soviet import agency in Moscow, has been in Austria for
some time. On behalf of the Soviet government it purchases from Austrian
firms as well as from USIA firms. Previously, purchases for the Soviet
government' were made by the sales offices of the various administrations.
* See footnote on p. 3, above.
-13-
S -E-~ ~-E-~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP79RO 1141A000100180002-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000100180002-8
PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF USIA
(UPRAVLENIYE SOVETSKOGO iMUSHCHESTVA v AVSTRII)
MOSCOW
SECRET
INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH USIA
Moscow
Deputy for
Commercial
Matters
Deputy for Administration
& Technical Matters
Planning
Department
Quality
Control
Accounting
Department
Financial
Department
MVD
(Deputy for
.Personnel)
Juschwneschtrans
(Soviet Transport and DDSG (Danube Shipping Co.)
Forwarding Agency)
Commercial Branch I Personnel Branch
Central Economic I Trud Central Austrian
Commercial Research I (Labor
Bureau Department Regulations) Bookkeeping Personnel
National I Administration
Desks I & Services
-------_--_-J
Control channels from Oirectorate
to Administrations
Metallurgical
and Coal
Machine
Construction
Avtodeio
(Automotive and
Fine Mechanics
Department)
Light
Industry
Electrical
Industry
Chemical
Industry
Construction
and Building
Materials
SECRET
Building,
Estates,
Real Estate
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000100180002-8
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SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/27: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000100180002-8