THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000100100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 27, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST
CHINA
CIA/RR 8
27 August 1952
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
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the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SE ?C?R?E?T
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR 8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S?E?C?R-E?T
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CONTENTS
Summary
Lam
I.
Introduction
2
1.
Description of the Industry
2
2.
Importance of the Industry
2
3.
History of the Industry
3
4.
Organization
4
II.
Production
5
1.
Location and Capacity of Facilities
5
2.
Current Production
6
3.
Conversions and Expansions
7
4,
Estimated Production for 1953
8
5.
Technology
8
III.
Input Requirements
8
1.
Raw Materials
8
2.
Finished Materials
8
3.
Imports
9
4.
Manpower
10
5,
Electric Power
10
6.
Transport
11
IV.
Limitations and Vulnerabilities
11
1.
Limitations
11
2.
Vulnerabilities
11
Appendixes
Appendix A. Shipyards and Labor Farces in
Communist China 13
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C.
Appendix C. Methodology 17
Illustrations
Control Channels for Shipbuilding and Related Industries
in Communist China (Tentative) 21
Following Page
China: Important Shipbuilding Facilities, Naval
Bases, and Component Production Centers
(1460 22
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(I)
CIA/RR 8 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 7-52)
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OF COMMUNIST CHINA
Summary
The shipbuilding industry of Communist China consists largely of
the construction and repair of small vessels, most of them built of
wood, for both commercial and military purposes. The use of such
vessels for coastwise and river traffic still plays its traditionally
significant part in the domestic commerce of Communist China. The
Chinese Communist Army has ordered large numbers of such vessels for
use as landing craft.
There is no available evidence that large merchant ships are
currently being constructed in Communist China. The shipyards at
Dairen (Ta-lien), Shanghai, Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao), Amoy (Hsievamen), and
Ta-ku have had facilities for constructing large merchant ships but,
partly because of the damaged condition of these facilities and partly
because of the inability of Communist China to import the raw materials
and finished goods required to undertake the construction of ocean-
going vessels, these yards, like the smaller yards existing along the
coast of China, are building only small vessels. Annual production in
all shipyards is estimated at about 85,000 deadweight tons.
The shipbuilding industry of Communist China is nationalized and
functions under both the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of
Heavy Industry. An estimated 1 percent of the national budget for 1951
was reportedly invested in the improvement of existing facilities at the
Dairen, Shanghai, and Han-ktou yards. Plans were reportedly made to con-
struct a new shipway at Dairen with a capacity of 20,000 gross registered
tons. There is no evidence of the conversion of other industrial facili-
ties to shipbuilding.
The annual input requirements of materials for the shipbuilding
industry of Communist China in its current type of construction consist
of 30 million board feet of cut lumber, 4,570 metric tons of steel, 3,000
marine diesel engines, and substantial quantities of nails, screws, and
fittings. Domestic sources can satisfy these requirements with the ex-
ception of the engines, of which over 80 percent must be imported.
Chinese shipbuilders have made no significant contributions to the
technology of the trade. Personnel training programs, however, some of
which are supervised by Soviet technicians, are being conducted in the
principal shipbuilding centers. While the industry's labor force of
25,000 now has a low productivity rate, both the quantity and the quality
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of this force can be expected to increase as a result of this training.
The shipbuilding industry, limited by its shortage of skilled
workers and supply of propulsion units, is not a significant contributor
to the Communist Chinese economy. It is vulnerable to economic warfare
only to a small degree, since international restrictions on the imparta
tion of diesel engines, under prevailing circumstances, would not
eliminate a major potential source of supply, the USSR.
I. Introduction,
1. Description of the Industry.
The shipbuilding industry of Communist China consists largely
of the construction and repair of small vessels destined for use in
coastwise and river trade or as military landing craft. There is no re-
liable evidence that large merchant ships are being constructed in
Communist China. The greater part of the shipbuilding industry of
Communist China is devoted to the construction of junks, which are shallow-
draft wooden craft of 25 to 30 deadweight tons (DWT),* 40 to 50 feet in
length. Motorized junks, which are sometimes equipped with auxiliary
sails, are powered by one or two engines ranging in capacity from 25 to 50
horsepower and are capable of a speed of from 7 to 10 knots. The military
landing craft include junks and other small craft used for the movement of
personnel and larger vessels, of approximately 75 DWT, designed for the
movement of supplies, weapons, and equipment.
2. Importance of the Industry.
China is not a maritime nation, and it is not likely to become one
during the next decade. The country lacks merchant marine personnel, both
technical and administrative, and the shipyards and auxiliary industries
required to build ocean-going merchant ships. Since river transport has
* The following types of tonnage are used for the measure of ships in
this report: Deadweight tons (DWT): the difference in weight, in long tons,
between a vessel in loaded and light condition. Displacement tons: the
weight of the water, in long tons, displaced by the ship. Gross registered
tons (GRT): the measure of the volume of the permanently enclosed space in
a ship (1 GRT equals 100 cubic feet).
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always been the cheapest means of carrying goods in China, and since
the economic activities of the interior are largely dependent on this
traffic, the Chinese Nationalist government in the postwar period and
the present Chinese Communist regime have given high priority to the
expansion of wooden ship construction and to the rehabilitation of boat-
yards producing this type of craft. It is in this type of construction
that the importance of the industry is found.
3. History of the Industry.
The principal dockyards in China originated as naval shipbuiding
yards. Very little merchant shipping was built in China until about
1938. Even then the industry was still in its initial stages of develop-
ment, and ouch progress as there was in shipbuilding was largely the
result of the government's efforts to create a navy.
After the outbreak of hostilities between the Chinese and the
Japanese, the Ministry of Communications, under which the shipbuilding
industry functioned, formulated a program for the construction of im-
proved river junks and shallow-draft steamers to supplement the vital inland
commerce system. Shipyards were taken over or granted loans in a number
of cities, many of which were located in the interior of China. Short-
ages of materials and chaotic economic conditions, however, precluded any
measure of success.
In 1935 the shipbuilding industry consisted essentially of dock-
yards located at Dairen, Shanghai, Tsingtao, FU-chou, Amoy, and Tlang-ku.
The most important shipyards capable of the construction of large ships
today are the Dairen Shipbuilding and Machinery Company, the Shanghai
Dockyard and Engineering Company, and the Kiangnan Dockyard and Engineering
Company of Shanghai.
During the period 1926-331 only 26 vessels of 100 gross registered
tons (GRT) or more, totalling 22,924 GRT, were launched in China. No pro-
duction figures are available for the period 1933-38. For the years
1939-44 inclusive, construction was reported of 8 to 10 steam vessels
totalling no more than 40,000 GRT and of 2,500 motorized jlinkst. 1/*
China's merchant fleet amounted to only about 100,000 GRT at the
time of the Japanese surrender in 1945, nearly one-half million tons
having been lost in World War II alone. By June 1947 the merchant marine
had been increased to 808,815 GRT and consisted of 1,017 seagoing vessels
and 1,600 river craft of all types. The major portion of the additional
tonnage was secured by salvage, by purchases, and by reparations. There is
no indication of domestic construction in these years.
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In planning its postwar merchant marine, the Chinese Nationalist
government intended to rehabilitate 11 shipyards at leading shipbuilding
centers. The combined capacity of the 11 yards was expected to reach
130,000 DWT of new ships annually. This tonnage was expected to be
augmented by construction from other widely dispersed yards located in
coastal and inland cities which were not enumerated in this plan. In
1946 a plan formulated by the Ministry of Communications called for the
building of 1,720,000 aRT of shipping by 1950. Of this new construction,
30 percent was allotted to inland service, 55 percent to coastal trans-
port, and 15 percent to near-seas and oceanic trade. First priority
was assigned to the building of inland and coastal types of vessels. Of
a total of 604 vessels planned, contracts were let for less than half of
this number -- 141 ships of 3,000 DMT each and 123 ships of 500 DWT each./
Mhch of this new tonnage, particularly ocean-going shipping, was to be
built in foreign yards, which have always provided the bulk of Chinals
merchant fleet. Little if any actual construction in Chinese yards under
the program was accomplished, because of the unstable economic and
political situation which prevailed immediately after its inception.
At the present time there are 41 ships (1,000 (iT and over),
totalling 102,800 GRT, of the former Chinese merchant fleet in the hands
of the Chinese Communist government, as the result of capture and de-
fections. The balance remains under Nationalist control. Most of the
small tonnage fleet, aggregating several thousand GRT, is considered to
have been taken over by the Communist regime.
The present total requirements for Chinese river shipping is
about 200,000 (PT, while that for coastal shipping is approximately
800,000 GRT, 2/ Annual replacement of inland and coastal shipping to
maintain these requirements is estimated to be about 5 percent of the total
Involved or 50,000 GRT,
4.. Organization.
Under the Chinese Nationalist government, maritime affairs, in-
cluding shipbuilding, were administered by the Ministry of Communications
and large ship construction was performed almost entirely for the govern-
ment-owned China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. The trend toward
nationalization had been especially pronounced in the field of transportation,
and in 1946 the government planned to bring the entire shipbuilding and re-
pair industry under government ownership and control in order to speed
construction of new shipping and to hasten the ship repair program. The
program failed with the acceleration of the civil war.
With the nationalization in 1950 of the huge Kiangnan Dockyard
and Engineering Company of Shanghai, the Communist government has succeeded
in obtaining control over virtually all private shipbuilding in China.
The Shipbuilding Bureau under the supervision of the Ministry of Heavy
Industry appears to be responsible for actual construction of merchant
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ships. Y* Control of this construction as well as of ship repairs
is centered in the Regional Navigational Bureaus in the Ministry of
Communications, but the extent of such control is not clearly defined.
Authority for the most important phase of shipbuilding, naval con-
struction, has largely been localized within the provinces, under control
of the Regional Naval Bureaus acting through units designated Services
and Supply Boards. 2/ These units are responsible for the procurement
and distribution of materials and the requisitioning of manpower for
the wooden boat program. In the important Dairen area shipbuilding
and repair activities come under the control of the Ministry of
Industries of the *Northeast Peoples Government" through the Bureau of
Mechanical Industries, in accordance with an agreement concluded in
February 1950. 2/
Production.
1. Location and Capacity of Facilities.
Important facilities for the construction and repair of modern
ships are found at the Manchurian port of Dairen. The Dairen shipyards
are capable of both building and repairing vessels of 10,000 GRT. Actual
output in the war years was extremely low. During the period 1942-45,
only about 5 steel tugs of 50 GRT and 6 river barges of 25 GRT were con-
structed. In the following years, production increased considerably but
still remained far below capacity. In the years 1946 through 1949 the
yards completed 80 patrol craft and 25 steel barges of a total tonnage of
nearly 6,000 GRT. Most of the required materials, including steel plate,
finished and semifinished, all propulsion units, and navigation gear,
were provided by the USSR. 21 From 1946 through 1949, three endless-
chain bucket-type dredges, various types of cranes, and rolling stock for
the South Manchurian Railway were also produced by the Dairen shipyards.
During the same time, repairs were made on ships of a total tonnage of
650,000 GRT, most of this tonnage being in large ships. ICS
* For a tentative description of the control channels for shipbuilding
and related industries in Communist China, see the chart following on p.21.
** The administrative control of the port of Dairen is wholly in the hands
of the Chinese Communists, whereas the actual port operation (that is,
berthing, communications, etc.) is Soviet-controlled. The shipyards are
entirely under Chinese Communist control. In allowing the Chinese control
of administration in Dairen, the Soviet government is following explicitly
the provisions of the agreement of February 1950 between Communist China
and the Soviet Union. The agreement also safeguards, for the next few
years at least, the controlling position of the Soviet Union in port opera-
tion. According to Article 3 of the agreement, the contracting parties
have agreed that the question of Dairen must be subjected to examination after
conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.
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Pert Arthur and Harbin (HA-erh-pin), with only small yards,
have facilities for the construction of shallow-draft river steamers,
although none is being built at the present time. Pert Arthur is re-
portedly being utilized as a refueling and repair station for Soviet
merchant ships and submarines.11/. There has been no evidence of
Soviet dismantling of shipbuilding facilities at Port Arthur after
Mbrld War II, hen other manufacturing industries and public utilities
in the Part Arthur region were dismantled.
There are shipbuilding and repair facilities at most of the
seaports of China proper, but only those at Shanghai, Tsingtao, Amoy,
and Ta-ku are considered to be of sufficient importance for the con-
struction and repair of large merchant ships. In the Shanghai area
there are 6 major shipyards and 15 small establishments. In the large
yards, construction of merchant ships up to 10,000 GRT is possible. The
largest ship built in China since World War II was an all-welded steamer
of 3,000 ORT launched at the Kiangnan Dockyard and Engineering Company
of Shanghai in 1948. As a result of repeated air attacks from Formosa
(Taiwan) in 1950, the Kiangnan yards were rendered inoperative for the
construction of heavy merchant ships. Construction of small wooden
craft was not affected, and there is some evidence that repair operations
have since been resumed at Kiangnan on a limited scale. Ei EXcept for
light-tonnage wooden craft, however, construction activity in the Shang-
hai area is at a standstill.
- In addition to the ports listed above, Canton (Kuang-chou),
Tlang-ku, Ftichou, Whampoa (Huang-pu), Hp-10?u, Swatow (Shan-V(3u),
Tientsin (Tlien-ching), FluAll-tao, and Yu-lin on Hainan Island are capable
of constructing large numbers of junks and landing craft.*
2. Current Production.
Orders placed by the Chinese Communist Army have resulted in a
vast program of construction, conversion, outfitting, and repair of vessels
designed for amphibious operations. These types embrace motorized junks,
wooden vessels of 25 to 30 DWT with sheet metal sheathing, and larger
landing craft averaging 75 DWT. The hulls are produced in large quantities,
but deliveries of the completed craft are curtailed by difficulties in
obtaining propulsion units. Great numbers of diesel engines have been
ordered from the Shanghai Dockyard and Engineering Company, China's principal
manufacturer, but the extent of fulfillment is unknown. A small number,
approximately 150, of new diesels (100 to 225 horsepower) was seized with
the capture of Shanghai. Many diesel engines have been imported via
* For the location of important shipbuilding facilities in China, see
the map following p. 22.
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Hong Kong and Am? from Western sources.
the USSR is providing quantities of landing craft engines, but there
is no direct evidence. 12/ The shortage of these components is
illustrated by reports of wholesale conversion of automobile and truck
engines to marine use. W
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of lack of materials and skilled manpower, postwar shipbuilding operations
have been considerably less than those carried on there during the
Japanese occupation. Ship repair activity at these yards, on the other
hand, has reportedly exceeded the Japanese wartime level of 100,000 GRT
annually. Repairs to Soviet vessels of all types account for the greater
part of the work done. Annual capacity of all ship repair facilities at
Dairen is estimated to be 200,000 GRT. 2.5./
Estimates of capacity and reports of deliveries indicate that
the main shipbuilding centers of the China coast and inland cities con-
struct annually about 2,240 wooden vessels, with a total tonnage of
85,100 DWT. This represents a monthly average construction of 14 motorized
junks of 30 DWT and 3 large landing barges of 75 DWT at each of the 11
major construction centers. There is insufficient information to gauge
the extent of construction of wooden ships in Harbin, Tientsin, and
HU-lu-tao, but it is probably less than the average of the other centers.
3. Conversions and Expansions.
Although Communist China is at present unable to undertake heavy
shipbuilding, effort is being made to improve production capabilities of
those yards engaged in the wooden shipbuilding program. Since July 1950
the Chinese Communist Army has reportedly invested roughly US $6 million,
or an estimated 1 percent of the national budget for 1951, in the Dairen,
Shanghai, and Han-k'ou shipyards. The Communist Army also has provided
steel plates, lumber, and machinery. 1?,/ Plans for 1951 called for the
production of 3,000 assault craft, with the bulk of the work centered in
those three areas. From estimates of capacity and reports of output for
the individual shipyards and from the evident lack of sufficient marine
engines to render these craft operational, it appears unlikely that this
total was reached.
Any possible
expansion of heavy shipbuilding in Communist China will depend on the 50X1
ability of the administration to overcome the scarcity of materials, of
components, of basic yard equipment, and of trained personnel. 50X1
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4. Estimated Production for 1951.
Although the construction of large merchant vessels in
present-day Communist China is extremely unlikely, the construction of
motorized junks and other wooden vessels continues unabated.
the Chinese Communist Navy planned to accumulate
before the end of 1952 a sum total of 150,000 displacement tons of naval
vessels, an increase of 70,000 displacement tons over the reported
present tonnage of 80,000. 14/ This increase was to be in large and
small landing craft.
In view of the full utilization of current capacity and the
absence of further investment plans, production for 1953 will probably
equal the current output of 85,000 DWT, although the inability of the
Communists to produce a sufficient number of marine engines could con.-
tribute materially to a decrease in construction.
5. Technology.
The Chinese have made no significant progress in the technique
of shipbuilding. They adhere to local conventional methods of working.
Although various technical training programs are now under way in the
principal building centers, the short-
age of trained technical personnel constitutes a serious problem for the
Communists in their efforts to give real significance to the shipbuilding
industry. Soviet technicians reportedly have been directing the training
of shipbuilding and repair personnel at Dairen, Canton, Shanghai, and
Tsingtao. 12/
III. Input Requirements.
1. ROW Materials.
The principal raw material used in Chinese boat construction is
lumber. The 1953 requirements for the construction of approximately 2,240
units are computed to be about 30 million board feet of cut lumber. The
industry has been receiving the bulk of its lumber requirements from
Manchuria and from the coastal provinces of Fukien and Chekiang. Before the
Nationalist expulsion from the mainland in 1949, extensive use was made of
lumber from Thailand and Indo-China . Douglas fir, particularly suitable
for small boat construction, was imported from the US. Other raw materials
are required in negligible quantities.
2. Finished Materials.
During the Japanese occupation a substantial amount of steel
plate was obtained from Japan proper in addition to that supplied by
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Mhnchurian mills for the operation of the Chinese shipyards. Japan
also furnished such items as steel shapes, propeller shafts, electric
motors, steering gear, and navigation equipment. Inability to procure
such items is one of the paramount reasons Why the Chinese shipbuilding
industry has been reduced to building only wooden craft. Steel plate
confiscated by Soviet authorities at Dairen at the end of the war and
shipped to Vladivostok was returned to Dairen to maintain a sufficient
supply for repair operations. In 1949, 4,800 metric tons of steel
were returned to Dairen.
The requirements for raw steel will not exceed 4,570 metric
tons for the ship construction program in 1953. The Chinese steel in-
dustry will be able to provide this amount. At the present time the
Chinese are producing sheet metal to reinforce the hulls of assault
craft and furnishing steel requirements for propeller shafts and a
limited number of marine diesel engines of low (50) horsepower. Steel
for extensive repair of Soviet shipping at Dairen reportedly is furnished
by the USSR and is estimated at 20,000 metric tons annually.
The most important finished product necessary to insure the
success of the wooden boat program is the marine diesel engine. Shanghai
is the primary producing center, and current output is estimated at not
more than 500 engines per year. 22/ Communist China has been making
vigorous efforts, therefore, to procure engines from Hong Kong, Macao,
Manila, and Japan. During 1950, 85 engines for landing craft were re-
portedly purchased in Manila, 21/ and an undetermined number of diesel
units was obtained from the USSR. To render the current output of junks
and landing craft operational, China needs approximately 3,000 marine
diesel engines ranging in capacity from 25 to 200 horsepower. In addition,
substantial quantities of nails, screws, and fittings will have to be made
available to accomplish the expected production.
3. Imports,
Dependence upon uncertain supplies of raw materials and finished
goods from abroad is a basic weakness of the Chinese economy. At the
present time, Chinese imports appear to be intended primarily to help meet
present military requirements rather than to aid the industrial development
of the country. Most basic supplies needed for heavy merchant shipbuilding
in the past were imported. By concentrating on the construction of smallwooden.
vessels, however, the Chinese Communists have eliminated the need for most
of these supplies. At present the critical import requirement is for
marine diesel engines, as is indicated by cumulative evidence of increas-
ing activity on the part of Chinese Communist purchasing missions.
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Communist China will continue to purchase large merchant
ships from abroad wherever possible.
Soviet contributions to the Chinese merchant and naval fleets. 22/
it is doubtful that the merchant marine has
received any assistance other than that provided by technical and
administrative personnel.
4. Mhnpower.
The Chinese shipbuilding and repair industry directly or in-
directly requires about 25,000 workers out of the 2,500,000 employed
in the registered industries,* or about 1 percent of the Chinese
nonagricultural labor force, excluding handicraft and coolie labor.
This amount of labor is available, but, as in most branches of
engineering in China, there is a marked deficiency of skilled workers
needed for large-scale ship production and repairs. The practice of
conscripting workers in various cities is widespread. Such labor is
generally of low quality and unskilled, with little or no mechanical
experience. The use of this conscripted labor is probably the most im-
portant single cause for the low rate of productivity in this Chinese
industry. Data on the productivity of labor in China are rare and often
inconclusive, but, generally speaking, output per man-hour is much lower
in Chins than in the West. The present official work week in the ship-
building trade is 48 hours on a one-shift basis. A considerable number
of Soviet advisers, estimated as several hundred to 2,000, is engaged
in planning and directing repairs in Chinese shipyards. In addition, an
undetermined number of Communist Army troops is employed in the yards as
an auxiliary labor force.
5. Electric Power.
Available data on Chinese shipbuilding yards do notpermit
segregation of electric power used in wooden ship construction from that
used in other construction. On the basis of comparable US experience,
however, the ratio of electric power cost to total manufacturing costs
would be the lowest Of all input factors. There is no evidence that the
electric power requirements for wooden ship construction are not being
satisfied.
* Registered industries are considered to be factories using power equip-
ment or employing 30 or more workers.
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6. Transrort.
Chinese boatbuilding and ship repair are not dependent on
the overburdened Chinese railroad system. Most shipbuilding and re-
pair materials, including motors, structural pieces, and fittings, are
shipborne through the ports of Dairen, Tsingtao, and Shanghai, and
clandestine shipments are received through Hong Kong and Macao. Huge
quantities of lumber reportedly have been floated down river to such
boatbuilding centers as Canton, Han-klou, Amoy, and Shanghai. 22/
IV. Limitations and Vulnerabllities.
1. Limitations.
Despite China's proximity to the great commercial markets of
the Far East, it does not have and never has had a merchant marine
tradition like that of Japan and certain Western nations. Therefore,
training in specialized maritime skills never has been established on
a large scale, and the lack of technical personnel is an immediate prob-
lem. The low mechanical skill of the average shipyard worker and the
unimaginativeness of Chinese industrial engineering and management have
committed present shipbuilding to traditional methods of the country,
with the resultant low volume of production. This limitation can be
partially offset only by the simplification in designs of the standard
types of ships put into production. Such simplification is at the
expense of speed and seaworthiness.
Since shipyard facilities require very sizable amounts of capi-
tal, there are no prospects for the large-scale development of Chinese
Communist shipbuilding and repair facilities in the near future. The
critical deficiency in skilled personnel is a distinct limitation to the
success of any shipbuilding program. Another factor tending to retard
the expansion of the industry is the lack of an effective electric power
network and of power generating facilities. In addition, poor administra-
tion, inadequate stockpiles, and lack of essential natural resources for
large ship construction constitute grave limitations for the Chinese ship-
building industry.
2. Vulnerabilities.
Given its present limited scope, the Chinese Communist shipbuilding
industry is not considered to be highly vulnerable to economic warfare.
Should the shortage of marine engines become more acute, the production
of hulls for naval vessels probably would be curtailed. However, inter-
national restrictions on the importation of marine engines by Communist
China would not necessarily produce this effect, in view of the possibility
that the USSR would meet the essential minimum requirements of the
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&EX -R-E.T
Chinese Communist shipbuilding industry.
From the point of view of transportation, the present
activities of the Chinese Communist shipbuilding industry are not
vulnerable either to economic warfare or to military attack, since its
transportation requirements can be met by the use of natural waterways
and with only the most primitive dock and storage facilities.
The larger coastal shipyards are vulnerable to direct military
attack. Direct military attack probably would have no serious effect
on output of the type of craft currently being constructed but would
serve to eliminate the repair facilities along the Chinese coast which
are presently available for use in emergency by naval vessels and
merchant shipping.
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APPENDIX A
SHIPYARDS AND LABOR FORCES IN
COMMUNIST CHINA il
location
Liaoning Province
Dairen (Ta-lien)
Hu-lu-tao
Sungkiang Province
Harbin (}Ih-erh-pin)
Kiangsu Province
Shanghai
Fukien Province
Shipyard
Dairen Dockyards
HU-lu,-tao Dockyards
Harbin Shipyards
Kiangnan Dockyard and
Engineering Company
Shanghai Dockyard and
Engineering Company
Kiousin Dockyard Limited
International Drydock Company
Fu-chou Government Shipyards
Amoy (Hsia-men) Amoy Shipyards
Hot:eh Province
Tientsin (rlien-ching) Tientsin Shipyards
Tlang-ku Tlang-ku Shipyards
Ta-ku Ta-ku Shipyards .
Labor Force
4,000
500
500
3,500
800
1,000
300
1,200
1,500
500
250
2,000
a. Estimates for labor represent the total labor force engaged in
shipbuilding and repair.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Kwantung Province
Canton (Kuang-chou)
Whampoa (Huang-pu)
Swatow (Shan-t I ou)
Shantung Province
Tsingtao (Ch ing-tao )
Hainan Island
Shipyard
Chinese Naval Dockyard
Company
Whampoa Shipyards
Kuang Fix Yards
Tsingtao Shipyards
Shipyard
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labor Force
1,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
200
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S-E-C-R?T
APPENDIX C.
METHODOLOGY
Generally speaking, input requirements except for labor were
derived through application of coefficients based on US inputs
for comparable types of vessels. These factors were determined
principally from information provided by the M4ritime Administra-
tion and the Deloartment of the Navy. Estimates for labor represent
the total labor force engaged in shipbuilding and ship repair and
are based on past reports of production of each shipyard as well as
reports of the total labor force employed at all yards during the
Japanese occupation.
The estimated production of wooden craft for 1953 is based on a
complete survey of building capabilities and production reports.
This estimated production when compared with that accomplished by
the Japanese in the same shipyards leads to the conclusion that such
production is within the capabilities of the yards.
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a-E-C-R-E-T
? ? ? ? ? ?
. CONTROL CHANNELS FOR SHIPBUIDING AND RELATED INDUSTRIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA (TENTArivb)
CENTRAL PEOPLES GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL PEOPLES GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE
COUNCIL
1ECONOMIC AND FINANCE COMMITTEE
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL NORTHEAST PEOPLES GOVERNMENT
NTATVL HEADQUARTERS
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES
MINISTRY OF
COMMUNICATIONS
MINISTRY OF
HEAVY INDUSTRY
BUREAU OF MECHANICAL INDUSTRIES
CENTRAL AND SOUTH
CHINA NAVAL BUREAL
'NORTHEAST CHINA
NAVAL BUREAU
SOUTHWEST CHINA
NAVAL BUREAU
REGIONAL
NAVIGATIONAL
BUREAUS
SHIPBUILDING
BUREAU
DAIREN DOCKYARDS
SHIPYARDS AND
SHIP COMPONENT PLANTS
(MERCHANT SHIPS)
SERVICES AND SUPPLY BOARDS'
SHIPYARDS
(NAVAL VESSELS)
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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