PROSPECTS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000100350001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 6, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
PROSPECTS FOR
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SUMMIT
6 January 1988
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I I
cenaal Intdll~enoe Agpxy
~n~pnaczosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 January 1988
Prospects for the Central American Summit
The Central American democracies have not yet
developed a strategy for challenging Nicaragua on
compliance with the peace accord at:~the summit meeting
on 15 January. The summit probably-.wi11 be marked by
sharp divergences with no resolution of key ambiguities
concerning compliance, simultaneity`Qf implementation,
and verification. Neither the democracies nor
Nicaragua, however, will want to interrupt the peace
process. The Presidents probably will recognize the
progress made so far, agree to meet again to reassess
compliance, and sign a treaty creating a Central
American Parliament. Such an outcome would work to the
Sandinistas' advantage in dragging out the peace
process but also could harm their interests if the
summit produces no call for an end to US aid for the
anti-Sandinista insurgents. Nevertheless, the danger
exists that new actions by Nicaragua to show
flexibility on democratization--such as the ending of
the state of emergency--would put .the democratic
presidents under .pressure to come out against a
continuation of US aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.
This~typeacript was prepared by Middle America-
Caribbean Division, Office of A rican an atin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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The meeting of Central American Presidents in San Jose on
15 January will consider a report by the International
Verification Commission on compliance with the peace accord
signed on 7 August, review a draft treaty for a regional
parliament, and make "all pertinent decisions" on the peace
process. Little progress has been made over the last three
months in resolving key ambiguities of the peace accord,
including devising standards to measure compliance with political
commitments. The democracies chose, for example, to reinterpret
the 5 November date originally conceived as the deadline for
implementation of cease-fires, democratization, and the end of
aid to insurgent groups as the beginning of a period for
implementing commitments that would be evaluated at the summit.
Central American Avproaches Toward the Peace Process
The four democracies have made. little progress toward
devising a joint strategy for the summit or thinking through the
implications of how the peace ,process may evolve. Although
officials from all four countries have complained of the lack of
unity in confronting Nicaraguan initiatives, the democracies have.
refrained from holding joint meetings--probably out of a desire
to avoid giving the appearance of forming an anti-Sandinista
bloc. The democracies probably believe that Managua's image has
been damaged by recent events--including the revelations of a
Sandinista defector, Nicaraguan stalling in cease-fire talks with
the anti-Sandinista insurgents, and statements by Sandinista
leaders that they would not cede effective power even if defeated
in fair elections--but do not see these developments as
justification for interrupting the peace process.
The democracies' hesitancy since August to push Nicaragua on
democratization reflects factors that vary from country to
country, although all probably feel constrained by the generally
favorable international response to Sandinista gestures of
flexibility. -The two leaders with the strongest inclination to
challenge the Sandinistas--Honduran President Azcona and
Salvadoran President Duarte--have said that they are unwilling to
take the lead at the summit. Both have said they are discouraged
by the}evolution of the peace process thus far, and each feels
that he alone is carrying the burden of confronting Managua.
Azcona has adopted a tough-line on the need for
democratization and for a cease-fire in Nicaragua before border
inspections verifying the end to external support to insurgents
begin, but he feels vulnerable because of Honduras'_high profile
role in assisting the anti-Sandinista rebels.
Nicaraguan peace initiatives increase
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pressure on Tegucigalpa to restrict anti-Sandinista use of
Honduran territory. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry and some
elements of the armed forces fear that the other democracies and
the United States are disposed to abandon Honduras. Recent
bilateral contacts with Managua--the dimensions of which remain
unclear--suggest Tegucigalpa may be positioning itself for an
Duarte"s preoccupation with demonstrating-that his
government is itself in compliance with the peace accord has
limited his ability to press Nicaragua, except-for continued
assertions that the Sandinistas are maintaining their-aid to the
Salvadoran rebels. Duarte-held the upper hand in direct talks
with Salvadoran insurgents--which the guerrillas broke off--and
challenged the Sandinistas to imitate his example. Nevertheless,
Duarte believes his ability to criticize the Sandinistas has been
hampered by the boycott of the Salvadoran National Reconciliation
Commission by both the rightist and leftist opposition.
Moreover, the Sandinistas' consent to indirect talks with the
Nicaraguan insurgents has undercut his efforts to press Managua
on the issue of face-to-face cease-fire talks.
Guatemalan President Cerezo, who aspires to be the
preeminent regional leader, occupies a middle ground and clearly
does not want to jeopardize the hard-earned gains of two years of
his "active neutrality" policy. While Cerezo has agreed with US
officials on the need to confront the Sandinistas on
democratization issues, his public statements have not matched
his private assurances. Cerezo, like Duarte, has steered clear
of commentary on the Nicaraguan cease-fire talks, recognizing
that support for anti-Sandinista demands would undermine his
position with the Guatemalan insurgents. Cerezo's recent
interest i.n involving Cuba in the peace process and his focus on
the regional parliament suggest less interest in pressing
Nicaragua than in devising ways to steal the limelight from Costa
Rican President Arias.
Arias had been the Sandinistas' severest public critic among
the Central American leaders but has adopted recently a less
critical posture that.has benefited Nicaragua and antagonized the
other democracies. Arias, who is determined to prevent a
collapse of the peace process that earned him the Nobel Prize,
was largely responsible for the interpretation that 5 November
should not be considered a deadline for compliance. In December,
he made a number of statements that conflicted with US positions,
suggesting a growing inclination to play the role of neutral
statesman. These included swipes at the Nicaraguan insurgents'
cease-fire proposal, indirect criticism of mediator Cardinal
Obando, opposition to US-aid to the anti-Sandinistas, and
.endorsing the notion of US-Nicaraguan bilateral talks. Moreover,
his detached perspective on the aborted Salvadoran cease-fire
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talks and his meetings with Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla
leaders showed little solidarity with Duarte and Cerezo.
Nicaragua, for its part, has attempted to influence world
opinion anti US Congressional action on aid to the anti-
Sandinistas by adopting a series of measures to show minimal
compliance with the peace accord while arguing that Managua is
not obliged to be in full compliance with the democratization
provisions until the insurgency has been dismantled. The
Sandinistas have been fairly successful at gaining maximum
publicity for partial measures that do not fundamentally
jeopardize their control--including the appointment of Obando to
head the Reconciliation Commission, selective relaxation of press
controls, the release of political prisoners, unilateral cease-
..fires, and indirect talks with the guerrillas on a highly
circumscribed agenda. In mid-December, however, the Sandinista
game-plan suffered some. setbacks when Obando supported several
aspects of the. rebel position in cease-fire talks, the opposition
walked out of the national dialogue, and Nicaraguan defector
Miranda's revelations forced the Sandinistas to confirm a planned
major military buildup. Moreover, Arias criticized a statement
by President Ortega suggesting that the Sandinistas would not
cede effective power if defeated in a free election. The
Sandinistas hope to recoup by attempting to schedule talks with
rebel Indian leader Rivera this week.
Issues at the Summit
'The summit probably will focus on compliance and.
verification--including. contending interpretations of what is
meant by "simultaneous" implementation of commitments. Nicaragua
is almost certain to try to gain a pledge from the other
democracies to oppose new US aid to the anti-Sandinistas and to
urge US-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.- The Central American
Parliament, joint appeals for economic aid, and the regional arms
balance are likely to be secondary concerns.
We believe the democracies will be reluctant to confront the
Sandinistas for not going far enough to meet the democratization
aspects of the peace accord. The report of the Verification
Commission probably will be of little help in criticizing
Nicaraguan performance, since US Embassy reports indicate the
Commission is focusing on compiling the observations of the
governments and National Reconciliation Commissions rather than
making judgments on compliance. None of the democracies has
indicated that it will enter the meeting with a predetermined
list of steps Nicaragua must take to be in compliance. The issue.
of cease-fires is a delicate one for the democracies,-and we
believe they will limit discussion to pressin Nicara a to
engage in direct talks with the rebels.
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The key issue at the summit will be simultaneity of
compliance with peace plan provisions. We expect the talks. will
quickly focus on the Sandinista contention that further
democratization measures in Nicaragua--including the complete
lifting of the state of emergency and release of-all political
prisoners--is contingent upon verification of the end of external
aid to the insurgents. Honduras-and Guatemala have opposed this
position in past meetings; E1 Salvador opposes Nicaraguan delays,
but does not want to postpone verification of the end of
Sandinista aid to the Salvadoran rebels. Even Arias says he
opposes leaving compliance open-ended, and all the democracies
probably will come prepared to discuss the adoption of new time
The mechanics of verification and what additional steps are
necessary to ready a border-monitoring observer units may-also be
discussed. Nicaragua already has indicated its willingness to
accept such observers. Although none of-the presidents
apparently intends to present a new proposal, we believe they all
would like to pursue Canadian offers of ass' is area
and could reach some preliminary decisions.
The major question remaining on the Central American
Parliament is when elections should be held and if they must take
place simultaneously in each of the countries. According to US
Embassy reporting, a draft treaty creating the parliament is
ready for signing, but follow-up efforts are necessary to secure
financing and arrange for international election observers. The
draft does not provide for adoption of common electoral rules;
and we do not expect any of the democracies to reopen that issue.
On security issues, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Ortega's
,confirmation of plans for a massive arms buildup probably will be
a topic of discussion and may impel movement towards arms control
negotiations. President Ortega will again seek to dismiss
Nicaragua's plans for a military buildup as contingent on US
actions.. The democracies probably intend to defer detailed
discussion of security issues--including foreign military-
advisers--until a meeting planned for February with the Contadora
countries. In the absence of a concrete US proposal to
participate in regional security talks, there is likely to be
little discussion of the US role.
Possible Outcomes
US Embassy reporting suggests that all parties expect the
summit to adopt a resolution taking note of the positive steps.
for peace and urging further progress. In addition; the
Presidents may schedule negotiations on security issues and
verification and agree to meet again to review compliance with
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.~i.:,~..a~c~ t
peace commitments. Agreement on the treaty for a regional
parliament would be heralded as a key break-through.
We believe the summit will be marked by sharp unresolved
differences on the problem of simultaneity, but neither the
democracies nor Nicaragua will risk interrupting the peace
process. The democracies are unlikely to declare jointly that
Nicaragua has not complied with the peace accord, although
individual Presidents probably will make public statements to
that effect. The democracies may propose that the Foreign
Ministers or the Verification Commission make a more detailed
study of criteria to evaluate whether a nation has fully
democratized. In our view, however, the democracies--left to
their own devices--are unlikely to adopt standards that would
meet US interests, and any Contadora involvement, through the
Verification Commission, will tend to make it easier for Managua
to finesse compliance.
The Sandinistas may put the democracies on the defensive by
offering what appears to be a key concession in exchange for a
joint declaration opposing US aid to the anti-Sandinistas. For
example, a Nicaraguan offer to end immediately the state of
emergency, release additional political prisoners, and send
government representatives to meet with the anti-Sandinistas may
prompt the democracies to accept the deal out of fear they
otherwise would be blamed for obstructing the peace process.
Ortega may counter accusations of continued Sandinista backing
for the Salvadoran rebels by stating his willingness to accept
on-site inspection if Honduras will do the same. Nicaragua
probably will not push for Cuban involvement in the peace talks
at this point out of fear the focus would be on Cuban aid to
regional insurgents. Nevertheless, if Cerezo or Arias raised the
possibility, Ortega might try to turn. it to Nicaragua's advantage
by coupling-the idea with an endorsement of US-Nicaraguan
bilateral talks.
Managua, on the other hand, would emerge as a clear loser at
the summit if the democracies jointly declared that Nicaragua is
the only country that has not fully complied with the peace
accord. For this to come about, we believe President Arias would
have to take the lead, and he would have to be convinced that
such a firm declaration would not end the peace process:
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mplications for the. United States
An ir~onclusive meeting probably would work to the
Sandinistas' advantage in dragging out the peace process, but
would fall short of.~Managua's desires to gain a strong
endorsement for ending US aid to the insurgents. Possible
agreement on parameters for a border monitoring force would not
immediately undermine Honduras's contention that it not be
deployed until Nicaragua democratizes. Nevertheless, over the
longer term there is some danger that progress on designing a
mechanism to verify the end of aid to the insurgents could
outstrip progress on setting up standards for political
verification, creating pressures to deploy the inspection teams.
Moreover, Tegucigalpa's cooperation with the anti-Sandinista
supply effort could be affected if it does not receive an
explicit endorsement of its position on simultaneity.
The democracies appear reluctant to make statements that
would give much political assistance to Washington on the
question of aid to the anti-Sandinistas. The press is almost
certain to focus on Arias's opposition to aid, .although he
probably will make some weak attempts to balance his statements
with observations that the decision is up to the US Congress.
Arias has moved away from his earlier position favoring sanctions
for noncompliance, and we believe that the prospect for
discussing sanctions may be even-more remote after .the summit.
The democracies probably will hold firm against Nicaraguan
attempts to promote bilateral talks with the United States,
although Arias is likely to continue to espouse his personal
opinion that such talks would be beneficial. The democracies are
receptive to a US role in multilateral talks on security issues,
but risk drifting into a situation establishing parallel sets of
talks--one with Contadora and the other with Washington. We have
seen no indications to date that the democracies are preparing a
joint arms control proposal that would force Nicaragua to cut
Finally, approval of the Central American Parliament
probably will introduce new possibilities for exploring the
Sandinistas' willingness to democratize, as well as the danger
that the opposition will not be sufficiently united to challenge
them. The democracies, however, originally planned for elections
to take place after cease-fires were reached. Altering this plan
in the name of "continuing the peace process" probably would give
the Sandinistas an opportunity to shift the focus from
negotiations-with the insurgents to the elections.
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Verification of the Peace Accord
.The Central American peace accord involves three sets of
issues, each of which presents different implications for
verification: commitments to democratize, commitments relating
to the insurgencies, and security commitments. On the national
level, the peace accord assigns verification functions to the
National Reconciliation Commissions. The International
Verification Commission--composed of the Central: Americans, the
four Contadora mediators, the four members of the Contadora
support group, and the UN and OAS Secretaries-General--is
formally charged with supervising overall verification and making
a report to the summit. The Central American democracies have
told US officials at various times that they intended that the
Verification Commission be subordinate`to them. Although this
has never been formalized, the Central American Foreign Ministers
.will exercise de facto control by reviewing the. International
Verification Commission's report on 13~January and submitting any
observations on the report to the Presidents.
Political Commitments. US Embassy reports indicate that the
International Verification Commission does not intend to exercise
independent judgment on democratization issues but to confine its
role largely to compiling the reports of the National
Reconciliation Commissions and the individual Central American
governments. There are no uniform criteria for assessing
compliance-with commitments to democratize.. Costa Rican
President Arias and, more recently, Salvadoran President Duarte
have told US officials that they intended to submit a list of
criteria to specify what political steps are considered necessary
for compliance, but neither has done so. We suspect that-the
democracies probably would not. craft a list that would fully
satisfy US interests, and the Contadora countries most likely
would 'view any detailed listing as unacceptable political
Commitments Relatina to the Insuraencies These
commitments, which include cease-fires, an end of external aid to
the insurgents, and non-use of territory by the insurgents to
carry on the war, were supposed to have entered into effect on
5 November, 90 days after the peace accord was signed. Honduras
has been the strongest adherent of the position that a border
monitoring force to verify the end of external aid to the
insurgents cannot go into effect until Nicaragua complies with
its commitments to democratize. Guatemala has actively supported
this interpretation, but E1 Salvador would. prefer that
verification begin immediately so
Salvadoran rebels could be halted.
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-The Verification Commission enlisted the aid of a UN-OAS
technical mission to help plan for the creation of a monitoring
force. The group's two reports stated that the absence of
negotiated agreements made it impossible to monitor-cease-fires
and extremely difficult to verify an end of external support for
rebels. Nevertheless, the group's second report indicates
general agreement among the governments that a monitoring force
should be small, nonmilitarized, and drawn largely from non-Latin
American countries. Independently, Canada has offered its
.assistance in designing a verification mechanism and
participating as an observer. According to US Embassy reports,
Canada believes it will require about six months to design a
mechanism and has assured US officials that its participation
presupposes the conclusion of negotiated cease-fires.
Security Issues. These issues, including arms and troop
levels, foreign military advisers, and foreign maneuvers, have
yet to be negotiated, and the Central Americans-have given no
thought to verification thus far.
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Nicaraguan Cease-Eire Talks
International pressure forced the, Sandinistas to drop
their previous opposition to-any talks with insurgents. who
.have not accepted amnesty, but there has been no
corresponding foreign pressure on the regime to move-the
negotiations forward. Several of the reasons for this
hesitancy reflect temporary factors,. but others appear more
enduring:
--Despite the disputes over venue of the talks and the
role of foreign advisers to the technical teams--and
fundamental differences over the agenda for the
negotiations--there is no general impression that
the talks have reached an impasse. Plans are
proceeding-for a third meeting, although the
insurgents oppose having it before the Central
American summit.
-- Cardinal Obando, while critical of the Sandinista
refusal to hold the cease-fire talks in Nicaragua,.
-has adopted an even-handed approach thus far and has
not denounced Sandinista intransigence. The Central
Americans and other foreigners probably are
unwilling to take a harder line than Obando, the
regime's chief. domestic opponent.
-- The peace agreement itself lends .support to the
Sandinista position that it need not discuss a wide
range of political issues during cease-fire talks.
Moreover, E1 Salvador and Guatemala do not wish to
compromise their positions in cease-fire talks with
their own insurgents. Costa Rican President Arias
has criticized publicly the anti-Sandinista
insurgents' negotiating position, probably less out
of solidarity with his democratic colleagues than in
an effort to end quickly the fighting in Nicaragua.
Despite the low level of foreign pressure on the
Sandinistas, we anticipate. that they will make additional
minor concessions over the next several months, both to
.avoid Obando's criticism and to undermine the case for new
US aid to the insurgents. The Sandinistas have already
stated their willingness to meet in Panama or Belize, and we
believe they will eventually agree to a Central American
location. According to US Embassy reports, the Nicaraguans
have agreed to-have a military .representative participate in
the technical discussions. They probably will agree at some
point to full-fledged direct meetings, possibly in
conjunction with a renewed call for bilateral talks with
Washington.. The Sandinistas appear to be trying hard to
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arrange separate talks with Miskito Indian rebel leader
Brooklyn Rivera, which they would publicize as a new gesture
of flexibility. We do not believe Nicaragua-will yield on
its opposition to discussion of political issues in cease-
fire talks, but it probably will make further unilateral
changes fo ease political restrictions and could make more
explicit offers to discuss insurgent political demands after
a cease-fire, amnesty, and the disarming of the rebels have
been accomplished.
In our view, it will be difficult for the insurgents to
gain the political initiative in the cease-fire talks in the
face of incremental-Sandinista concessions and the
unfavorable provisions of the peace plan itself.
Nevertheless, we believe the insurgents could ,improve their
position by adopting a less reactive approach and imitating
the Sandinista strategy of projecting an image of
flexibility while hammering away at consistent themes.
Obando's willingness to endorse aspects of the insurgents'
position will be the key factor in their prospects.
Secondly, the guerrillas' position is likely to be bolstered
to the extent. the Central American democracies agree to meet
with insurgent leaders, support direct negotiations with the
Sandinistas in Managua, and endorse political changes
advocated by the .anti-Sandinistas. Finally, insurgent gains
on the battlefield--as in the recent attacks in the mining
region--could have an indirect effect on the cease-fire
talks by giving the rebels a psychological edge.
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6 January 1988
President Duarte's Views on Nicaragua
Attitudes Toward the Anti-Sandinistas
President Duarte has long viewed the Nicaraguan rebels
primarily as an effective distraction for the Sandinistas, forcing
them to focus their attention and resources on counterinsurgency
operations rather than exporting revolution to El Salvador.
Neither he nor the High Command believes the anti-Sandinistas could
overthrow the regime, but both feel that insurgent pressure might
eventually force Managua to make democratic reforms. In signing
the peace plan, however, Duarte committed himself to the principle
that outside aid to insurgencies should end. Nevertheless, he has
been willing to support covert assistance to the insurgents, such
as allowing Radio Liberacion to broadcast from E1 Salvador. 25X1
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Willingness to Support the Anti-Sandinistas
While privately supportive of the Nicaraguan rebels, Duarte
has always been reluctant to support them openly, fearing that to
do so would legitimize Sandinista support for his own insurgency.
Revelations in 1986 that his military was providing some logistics
support for the anti-Sandinistas was politically-damaging--
suggesting the armed forces were acting without presidential
knowledge or authority--and cost him some international
credibility. Under current conditions, it is unlikely he would
publicly support continued aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents.
Willingness to Press the Sandinistas on Compliance
While publicly critical of the pace of democratic reforms in
Nicaragua, Duarte is unlikely to endanger the peace plan by hinging
its future on immediate compliance by Managua. He probably
believes that the potential gains--including enhancing the
legitimacy of his government and f-orcing Managua to end its support
for the Salvadoran guerrillas--are sufficient to avoid, for the
moment, derailing the peace process. Duarte would be especially
reluctant to call for Nicaraguan compliance without the full
support of the other Central American democracies, and he is
unlikely to take the lead for fear of being tarred as Washington's
agent.
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Factors That Could Make Duarte More Willing to Press Nicaragua
-- Evidence of significantly increased Sandinista support to
the Salvadoran insurgents.
-- Agreement by Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica that the
peace plan had failed due to lack of Nicaraguan compliance
and their guarantee to back Duarte in an open indictment of
Managua.
-- Direct linkage of continued U5 military assistance to his
support for the anti-Sandinistas.
--.Salvadoran military insistence that support for the
Nicaraguan insurgency is the linchpin for succe
counterinsurgency operations in E1 Salvador.
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6 January 1988
President Cerezo"s Views on Nicaragua
Attitude Toward the Anti-Sandinistas
President Cerezo does not believe the Nicaraguan rebels can
topple the Sandinista regime and has expressed doubts that the
United States can maintain consistent backing for the rebels.
Cerezo is convinced that military pressure is _counterproductive
for inducing political change in Nicaragua and, instead,
advocates negotiation and diplomatic pressure as the best means
of moderating Nicaraguan behavior. Although most Guatemalans
believe Nicaragua poses a security threat to the fledging
regional democracies, they do not feel they are on the Nicaraguan
"front line," making it unlikely that Guatemala City would openly
align itself with US policy.
Willingness to Support the Anti-Sandinistas
Cerezo and other high level Guatemalans privately voice
their support for broad US goals in Central America, including
the need for democracy in Nicaragua, but they avoid statements
supportive of US military pressure on Managua. Cerezo--intent on
portraying himself as the leading regional peacebroker--is
concerned that any public statements supporting US military
pressure on Managua would violate his policy of active neutrality
and possibly encourage Nicaragua to increase aid to the
Guatemalan insurgents. Nevertheless, he has refrained from
criticizing US policy--he did not, for example, back President
Arias's call in September for an end to all US assistance to the
rebels--in part to maintain good relations with Washington. He
also wants to assure his own military that his neutrality is not
overly accommodating toward the Sandinistas, and he has been
willing to permit meetings of the anti-Sandinista political
leadership in Guatemala.
Willingness to Press the Sandinistas on Compliance
Cerezo has avoided pressing Nicaragua on key issues .of
compliance with the peace plan in order to prevent a breakdown of
the peace process and keep Nicaragua engaged in talks. Although
Cerezo might publicly call on Managua to democratize if joined by
the other Central American presidents, he is unlikely to take a
hard line on specific measures--such as urging the Sandinistas to
enter into direct talks with the Nicaraguan rebels or to lift the
state of emergency--because he fears such action would increase
pressure on him to engage his own insurgents in a dialogue.
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25X1
Factors That Might Make Cerezo More Willing to Press Managua
-- Managua demonstrates absolute intransigence on compliance
with the peace accords and there is widespread
international denunciation of Nicaragua. '
-- Proof that Nicaragua is increasing assistance to the
Guatemalan rebels, or, to a lesser extent, Guatemalan
certainty that Nicaraguan aid would lead to a victory for
the insurgents in neighboring E1 Salvador.
-- Pressure by his military, which, in the wake of the recent
Miranda revelations, is increasingly concerned about the
consolidation of the Sandinista regime and convinced that
prospects for increased US military aid for Guatemala are
linked to Cerezo's Nicaraguan policy. 25X1
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6 January 1988
President Azcona"s Views on Nicaragua
Attitudes Toward the Insurgents
President Azcona supports the anti-Sandinista insurgents
primarily out of a deep sense of loyalty to the United States, and he
expects to be rewarded for backing US policy. Although Azcona
privately would like to see the anti-Sandinista insurgents prevail, he
is too weak politically to commit Honduras to open-ended support of
the rebels and looks to his military to determine policy on this
issue. Rebel use of Honduran territory during the .last two years for
resupply, training, and command-and-control activities has created
some political and security problems for the President_ Moreover,
Azcona is worried that his government's aid to the insurgents is
underming support for Honduras in the U5 Congress.
Willingness to Support the Anti-Sandinistas
Azcona adheres to a longstanding Honduran position of denying any
official role in aiding the insurgents and is unwilling to take the
lead in publicly asking Washington to continue funding-the anti-
Sandinistas. For example, despite promising Ambassador Briggs he
would publicly request continued funding for-the insurgents during his
October visit to the US, Azcona told US legislators and journalists
that no lethal aid should be provided until after the Central American
summit. Although he has publicly characterized the insurgent cause as
just, he is careful to describe it as internal Nicaraguan-matter that
must be solved by Nicaraguans. There is a consensus among Honduran
leaders that Tegucigalpa has carried a disproportionate share of the
burden in helping the insurgents and. that the other Central American
democracies must be actively support calls for additional aid.
Willingness to Press the Sandinistas on Compliance
Azcona is unwilling to take the lead in accusing the Sandinistas
of not complying with the peace plan--given his country's role in
harboring insurgent base camps--but he would support a joint
condemnation if Guatemala and El Salvador spoke out first. At the
same time, Azcona insists Honduras does not have to comply with the
plan until Nicaragua fulfills its obligations. The President fears
that unilateral Honduran pressure on Nicaragua could backfire and
leave Tegucigalpa in the uncomfortable position of having to defend
its covert policy of aiding the anti-Sandinista rebels. During the
last two years, for example, Azcona has refused to denounce the
Sandinistas for military incursions into Honduras in order to avoid
.having to admit that their were rebel camps in his country. As
recently as October, Azcona denied US re nests to publicize Sandinista
bombing of Honduran territory. 25X1
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P.T/1TTT
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Factors That Could Make Azcona More Willing to Press Nicaragua
-- Guatemala and E1 Salvador agree to take the lead in
accusing Nicaragua of failing to comply with the peace
plan.
-- Concrete assurances from Washington--including a
bipartisan Congressional commitment--that aid levels
would not be reduced if Honduras takes the lead in
pressing Nicaragua.
-- A US commitment to take responsibility for resettling
anti-Sandinista insurgents.
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6 January 1988
President Arias"s Views on Nicaragua
Attitudes Toward the Anti-Sandinistas
Costa Rican President Arias is convinced the Nicaraguan
rebels cannot oust the Sandinistas militarily and believes the
fighting provides a justification for continued Nicaraguan
repression and poses a long-term threat to Costa Rica itself. He
has attempted to reduce tensions with Managua since taking office
by prohibiting rebel military activity in Costa Rican territory
and placing new restrictions on insurgent political leaders as
well. Arias has long publicly opposed aid to the Nicaraguan
insurgents, and recently indicated that nonlethal aid was
contrary to the spirit of the Central American peace accord,
despite past assurances to Washington that he did riot oppose such
aid.
Willingness to Support the Anti-Sandinistas
Arias is unlikely to make public or private statements
supporting the Nicaraguan rebels at this stage of the peace
process, believing that his neutral stance has greatly advanced
Costa Rican policy interests. Efforts to bolster his image as an
"honest broker" has led Arias to make statements damaging to the
rebel cause. For example, he recently denounced the insurgents'
cease-fire proposal, saying it was impossible for Nicaragua to
agree to .such excessive demands. He did not balance his remarks
with similar criticism of Managua's proposal, which calls for a
virtual surrender of the rebels without guaranteed
democratization.
Willingness to Press the Sandinistas on Compliance
While Arias is sensitive to public criticism, his desire to
reaffirm Costa Rican neutrality and his reluctance to declare the
peace accord a failure probably makes him unwilling to focus
attention on Sandinista intransigence at the January summit.
Arias has publicly downplayed the revelations of Nicaraguan
defector Miranda on Managua's plans to bomb Costa Rican territory
in the event of a US invasion.
His heavy policy investment in the peace plan may
move him to push to keep the process alive even in-the face of
growing Nicaraguan intransigence.
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Factors That Could Make Arias More Willing to Press Nicaragua
-- Flagrant evidence of Sandinista noncompliance combined
with unanimous support from the three other Central
American countries.
-- Widespread public charges that targeted Arias as the most
sympathetic to the Sandinistas of the Central American
leaders, including allegations which questioned Arias's
preeminent role as regional peacemaker..
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