OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000200330001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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SEb2FT
NIE 53-54
19 October 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 53-54
OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following organizations participated in the preparation
of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY commirrEE
on 19 October. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
0-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic En-
ergy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant
to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan's internal affairs and exter-
nal relations over the next few years in the light of: (1) Soviet policy respecting
Afghanistan, and (2) the impact of Western-sponsored efforts to strengthen the
surrounding area.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Afghanistan is a primitive tribal king-
dom with a heterogeneous population and
with undeveloped economic resources. Al-
though the royal family, which complete-
ly controls the government, is not very
popular among the Afghans, it can prob-
ably meet any internal challenge to its
authority in the foreseeable future. In
general, the Afghan armed forces are of
poor quality. They are capable of main-
taining internal security, provided there
are no simultaneous widespread tribal
uprisings, but would quickly disintegrate
as an organized force against outside
aggression.
2. Afghanistan is confronted with a
shortage of foreign exchange needed for
economic development and for certain es-
sential imports. This shortage may be-
come critical in the next three years.
However, the Afghan economy is largely
self-sufficient in foodstuffs, and if it is
able to surmount its foreign exchange
difficulties, Afghanistan's longer-term
economic prospects including economic
development on a modest scale, will be
reasonably good.
3. The strategic significance of Afghan-
istan is as a buffer state, separating the
USSR on the north from non-Communist
Pakistan and India to the south, but it-
self dominated by neither the Communist
nor the non-Communist power bloc. Af-
ghanistan's proximity to the USSR, its
remoteness from centers of Western
strength, its military weakness, and its
growing reliance on the USSR for trade
and loans with technical assistance make
it highly vulnerable to Soviet pressures.
4. Soviet attentions to Afghanistan, par-
ticularly in the form of technical and eco-
nomic assistance, have increased marked-
ly within the last year. We believe that
these attentions are part of a general
effort to counter Western gains elsewhere
in the Middle East-South Asia area and
that they are likely to increase substan-
tially. The Soviet reaction would be par-
ticularly strong if Afghanistan's own par-
ticipation in a Western-backed defense
arrangement or its acceptance of substan-
tial Western military aid appeared to be
in prospect.
5. Soviet economic penetration may well
result in a gradual drift of Afghanistan
toward the Soviet orbit. Moreover, the
influx of Soviet personnel in connection
with Soviet economic and technical aid
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greatly enhances Soviet subversive capa-
bilities. However, we do not believe that
the USSR will actually gain control of
Afghanistan, at least within the next few
years. It is unlikely that the now negli-
gible pro-Communist element within Af-
ghanistan can gain sufficient strength to
overthrow the regime in the foreseeable
future. The USSR could easily take over
Afghanistan if it chose to do so, but open-
ly aggressive action against Afghanistan
would almost certainly entail anti-Soviet
reactions elsewhere, particularly in the
Arab-Asian bloc, which the USSR would
wish to avoid.
6. The Afghan Government is likely to
continue with its fundamental policy of
attempting to play off the great powers
to Afghanistan's advantage, meanwhile
continuing its association with the Arab-
Asian bloc in the UN.
7. Afghan leaders will attempt to obtain
additional Western economic aid to
counterbalance that received from the
USSR and will probably display continu-
ing interest in the idea of participating
in Western-backed military aid programs.
However, it is unlikely that the Afghans
would actually accept membership in a
I. BACKGROUND AND PRESENT
CONDITIONS
2
Western-backed area defense arrange-
ment since they almost certainly realize
that no foreseeable arrangement could
furnish them sufficiently realistic protec-
tion against Soviet attack to compensate
for the increased Soviet hostility toward
them which would almost certainly ensue.
8. At the same time, Afghanistan will
probably continue to accept Soviet aid
offers. In doing so, Afghan leaders may
misjudge their ability to curb Soviet po-
litical and subversive activity connected
with economic development, and may fail
to recognize the limitations on the ability
and willingness of the Western Powers to
assist them in the event of a military or
diplomatic crisis.
9. Chances for an improvement in Pak-
istan-Afghanistan relations, now domi-
nated by the Afghan-instigated Push-
tunistan controversy, are poor. There
has actually been some discussion in Pak-
istan and Afghan official circles of some
form of union or confederation between
the two countries. However, because of
basic internal complications and almost
certain Soviet and Indian opposition, it
is extremely unlikely that such a merger
will take place.'
DISCUSSION
ever, US interests may be substantially af-
fected by developments respecting Afghani-
stan because: (a) it is flanked by states which
the US is seeking to strengthen against the
Soviet threat; (b) its weakness and remote-
ness from centers of Western strength make
it highly vulnerable to Soviet moves, and
thus a likely point for Soviet pressures against
Western interests in the general area; and
(c) it lies between the USSR and the subcon-
tinent of India and Pakistan.
Afghanistan's Strategic Importance and
International Position
10. Afghanistan's primitive economy, unde-
veloped resources, negligible military capabil-
ities, and lack of useful strategic facilities
severely restrict its positive value to either
side in the East-West power struggle. How-
See paragraphs 43-44. Other than is stated
therein, the feasibility and consequences of such
a merger are beyond the scope of this estimate.
11. During the nineteenth century, Afghani-
stan became a focal point of conflict between
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the Russian and British Empires, since it lay
in the path of Russia's drive to expand south-
ward toward India. The British accordingly
came to favor Afghanistan's development as
a buffer state, with a reasonably strong gov-
ernment which in its own interests would
oppose Russian expansion. By the latter
part of the century, Afghanistan had come
under a strong ruler and Britain had gained
control of Afghan foreign policy. After 1885,
Afghanistan's buffer role was strengthened
when its previously ill-defined borders were
delimited by joint commissions. In 1907,
Russia and Britain confirmed its buffer status
when Russia agreed that it lay outside the
Russian sphere of influence, in return for
which Britain pledged noninterference in
Afghan territory and internal affairs.
12. Thus for almost a century, Afghanistan's
security and internal independence depended
on the fact that neither Russia nor Britain
could afford to permit its seizure by the other.
As a result, Afghanistan's foreign policy,
after it gained control of its external relations
in 1919, became one of balancing British and
Russian influence. World War II and the
British withdrawal from India in 1947, how-
ever, radically altered the balance of power
which had supported Afghanistan's inde-
pendent status. The replacement of British
power in the subcontinent by two relatively
weak states, Pakistan and India, deprived
Afghanistan of its traditional support from
the south. In the absence of counterbalanc-
ing power, Afghanistan is extremely vulner-
able to Soviet pressures.
13. Partly because of this position Afghani-
stan has taken a neutralist position in the
present East-West conflict. It is a member of
the Arab�Asian bloc in the UN and has fre-
quently abstained from controversies between
the Soviet Bloc and the West. It has wel-
comed Soviet as well as US and UN assistance
in its development program. While leading
Afghans are believed in general to favor the
West and to regard the USSR with distrust,
they are aware that they are in no position
to disregard the attitude of such a strong
neighboring power. In general, they con-
tinue to seek maximum advantage for Af-
3
ghanistan from balancing the interests of the
two great power blocs.
The Pushtunistan Controversy with
Pakistan
14. The replacement of British power along
Afghanistan's southeast flank by a weak na-
tion of initially uncertain stability also en-
couraged a revival of Afghan interest in the
territories and peoples it had previously lost
to the British. Although Afghanistan has
laid no formal claim to territory in what is
now Pakistan, it has never fully accepted
Pakistan's assumption of the old Durand Line
as its boundary with Afghanistan and has
demanded ever since Pakistan's establishment
that the latter's approximately five million
Pushtu-speaking Pathan tribesmen, originally
part of what is still the dominant tribal group
in Afghanistan, be given an autonomous state
of their own, Pushtunistan. Afghanistan's
original motives in sponsoring the Pushtuni-
stan cause are still not completely clear, and
its efforts to stir up support among the tribes-
men themselves have had only limited success.
However, Afghanistan has persisted in its
campaign to the extent that by now the Push-
tunistan issue has become an issue of national
prestige with a momentum of its own.
15. Although Afghanistan's demand for Push-
tunistan is a major theme of its foreign policy,
the proposal has never been exactly defined.
Afghan propaganda varies widely in its treat-
ment of the territorial extent of the proposed
state and what its relations to Pakistan and
Afghanistan should be. Pakistan refuses to
discuss any question involving its territorial
integrity. It takes the position, which is
largely supported by the available evidence,
that Pakistan has succeeded to all British
rights east of the Durand Line and that the
Pathan tribes are satisfied with maintaining
the same relation to Pakistan as they had
with British India. The Pathan tribes them-
selves receive subsidies and inducements from
one side or the other and, hence, though the
tribes themselves are not particularly in
favor of the Pushtunistan state, they have an
interest in seeing the controversy continue.
Various efforts by third parties, including the
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US in 1950, to bring about a settlement have
foundered on the unwillingness of either side
to recede from its basic position.
16. Afghanistan refuses to enter formal nego-
tiations with Pakistan over common problems
unless Pushtunistan is on the agenda. Al-
though some leading Afghans profess a desire
to see the dispute closed, Prime Minister
Daud is perhaps the most ardent advocate
of Pushtunistan among the royal family. The
tempo of propaganda from Kabul has been
stepped up again in recent months. At jirgas
(tribal assemblages) , tribal leaders have been
promised that the government will continue
to seek the separate Pathan state and the
government-controlled Afghan press main-
tains a barrage of Pushtunistan propaganda.
Internal Conditions
17. Socio-political. Afghanistan's population,
variously estimated at eight to 12 million, is
largely engaged in agriculture and animal
husbandry. Perhaps as much as one-third of
the people are nomadic or seminomadic, and
the tribal system is still strong. Communi-
cations are poor, and there are few urban
concentrations, the capital city of Kabul with
a population of something over 200,000 being
the largest. In common with other underde-
veloped countries of the Middle East and
South Asia, Afghan society consists of a vast
majority engaged in primitive agricultural
and pastoral pursuits; a much thinner layer
of small landowners, petty traders, lesser
tribal leaders, and a few urban shopkeepers,
professional men, and government employees;
and a very small elite (probably not more
than two thousand) comprising the royal
family, big landowners, the principal tribal
leaders, large-scale traders, and wealthy busi-
nessmen.
18. As a result of the many invasions and
migrations which have traversed the area, the
Afghan population is ethnically heterogen-
eous and the various groups have little in
common beyond adherence to Islam. Loy-
alty to the tribe, clan, or family is usually
stronger than loyalty to the nation. There is
a lack of national spirit and a general dislike
of the central government. National con-
4
sciousness is further weakened by the fact
that many of the tribes near Afghanistan's
borders are ethnically akin to similar groups
in adjacent areas of the USSR, Iran, and
Pakistan.2 The dominant ethnic-linguistic
group, both numerically and politically, is
composed of the Pathan tribes (also called
Pushtun and "true Afghans") , which are con-
centrated in southern and eastern Afghani-
stan. Afghanistan's ruling oligarchy stems
from the principal Afghan Pathan tribe.
Other ethnic groups, such as the Tajik,
Hazara, Uzbek, Turkomen, and Nuristani,
have little or no political power in Afghan-
istan and for the most part have been forced
to accept a second class status within the
nation.
19. The government, ostensibly a constitution-
al monarchy, is actually an autocratic oli-
garchy tightly controlled by the royal family.
There are no political parties, and the mem-
bers of the royal family, who occupy the top
positions in the government, also maintain
their hold on the government machinery
through appointment of lesser officials, fla-
grantly rigged elections to the rubber stamp
legislature, complete state control of news-
papers and other media of communication,
and a large degree of state monopoly over the
economy. While disputes do occasionally
occur within the ruling family, they are
normally settled within the group.
20. Although the royal family is apparently
not very popular among Afghans, in recent
years there has been no serious challenge to
its position. It maintains control of the prin-
cipal Pathan ("true Afghan") tribes, who con-
stitute the most likely internal threat to the
central government, by a combination of sub-
sidies, use of the armed forces, and exploita-
tion of tribal rivalries. The three changes of
prime ministers which have occurred within
the last decade, the most recent being the
accession of Prince Daud in September 1953,
have been effected peacefully within the
family councils. Daud is not well-liked per-
sonally, and some of his policies have incurred
2 An accompanying map indicates the location of
the principal ethnic groups in Afghanistan and
related groups in adjacent states.
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the resentment of influential elements in Af-
ghanistan. He is probably less favorably dis-
posed toward the West than most Afghan
leaders and he, along with Finance Minister
Malik, who is the other key figure in the
present regime, is largely responsible for the
current policy of accepting closer economic
relations with the USSR. He has also fostered
a trend toward increasing government intru-
sion into economic activity. These views
have aroused some resentment among other
members of the royal family and among
trading and commercial circles. In addition,
certain of Daud's projected tribal policies �
notably his efforts to subject the previously
exempt Pathan tribes to taxes and military
conscription � have had to be withdrawn at
least temporarily in the face of strong tribal
opposition. Daud and Malik probably receive
the support of a group of young intellec-
tuals � many of whom have been trained
abroad � who form the second echelon of the
government services.
21. The only political forces of consequence
other than the Pathan tribes and the ruling
oligarchy are the wealthy urban merchants
and traders and the religious leaders (mul-
lahs). Religious opposition to King Amanul-
lah's attempts at sweeping modernization in
the late 1920's was the primary factor in a
successful revolt against him, and indicates
the potential of the religious leaders as a
check on modern reforms. Some merchant
and trading interests with large financial re-
sources are influential in urban areas but
would probably assume political importance
only in combination with army, tribal, or re-
ligious leaders. While certain minority tribal
elements and some young reformists in Kabul
and provincial cities are probably dissatisfied
with the regime, they are not united and have
little opportunity to make their influence felt.
22. Economic. Although much of its total
area is wasteland, Afghanistan's agricultural
and pastoral economy is normally self-suffi-
cient in basic foodstuffs, except for sugar. In
the past, foreign trade has not been of major
importance to the Afghan economy, which has
depended on external sources to only a limited
degree. With growing Afghan desires for eco-
5
nomic development, foreign exchange require-
ments have expanded with a consequent in-
crease in the significance of foreign trade.
Afghanistan's major export and foreign ex-
change earner has long been karakul (Persian
lamb) skins, but cotton has increased in im-
portance and, with recent declines in karakul
sales, may replace the latter as the principal
export article. Other exports are wool, fruits,
and nuts. Major imports are sugar, tea,
cotton cloth and other manufactured con-
sumer goods, petroleum products and materi-
als needed for development.
23. Sixty to seventy percent of Afghan foreign
trade is with non-Soviet Bloc countries. Until
very recently, the US was the largest pur-
chaser of Afghan exports, chiefly karakul
skins, with the Soviet Union, India, and Pak-
istan ranking next in order. Principal sources
of imports are the Soviet Union, India, the
US, and West Germany, in that order. In the
past few years, however, as a result of a sharp
decline in karakul sales to the US and a con-
current rise in barter trade with the USSR,
the Soviet Union probably now ranks near the
US as a leading market for Afghan goods and
is easily the largest single exporter to Afghani-
stan. Soviet trade now constitutes between
30 and 40 percent of Afghanistan's total legal
trade. The USSR's willingness to engage in
barter trade is particularly attractive to Af-
ghanistan at this time because of its foreign
exchange difficulties arising out of the de-
pressed karakul skin market. In addition,
prices charged by the USSR for commodities
needed by Afghanistan are low, and, especially
for northern Afghanistan, the USSR is the
most accessible market and source of supplies.
24. Afghanistan's most serious economic prob-
lem results from its dependence for foreign
exchange on the export of karakul skins to
the West, chiefly the US. Postwar overstock-
ing of karakul in the US, reduced demand,
and increased competition from South Africa
have led to a sharp decline in Afghanistan's
karakul sales to the US (from a high of $16
million in 1949 to around $10.5 million in
1953). Afghan foreign exchange reserves,
mostly dollars, have consequently dwindled to
less than $2 million from a total of more than
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$13 million in 1951. This decrease in foreign
exchange receipts has reduced Afghanistan's
ability to import essential cloth, sugar, tea,
and gasoline from sources other than the
USSR. It has also adversely affected the de-
velopment of private cotton and textile pro-
duction, which would help Afghanistan to-
ward self-sufficiency. The loss of foreign
exchange from karakul has been partly offset
by increased cotton sales to Germany and
other countries, as well as barter arrange-
ments with the USSR. Moreover, the govern-
ment has some $47 million in gold and silver
reserves on which it could draw. However,
the over-all exchange position is not good.
25. Economic development in Afghanistan
was undertaken on a very small scale in the
1930's and has been accelerated since World
War II. The two major objectives of the cur-
rent program are the irrigation and reclama-
tion under government auspices of the Hel-
mand Valley in southwest Afghanistan, and
the construction of small industrial plants,
such as cotton mills, aimed at reducing the
country's dependence on external trade and
conserving foreign exchange for development
purposes. Heretofore, private enterprise car-
ried out much of the development of small
industries but the Daud regime favors a statist
economy in which private enterprise will play
a small role. Afghanistan is heavily depend-
ent upon outside loans and technical assist-
ance for its development. Loans totalling
almost $40 million from the Export-Import
Bank have been made for the Helmand Valley
program and much of the work has been done
by a US engineering firm; in addition the US
has supplied more than $5 million in develop-
ment assistance and technical aid. Within
the last year, the USSR has made a series of
offers to Afghanistan of economic loans and
technical assistance for development purposes.
It has also sought to participate in the small
UN technical assistance program for Afghani-
stan. So far, Afghanistan has reportedly ac-
cepted over $6 million in Soviet loans for
development with accompanying technical
assistance. In addition, Afghanistan received
in September 1954 a $5 million credit from
Czechoslovakia.
6
26. Military. The Afghan armed forces, total-
ling about 65,000, consist of the Royal Afghan
Army (about 45,000) , the Royal Gendarmerie
(about 20,000) , and the small Air Force (about
30 aircraft). The greater part of the armed
forces are located in tribal areas in eastern
and southern Afghanistan and in Kabul.
These dispositions reflect the primary missions
of the armed forces, which are to defend the
government against tribal uprisings and to
maintain internal security in the more
troublesome tribal areas, chiefly among the
Pathans. In general, the Afghan armed forces
are of poor quality. They are capable of
maintaining internal security, provided there
were no simultaneous widespread tribal up-
risings, but would quickly disintegrate as an
organized force against outside aggression.
II. PROBABLE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
27. Socio-political. The primitive, personal-
ized nature of the Afghan Government makes
political stability somewhat uncertain. How-
ever, in the absence of strong external subver-
sive interference, present indications are that
the royal family can probably meet any likely
challenge to its control of Afghanistan in the
foreseeable future. While disputes within the
royal family may be expected to recur, and
changes of prime ministers are quite possible,
there is no indication that the present method
of settling these matters will be altered. Prime
Minister Daud's removal in the near future is
not expected. The possibility should be noted,
however, that Daud, an unusually strong-
willed and ambitious official, might forcibly
resist an attempt by other members of the
oligarchy to oust him.
28. In any event, a change of prime ministers
would not substantially alter present internal
and external policies, although there might be
some weakening in the present trends toward
a statist economy and toward expanded eco-
nomic ties with the USSR. Those politically
active members of the royal family who
happen at any time to be out of office, and
who therefore constitute a sort of opposition,
do not differ significantly in their basic views
of policy from those in authority. A coup by
leading Afghans other than members of the
royal family might have initial success, but
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unless it had firm army and tribal support,
and was not opposed by the religious leaders,
its success would probably be short-lived. As
far as is known, no group has such support.
29. A military coup is not likely. Tradition-
ally the army has been loyal to the King.
However, in the unlikely event of Daud initi-
ating a contest for power with the King,
Daud's long and close association with the
military as Minister of War and the numerous
changes made among top-ranking officers
since he became Prime Minister probably
would enable him to obtain the support of the
army.
30. Prime Minister Daud or any member of
the royal family will probably move very
cautiously in order to avoid open conflict with
the tribes. A concerted uprising of the major
tribes is not expected, although Pathan tribal
discontent in the Southern Province is con-
siderable and isolated rebellions are possible.
The armed forces are capable of handling such
minor tribal disturbances.
31. We have no evidence of the existence of a
Communist party in Afghanistan, and the
number of Communist sympathizers is be-
lieved to be very small. The minority tribal
elements near the Soviet border in northern
Afghanistan, many of whom are ethnically
akin to groups in the USSR, offer opportuni-
ties for Communist subversion. One neutral-
izing factor, however, is that a substantial
number of the northern tribal people are refu-
gees who fled from Soviet oppression in Cen-
tral Asia in the 1920's and 1930's.
32. Economic. Afghanistan's short-range eco-
nomic prospects are darkened by the current
depression in the karakul market. The re-
sulting shortage of foreign exchange will prob-
ably continue to hinder such industrial devel-
opment as the cotton textile industry and will
increase the difficulties of servicing the ex-
ternal debt. By 1957, when the external debt
burden will be heaviest, a serious foreign ex-
change crisis is possible. In these circum-
stances, Afghanistan's need for barter trade
may increase its vulnerability to economic
threats and inducements from the USSR.
33. However, if Afghanistan is successful in
meeting these immediate problems, and sets
7
reasonable limits on foreign borrowing for its
economic development, its longer-range eco-
nomic prospects will be reasonably good.
Some improvements in karakul production
have been initiated, although the benefits will
not be realized for several years and Afghani-
stan will continue to be vulnerable to fluctua-
tions in the karakul market in the foreseeable
future. The development of a local cotton
textile industry, although proceeding more
slowly than was hoped, should within the next
few years release several million dollars now
annually spent on piece goods imports. In
addition, the production of raw cotton may be
expected to increase sufficiently to permit a
gradual rise in export. Finally, the recent
Export-Import Bank loan will probably allow
completion of the important Helmand Valley
project in the next few years. Barring un-
predictable catastrophes, food production, ex-
cept for sugar, will probably continue to be
sufficient for local consumption.
III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET-
AFGHAN RELATIONS
34. Since about mid-1953, and particularly
after the signing of the Turk-Pakistani agree-
ment in early 1954, Soviet attentions to Af-
ghanistan have markedly increased. As noted
above, the USSR has made substantial offers
of economic and technical assistance and has
considerably improved its trade position in
Afghanistan.
35. We believe that this increased Soviet at-
tention to Afghanistan is part of a general
effort to counter recent Western (particularly
US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area.
With regard to Afghanistan itself, Soviet ob-
jectives probably remain those of: (a) limiting
Western influence and especially preventing
the development of Western military facilities
in the country; (b) maintaining the Afghan
Government's responsiveness to Soviet pres-
sures and influences; (c) building up Soviet
subversive capabilities within Afghanistan;
and (d) developing facilities that would be
useful in the event of a decision to invade the
Indian subcontinent.
36. Nevertheless, the USSR almost certainly
views the cumulative effects over the last year
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of the Turk-Pakistani agreement, the initia-
tion of military aid programs for Pakistan and
Iraq, the strengthening of the Western posi-
tion in Iran, and the settlement of the Suez
dispute as a setback for Soviet interests in
southwest Asia. In this situation Afghani-
stan, with its extreme military weakness, its
already great economic dependence on the
USSR, and its strategic location athwart the
"northern tier" defense line which the US is
attempting to develop, offers the USSR a con-
venient arena for countermeasures designed
to discourage nearby states from further co-
operation in Western defense programs and
to offset Western gains in the area.
37. Soviet efforts to exploit the situation in
Afghanistan will almost certainly continue.
At least initially, the USSR is likely to con-
tinue to emphasize a soft policy of economic
and other inducements, which serve the dual
purpose of demonstrating to Afghanistan's
neighbors the value of cooperation with the
USSR and of building up Soviet power and
influence within Afghanistan. If the threat
to Soviet interests in the area grows, however,
the USSR is likely to turn increasingly to
pressure tactics. If Iran should show signs
of preparing to join a Western-oriented de-
fense system, the USSR might consider a
show of strength not only against Iran but
also against Afghanistan. This show of
strength might take the form of diplomatic
and economic pressures backed up by military
moves along the borders. While the USSR
will in any event continue to discourage
Afghan acceptance of increased Western in-
fluence and activity in the country, it would
bring particularly strong pressure to prevent
Afghan participation in any Western-backed
defense arrangement or acceptance of sub-
stantial Western military aid. The Soviet-
Afghan Treaty of 1931, which binds each
party to refrain from undertaking or assisting
any actions prejudicial to the interests of the
others would provide strong legal backing to
such pressure.3
38. Thus the outlook is for continuing Soviet
penetration of Afghanistan's economic and
other internal affairs. Afghan leaders will
The text of this treaty appears in the Appendix.
almost certainly seek to place some limit on
the growth of Soviet power and influence over
their country and will endeavor to obtain
counterbalancing Western economic and
other support. However, they will find it dif-
ficult to resist the economic advantages of
Soviet offers of assistance. They probably
overestimate their ability to curb the growth
of Soviet political influence and subversive
activity in connection with economic cooper-
ation programs, and may fail to recognize the
limitations on the ability of the Western Pow-
ers to come to their assistance in the event
of a military or diplomatic crisis. Soviet eco-
nomic penetration may well result in a grad-
ual draft of Afghanistan toward the Soviet
orbit.
39. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the
USSR will actually gain control of Afghan-
istan, at least within the next few years.
Communist subversive capabilities will be in-
creased by continuing Soviet penetration of
Afghan economic life and the accompanying
introduction of Soviet personnel. However, it
is unlikely that the now negligible pro-Com-
munist element within Afghanistan can gain
sufficient strength within the next few years
to overthrow the regime. The USSR could
readily reduce Afghanistan to satellite status
by more or less open means: through over-
throw of the present dynasty or establishment
of a puppet regime in northern Afghanistan,
utilizing guerrillas from across the border as
well as disaffected and venal tribesmen;
through demands for military bases on
Afghan territory; and through open military
aggression. Under present circumstances,
however, Moscow would probably be reluctant
to engage in such openly aggressive tactics
lest it thereby alarm the neutralists of the
Middle East and South Asia and encourage
them to draw closer to the West. Physical
occupation of the country would offer few if
any strategic advantages to the USSR. Even
in the event of a general war, Afghanistan
would probably be taken over only as part of
a Communist invasion of the Indian subcon-
tinent. Our present estimate is that such an
invasion would probably not be undertaken,
at least in the early stages of general war.
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IV. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHAN
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
40. The chances for an improvement in
Pakistan-Afghan relations, now dominated by
the Pushtunistan controversy, are poor.
Afghan agitation of the issue is likely to con-
tinue, particularly while Daud continues as
prime minister. While most other nations
oppose the Afghan proposal, covert support
from India, and possibly from the USSR, is
likely to encourage Afghanistan to persevere
in its demands. It is possible that Afghani-
stan may take the issue to the UN.
41. Pakistan is unlikely to give in to these
pressures. It will probably continue its pres-
ent policy of economic betterment in the tribal
areas and a gradual integration of the tribes
into settled life. While Pakistan is apparently
still willing to cooperate with Afghanistan in
jointly solving some tribal problems, it is irri-
tated with what it views as the aggressive
nature of Afghan propaganda. If the con-
troversy should become more acute, Pakistan
might feel compelled to take countermeasures
such as covertly creating tribal disturbances
within Afghanistan. However, open hostili-
ties between the two countries are unlikely.
Pakistan might also retaliate against Afghan
trade with and through Pakistan. As a re-
sult of Afghanistan's reliance on Pakistan for
the transit of its trade and its communications
with the West, such developments would
threaten to increase Afghanistan's dependence
on the USSR.
42. If the Pushtunistan issue were to be
settled, Pakistan-Afghan relations would im-
prove considerably. Pakistan-Afghan trade
is substantial, Pakistan being the fourth
largest importer of Afghan goods, and Af-
ghanistan's trade with the West must pass
through Pakistan in transit. Pakistan has
generally facilitated Afghan trade within the
limits of its transport capabilities, except for
a brief period in 1951, and would probably
welcome closer ties if the Pushtunistan irri-
tant could be removed.
43. There has actually been some discussion
in Afghan and Pakistan official circles not
merely of rapprochement but, apparently un-
der Afghan initiative, of some form of union
or confederation between the two countries.
Such a project has also been advocated by the
Agha Khan, leader of the Ismaili sect of Shia
Moslems, who enjoys considerable prestige in
the area. In October 1954, the Afghan For-
eign Minister, Prince Naim, approached high
US officials with the suggestion that the US
use its good offices to promote the plan of con-
federation. It is possible that Afghans ad-
vocating the project may be motivated by the
belief that close association with Pakistan is
the most feasible means of securing Western,
particularly US, support to prevent Soviet
domination of Afghanistan, now that the
British no longer provide a counterbalancing
power on Afghanistan's southern flank. How-
ever, we believe it at least as likely that such
proposals as Prince Naim's may reflect no
more than a desire to involve the US in the
Pushtunistan controversy. There is no evi-
dence that confederation has been formally
considered by either government.
44. The concept of Pakistan-Afghan unity
is likely to continue to be discussed and fur-
ther efforts may be made to enlist US support
for the project. However, we believe that
even if responsible officials of both countries
were to agree on its desirability, the practical
difficulties involved, both internal and exter-
nal, would make actual implementation high-
ly unlikely: (a) both Pakistan and Afghani-
stan are aware that the USSR would almost
certainly regard such a development as threat-
ening its position and rights in the area, which
are spelled out in the long-standing Soviet-
Afghan Treaty; (b) India would also strongly
oppose a merger both because it would
strengthen Pakistan and because it would in-
vite adverse Soviet reaction in an area India
seeks to keep neutral in the East-West
struggle; and (c) the two governments would
not only have to work out a solution to the
Pushtunistan dispute, but would also have
to cope with a complex of almost insurmount-
able constitutional, administrative, and social
problems.
V. OUTLOOK FOR AFGHAN'S RELATIONS
WITH THE US
45. Despite Afghanistan's neutralist policies,
most Afghan leaders recognize the desirability
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of maintaining good relations with the West
as a counterpoise to the USSR, which they
fear and distrust. Afghanistan will probably
continue to hope for the maximum Western
assistance but, in view of the proximity and
power of the USSR, and in line with the
habitual Afghan policy of playing off Russia
and the West, it will probably set cautious
limits on the extent of Western influence over
its policies. Despite the recent growth in
Afghan-Soviet trade, Afghanistan will con-
tinue to be dependent upon non-Communist
countries, particularly the US, for a substan-
tial proportion of its foreign trade and a large
share of the external assistance required for
its major current development projects. Af-
ghanistan will also continue to seek US eco-
nomic aid, primarily because of its economic
needs but possibly also to increase US in-
terests in Afghanistan.
46. While Afghanistan has been critical of US
arms aid to Pakistan, it has not opposed US
efforts to strengthen the area as a whole, and
has even expressed some interest in receiving
US arms aid. There is little doubt that many
leading Afghans would like to join in a de-
fense pact with other states of the area if it
had US backing and US arms aid were in-
volved. However, it is unlikely that Afghani-
stan could actually accept membership in a
Western-backed area defense pact since the
Afghans almost certainly recognize that any
foreseeable arrangement, even with the firm-
est US backing, could scarcely offer Afghani-
stan realistic protection against Soviet attack.
In addition, the Pushtunistan dispute would
make difficult if not impossible any arrange-
ment involving direct ties with Pakistan.
47. Although US efforts to strengthen the
area may to some extent run counter to Af-
ghan interests by building up Pakistan and
increasing the USSR's sensitivity over its
southern flank, Afghanistan probably hopes
for continued US interest in area defense.
The Kabul Government still tends to think in
terms of Afghanistan's traditional buffer state
role, and probably regards US moves in the
area as a desirable means of replacing British
with US power on Afghanistan's southern
flank and of giving the US an increased stake
in continued Afghan independence. For this
reason, Afghanistan will probably seek to ex-
ploit to the maximum US interest in Afghani-
stan and in the area as a whole, and is likely
to continue to bring up at intervals the possi-
bility of obtaining US arms and of joining a
regional defense arrangement even though it
recognizes that such plans are impractical.
VI. OUTLOOK FOR RELATIONS WITH
OTHER NATIONS
48. India. Relations between Afghanistan
and India have been amicable. Both have
long-standing disputes with Pakistan, and In-
dia has given Afghanistan moral and financial
support in the Pushtunistan dispute. India
and Afghanistan have substantial trade rela-
tions, and both follow neutralist policies in
the East-West conflict. Although Moslem
Afghanistan retains some distrust of Hindu
India, their mutuality of interests appears to
outweigh their differences. India may be ex-
pected to continue its efforts to draw Afghani-
stan more closely into the neutralist bloc.
49. Iran. Afghan-Iranian relations have long
been irritated by Iranian contempt for Afghan
culture, recurring border incidents involving
migratory tribes, and some smuggling between
the two states. The chief controversy be-
tween the two governments, however, is over
the disposition of the waters of the Helmand
River, which rises in central Afghanistan, en-
ters eastern Iran in the Seistan region, and
is important to both countries for irrigation
purposes. During normal years the volume
of Helmand water is sufficient for both na-
tions but in years of low rainfalls, the Seistan
region of Iran does not get sufficient water.
In addition, Iran fears the Afghan develop-
ment in the Helmand Valley, because it will
enable Afghanistan to construct new irriga-
tion facilities consuming a disproportionate
share of the available water. In 1952 Afghan-
istan concurred in the report of a neutral
technical commission, appointed at the in-
stance of the US to find a satisfactory basis
for sharing the waters. Iran rejected the
commission's report and has only recently
agreed to resume negotiations. There appear
to be no insuperable obstacles to a settle-
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ment. However, Afghanistan's control of
most of the course of the river and of the
river control projects give it a good bargaining
position and, from the standpoint of Iran, it
may prove intransigent. In the absence of an
early settlement of the dispute, and with Iran
now freed from its preoccupation with the oil
controversy, an increase in tension over this
issue is possible.
50. Turkey. Afghan-Turkish relations have
been generally cordial and the Turks have had
a strong influence, particularly in Afghan
military and educational fields; for over 30
years Afghanistan has been assisted by a
Turkish military mission, Afghan military
men have been trained in Turkey, Turkish
teachers have been employed in Afghan
schools, and some Turks have served in cer-
tain Afghan government departments. How-
ever, Turkey does not have a decisive influence
on any major policy matters in Afghanistan.
Some Turks are irritated by Afghanistan's
continued Pushtunistan agitation and are
likely to oppose it even more if Turkey and
Pakistan draw closer together on the basis of
their present agreement. In addition, Turkey
resents the frequent failure of many Afghan
military leaders to implement Turkish recom-
mendations. These are minor irritants, how-
ever, and will not disrupt basic Afghan-
Turkish friendship. Turkish association with
Pakistan in a regional defense arrangement
11
has not had, and is not likely to have, a detri-
mental effect on Afghan-Turkish relations.
51. Western European nations. Since the
British withdrawal from India, UK-Afghan re-
lations have not been close. Trade between
the two countries is not large and the UK has
not participated significantly in development
assistance to Afghanistan. Afghans gener-
ally are disposed to resent UK foreign policy
as imperialistic. France exerts cultural in-
fluence through a French-Afghan college and
a hospital in Kabul, and archeological activi-
ties. French-Afghan diplomatic relations are
cordial. German prestige has traditionally
been strong in Afghanistan, and Afghan rela-
tions with West Germany in the commercial
and technical fields may be expected to in-
crease with current German efforts to revive
trade with states of the area. German-
Afghan diplomatic relations, broken off in
1945, may shortly be resumed. Afghan rela-
tions with other West European countries are
extremely limited.
52. The Arab States. Afghanistan maintains
friendly relations with the principal Arab
states, with whom it shares a common adher-
ence to Islam and a neutralist and anticolo-
nial outlook. The Arab cause in Palestine, for
example, has a certain emotional attraction
for Afghans. It is likely that Afghanistan will
continue to support the Arab-Asian bloc in
the UN.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF THE TREATY OF NEUTRALITY AND NONAGGRESSION
BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR
SIGNED 24 JUNE 1931 *
Article I � In case of war or of hostilities between either of the Contract-
ing Parties and one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party
undertakes to observe neutrality with regard to the former.
Article Il �Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to abstain
from any aggression against the other Party or against territories in its
possession, and not to undertake or to tolerate on the part of anybody
whatsoever any act which might inflict political or military damage on
the other Contracting Party. Similarly, each Contracting Party under-
takes not to be a party to any alliances or agreements of a military or
political character with one or more Powers which might be directed
against the other Contracting Party or in any financial or economic boy-
cott or blockade directed against the other Contracting Party. Further-
more, in the event of a hostile attitude being adopted by one or more
third Parties towards either of the Contracting Parties, the other Con-
tracting Party undertakes not only not to encourage such attitude but is
under an obligation in its territory to oppose it together with any hostile
acts and undertakings arising therefrom.
Article III �The High Contracting Parties, having recognized each
other's sovereignty, undertake to abstain from any armed or unarmed
intervention in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party and
shall categorically abstain from giving assistance to and taking part in
any intervention whatsoever on the part of one or more third Powers
which might take action against the other Contracting Party. The
Contracting Parties shall not tolerate and shall prevent in their territory
the organization and activities of groups of persons and the activities of
private persons that might be prejudicial to the other Contracting Party
or prepare the overthrow of its form of government or make an attempt
on the integrity of its territory or proceed to the mobilization or recruit-
ment of armed forces to be used against it. Similarly, neither Party
shall authorize or permit the passage and transport through their terri-
tories of armed forces, arms, ammunition, implements of war, and any
kind of war material directed against the other Contracting Party.
Article IV �In accordance with the above provisions of the present
Treaty, each of the High Contracting Parties declares that it has not
had and has not at present any secret or public obligations in relation
� Source: "League of Nations Treaty Series � 1935," No. 157. The treaty was
formally renewed in 1936 and 1945 and has since continued in effect
under the annual automatic renewal provisions of Article VIII.
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to one or more States which would be incompatible with the present
Treaty and that, during the entire period of validity of this Treaty, it
will not enter into any treaties and agreements which are incompatible
with the present Treaty.
Article V � Similarly, each of the Contracting Parties declares that no
obligations exist between itself and other States in the immediate neigh-
borhood of the land or sea frontiers of the other Party except such as
arise out of instruments which have already been made public.
Article VI �Beyond the limits of the undertakings the conditions of
which are laid down in the present Treaty, each of the Contracting
Parties retains entire freedom of action as regards steps to be taken to
establish all kinds of relations and alliances with third Powers.
Article VII � The Contracting Parties recognize that the settlement of
all disputes or conflicts which may arise between them of whatever char-
acter or origin must always be sought solely by pacific means. With a
view to amplifying the provisions of this Article, special agreements may
be concluded between the Contracting Parties.
Article VIII � The present Treaty is concluded for a period of five years
and shall come into force at the moment of its ratification, which shall
take place not later than two months after the date of signature. The
exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Kabul
within one month after ratification of the Treaty.
On the expiry of the period of five years, the present
Treaty shall be automatically prolonged from year to year, each Con-
tracting Party being entitled to denounce it at six months' notice. In
case of denunciation of the Treaty as provided for in this Article, the
Contracting Parties shall at the same time enter into negotiations re-
garding the renewal of the present Treaty.
Article IX � The present Treaty is drawn up in the Russian and Persian
languages. In respect of its interpretation, both texts are regarded as
authentic.
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