ANGOLA: NEAR-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00837R000500160004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Angola: Near-Term
Implications of
Negotiations
Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
This Memorandum represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
_Secret-
-
NI SHM 88-10003
October 1988
Copy 3 4 I
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Discldsure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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*11.101
Intelligence 25X1
NI SIIM 88-10003
Angola: Near-Term
Implications of
Negotiations
Information available as of 4 October 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating: ?
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
October 1988
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Key Judgments'
Whatever the outcome of US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba,
and South Africa, neither the Angolan Government nor the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency is likely
to gain a decisive military advantage in the next six to 12 months. Success
in achieving an agreement linking Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to
independence for neighboring Namibia, while not ending the Angolan civil
war, wduld clear the way for dialogue on an internal settlement. Failure to
reach an accord would intensify the Angolan conflict and raise chances for
direct clashes between South Africa and Cuba along the Angola-Namibia
border
The acceleration in the negotiations and the willingness of the participants
to discuss the issues seriously follow a major change in Cuba's posture over
the past year that has altered the balance of forces in the region and
challenged South Africa's military hegemony. The talks have significantly
narrowed differences among the parties, with the remaining issues focused
on the timing and pace of Cuban troop withdrawal. To maximize
protection of the Luanda regime, Cuba and Angola want a longer
timetable than does South Africa, which seeks a rapid Cuban exit
Objectives
Cuban President Castro believes the negotiations offer him the best chance
for an honorable withdrawal from a protracted and increasingly costly war,
although his conditions require survival of the Angolan regime and
independence for Namibia. The Angolan Government is more hesitant
than Havana to take risks with the timing of a Cuban withdrawal, but be-
lieves a settlement will put it in a better position to conclude the war on ac-
ceptable terms by removing South African support for UNITA.
Pretoria wants to avoid an escalating conflict and believes that the talks of-
fer the least costly way out of Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria is not
desperate and is not interested in an agreement that threatens its long-term
security interests in the region
' Due to the sensitivity of ongoing US-mediated negotiations, distribution of this Memoran-
dum has been restricted. Recipients should not give the document any further dissemina-
tion.
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The Soviet Union and UNITA are also key players. The Soviets seek the
removal of South African forces from Namibia and a settlement that
leaves their Angolan client relatively secure. Such an outcome would be
consistent with Moscow's efforts to reduce costly support to clients fighting
insurgencies, improve relations with the United States, and promote a less
threatening image internationally. UNITA generally supports the negotia-
tions, but is concerned about how an agreement would affect prospects for
its primary goal?an internal political settlement that provides for a power-
sharing arrangement with the government.
Alternative Scenarios
Agreement on a regional settlement would gradually take Cuban forces out
of the fight, but Cuba and the Soviet Union would rely on military advisers
and continued arms aid to ensure that they maintained their influence in
Angola. Luanda intends initially to continue military operations against
UNITA, pressure on Zaire to sever remaining outside support, and
intensification of its clemency campaign. Loss of Cuban support, however,
would make Luanda scale back on more ambitious military campaigns.
UNITA would sustain its military activity to show it had not been hurt by
a settlement and continue pressure on Luanda for reconciliation. South
Africa would continue covert materiel support to UNITA.
If the negotiations fail to produce a settlement, Cuba would attempt to step
up pressure on South Africa, although short of launching a full-scale
attack on Namibia. Castro would seek to limit his risks by encouraging in-
filtration into Namibia by the South-West Africa People's Organization
and a major Angolan offensive into UNITA-held southeastern Angola.
Meanwhile, Cuban forces would be prepared to retaliate if South Africa
reentered Angola. South Africa would defend Namibia, but realizes that a
preemptive attack on Cuban forces would entail unacceptable costs.
Pretoria might hesitate to commit a large force to fight at UNITA's side
again.
Implications for the United States
A successful outcome to the negotiations would enhance the opportunities
to promote national reconciliation. Luanda's attitude would depend on its
perception of the military situation, however; if it believed UNITA were
gravely weakened by loss of all outside support, it probably would hold
back from serious talks. Moreover, if UNITA perceived that it had lost US
support, it might reject a US role.
Even if the talks fail, the parties probably would still be interested in an
eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war and might seek
renewal of US-mediated talks at a later date. The parties could, however,
look for another mediator and threaten to freeze the United States out of
participation in a major regional settlement.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Discussion
1
Status of the Negotiations
1
Objectives of the Players
2
?Alternatives if the Negotiations Succeed or Fail
4
Implications for the United States
8
Annex: The Military Balance
9
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Military Forces Situation
Tanzania
KINSHASA
Zambia
Zimbeb e
m ? ;qua
Namibia
Botswana
aitUb
Swaziland
South
Africa
Lesotho
Soviet and Cuban Military
Advisory Group headquarters
LUANDA
South
Atlantic
.0cean
Luena
Lobito Munhango
Benguela Huambo Kuito
territory
Matala
Luban
Namibe
BOLIeldary reoretsentation IS
not necessarily aw horttative.
Caham
Chipa.
-711.7-111P
-Caluequ
Ruacana
Opuwa?
Secret
ong
`Ondjiva
(1.ath Kati
Ondangwa
Menongue
15th parallel
to
'urinate
16th parallel
.Mavinga nL
UN/TA
headquarters
at Jamba
Oshivelo
South African
airfields and garrisons
?Air Cuban armored
brigade
Grootfontein
Namibia
vi
Botswana
It Cuban garrison
290 Kilometers
200 Miles
714694 (546940) 0-88
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Discussion
Status of the Negotiations
The US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba,
and South Africa continue after having made sub-
stantial progress through seven rounds. Talks during
May in London, followed by rounds in Cairo, New
York, Geneva, and lately in Brazzaville, have pushed
the process along to where agreement has been
reached on a settlement framework that links South
African implementation of UNSCR 435 for Namib-
ian independence to a total withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola. The negotiations have estab-
lished a sequence of key steps and provisional dates
for reaching a regional settlement that would culmi-
nate in implementation of UNSCR 435 beginning as
early as 1 November
In addition, the parties have agreed to a cessation of
hostilities in southern Angola to reduce the chances of
an escalation prior to reaching a settlement. South
Africa pulled its remaining troops out of Angola and
the Cubans promised not to move south beyond their
present forward positions. The military standdown is
being monitored by a joint military commission
(Cuba, Angola, South Africa) from posts along the
Angola-Namibia border. The National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), not a party
to the talks, has refused to abide by a cease-fire but
has offered to conclude one with Cuba.
The talks have now come down to the contentious
issue of timing and pace for a total Cuban troop
withdrawal, which has been the focus of talks in
This Memorandum was initiated by the National Intelligence
Officer for Africa to assess the options?primarily military?of the
principal players in Angola under the alternative scenarios that
ongoing negotiations, linking total Cuban troop withdrawal from
Angola to independence for neighboring Namibia: (a) succeed in
achieving a regional settlement, or (b) break down or stall
1
Provisions of UN Security Council
Resolution 435
Following agreement on a date to implement
UNSCR 435 and establishment of a formal
cease-fire, a UN representative and a UN plan-
ning group would administer Namibia during
the transition to independence in conjunction
with the South African?appointed Adminstra-
tor General. A 7,500-man UN Transitional
Assistance Group (UNTAG), including about
5,000 troops, would supervise the cease-fire and
monitor South African and South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) troops
Within three months of a cease-fire, South
African forces would be reduced to 1,500 men,
confined to one or two bases in northern Namib-
ia. SWAPO forces would be restricted to speci-
fied locations in Angola under UN supervision.
All political prisoners held by both sides would
be released
Seven months after the implementation date,
elections would be held under UN auspices for a
new constituent assembly. The remaining South
African troops would depart within a few
months, once elections were certified by the
United Nations and independence granted. Un-
armed SWAPO members and Namibian refu-
gees would be permitted to return to participate
in the election process
Brazzaville. Substantial differences between the posi-
tions have narrowed, but the sides are still short of
agreement. Angola and Cuba have held out for a
longer withdrawal period than South Africa has
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proposed. Room for compromise still exists, however,
and the parties are considering various formulations.
Other issues have emerged during the discussions or
in bilateral contacts, but are not formally part of the
agenda. The United States is urging an end to the
civil war through national reconciliation and an inter-
nal political settlement between the Angolan Govern-
ment and UNITA. Luanda is pressing Washington to
end support to UNITA, and Pretoria has raised
concerns about African National Congress camps in
Angola, financial costs of a settlement, and modifica-
tions to the decade-old UNSCR 435. The ANC issue
may have been used as a sweetener in moving toward
a settlement.
Objectives of the Players
The recent acceleration in the negotiating process and
the willingness of the Cuban, Angolan, and South
African participants to discuss the issues seriously
follow directly from a major change in the military
situation over the past year. In response to the
unprecedented scale of South African involvement on
the side of UNITA in late 1987, Cuba sent about
15,000 well-equipped and trained troops to Angola?
bringing its total to over 50,000 men?and adopted a
more combative strategy. This altered the balance of
forces in the region and challenged South Africa's
military hegemony (see annex)
Although they are not direct participants in the
negotiations, the Soviet Union and UNITA are key
players. A Soviet observer has been available at each
round of talks and has intervened informally to keep
the negotiations on track. UNITA is following the
talks, albeit at a distance, and has asserted its pres-
ence vocally and by military action to ensure that its
interests are taken into account
Cuba
After 13 years of military involvement in Angola,
Cuban President Castro probably believes the current
negotiations offer him the best chance for withdraw-
ing Cuban troops under his requirement for honorable
conditions. Cuba's decision last year to reinforce its
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troop strength in Angola?and go beyond its largely
defensive role by moving troops to the frontlines?was
motivated by a desire to save Luanda from looming
defeat and to force an end to longstanding South
African intervention, either by negotiations or direct
military action.
A negotiated withdrawal, portrayed as a victory,
would provide an escape from a war that was proving
unwinnable as long as Pretoria's involvement contin-
ued. In Castro's view, Namibian independence would
effectively end direct South African military interven-
tion on UNITA's behalf and cut materiel support by
isolating the insurgents from their primary backer.
Angola is also increasingly unable to pay for Cuban
services?its debt may now total some $500 million?
and the Cuban population is unenthusiastic about
endless foreign adventures.
Nevertheless, Castro's bottom-line conditions for a
settlement require the survival of the Angolan regime
along with Namibian independence from South Afri-
ca. Castro apparently is under no immediate domestic
or foreign pressure to leave Angola short of his
objectives. The regime's propaganda apparatus has
been preparing the Cuban population for increased
casualties and additional fighting if the talks break
down.
Angola
The Angolan Government shares Havana's basic as-
sumptions about the military situation and the negoti-
ations. Luanda is frustrated by its inability to fight
both South Africa and UNITA and sees a regional
settlement as the best way to remove South Africa
from the scene, even if it eventually loses support from
Cuban combat forces
kngolan
leaders also have grown weary of the prolonged,
expensive, and overbearing Cuban presence.
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The Angolan regime?with its own security at
stake?is more hesitant than Havana to take risks
with the timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal.
but the Ango-
lans probably have little choice but to follow Cuba's
lead.
Luanda believes a troop withdrawal agreement that
removes South African forces from Namibia would
put it in a better position to conclude the civil war on
its terms. Luanda agrees that an internal political
settlement eventually will be needed to end the war,
but has so far proposed only a clemency program for
individual UNITA members. The Angolan regime
shies from political reconciliation that would involve
sharing power with the insurgents or a role for
Savimbi, despite counseling from its Cuban and Sovi-
et allies and several African leaders. The government
has attempted to defer pressure for reconciliation by
arguing that a troop withdrawal agreement must be
achieved first
South Africa
Surprised by the Cuban military moves and the
change in the military balance, Pretoria now calcu-
lates that it would have to pay a stiff price were it
forced into a larger conflict. In addition to increased
military risks, high financial costs of Namibian occu-
pation and rising domestic criticism of military opera-
tions in Angola have encouraged Pretoria to negotiate
seriously.
As a result, many South African officials apparently
argue that the time has come to end South Africa's
73-year rule in Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria does
not view the current military situation with despera-
tion and is not interested in settling for an agreement
that, in its view, threatens its long-term security
interests and regional role. South Africa views defense
of Namibian territory against possible Cuban aggres-
sion as intrinsic to its security and faces little domestic
opposition to this position. Moreover, Pretoria is
adamant that its participation in the negotiations not
be perceived as a sign of military weakness. South
Africa has recently strengthened its forces in Namib-
ia to improve its defenses in the event that the talks
break down.
3
Soviet Union -
The Soviet Union is interested in a settlement as long
as it provides for removal of South African forces
from Namibia and leaves its Angolan client relatively
secure.' This approach is in line with Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev's overall efforts to reduce costs
of supporting client states fighting insurgencies, im-
prove relations with the United States by displaying
flexibility on regional conflicts, and promote a less
threatening image internationally. Moscow expects
that a Cuban troop withdrawal will reduce its finan-
cial burden, now running at about $1.5 billion ann-
ually in arms aid alone.
Continuing Soviet arms deliveries and support for
Cuban troop augmentation suggest a calculation that
military strength will allow Cuba and Angola to
extract as many concessions as possible from the
South Africans. At the same time, however, Moscow
has given some indication that it wants to avoid the
political and economic costs of an escalation in the
conflict and has sought to keep the talks from break-
ing down. The Soviets probably believe that the
Angolan Army will be able to cope with UNITA after
a settlement and that Luanda will be in a position to
deal confidently with UNITA in any internal political
negotiations.
UNITA
UNITA's primary goal is to achieve an internal
political settlement that provides recognition and a
power-sharing arrangement for the movement and its
leader, Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's immediate objective
is to get direct negotiations with Luanda under way
while international attention is focused on the US-
brokered talks. Savimbi argues that a regional settle-
ment will be unworkable without a total cease-.fire
and a negotiated end to the civil war. To this end, he.
is seeking international support for internal reconcili-
ation and en a ement of African leaders in mediation
efforts
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eLIeL
Although Savimbi is generally supportive of the nego-
tiations, he sees both advantages and disadvantages to
a regional settlement. Withdrawal of some 50,000
Cuban troops would improve the balance of forces for
UNIT h Afric n
sus ort
Neither Savimbi nor UNITA is prepared to quit if a
regional settlement reduces foreign involvment but
leaves the fratricidal civil war unresolved. Even a
substantial loss of outside support would not diminish
the movement's dedication to its goals. Nevertheless,
Savimbi's greatest immediate concern is not that
UNITA will be destroyed, but that its prospects of
achieving its political goals will recede in the face of
another prolonged period of guerrilla war in which
UNITA is increasingly isolated and vulnerable.
Alternatives if the Negotiations Succeed or Fail
Successful conclusion to the negotiations would in-
volve formal agreement by Cuba, Angola, and South
Africa under the principles set in New York and
approved subsequent to the Geneva talks. These prin-
ciples set the date for South African implementation
of UNSCR 435, a transition to Namibian indepen-
dence, and Cuban agreement to begin withdrawal of
its military forces from Angola at a specified pace
within a set deadline. The parties also accepted other
conditions?such as a commitment to cease hostilities
and respect borders?intended to build confidence
and smooth the way to a final settlement. The agree-
ments do not directly address the civil war and the
issue of national reconciliation
Failure, on the other hand, would entail assertion by
any of the participants to the negotiations that no
further progress is likely, compromise unattainable,
and continued involvement useless. This reaction
could be provoked by the belief that other participants
are purposefully dragging out the talks or stalling to
gain time.
Secret
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, neither the
Angolan Government nor UNITA is likely to gain a
decisive military advantage in the next six to 12
months. Success would immediately reduce the risk of
Cuban?South African conflict along the border but
would not necessarily reduce the level of fighting
between Angolan forces and UNITA. Failure would
risk bringing reinforced Cuban and South African
military forces into direct confrontation.
If the Negotiations Succeed
Cuba and South Africa would honor commitments
made in the talks, but each would be suspicious of the
other and alert for signs of cheating. Signing of a
treaty would lead to an almost immediate standdown
of South African forces under supervision of UN
peacekeeping forces. Cuban forces would begin to pull
back from the Namibian border and some would
begin preparations for return to Cuba
Both Cuba and the Soviet Union would seek to
maintain their influence in Angola. In any case,
Soviet involvement in Angolan affairs would not be
seriously affected by a settlement. Moscow provides
most of Luanda's weapons and countrywide airlift,
trains most of the senior officers, and has some 1,200
advisers attached to senior and midlevel commands.
Although a settlement could lead to a reduction in
Moscow's military support, the Soviets have indicated
that they intend to continue aid at a level they deem
necessary to support Angolan operations against
UNITA.
Castro almost certainly believes that a
strengthened advisory presence would sustain
Havana's influence with Luanda after his combat
troops depart
Luanda probably intends, at least initially after a
regional settlement, to stay with the general aims of
the strategy against UNITA that it already has
formulated: continue the war through pressure on
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Monitoring a Troop Withdrawal
UNITA-held territory in the southeast and counterin-
surgency operations elsewhere; sever UNITA from
outside support by pressuring remaining backers; and
intensify the clemency campaign to split the ins
leadership and sow dissention in UNITA ranks.
Nevertheless, many of the departing Cuban troops
would have to be replaced by Angolans, and the
Angolan Army?already stretched thin?would have
to scale back on more ambitious operations to secure
important urban areas, garrisons, and vital economic
targets. Even though capture of Jamba will continue
to be one of Luanda's primary objectives, a force for
5
such an effort is not currently available for renewal of
a major offensive like the one in 1987. The govern-
ment probably will not be ready until next year, and a
successful campaign to take Jamba probably would,
in any event, entail several years of fighting. Luanda
also may have in mind a series of smaller, more
regionally focused offensives, like the one just con-
cluded at Munhango in central Angola, or other
operations intended to isolate UNITA's regional com-
ponents.
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Cuban Troop Repatriation
It is unlikely that Castro would attempt imme-
diately to redeploy large numbers of Cuban
troops from Angola to another client state.
Rather than involve Cuban troops in another
regional conflict, Castro probably would con-
centrate on absorbing the returning Cuban
forces and resolving other domestic problems.
Approximately 15,000 of the troops belong to
regular military units and would return to their
garrisons on the island. Almost all the remain-
ing troops are reservists who would be phased
into the Cuban economy gradually over the
withdrawal period, although some almost cer-
tainly would be converted into advisers and
remain in Angola.
In addition, reactiva-
tion of the Marie! Accord, which provides for
the emigration of up to 20,000 Cubans annually
to the United States, also would help offset any
problems associated with absorbing large num-
bers of returnees.
Luanda sees Zaire as the most important regional
supporter of UNITA after South Africa and has
charged that UNITA's use of Zairian territory allows
the insurgents to support guerrilla operations in the
north and to infiltrate supplies. In the aftermath of a
settlement, Luanda probably would focus on Zaire as
UNITA's remaining means of access to the outside
and use a combination of cajolery, blandishments, and
threats to discourage Zairian support for UNITA.
For example, the Angolan Government might sponsor
infiltration of Zairian dissident factions and even
direct cross-border raids.
Luanda probably would drag its feet on an internal
political settlement in the hope that its "harmoniza-
tion" or clemency program would show some prog-
ress. The government's aims are to deny recognition
of UNITA as a political movement and reject Savim-
bi's involvement in the political process, although it
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might entertain compromises. Luanda has recently
indicated that it is willing to consider a more concilia-
tory approach and deal with African mediators. Still,
Luanda would be likely to keep the military pressure
on UNITA to maintain its bargaining position and
probably hopes that military gains would enable it to
compel acceptance of the harmonization policy. If, on
the other hand, government forces fail on the battle-
field, Luanda might become more open to African-
backed efforts to promote an internal settlement.
For its part, UNITA almost certainly would sustain
its military activity to show that it had not been hurt
by the settlement and continue pressure to move the
government toward reconciliation. The insurgents
probably would have stockpiled sufficient supplies to
support operations at current levels of activity for a
year. UNITA no doubt would, however, closely moni-
tor the levels of outside support, and any suspicion
that a support cut was looming probably would lead
UNITA to implement organizational changes more in
line with a protracted conflict. These might include
greater concentration on guerrilla units, a correspond-
ing deemphasis of larger, semiconventional military
units, and conservation of resources. Savimbi is loath
to give up UNITA-held territory in the southeast or
fixed bases, such as the headquarters at Jamba,
however, and he would seek to defend the territory for
as long as possible.
Although Pretoria would lose the capability for major
direct intervention on UNITA's behalf, it would
provide continuing support to UNITA to maintain
some influence in Angolan developments. South Afri-
can logistic support following a settlement would have
to be covert, however, and operational limitations
would reduce the quantity that could be delivered.
Pretoria realizes that substantial Soviet and Cuban
military assistance to Angola will continue after a
settlement, and has urged UNITA to reevaluate its
organization and tactics to cope with government
advantages in conventional forces
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If the Negotiations Fail
Failure to reach a negotiated settlement?whether
through outright breakdown of the talks or the pros-
pect of their indefinite prolongation?would leave
substantial Cuban and South African military con-
centrations on the Angola-Namibia border, held in
check by a temporary cease-fire. Chances of an
inadvertent escalation would increase as each side
would be uncertain of the other's intentions and might
overreact to perceived threats. Although both Cuba
and Pretoria probably are prepared to deal with or
even provoke some escalation in the conflict, both
sides appear to have put limits on how far they would
be willing to carry the fight. Moreover, even if
fighting broke out, they both might be willing to
return to the negotiations at a later date if no
significant advantage were won by either side.
In the near term?notwithstanding the risk of a wider
conflict?Havana would not be satisfied with the
status quo and would be willing to ratchet up the
military pressure on Pretoria to obtain South African
withdrawal from Namibia and an improved military
position for the Angolan Government. Purely military
resolution of the issue through a full-scale Cuban
invasion of Namibia does not appear likely, however.
Cuban forces at present lack the size and capability
for operations on this scale, and we believe Castro
would be very reluctant to incur the inevitable costs of
major fighting with South Africa
Instead, Castro likely would seek both to gain the
military initiative and to limit his risks by encourag-
ing infiltration of Namibia by the South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) and an Angolan
Army offensive against UNITA. Cuban forces would
be prepared to support and assist these operations and
strike back if provoked or if South African forces
reentered Angola. In Havana's view, Pretoria is sensi-
tive to increased white casualties and security costs in
Namibia. Castro might calculate that SWAPO's per-
formance?even though it would not seriously threat-
en South Africa's hold on Nambia?would raise the
political costs to Pretoria of remaining in Namibia.
Additional SWAPO units have already been moved
into southwestern Angola where they are supported
and sheltered by Cuban units
7
Moreover, Castro probably would back another major
Angolan offensive against UNITA-held southeastern
Angola, although this option would not be immediate-
ly available. Some Cuban forces?specialists, such as
pilots, tank drivers, and artillerymen?could become
directly involved in eventual fighting, but Castro has
repeatedly asserted that the fight against UNITA is
Luanda's responsibility. Castro almost certainly
would prefer that Angolan troops bear the brunt of
combat and order Cuban troops into the fight only as
a last resort. More likely, Cuba would keep its forces
in reserve, ready to retaliate if Pretoria again inter-
vened on UNITA's side. Nonetheless, in anticipation
of the increased danger of a wider military engage-
ment arising from these initiatives, Havana would be
willing to expand its expeditionary force in Angola if
required
For its part, Pretoria is vitally concerned that it avoid
any appearance of military weakness and almost
certainly would choose to maintain its hold on Namib-
ia, which is too important to be given up without
compensation or a fight. South African officers be-
lieve they can defend Namibia against Cuban or
SWAPO attacks by stopping small incursions on the
border or, in the event of a larger attack, by falling
back to lure the invader into overextending itself.
Although Pretoria has the capability to mobilize
rapidly and deploy large numbers of forces, a direct,
preemptive attack on Cuban forces in Angola does not
appear likely; cooler heads among the South African
military realize that a major escalation would entail
unacceptable costs. Nevertheless, Pretoria has sug-
gested that the Cubans are vulnerable to attacks
along their lines of communication and might consid-
er harassing operations of this sort.
A repeat of South African intervention in support of
UNITA would be problematic. Materiel support al-
most certainly would be provided, but South Africa
might hesitate to send large military forces to fight at
UNITA's side in the event of another major govern-
ment offensive. Pretoria would be mindful of the vocal
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domestic opposition to its last intervention as well as
the threat to its flank sosed by Cuban troops in the
southwest
Implications for the United States
The United States is inexorably linked to these negoti-
ations, whatever the outcome, and will receive credit
for a success or blame for a failure. If the negotiations
lead to a regional settlement, the participants would
hold the United States responsible for compliance
despite the United Nations' official monitoring role,
and charges of cheating or other violations would be
directed at the United States for answers or resolu-
tion. Moreover, continued civil war despite a regional
settlement would bring Zaire under increased Ango-
lan pressure to curtail its assistance to UNITA.
A successful outcome, however, also would raise the
opportunity to expand a US peacemaking role, and to
encourage Luanda to open discussions with UNITA
on the unresolved problems of ending the civil war
and national reconciliation. The Angolan Govern-
ment's attitude would hinge principally on its percep-
tion of the military situation: should UNITA make
Secret
gains despite loss of South African support, Luanda
probably would become more disposed toward inter-
nal negotiations; alternatively, prospects for further
curtailment of UNITA's external backing would en-
courage the government to hold back from serious
talks. UNITA's attitude would also be important.
Belief that its interests were slighted during the
negotiations or that US support was waning might
lead UNITA to reject a US role and hold out for
direct talks or another mediator.
In the event of a breakdown, the United States might
still remain involved. Even with additional fighting,
the parties probably would still be interested in
eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war.
Despite occasional complaints about the US role, the
participants have acknowledged the utility of US
mediation as a useful framework for talks. There
would be a danger, however, that the parties might
seek another mediator and threaten to freeze the
United States out of participation in a major regional
settlement, especially if any of the parties perceived
that US policy was becoming hostile to their interests.
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Annex
The Military Balance
9
Should Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola,
government military capabilities would deteriorate.
Cuba would focus during the transition period on
enhancing Angola's ability to continue fighting and to
assume rear area support and point defense roles. The
presence of Cuban and Soviet Bloc military advisers
and shipments of supplies and equipment would con-
tinue. Nonetheless, the government's ability to con-
duct offensive operations after a Cuban troop with-
drawal would decrease. Primary emphasis would be
placed on defending key areas.
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UNITA
Although the withdrawal of South African combat
forces from Angola has reduced UNITA's ability to
counter large-scale government offensives, continued
South African covert logistic support will facilitate its
ability to conduct widespread insurgent operations.
UNITA's strengths include effective leadership, high
morale, and good organization in addition to South
African support. Weaknesses include limited logistic
and conventional combat capabilities.
Should South African forces withdraw from Namibia,
UNITA's military capabilities would not suffer sig-
nificantly during the first six to 12 months. Over time,
however, dwindling fuel supplies would have a detri-
mental effect on its ability to conduct more conven-
tional operations. Nevertheless, UNITA would retain
the ability to conduct insurgent operations throu hout
the country, using captured and existing stocks
The South Africans
The unprecedented move of Cuban and Angolan
forces to the border area has stimulated a South
African buildup on the Namibian side of the border.
Upon implementation of UNSCR 435 and South
African withdrawal from Namibia, supply channels to
UNITA would be restricted, and would become even
more covert in nature. The capability of the South
Africans to support UNITA with conventional forces
would still exist, but would necessitate use of imprac-
tically long air logistic lines or reoccupation of bases
in Namibia. The South Africans probably have al-
ready found ways to continue special forces advisory
and covert resupply activities in support of UNITA,
some of which likely include joint efforts with Zaire
and the use of Zaire as a conduit.
If negotiations break down, the South Africans could
launch a major offensive but would risk significant
losses and a protracted conflict with the Cubans.
Were the South Africans to decide on such a course,
they could deploy to Northern Namibia?on short
notice?as many as eight squadrons totaling 170
combat aircraft, including jet fighters and bombers.
Five airfields suitable for support of such operations
are available within the border area. Ground forces
could also be reinforced quickly. South Africa can
mobilize approximately 15 conventional force battal-
ions or two brigades, totaling about 11,500 personnel,
on the first day of mobilization. Using civilian and
military transport aircraft and rail assets, most of
these troops could be at the front within four days.
Within one month, the South Africans could have a
total of 60,000 conventional forces in Namibia, an
acceptable force level for offensive operations against
the Cubans now present in southwestern Angola.
For now,
however, the deployment is defensive. The South
African Air Force?whose aircraft can only be re-
placed at great expense and difficulty?has the capa-
bility to conduct only limited offensive air operations,
and would probably devote a majority of its assets to
air defense missions. Currently deployed South Afri-
can air defense weapons would not deter Cuban
airstrikes
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