SENIOR REVIEW PANEL COMMENTS ON DRAFT NIE 14.2-88: NORTH KOREA: PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESSION AND INTERNAL STABILITY, INTERNALLY DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 9, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080003-8 L SLIP 0 9 MAR 19uts
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Senior Review Panel
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC-00598-88
9 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
NIE 14.2-88: North Korea: Prospects
for the Succession and Internal Stability,
internally dated 22 February 1988
1. The Panel finds
this draft both commendable and
worrisome. The author
is
to be commended for organizing the
material in such a way
as
to make clear the strange character of
the socialist dynasty
in
North Korea and to explore the ran ? ""
?
succession problems.
Probably the first Key Judgment
should be that the US needs to devote new energies to our
collection efforts on the DPRK.
2. The draft Estimate is remarkably compact--sufficiently
so that we do not believe an "Executive Summary" is really
necessary. The four Box Texts provide useful elaboration. We do
have a few comments on them:
a. Kim Il-Song's Health. Are we sure that the ageing
despot suffers from all the illnesses listed, or is it that
various reports have from time to time mentioned these
maladies?
b. Kim Chong-Il: What Makes Him Tick. This sketch is
especially well done. The main Discussion refers to his
"mercurial behavior" (paragraph 18) and Box 3 might also be
referenced in that connection. Aspects of his strange
behavior might even deserve an additional paragraph in the
Box, including his very frank discussion of having a movie
actress and her director husband kidnapped from Hong Kong.
Incidentally, it might also help to indicate the exact age of
the "dear leader."
c. Who Are the Players? Box 4 discusses groupings--
hawks vs. doves, technocrats vs. militarists, etc., yet not a
i
Signers
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single name is mentioned. Given the recent purge of Defense
Minister 0 Kuk-Yol, the activities of Foreign Minister Kim
Yong-Nam, or the records of who travels with Kim the elder
and Kim the younger, we believe it would be helpful to have a
listing of the key players immediately under them. Or is the
absence of any names in this box merely a reflection of our
intelligence gap?
3. Economic Problems. In both the text and in Box 2 there
is general reference to North Korea's stumbling economy. It
would help the reader of this admirable NIE to have a few
illustrations of current problems: the extent of debt default,
trends in production and foreign trade, and especially current
energy shortages. These would help to portray the magnitude of
the challenges Kim Chong-I1 will face. Even if the younger Kim
were to face up to his economic problems, what is the likelihood
he could do something about them without putting his political
controls at risk?
4. Tension Reduction. The draft argues (paragraph 14) that
Kim Il-Song may opt for tension reduction in order to smooth the
transition. We wonder whether the opposite might also be the
case; he could feel that heightened tension would help bring the
older cadres, the fractious family-members, and the military into
line. The Panel also feels that the description of the DPRK
"peace offensive" since 1984 might be a bit overplayed. The
forward deployment of second and third echelon military units
(1984-85), the intensity of the anti-Team Spirit campaigns (1985,
1986, and 1987, and now especially strident in 1988), and other
activities are hardly reassuring.
Courtland D. Perkins
cc: AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
VC/NIC (Mr. Gries)
NIO for East Asia
. McPherson Richard L. Walker
2
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