U.S.-ISRAELI ACCORD SAID TO AUTHORIZE NORTH-NIR OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92M00732R000900010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 23, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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. U.S.-Israeli Accord
Said to Authorize
North-Nir Operations
By Bob Woodward
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Stitt Writers
Amiram Nir, the former Israeli
official who died in a Mexican plane
crash Wednesday, said last June
that a confidential Israeli-American
agreement . authorized still-secret
counterterrorist operations that he
and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North super-
vised in 1985-86.
American and Israeli sources
confirmed that there was an Israeli.
American agreement, referred to
as "terms of reference" or "accords"
by some knowledgeable sources. Its
existence has never been disclosed
to Congress, according to American
sources familiar with it.
A White House spokesman said
yesterday the Reagan administra-
tion would have no comment on the
agreement or any operations that
may have been conducted under it.
Yossi Gal, spokesman for the Is-
raeli Embassy, said, "I won't go into
this agreement. . . . Israel and the
United States have lots of agree-
ments . . We have never main-
tained that Nir was operating on his
own or as a renegade . . Every-
thing he did was being done by the
government of Israel."
Nir disclosed the existence of an
agreement during interviews in
London last June. He maintained
that secret U.S.-Israeli covert op-
erations were authorized by Pres-
ident Reagan and then-Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres under the
accords. Few details of these oper-
ations have been disclosed. Nir said
the Israeli government has detailed
records of all of them.
One operation conducted under
the agreement was the organizing
of an armed force of Lebanese
Druze in Beirut in May 1986, at a
time when the White House was
considering the use of force to try
to free American hostages.
? _
Disclosure of the agreement adds
yet another layer to the mysteries
surrounding the Iran-contra affair.
As described by Nir, the agreement
led to a series of covert actions that
had common tactical elements. The
now-famous. secret transactions
that produced unauthorized aid for
the Nicaraguan contras from the
profits of arms sales to Iran may
have fit a pattern established in
those other secret undertakings.
And, like the arms-for-hostages
dealings with Iran, these other se-
cret ' operations were apparently
hidden from Congress.
References were made to the
North-Nir "off-the-books" opera-
tions during the congressional Iran-
contra investigation, but Nit's as-
sertion that they were carried out
under an agreement was the first
indication that he and North, who
has since retired from the military,
claimed top-level governmental au-
thorization for their activities.
Nir was interviewed by reporter
Bob Woodward for 13 hours last
June 25 and 26 in London. He dis-
cussed some of his activities with
the understanding that these were
preliminary and "private" conver-
sations. He said he expected to tell
his story publicly later, and said he
was debating how best to do it?in
a television interview, for a news-
paper or some other way. Wood-
ward and Nir agreed that the infor-
mation Nir provided was not to be
attributed to him without further
discussions.
In those interviews, Nir said re-
peatedly that half or less of the sto-
ry of the secret arms transactions
with Iran was publicly known. He
refused to elaborate.
Throughout the, summer Nir did
not return numerous phone calls to
his home in Israel. The Post pre-
pared a story on the secret U.S.4s-
raeli agreement, but editors decid-
ed not to print the story in hopes of
getting a fuller account later from
Nir or other U.S. or Israeli sources.
RDP92M00732R000900010010-7
The Washington Post
The New York Times
Th t Washington Times
The Wall Street Journat
A-1
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Oaily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Date Li n4 c svg
In a subsequent telephone con-
versation Oct. 10, Mr said he was
not ready to "go public," citing the
damage publicity might do to his
business activities. But he said he
would be willing to meet again in
London sometime in the future, and
held out the possibility that he
would provide important revela-
tions about U.S. officials.
Washington Post editors con-
cluded that Nit's death Wednesday
removed the reasons for the agree-
ment to withold attribution to Nir of
the information he provided in June.
In a telephone interview on Friday,
Nit's widow, Judy, said she knew
that her husband was talking to
Woodward. but she had -"no ? idea" -
why he was doing it. At the time of
his death he was not prepared to
tell his story publicly, she said.
Nir was a central figure in many
aspects of the Iran-contra affair: - - -- ?
? He was cited by North as the
originator (in November 1985) .of _
the idea of generating profits from
arms sales to Iran to fund other co-
vert projects?the idea North used
later to divert support to the Ni-
caraguan rebels. In January 1986.
North and Nir discuusing $2.5
million from the first d ct sale of th
ssele
U.S. arms to Iran for it joint co-
vert operations, according to an en-
try in North's notebook Made public
by the congressional Iran-contra
committees. When details of the
Iran-contra operation were about to
be disclosed in November 1986. Nir
refused North's request that he
take the blame for the diversion of
profits to the contras, according to
North's notebooks. Nir said in the
June interview: "I like 011ie. He was
under great pressure. To mix the
Iran operation and the contras was
stupid, stupid, stupid."
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? Nir represented Israel in nego-
tiations with U.S. and Iranian rep-
resentatives that led to three ship-
ments of U.S. arms to Iran in 1946.
e He accompanied former national
security adviser Robert C. (Bud)
McFarlane and North on their se-
cret mission to Tehran in May
1988. Nir said in the June interview
that McFarlane failed to improvise
and take advantage of the meetings.
that "fully 50 percent of (this trip) is
not known," and that he had exten-
sive notes on this and other aspects
of the secret initiative.
? Nir and North planned and car-
ried out at least two secret joint op-
erationa outside normal intelligence
channels. These were "only part" of
their covert activities. Nir said,
"There is much more."
? With Iranian middleman Manu-
cher Ghorbanifar, Nir arranged for
Iranian help in freeing the Rev.
Lawrence C. Jenco, an American
hostage held by Lebanese extrem-
ists. Jenco was released in July
1986 based on Ghorbanifar's prom-
ise that the United States would
subsequently ship arms to Tehran.
Nir called Ghorbanifar "a tool, no
matter whose tool," adding that he
was told by an important figure in
the affair that "imperfect tools must
be used for imperfect ends."
e On July 29, 1986, within days af-
ter Jenco was released, Nir briefed
Vice President Bush and his chief of
staff, Craig L. Fuller, in Israel on
the need to respond to the release
by shipping arms to Iran.
Like the other Israeli participants
in the affair, Nir was barred by his
government from answering ques-
tions from the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment, independent counsel Law-
rence E. Walsh and congressional
investigators. Nir was interviewed
during an Israeli investigation and
information he provided was includ-
ed in reports Israel filed with the
House-Senate Iran-contra commit-
tees and Walsh.
Nir said in the interview that Is-
rael carefully restricted the infor-
mation that was provided to U.S. in-
vestigators of the Iran-contra affair,
assigning a former senior Israeli of-
ficial who had been inspector gen-
eral of the Israeli armed forces, re-
serve Gen. Raphael Vardi, to re-
view the Israeli documents. Two
limited chronologies, one financial
and the other historical, were given
to the United States. By sticking to
dates and the most general descrip-
tions of planned agenda items for
meetings, the Israelis conveyed
very little of substance to the Unit-
ed States, Nir said.
Nir said Israel has assembled ex?
eAsive records not turned over to
the' United State% based is lskrt On
hes detailed notes and papers. They
provided point-by-point documen-
tation of all contacts. .discussions
and undertakings with U.S. officials,
including North, Nir said.
Nir said he also Provided full
written reports to his superiors and
gave oral briefings to Peres, who
hired him as counterterrorist ad-
viser, and later to Peres' successor
as Israeli prime minister. Yitzak
Shamir. Nir said he was "on a short
leash."
At the time North and Nit joined
forces in 1985, the former military
correspondent for Israeli television
was the newly appointed counterter-
rorist adviser to Peres. North Was a
member of the staff of the National
Security Council and was responsible
for coordinating counterterrorist ac-
tivities for the White House.
Informed sources said the secret
agreement that Nir said authorized
the Nir-North undertakings VMS
signed by high-level officials for
both governments. Nir said he
drafted the agreement and that it
was formalized in an exchange of
letters between Reagan and Peres.
Other sources involved in counter-
terrorist operations for the two
countries said the agreement was
signed at a lower level.
Whatever form it took, the
agreement is an important missing
piece in the history of secret White
House operations in Reagan's sec-
ond term.
U.S. government sources said
the agreement originally was nego-
tiated by the State Department and
the Israeli foreign ministry to per-
mit the exchange of sensitive infor-
mation between U.S. and Israeli
government counterterrorism ex-
perts. These sources said Nir and
North in their activities clearly
went beyond this intent; at least as
understood by senior State Depart-
ment officials.
The agreement is formally spelled
out in its "terms of reference," which
officials said included vague language
and statements that are subject to
different interpretations.
One senior U.S. source said the
American-Israeli agreement ap-
peared to be connected to earlier
authorizations or ''findings" for co-
vert intelligence operations signed
by Reagan, which authorized ag-
gressive antiterrorist actions. The
Post reported in October that Rea-
gan signed findings in 1984 and
1985 authorising antiterrorist op-
erations and stipulating that any ac-
tions taken under those orders in
"good faith' would be "deemed" le-
gal?language several officials in-
terpreted as a license to kill."
Under longstanding executive or-
ders, it is illegal for American in-
telligence operatives to engage in
any activity that could lead to as-
sassinations, but those intelligence
findings signed by Reagan seemed
to at least some officials to create a
legal loophole to circumvent that
prohibition.
One of several versions of the li-
cense-to-kir finding was signed by
Reagan on Aug. 11. 1985, at about
the time that Nir said he was draft-
ing the secret American-Israeli
agreement on counterterrorism.
The same senior American
source said that because Congress
was never told of this secret anti-
terrorism agreement with Israel, it
appeared to be a new case of failure
by the administration to give the le-
gally required notification to Con-
gress of a covert intelligence activ-
ity. The Iran-contra investigations
showed that the administration also
failed to notify congressional over-
sight committees about the 1985-
86 secret sales of U.S. arms to Iran.
North faces criminal charges that
he to divert U.S. govern-
ment funds for unauthorized activ-
ities bawd on his use of the pro-
ceeds of arms sales to Iran. Nir said
in the interview that he expected
North to maintain at his trial that
these joint operations financed by
Iranian arms sales were authorized
by the secret U.S.-Israeli counter-
terrorism agreement, and so were
legal. North's lawyers have said
they want to introduce still-secret
material in his defense; this agree-
ment is one of the secrets they
want to use, according to an in-
formed source. North's lawyer,
Brendan V. Sullivan Jr., declined
comment.
Nir and North's counterterrorist
operations were mentioned in rec-
ords released in the Iran-contra in-
vestigations. They show Reagan and
Peres were aware of covert counter-
terrorist plans and operations being
arranged by North and Nir.
For example, a Sept. 15, 1986.
memo from North to then-national
security adviser John M. Poindexter
shows that Reagan was informed of
some of these plans.
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? Nir for 10 minutes before an up.'
' " ? ? ,
? ? coming meeting between Peres and
Reagan. "Purpose of this meeting is
...to debrief Nir on his meeting. with
-Peres over the weekend," North
told Poindexter. After that session
with Nir, "You will then be able to
brief the President on Peres'
views.* North told his boas.
The same memo shows Reagan
was briefed for a scheduled meeting
with Peres the next day acwhic.h bi-
lateral counterterrorist efforts were
high on the agenda. The memo was
heavily censored in the Iran-contra ?
committees' report, but a fuller ver-
sion. published earlier in the report
by the presidentially appointed Tow-
er Commission, referred to "several
ongoing and contemplated initiatives
with the Israelis" and said the topics
were so secret "it is unlikely that
Peres will discuss any of these with
anyone else in the room (other than
Reaganj."
Poindexter wrote "Done on
North's recommendation that the
president be briefed. The phrase
"Non-Log" appears in the upper
righthand corner of the memo, in-
dicating that the document was so
sensitive it would not be logged in
any of the White House filing sys-
tems, even the files for the most
classified intelligence operations.
Both North and Poindexter testified
that the memo referred to the
North-Nir operations.
The North memo also suggested
to Poindexter that he discuss other
matters relating to Nir with then-
CIA Director William J. Casey. Poin-
dexter initialed the "approve" option
under North's recommendation that
"you privately discuss the papers at
Tabs I and II with Director Casey
an indicate next steps fter the con-
versation." Those tabs are three
pages deleted from the public record
by the Tower board and the congres-
sional panels.
An Oct. 14,_ 1986, memo written
a month later by CIA analyst
Charles Allen provides further con-
firmation that the diversion of
arms-sales profits was part or on-
goiag counterterrorist operations.
"The government of the United
States along with the government
of Israel acquired substantial profit
from these transactions, some of
which profit was redistributed to
other projects of the U.S. and Is-
rael," Allen wrote.
The relationship between North
and Nir grew out of the successful
cooperation between the two coun-
tries to obtain the release of the
Americans held during the 17-day
TWA flight M7 hijacking in June
1985.
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According to Nir, he spent eight
days in Washington during that cri-
sis acting - as the "unofficial but di-
rect channel" to the U.S. govern-
ment. Nir helped insure that some
? 700 Shiite prisoners held by Israel
would be released as the hijackers
of flight 847 had demanded.
Nir said he and North collabo-
rated successfully in the October
1985 interception of the PLO ter-
rorists, who had hijacked the Italian
cruise ship Achille Lauro. Israel
provided covert intelligence about
how and when the hijackers were
planning to escape from Egypt.
Nir came to Washington next on
Nov. 14, 1985, when, according to
the congressional Iran .contra re-
port, he and North met to "set the ?
foundation for a variety of future Is-
raeli-U.S. covert operations.".
North's notes for that day indicate ?
they discussed that the United
?States and Israel "have similar
aims, liabilities, vulnerabilities in
(Lebanoni." They agreed that 81
million a month would be needed
"for near-term and probably mid-
term" financing of their joint activ-
ities, the report said.
North also wrote: "How to pay
for; How to raise L.: Use Israelis
as conduit? Go direct? Have Israelis
do all work w/U.S. pay? Set up
joint/Israeli op."
Though the congressional COMMIt?
tees deleted specific descriptions of
the bilateral operations from their
report, sources said?and docu-
ments show?that one of the North-
Nir projects that was given the code
name 111-1 involved assembling a
40-man Drum force in Lebanon for
armed hostage rescue missions in
May 1986. North testified that "we
spent a fairly significant amount of
money" on this force.
Another contemplated plan in-
cluded the kidnaping of terrorists or
possibly their relatives to be used
as hostages to exchange for Amer-
ican hostages, according to an of-
ficial source.
Both of these projects had been
discussed but turned down as co-
vert U.S. operations by the formal
White House interagency group on
counterterrorism. North apparently
then decided to undertake them us-
ing his "off-the-books" operation
with Nir; according to informed
sources.
Money to fund these activities
was found through different means.
Nir, in the interview, said one
plan was that Israel would take 10
percent of the cost of handling an
Iranian arms transfer and use it to
fund other joint operations. An Is-
raeli source said this "cross-
funding" is standard in Israeli intel-
ligence operations and provided
Nir's initial concept for diversion of
Iranian arms sales profits.
North's notes for Jan. 9, 1986,
show Nir proposed use of $2.5 mil-
lion from the first 1986 direct sale
of U.S. arms to Iran to support un-
specified "Ops"?apparently not for
the Nicaraguan contras.
Staff researcher William F. Powers
Jr. contributed to this report.
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