BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Lentral Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
NIC 04164-87
6 October 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
3. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
NIO/W
6 October 1987
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
The likelihood has increased that Tehran will raise the stakes by
attacking US or Gulf Arab interests as it feels increasingly isolated
internationally and the US Navy has sunk an Iranian Navy landing craft
conducting minelaying operations. An Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander
has called publicly for an attack on a US Navy frigate
Revolutionary Guards Navy had contingency plans to attack a
US ship with 100 small boats. In addition, the Iranians continue to plan
attacks on oil and harbor facilities of Gulf Cooperative Council states and
have moved boats to Khark Island--a staging area.
The probability of a US combatant being involved in
hostilities in the region is higher than ever before.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a new
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
P a mine on soutnern Lebanon ailegea to oe
similar to those useb recently in the Persian Gulf while Lebanese found three
others; a Revolutionary Guard c laimed at about the same time that
his contingent already had laid near Tyre. In addition, Libya may
try to lay mines off the Suez Cana . n all cases, the mine laying is likely
to be covert. It may be difficult to prove responsibility. We cannot count
on catching mine layers red-handed again.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Soviet Pressure
Soviet diplomatic initiatives, violations of Pakistani ground and
airspace, and possibly financial inducements are maintaining pressure on
President Zia to stop providing aid to the Afghan resistance and to reach an
accommodation with Moscow. Some cross border attacks on Afghans in Pakistan
continue, and harassment attacks against Pakistani civilian targets are
contributing to wearing down Pakistani domestic support of the war.. In an
effort that will boost pressure further, Moscow proposed a shorter timetable
for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during recent talks in Geneva.
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INDIA/CHINA: Risk of Confrontation
Chinese initiatives since mid-July to defuse the border issue--and New
Delhi's conciliatory actions--have helped ease tensions along the Sino-Indian
border; there also have been some troop withdrawals from the border.
However, the Indian Army Chief of Staff seems to be spoiling for a fight. A
breakdown in talks scheduled in Beijing for 16-18 November could result in
new confrontations. In addition, the current turmoil in Tibet could
complicate the strategies of both countries.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad probably has the capability to produce a nuclear device within
a few days to a few weeks of a decision to do so. The Pakistani nuclear
program enjoys widespread domestic support, and external pressures against
the nuclear program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of
the nuclear option. This has also triggered Indian reassessment of its
nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions in the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Invasion?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's
adoption of a doctrine formulated by his mother asserting an Indian right and
responsibility to protect ethnic Indians anywhere. India has committed most
of an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka
in recent weeks to help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil
(ethnic Indian) insurgency and has put another on alert for deployment. In
addition to introducing a force that could dominate the whole Sri Lankan
Army, the Indians have obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri
Lankan state and to a virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri
Lanka. It is not yet clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing
dominance over Sri Lanka. The instability in Fiji between the native Fijians
and the ethnic Indians may soon be another case for Indian intervention using
the Navy to "protect" ethnic Indians.
IRAN/IRAQ: Internal Developments
Political stakes in the war are high. The potential for sudden collapse
of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military
results. Domestic military and civilian opposition to Iraqi President Husayn
continues. Meanwhile, in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's death could lead to
major instability within the post-Khomeini government.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya probably has received
limited quantities of chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran and will
complete, by late this year, a chemical agent production plant. We should be
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prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile in Libya
against Chad in the near future. Military forces in southern Libya have
received chemical treatment kits.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is increasing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside
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Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that 25X1
Iranian irregulars recently captured while infiltrating intended to attack 25X1
Iraq's pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is
seriously straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in
Istanbul--the first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on
Prime Minister Ozal to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps
in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change.
TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
President Bourguiba's campaign to suppress all political opposition is
escalating with harsh crackdowns on Islamic fundamentalists, including seven
death sentences for convicted bombers of a hotel and a life sentence for a
popular fundamentalist leader. Islamic Jihad has promised retaliation if
executions are carried out. The regime's efforts are increasing discontent
and ensuring uncertainty and confusion when the succession crisis comes. The
Libyan threat almost certainly will increase in the post-Bourguiba period,
and Algeria too seems poised to influence the succession struggle.
WESTERN EUROPE
WEST GERMANY: Pressures on Defense Policy
Chancellor Kohl's decision to scrap the Pershing lAs marked a turning
point in Bonn's security policy. The Christian Democrats have decided that
they will be champions of arms control--an increasingly popular stance among
many segments of the German population--and will not concede that ground to
either the Free Democrats or the Social Democrats. The government may also
be debating how to improve conventional capabilities as Soviet and US nuclear
weapons are withdrawn. Public statements indicating that nuclear weapons
hold the only key to defense, according to some influential Bundestag
members, are working against efforts to improve conventional defenses.
Meanwhile, working against such efforts, the Soviets continue their "peace
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offensive" in West Germany. In addition, the Soviets, by allowing the recent
much desired visit by East German leader Honecker to the Federal Republic,
are hoping to demonstrate a lowered threat to West Germans.
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: More Tension
Another crisis may be brewing. Frequent reports of Greek troop
redeployments, new tensions over Cyprus, and ongoing issues such as rights to
the Aegean seabed, militarization of islands, and differences over air and
sea navigation rights point to heightened tensions. Whether the Greek
actions are for domestic consumption or to affect US/Aegean relations is not
clear, but the effect is to heighten tensions with the Turks. Both countries
may move toward confrontation because they believe the US will act to prevent
war.
EAST ASIA
SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA: Rocky Road to December
Agreement by the major parties on a new draft constitution sets the stage
for a presidential election late this year, but hardliners on both sides
continue to oppose the pact. The radicals are likely to instigate street
demonstrations. Additional, perhaps greater, unrest could result from labor
strife. There appears to be general popular belief that a major breakdown in
order could occur before December. A collapse of public order could yet
result in the imposition of martial law.
Disorder would encourage North Korea to attempt
actively to capitalize on anti-government riots and mount some sabotage
operations. Moreover, the Chinese evidently want the US to know that North
Korea intends to disrupt the Seoul Olympics.
PHILIPPINES: Troubles for Aquino
President Aquino's support is weakening. A recent rally in Manila drew a
scant 3,000 people, for example, and both civilian and military opposition is
growing. Meanwhile, the communist New People's Army is stepping up attacks
on bridges, possibly signaling a shift in tactics toward sustained attacks on
economic targets. Continued guerrilla successes, aided by divisions within
the military, will accelerate political polarization and encourage opponents
of Aquino to increase their efforts to organize a broad coalition that can
force her from office.
coup
leader Colonel Honasan has stated publicly that he will lead another coup
within a week and a half.
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LATIN AMERICA
BRAZIL/ARGENTINA: Tougher Stances on Debt
Brazil and Argentina may soon be taking significantly tougher stands on
repayment of their international debt, threatening more confrontations and,
ultimately, the solvency of major US banks. The recent mid-term election
defeat of Argentine President Alfonsin's party by the Peronists will increase
pressure on him to adopt a harder line on repayments. Brasilia continues to
insist on "alternative" approaches to the debt problem--all of which probably
will be costly to the banks. Continuing balance of payments problems in both
countries make early resolutions unlikely. The chances of declarations of
debt moratorium are increasing.
BRAZIL: Military Plotting
The next few months will be critical as
Congress debates the constitution. Increasing economic problems could lead
to broad-based opposition, providing ,a pretext for military intervention.
CHILE: Intransigence
General Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain
in power beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major
reshuffle of the army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet
now seems determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's
actions to maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over
his leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class,
fueling momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Descent Into Anarchy
The situation continues to deteriorate rapidly. Street violence and acts
of anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US citizens.
Radical Catholic priests and communists are increasingly involved in
anti-government activities. In addition, former President Duvalier continues
to plot a military coup. Economic problems--plus harsh military
reactions--increase the likelihood of a governmental crisis before the
presidential elections scheduled to be held in November. Even General Namphy
seems to yearn for a return to strongman rule.
PANAMA: Stalemate
Anti-government protests are tapering off, but the opposition Could yet
unify and force Noriega's resignation. General Noriega under siege would
increase his demagogic campaign against the US, crack down roughly on the
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opposition and, if necessary, install a military junta. As the crisis
evolves, there will be an ever increasing risk that Noriega will target more
sensitive US interests in Panama for subversion.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ANGOLA: Prospects for Cuban Clash with South Africa
The risk of direct South African-Cuban clashes is high, as South Africa
intervenes to stop the Angolans' measured offensive against UNITA positions
in southeastern Angola. A Cuban aircraft may already have attacked a South
African plane. Should the South Africans attack Cuban strongholds, Cuban
retaliatory airstrikes against South African air bases in Namibia, thus
increasing the chances for escalation and reducing prospects for a Cuban
withdrawal.
SOUTH AFRICA: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains and deep divisions within the Afrikanner
community have revealed increased domestic polarization that has further
undermined the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
Pretoria's gambit to co-opt South African blacks with a new constitution that
allows for urban black participation in government--but which does not
recognize the concept of one man, one vote--will not provide political power
to blacks or satisfy their demands for full political representation. In
extending the emergency decree to a quasi-permanent condition and stifling
legitimate dissent, the government has demonstrated that its authority can be
perpetuated only by force. Externally, until Pretoria's increasingly
coercive measures against Frontline States subside, there will be greater
opportunities for both West and East to capitalize on the Frontline States'
heightened senses of vulnerability.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability. In Hungary, strikes and
demonstrations may grow as the impact of recent economic austerity
measures are felt this fall. Even the normally docile legislature
appears restive over austerity proposals.
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Pressures are especially great in Romania, where continuing debt
problems and economic mismanagement have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
are contributing to new outbreaks of diseases like cholera. Popular
discontent may reach its peak in late winter, when consumer goods
supplies are lowest. Elements in the security services are
disaffected. Should they decide to move against the ailing
Ceausescu, we may have little additional warning. Moscow would seek
to draw Bucharest back to the fold.
YUGOSLAVIA: More Financial Troubles
Belgrade has worsening payments problems and little prospect that it can
solve them any time soon. After failing to make scheduled payments twice
since June, the Yugoslays face new rounds of rescheduling negotiations with
both banks and Western governments late this month and in November. The
banks, especially, are likely to be cool to requests for new lending in light
of other debtors' problems and Yugoslays' insistence earlier this year that
they had no financial troubles. With export prospects poor, Yugoslavia
probably will have financing gaps of $1 billion or more annually for the rest
of the decade.
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