NOAC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001000510038-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: May 4, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
ICS 0830-88
4 May 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
FROM:
Acting Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: NOAC Meeting Announcement
enle /2-5'
1. The attached correspondence announces a 13 May 1988 meeting of the
IG/CM(P) subordinate National Operations Security Advisory Committee (NOAC).
Addressees of this memorandum are requested to expeditiously identify and
subsequently provide the attached correspondence to appropriate
representatives of respective agencies or departments who are to attend the
cited meeting.
2. The assistance of IG/CM(P) members and invitees in making the required
distribution is necessitated by the lack of timely response to previous
requests for identification of names, addresses, and security clearance status
of representatives to the NOAC.
3. It is, therefore, further requested that the provisions of the last
paragraph of the memorandum from the NOAC chairman be specifically brought to
the attention of nominated attendees from your organization. The IG/CM(P)
chairman solicits your personal support in the revitilization of this
important subcommittee.
Attachment:
a/s
UNCLASSIFIED
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SUBJECT: NOAC Meeting, 13 May 1988
CCISCMO:WRW:emc: 351-2001 (4 May 1988):
Distribution of ICS 0830-88 (w/att):
1 - Mr. Pollari, OSD
1 - COL Linnen, ODCSINT/Army
1 - Mr. Argubright, Navy
1 - Ms. Smith, Air Force
1 - Mr. Guenther, Marine Corps
1 - Mr. Seidman, Coast Guard
1 - Mr. Negus, DIA
1 - LTC Groggel, JCS
1- NSA
1 - Mr. Penrith, FBI
1 - Mr. Corry, State
1 - Mr. Lewis. NSC
1 - CIA
1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ
1 - Mr. Cassetta, Commerce
1 - Mr. O'Brien, Energy
1 - Mr. Pollard, Treasury
1 - Mr. Garfinkel, ISO?
1 - Mr. Puffer, NASA
1 - Ms. Sclafani, OPM
1 - ICS Registry
1 - IG/CM(P) subject
1 - IG/CM(P) chrono
UNCLASSIFIED
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National Operations Security Advisory Committee
STAT
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (P)
Washington, D.C. 20505
'MEMORANDUM FOR NOAC MEMBERS AND INVITEES
SUBJECT: NOAC Meeting and Agenda
REFERENCE: National Security Decision Directive 298, "National
Operations Security Program," January 22, 1988.
The 10th meeting of the NOAC is scheduled for Friday,
May 13, 1988. The meeting will convene at 2:00 p.m. in Room
Washington, DC. An agenda is attached.
This meeting is intended to implement NOAC responsibilities
under NSDD 298, as well as continue with tasks assigned to the
NOAC by the IG/CM-(P). Please review the agenda and background
material at tabs, and be prepared to discuss items as indicated.
Request the name, organization, social security number,
and clearance status of attendees be passed to
by close of business
to facilitate entry into the
order
Attachment
As Stated
11
May,
in
Ray W. Pollari
Chairman
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AGENDA
10th NOAC Meeting
May 13. 1988
I. OPENING REMARKS, Ray W. Pollari, Chairman,
NOAC Charter, Tab 1.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDD 298
A. Task: All members should be prepared to briefly
discuss the status of implementation of NSDD 298,
Tab 2, within their department or agency.
B. Action Lead: OSD; POC: Captain Mary Moffitt.
C. All Members will:
- Be prepared to discuss status of implementation
within their department or agency and how long it
will take to prepare initial plans for their
program. Do you require assistance? Note: JCS
should address DoD issues.
- Be prepared to propose courses of action for the
NOAC to monitor implementation of NSDD 298.
D. OSD Representative will:
Chair an ad hoc working group to propose corre-
spondence to-NSDD 298 addressees establishing a
suspense date for their written OPSEC program to
be submitted to NSC.
III. INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF (IOSS)
A. Task: Outline status of the establishment of the
IOSS.
B. Action Lead: NSA; POC: Member of IOSS.
C. LOSS Representative will:
- Brief current status of the establishment of the
IOSS.
- Discuss relationship of LOSS to the NOAC.
- Discuss feasibility of writing an OPSEC manual.
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ATTACHMENT ____ --------
Interagency Group/Countermeasures
Washington, D.C. 20505
January 1984
CHARTER
NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PREAMBLE: By direction of the Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence), the
National Operations Security Advisory Committee (NOAC) is established as a
committee of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures (IG/CM). The NOAC shall
have the purpose, functions, responsibilities, and organization described in
the following paragraphs.
1. PURPOSE: The NOAC shall serve as the principal interagency forum
within the executive branch for discussion, consultation, and coordination of
operations security (OPSEC) issues. The NOAC shall advise the IG/CM
concerning OPSEC policies and procedures appropriate for implementation by
member departments and agencies to protect sensitive programs and activities.
2. FUNCTIONS: Under the guidance of the IG/CM, the NOAC shall:
a. Bring to the attention of the IG/CM those OPSEC
vulnerabilities and deficiencies the NOAC may identify within
sensitive programs and activities of the executive branch.
b. Provide the IG/CM with advice and recommendations
concerning measures and methods for reducing OPSEC vulnerabilities
and correcting OPSEC deficiencies.
c. As requested, consult with and provide advice and
recommendations to the various departments and agencies of the
executive branch concerning OPSEC vulnerabilities and corrective
measures.
d. Coordinate OPSEC support among the various departments and
agencies within the executive branch when interagency coordination
is appropriate and necessary.
e. Prepare OPSEC studies, analyses, advisory memoranda,
recommendations, and informational materials for consideration and
use by the various departments and agencies of the executive branch
f. As requested, review and provide comments, advice, and
recommendations concerning OPSEC policies and procedures in effect
within and among the various departments and agencies of the
executive branch.
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g. Maintain an awareness of the OPSEC programs and
initiatives of US Government departments and agencies.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES Of MEMBERS: Member departments and agencies shall
provide information relevant to the purpose and functions of the NOAC as
appropriate. Member departments and agencies shall designate and identify
points of contact to the NOAC for OPSEC within their activities.
4. ORGANIZATION:
a. The NOAC shall be chaired by a representative from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, as designated by the IG/CM
Chairman.
b. The membership of the NOAC shall consist of
representatives of those departments and agencies represented on
the IG/CM.
c. Additional members may be approved by the IG/CM upon
recommendation of the NOAC Chairman.
(I-. Secretariat support for the NOAC shall be provided by the
Community Counterintelligence Staff/Intelligence Community Staff.
5. PROCEDURES:
a. The NOAC shall meet at the call of the Chair.
b. The Chair shall endeavor to achieve consensus. If
consensus cannot be achieved, majority and minority views will be
provided to the IG/CM. No formal voting procedure shall be
established.
c. The NOAC Chair may establish, as deemed necessary,
temporary working groups to address specific issues. Unless
approved by the IG/CM, the NOAC Chair shall form no standing
working group.
d. The members of the NOAC may effect working level
coordination of OPSEC matters among themselves.
e. Representatives of organizations, agencies, and activities
outside the executive branch, including commercial firms and
consultants, may, from time to time, be invited to address the NOAC
on issues pertinent to the NOAC's purpose and function.
/
hard G.,Ailwell
Chairman
2
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FACT SHEET
ATTACHMENT -
NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM
The President has signed an National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) to establish a National Operations Security Program.
OBJECTIVE
Security programs and procedures already exist to protect clas-
sified matters. However, information generally available to the
public as well as certain detectable activities reveal the
existence of, and sometimes details about, classified or
sensitive information or undertakings. Such indicators may
assist those seeking to neutralize or exploit U.S. Government
actions in the area of national security. Application of the
operations security (OPSEC) process promotes operational.effec-
tiveness by helping prevent the inadvertent compromise of
sensitive or classified U.S. Government activities, capabilities,
or intentions.
OPSEC PROCESS
The operations security process involves five steps: identifica-
tion of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of
vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, and application of appro-
priate countermeasures. The process begins with an examination
of the totality of an activity to determine what exploitable but
unclassified evidence of classified activity could be acquired in
light of the known collection capabilities of potential adver-
saries. Such evidence usually derives from openly available
data. Certain indicators may be pieced together or interpreted
to discern critical information. Indicators most often stem from
the routine administrative, physical, or technical actions taken
to prepare for or execute a plan or activity. Once identified,
they are analyzed against the threat to determine the extent to
which they may reveal critical information. Commanders and
managers then use these threat and vulnerability analyses in
risk assessments to assist in the selection and adoption of
countermeasures.
OPSEC thus is a systematic and proved process by which the U.S.
Government and its supporting contractors can deny to potential
adversaries information about capabilities and intentions by
identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified
evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government
activities.
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APPLICATION
Indicators and vulnerabilities are best identified through
detailed OPSEC planning before activities start. They may also
be identified during or after the conduct of routine functional
activities by analyzing how functions are actually performed and
the procedures used. Planning and analysis proceed from the
adversary's perspective. To assist in OPSEC planning and
analysis, OPSEC planning guidance must be developed jointly by
those most familiar with the operational aspects of a particular
activity together with their supporting intelligence elements.
OPSEC planning guidance should take account of those aspects of
an activity that should be protected in light of U.S. and
adversary goals, estimated key adversary questions, probable
adversary knowledge, desirable and harmful adversary apprecia-
tions, and pertinent intelligence threats. OPSEC planning
guidance should also outline OPSEC measures to complement
physical, information, personnel, signals, computer, communica-
tions, and electronic security measures. OPSEC measures may
include, but are not limited to, counterimagery, cover, conceal-
ment, and deception.
In the OPSEC process, it is important to distinguish between
analysis of threat and vulnerability, on the one hand, and
implementation, on the other. Recommendations on the use of
OPSEC measures are based on joint operational-intelligence
analyses, but ultimate decisions on implementation are made by
commanders, supervisors, or program managers who determine the
aspects of a program or activity to be protected. The decision-
maker with ultimate responsibility for mission accomplishment and
resource management must have complete authority for determining
where and how OPSEC will be applied.
POLICY
A National Operations Security Program is hereby established.
Each Executive department and agency assigned or supporting
national security missions with classified or sensitive activi-
ties shall establish a formal OPSEC program with the following
common features:
Specific assignment of responsibility for OPSEC direction
and implementation.
Specific requirements to plan for and implement OPSEC in
anticipation of and, where appropriate, during department or
agency activity.
Direction to use OPSEC analytical techniques to assist in
identifying vulnerabilities and to select appropriate OPSEC
measures.
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Enactment of measures to ensure that all personnel, commen-
surate with their positions and security clearances, are
aware of hostile intelligence threats and understand the
OPSEC process.
Annual review and evaluation of OPSEC procedures so as to
assist the improvement of OPSEC programs.
Provision for interagency support and cooperation with
respect' to OPSEC programs.
Agencies with minimal activities that could affect national
security need not establish a formal OPSEC program; however, they
must cooperate with other departments and agencies to minimize
damage to national security when OPSEC problems arise.
ACTION
Heads of Executive departments and agencies assigned or support-
ing national security missions.
Heads of Executive departments or agencies with national security
missions shall:
Establish organizational OPSEC programs;
- Issue, as appropriate, OPSEC policies, procedures, and
planning guidance; and
- Designate departmental and agency planners for OPSEC.
Further, they shall advise the National Security Council (NSC) on
OPSEC measures required of other Executive departments and
agencies in order to achieve and maintain effective operations or
activities.. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
advise the NSC of the impact of nonmilitary U.S. policies on the
effectiveness of OPSEC measures taken by the Armed Forces, and
recommend to the NSC policies to minimize any adverse effects.
Chairman, Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I).
Consistent with previous Directives, the SIG-I has responsibility
for national OPSEC policy formulation, resolution of interagency
differences, guidance on national-level OPSEC training, technical
OPSEC support, and advice to individual Executive departments and
agencies. The National Operations Security Advisory Committee
(NOAC), as part of the SIG-I structure and functioning under the
aegis of the Interagency Group for Countermeasures (Policy),
will:
Advise the SIG-I structure on measures for reducing OPSEC
vulnerabilities and propose corrective measures;
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As requested, consult with, and provide advice and recom-
mendations to, the various departments and agencies concern-
ing OPSEC vulnerabilities and corrective measures;
On an ad hoc basis, chair meetings of representatives of two
or more Executive departments or agencies having competing
interests or responsibilities with OPSEC implications that
may affect national security interests. Analyze the issues
and prepare advisory memoranda and recommendations for the
competing agencies. In the event NOAC fails to resolve
differences, it shall submit the issue, together with its
recommendation, to the SIG-I for resolution, which may
recommend a meeting of the Policy Review Group (PRG) to
consider the issue;
Bring to the attention of the SIG-I unsolved OPSEC vulner-
abilities and deficiencies that may arise within designated
programs and activities of the Executive branch; and
Specify national-level requirements for intelligence and
counterintelligence OPSEC support to the SIG-I.
Director, National Security Agency.
The Director, National Security Agency, is designated Executive
Agent for interagency OPSEC training. In this capacity, he has
responsibility to assist Executive departments and agencies, as
needed, to establish OPSEC programs; develop and provide inter-
agency OPSEC training courses; and establish and maintain an
Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), whose membership shall
include, at a minimum, a representative of the Department of
Defense, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the General
Services Administration. The IOSS will:
Carry out interagency, national-level, OPSEC training for
executives, program and project managers, and OPSEC
specialists;
Act as consultant to Executive departments and agencies in
connection with the establishment of OPSEC programs and
OPSEC surveys and analyses; and
Provide an-OPSEC technical staff for the SIG-I.
Nothing in this directive:
Is intended to infringe on the authorities and responsibili-
ties of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods, nor those of any member of
the Intelligence Community as specified in Executive Order
No. 12333; or
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Implies an authority on the part of the SIG-I Interagency
Group for Countermeasures (Policy) or the NOAC to examine
the facilities or operations of any Executive department or
agency without the approval of the head of such Executive
department or agency.
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