RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000500080024-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2014
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
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AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION,
STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44
MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED,
RETIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN
DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A
POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE
THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT
ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE
LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN
THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE
SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF
PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT
BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES
ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV
IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
-- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING THEIR MILITARY
POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC
POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY
WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
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THESE TRENDS, AT A TIME OF WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
REMARKABLE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND DRAMATIC ECONOMIC GROWTH,
FORCED THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT.THE SOVIET UNION COULD
NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS.
THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM
THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS
REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY, FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.
AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING TWO WEEKS AGO, GORBACHEV
SHOWED REAL POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND
SUPPORTERS WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV
HOLDOVERS. BUT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL
STROKE IN THE KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER -- OR AT
LEAST THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE
APPARENT. TWO SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE
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BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- SECOND SECRETARY
YEGOR LIGACHEV AND FORMER KGB CHIEF VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV -- REMAIN
ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH
DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN UNABLE
TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES, PARTY SECRETARY
GEORGY RAZUMOVSKIY. GORBACHEV PROBABLY CAN COUNT-ON ONLY 3 OR
4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY HIS MEN,
CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD. SO, WHILE THIS SET
GOES TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS CLEAR
THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE
STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER
POLITICAL POWER.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE THERE ARE POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES OUTSIDE
THE POLITBURO THAT ARE RESISTANT TO CHANGE -- ESPECIALLY THE
FAR?REACHING CHANGE HE SEEKS. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED -- JUSTIFIABLY IT WOULD SEEM --
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN
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EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL
CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE HAVE COUNTED SOME 600 POPULAR
DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO
ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST
DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE LAST
JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL
PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE
INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO
GIVING WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY
ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND
HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY
STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND, ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT
POSITION HIMSELF, AND TO TRY TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO
DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY
SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO
DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.
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IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS
MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. A MAJOR
DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE
AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN
SOVIET LIFE, WHETHER HE CAN DO SO WITHOUT CREATING CHAOS, AND
WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE WEAKENED AND
EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS
POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S
SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. ,AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
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REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE
REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL
CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM,JHE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991
AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM
THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND
TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO LESS THAN 1% IN 1987, DOWN
FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986. GNP GROWTH WILL BE ABOUT 2-3%
THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER
YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
TARGETS, A TARGET THAT IS FAR BEYOND REACH.
-- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM
CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR,
FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
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DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN
DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE
INITIATIVE.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE
LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY
OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT
RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD
WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE
SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT
TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.
UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET
HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT
7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF
COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO
YEARS'AGO.
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FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR
SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY
SHELVES, LONG LINES IN STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN
RETAIL MARKETS. INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND
RECOGNITION THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER
SUPPORT HAS PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF
NEW POLICY INITIATIVES. TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING
ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND
INVESTMENT IN THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. EVEN SO, THE
POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS LIVING STANDARDS IN THE
SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW
RESULTS AND THE SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE
SO LARGE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER PRIORITY
FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN
AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE
CRITICAL ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. AFTER
THREE YEARS OF REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND TURMOIL, THERE HAS
BEEN LITTLE, IF ANY, SLOWING IN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF THE
SOVIET ECONOMY. THE GAP BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING. ITIS THIS REALITY THAT
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LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL
CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.
POLITICAL REFORM
AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF GORBACHEV'S
VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND
ECONOMY COULD SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING
ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT
SEEKS:
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN
EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A_50 YEAR FARM LEASE
DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM HAVE BEEN,
AT THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.
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THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THE
PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO
WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE
DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED
RESULTS.
THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
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WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK - SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
? HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE-DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
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FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA,
AZERBAIJAN, ESTONIA, LATVIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW.
IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL
RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY
CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL
DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. ? AS ONE
RUSSIAN RECENTLY SAID, "THERE HAVE BEEN MANY BOOKS WRITTEN ON
THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM BUT NOT ONE ON THE
TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM." BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL
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AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS
SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE
VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL
AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT GORBACHEV CAN IN THE END REJUVENATE THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION AND THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF IN THE
EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE
BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS. AND EVEN HE NOW
ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR DECADES.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT
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AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV
MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT
THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST
GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO
DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO
SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL
OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING.
AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN,
THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET
CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND
CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987: MORE THAN TWO BILLION
DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS
AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF BILLION
DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR --
TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN
BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF
ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SAY A GREAT DEAL
ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION PLAINLY WOULD LIKE TO
EASE THIS BURDEN AND IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE
THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE
WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT IN
AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN
UNWINNABLE WAR, THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS AND CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD
WERE BETTER SERVED BY LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR
CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND
CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN MY VIEW REFLECTS
INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE KREMLIN. EVEN SO,
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE THIRD WORLD -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN
GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES
IN THE PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH
US GLOBAL INFLUENCE AND REACH.
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THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD
INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH CHINA THAT
LIKELY WILL LEAD TO A SUMMIT IN A MATTER OF MONTHS; OVERTURES
TO JAPAN ALSO SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- MOST OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH ? SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE
AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE
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PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY
ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS
ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF
THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY
THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A
GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
. AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A
FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL,
CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE?BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE'SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
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CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER.
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD
ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM?LINE POSITIONS
WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
?
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO
FAR HAVE BEEN SMALL AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, WHAT
GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A
SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE --
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. HE IS
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A FIGURE OF ENORMOUS HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE. THE FORCES HE HAS
UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS
HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. HOWEVER, GORBACHEV'S
LENINISM STILL MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY -- ALBEIT A REJUVENATED ONE, ITS ROLE AS SOLE
ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS
OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
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CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN
OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING
WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED
STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON
INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF
WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF
THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND
TRANQUILLITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE
THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE
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VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN
HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY
CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT -- AND SHOULD NOT -- CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND
EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET?WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE
SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT
MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR
PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES
THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES
WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT
DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO PROMOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS
TO SOVIET-GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN
EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS .
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
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THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND
FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING
THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE --
WITH KEEN AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS
-- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.
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