OFFICE OF TRAINING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTIONS COURSE COURSE RESEARCH PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001000120034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 17, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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Office of Training
PRULUOT1CA; CkAIRZ
Course Research Paper
The Need?to?Know Principles A Brief Hir..toricol Analysis
June 17, 1965
STAT
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In the senturiea between the eepionage program of 1,oues ano the
missle crisis in Cuba, we witness the grudual oevelopment of military
and political intelligence organizations and observe the most famous
spies in history ent_uod in clanuestime work. Xet it is as impossible to
determine the exact beginnings of secret service as it is of esrionage,
though hundrecs of years most have separated them. Likewise the peginninz
of organized secret service is no less obscured uy time. 1.hoover elected
to invent it as a by-product of some conflict failed to reveal his name,
the date, or an organization chart?
The art of intelligence gathering has had much more influence on
history than on the historian. History is full of examples of famous spies
but little is known of how they orerated, what t.ape of organization ran
them, how much money they spent, or whom they spent it on. Piuoh of this
historical ignorance is due to the nature of an intelligence organizationo
Inherent in every successful - or unsuccesJful - secret service is the
element of secrecy0 foaay we use the more sophisticated term of compart-
mentation or the need-to-know, but by whatever name we use, the purpose is
to limit knowlecge aoout one's secret service so that it may more
effectively operate without fear of oisclosure.
In democratic america, with our tradition of an open society, and
our uncontrollec tendency for big organizations, the necessity for
recresty leads to security proslems that never occurree in antiquity,
Yet the ancients were very successful spies ano much of what they did
on a small scale forms the basiu for the corporation approach to
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intelligence gathering today0 kw. example, Sun fzo in his nook Art of Lur
gives the basis of espionage as practiced in 400 X by the Ghinese. His
emphasis on security and the need-to-know is much the same as practiced
today, which is why the nook is a favorite of Mao. Therefor-1 a brief
excursion through the annals of espionage might shed some light on the
growth of security techniques,
There were many spies but very few secret service organiLations in
ancient times p for the evident reasons that, whatever limitations of
comfort, communications or scientific comprehension the ancients suffered,
they were spared administrative impedimenta and most of our virulent
forms of red tape., Zings and commanders solved their own intelligence
problems. But what the ancients lacked in system, moreover, was counterbalanced
sy their exceptional fertility of imagination and instinctive conning.
Those stratagems and surprise onslaughts which the einle *no the Iliad
prove to have been the suggestions of Jehovah or martial Greek gods were
in reality devised by impromtu secret services. .hen Alexander the Great
was marching into Asia he tested the loyalty of his troops by reading
their mail)
Rome trete strong by its use of the secret service and learned to
jettison all mercy, fratitude and scruples. Individuals such as *Apia,
Urassus, and Caesar developed their own intelligence organizations in
order gain information on their political or,onets. Informants were paid
off by securing one-half title to the denounced man's lands but often
this transfer of property was not recorced in order to protect the informer.
ahades of our escrow 3/stem!
1 This very system was emnloyed to measure the moral anc combative spirit
of American troops in France during 1918. Thus the originul military
71ostal censorship blended with counterespionage. '
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Precious little is known about the acturl operations by the ancients
end it is not till the 16th century, with the rise of nationalism and
religious strug,:le, that we can distinguish between external and
internal security within an intelligence organization. t,e may *8 ..Uma
that the need?to?know principle was operative then for examples of the
Jesuits, or of Walsingham's secret service, working against themselves
would make a delightful book. To suggest that the need-.to-know principle
was used to cover up bureaucratic bungles is perhaps reading toomuch
into history. However Walsingham's contribution to the 4ng1ish defeat of
the Spanish Armada is on object lesson, even today, in perfect espionage
and perfect security.
While .'alsingham is rightly called the "father of the English secret
service", he must share his reputation with John Thurloe, Cromwell's
extraordinary secret .ervice chief. Here we get our first real glimpse
into an into lligance organization merely turning to the pages of Samuel
Popys. Pelves, a good friend of .vie of Thurloe's agents in Holland,
records three es-ential steps in the English art of spying: to
locate the most reliable and valued information, obtain it without being
discovered, and to transmit it promptly to a superior while leaving the
advisory in ignorance of his being decieved. Unfortuanately for Cromwell
end his son, there is fourth step, so necessary and yet not difficult,
that must bo token: the heeding of the summary of intelligence. that
good or use is the gathering of intelligence, in this case the planned
reztoration of Charles II, if it is not used b7 the government? Already
the friction between the go-Viers enr the users of intelligence
crops up.
Ls the power of the state grew, the powers of the secret service
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correspondingly grew. In the late 18th aria 3ar1y 19th century, an
ever sharpening aistinction attween internal security Lind the collection
of foreign intelligence took place. Separate organizations under
separate heads developed. khis was largely due to the imnerial system's
fear of internal dissidence and revolution* Additionally tith the
increase of speed, brought apout oy the telegraph (18?) and the
submarine cable (18.51), the whole pattern of intelligence began
cNinging. The spheres of intelligence, traditionally limited to political
and military, expandeo to aocioloLy, geogral.hy, and economy. This led to
further sub-dividing of intelligence organizations, with each civision
operating under senarute security rIgulations.
ladle it is not within the bounds of this paper to discuss
case by case the trowth of intelligence as a facet of government, suffice
it to say that today all countries have intellionce services. The, may
os different in their organizations, efficiency, and methods, out all
have their basic functions - to collect information, evaluate it, and
disseminate it to those who need to know it.
Eo intelligence organization iu any cotter than its security.
Much of this can be naturally guilt it. The 01A is uniqul in that it
combines uncer one roof the overt and covert colleotion means, alone
with the analytical side. This reveals the modern tendency in intelligence
to not only collect out evaluate what is collected* cut the purpose
today, as it was under Lulaingham and Thurloe, is to an2 produce finished
intelligence that can be useful. And this leads to security problems.
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TO appreciate the difficulty of investigating the history of
intelligence security, one need only try to investigate the-present
security system of the CIA. Many people within the DDI will talk freely
about the need-to-know but no one agrees; within the DDP there is a
hesitancy to even discuss it. And when the meaning of something as basic
as the need-to-know cannot be agreed upon, or even discussed, questions
arise and problems follow.
The general justification within the DDP for the application of
the need-to-know is primarily source protection. The reason is obvious.
The most sensitive information pertaining to a clandestine poration is
that concerning the source or agent employed. The agent is the key element
is any clandestine activity so that the Potential harm to an agent and
the drying fin of a source cannot, in most cases, be condoned.3- Because
this is so, the IMP strictly limits its dissemination.
The application of the need-to-know within that DOI is based on two
criteria: does the individual need-to-know certain information for the
Performance of his duties, and is he cleared for access to this information.
If the answer is affirmative to both these conditions, the disseminators
Will channel the information to that person, This is often a judgment
question for the disseminators so they tend to nlay it safe by
disseminating a broadly as possible.
While the need-to-know works in opposite directions within the DDI
and the DDP, it seems to work satisfactorily. However when the !VP and
DDI have to function together in the intelligence nrocess, which is
3 One DDP -qan said that of the agents lost, 50% were lost for reasons beyond
DEDI control, 40', were lost because of DDP mistakes, and 10% due to
mistakes by the rest of the inielligence community.
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much of the time, the need-to-know often prevents atieluate comnunications
between the two. Lt is omvious, even within oDP, that the cunning
of an agent is not an end in itself., The information must De pa4sed
on with a source description included to establish the veracLty of
the information. mule the DDP tries to be accurate, its first concern
is with source nrotection. The DOI feels, however, that the DDP tends
to generalige the source descrintion toonuch. Often the same adjectives
and adverbs are used to describe a source.
The DOP fetls, ouite correctly, that there is no need for the DDL
to know onerational information. However the OW does have a need-to-know
to general credibility of the information and therefore a direct need -to-
know the access of the source. Often it appears thet the only satisfactory
way to ac-omolish this isan unofficial exchange between the appropriate
desks within the divisions. But this tvne of working agreement usually
takes years to develope.
Two interesting phenomena appear within the OUP on the application
of the need-to-know. As a general rule the higher the pdreon in the
DP echelon the less constraint there is to annly a strict interpretation
of the need-to-know. This Person feels freer to use his judgment is
disclosing operational matters, both within and outside the agency.
Secrecy for secrecy sake is discarded. The opnosito pnears in the lower
echelons. New employees overguse the need-to-know, whether from a
misplaced fascination with secrecy Or because of a lack of knowledge on
how to apply it.
This creates undue suspicion, anger,and hinders
effective communication. Examples could be cited to illustrate both
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these hoints hutoelson to be learned is that whenever reluctance to
disclose details of needed information has to be overcome or whenever
a seemingly unreasonable demand for more information has to be clarified
or withdrawn, the co-ordination nrocess is unduly delayed.
The need-to-know goes deeper than sometimes hammerim DDI DOP
co-ordination. And it raises questions that are not only tough to ask
but toulber to answer. Does the need-t.-hnow princimle, by its very nature,
cause 1)1? to broaden its dissemination in order to 'lay it safe? Or
severely narrow narrow PDP dissemination for the same.reason? Can the
Support branch provide adequate surnort to WM without knowing more
of OPP's onerational needs and proceaures? Are some wasteful internal
procedures necessary by POP in order to hide its operations from the
rest of the agency? Can OTR adequately train the JOT's if hindered by
the need-to-know nrincinle? Or more basically, OM proSnective.
employee's make a sound decision on the information told them? Is the
need-to-know a convenient hlanket to cover um bad decisions, either operationally
or analytically? And does it occasionally provide a orfu/o for crooks
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In the
of funds? Does the overuse of the need-to-know overseas
prevent harmonious relationshins in our embassies? And back NNW, are
the agencies turnstiles really necessary or do they serve to increase
a security fetish? And how wise it, from a morale viewpoint, to hide
various medals granted for outstanding service? And most importantly,
who has been grant,d the wisdom to determine who has a need-to-know?
While it would he Impossible to satisfactorily answer all these
questions they do noint out th,it a blanket application of the need-to-know
can create as much difficulty as it can erase. 31 is fre,uently said
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that the agency's efforts can he slccessfulty co-ordinated if we display
old fashioned common sense, good will and co-operation. hut that is
nxt enough, There must be an understanding by all divisions of the
agency of the relative importance of their work with respect to U. 4.
intelligence and policy objertives. It should be recognized that
co-ordination means more than just co-operation and that the responsiblities
of co-ordination are, in the national interest, trascendittg.
If this is true, then the need-to-know Principle as applied
today seems to need a general overhauling. employees should he taught
what it means, understanci its limits and significance, and realise
that the need-to-know is only effective when it Contribhtes to, and
doesn't work against, agency co-ordination. Per good management says that
good co-ordination rests on good communication, but the need-to-know
often says no to this.
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