LATIN AMERICA WARNING REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020029-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 16, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
25X1
P 4P 40
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 6703-83
16 September 1983
FROM: John R. Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning Report for September 1983
1. The Warning Meeting held on 14 September 1983 was addressed by
Mr. Jon Glassman, a Foreign Service Officer, assigned to Ambassador
Richard Stone, and the discussion reported here is a digest of Mr. Glassman's
remarks, questions asked of him, and comments made by others. Mr. Glassman
began by pointing out that Ambassador Stone's mission, our support to the
Contadora talks, and the substantive talks with the Farabundo Marti Liberation
Front (FMLN), are in response to a Congressional initiative -- that is, that
the US carry on such talks, that the government of El Salvador do the same,
and that there be a credible offer made to the FMLN to participate in
elections in El Salvador. In meeting with Stone, the FMLN representatives
made a point of their confidence of winning the war on the ground and of their
willingness to talk to the Peace Commission of El Salvador in order to reach
the "real factors of power," which Glassman said they define as the government
bureaucracy of El Salvador, the armed forces of El Salvador, and the United
States. The members of the FMLN delegation consisted of Guillermo Ungo,
President of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), who was introduced as
moderator, Ruben Zamora, also of the FOR, Mario Aguinaga Carranza of the
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), and Mario Lopez, of the Central
American Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC). Importantly, they said that they
were not interested in participating in elections. They talked instead of a
coalition government and of dealing -- again -- with the "real factors of
power." They spoke of precedents for a coalition government, such as the
first junta and also of coalitions of groups. in the National University of El
Salvador.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
? SECRET w 25X1
2. After that meeting -- which occasioned a press release by the FMLN,
repeating most of what it had said in the meeting -- both General Vides
Casanova and Roberto d'Aubuisson were surprised that the FMLN had rejected the
offer to participate in elections. The government was also disturbed that the
FMLN had made a public statement, an agreement of confidentiality having been
agreed to by El Salvador. The people of El Salvador, and especially the armed
forces, Vides feared, would suspect that political power was being bargained
away in secret, so the government also made its stand public.
3. Concerning the Contadora process, there are tensions here too,
particularly within the Core Four. Honduras suspects Costa Rica of wanting
bilaterally to alleviate its uncomfortable relations with Nicaragua. There is
nervousness about the new Foreign Minister of Guatemala, Andrade, who wants to
talk bilaterally instead of being confined to the Contadora/Core Four
framework. The others in the Core Four suspect him of throwing Guatemala's
weight around, as though it were the colonial days when Guatemala had the
Captain Generalcy of the region. (The US is opposing this bilateral tendency
in Andrade.) Now the Contadora has brought forth a statement of objectives,
the twenty-one points, which might later be phrased as a treaty. Honduras is
satisfied with this scheme, just so long as there is no step-by-step approach,
and the US too wants to be sure that results would be reached simultaneously,
especially the specification for democratization. Mr. Glassman commented that
no one expects that we will ever get to an actual treaty with these
negotiations.
4. The motive of the Salvadoran guerrillas is to appeal directly to the
U.S. Congress in a context of reasonableness. In their dealings with the
Peace Commission, which the government of El Salvador insists is not a
governmental body, the guerrillas try to make it appear that they are dealing
with the government of El Salvador. On the El Salvador side, d'Aubuisson
pretends publicly to support these negotiations but makes it clear privately
that he does not. And Vides, to retain the support of the officer corps and
for the morale of the troops, iterates the point that the purpose of
negotiations is to arrange participation by the far left in the elections, not
for arranging the sharing of power.
5. Differences are apparent among guerrilla factions. Neither the
Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) nor the Armed Forces of National Resistance
(FARN) is represented on the FMLN negotiating delegation. And Joaquin
Villalobos, heading the ERP, in speaking of a makeup of a coalition government
in El Salvador, uses the term "democratic forces," rather than the cliche,
"real factors of power." These are a couple of examples of differences, and
it is tempting to speculate how, by making offers, differences might be
exploited to increase factionalism, to break up the FMLN. There is another
sort of difference which shows itself when we consider symmetry. The
Sandinista Directorate is not talking with the Nicaraguan guerrillas. In the
words of Daniel Ortega, they will "talk with the masters not with the dogs."
2
SECRET 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
r SECRET
0
6. So far as negotiations are concerned, there is a good argument for
the proposition that the application of force has produced results, although
the Salvadoran guerrilla delegation refuses to admit this. What we look for
from the guerrillas is acceptance of El Salvador's offer to participate in the
elections: if the guerrillas don't accept it, then they face defeat by the
government. Concerning the ability of the government to guarantee the safety
of those participating in elections, it is a real weakness and in addition to
the threat from the right, there is that of the vengeful left. Anyway, it is
doubtful that anyone, even Ungo, will agree to take part in the 1984
elections. The guerrillas have thought too of the prospects for d'Aubuisson's
becoming President, for his abolishing reforms and for his driving the
Christian Democrats (PDC) into the arms of the guerrillas. The members of the
delegation claim that they keep in touch with the PDC, with Napoleon Duarte,
and with Morales Ehrlich, an item of information which the Stone party did not
pass on to the government of El Salvador. Concerning the possibility of a
Central American settlement which would allow separate states to choose their
own form of government in return for pledging to leave each other alone, it
would be unacceptable because we could not be sure that clandestine support
would not continue flowing from Nicaragua to neighboring states and the large
military establishment of Nicaragua itself would continue to be a threat to
neighbors. Human rights in El Salvador continues to be a problem affecting
Congressional attitudes in this country. Vides is sensitive enough to this to
have circulated a standard of procedures to the army but the vexing Lopez
Sibrian case seems unlikely to be resolved.
7. In Nicaragua, symmetry would call for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas
to initiate preliminary discussions with the Sandinista Directorate through
intermediaries. The aim would be to produce a peaceful resolution of the
differences between the Contras and the Sandinistas at which point the US
would stop supporting the anti-Sandinista forces. The ultimate and beneficial
result of the Contadora negotiations themselves would be a new government in
Nicaragua which would allow opposition to flourish, unlikely as that may be.
A question was asked then: what if the means we are using to put pressure on
the other side are not sufficient to produce our maximalist objectives? One
reply to this is that we keep the pressure on to attain the resources we need,
namely, resources from Congress for our help to the government of El Salvador
and our support to the anti-Sandinista forces. If we were really negotiating,
we would make attractive offers to such persons as Ungo, for example, to split
various factions off from the FMLN, or to isolate the hardline Villalobos.
And in addition to playing them off against each other in negotiations, we
would plan the anti-guerrilla campaign in El Salvador with the same end in
mind: that is, attack or go easy on the forces of this faction or that for
the purpose of increasing doubts and jealousies among them.
8. Going back to the question of the ability of the government to defeat
the guerrillas in El Salvador, considerable skepticism was expressed by
military men about the possiblity ever of defeating the guerrillas as long as
they are supplied and supported from Nicaragua. A distinction was made here
between the difficulty of wearing guerrillas down in a war of attrition, which
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
?
0
may grind down the government as much as it does the guerrillas, and dealing
deliberate heavy blows to a particular unit in a short time. (There is a far
greater effect on morale if a unit takes a large number of casualties in a
short time rather than taking the same number of losses over an extended
period.) It was brought out by one participant that we must assume that the
FMLN can last until the next Presidential election in this country -- if that
is considered to be an aim -- but we must question whether the anti-Sandinista
forces in Nicaragua can last as long. Their performance so far has not been
significant: if anything they are unifying the Sandinistas rather than
causing factionalism in the Directorate and the Directorate has been flexible
in dealing with them.
9. Concerning the strength of the guerrillas in El Salvador, compare the
activity of the guerrillas a year ago, when they seemed formidable, with the
past summer, and we see that they have accomplished much less. We have been
waiting all summer for a major attack on government forces, but it has not
taken place and we hear reports now of an October offensive. What is the
reason for the delay? Several reasons were cited: factionalism in the FMLN
was one. The result of the government's summer-long offensive, much more
effective than we had thought in May that it could be, was another. Perhaps
the guerrillas had been pacing themselves for the then-expected elections in
El Salvador at the end of this year. The guerrillas may need new weapons as a
result of the disruption of supply. (There was speculation about their having
SA-7's, the Soviet version, or US Redeyes, for use against helicopters. This
would be a blow to the anti-guerrilla-forces in El Salvador: the Afghan
rebels have hand-held SA missiles, after all, so that the lack of such weapons
in El Salvador is probably not a result of any Soviet reluctance to escalate
in weaponry.) Another reason for the lack of a guerrilla offensive was
offered: What can the guerrillas gain from a large-scale offensive while
talks'are going on? Past offensives were followed by propaganda pushing for
the negotiations now going on. Also, the guerrillas do continue to undermine
the economy of El Salvador through sabotage. Now we wait to see what October
will bring.
J
John R. Horton
4
SECRET/
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020029-8