THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004600030001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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L,IC 4
JSW
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
V,7
THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE
CARIBBEAN AREA.
NIE 87-54
Approved 9 March 1954
Published 16 March 1954
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: FIR 70-2
DATED t Y 1 REVIEWER:
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 9 March 1954. The FBI abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
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IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current situation and probable developments in the British,
French, and Dutch dependencies in the Caribbean area, with particular reference to
internal security; and to.evaluate the current attitudes of the Latin American repub-
lics toward those dependencies.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The European possessions' in the
Caribbean area are of strategic impor-
tance to the US primarily because of their
geographic position. In time of general
war, US military bases in most of the de-
pendencies would. be essential to the se-
curity of strategically vital US and West-
ern Hemisphere areas, installations, and
lines of communication. Conversely,
control or even covert use of any of the
dependencies by enemies of the US could
in wartime threaten vital US interests.
2. Certain dependencies are also impor-
tant producers of -strategic bauxite and
petroleum products. Dutch Guiana
(Surinam), British Guiana, and Jamaica
currently produce approximately 59 per-
cent of the Free World's supply of bauxite
ore. They provide nearly 50 percent of
the total US supply and the major part of
Canada's supply. The capacity of the
petroleum refineries of Dutch Aruba and
Curacao amounts to about 6 percent of
Free World capacity. In the event of
war, the importance of the Caribbean
A list of these possessions, including their popu-
lation and racial composition, is in Annex A. -
sources of these commodities would be
greatly enhanced, and might become crit-
ical, owing to the distance and vulner-
ability of other major sources.
3. For the most part, the dependencies
are characterized by political immaturity
and depressed social and economic condi-
tions. Political tensions within the de-
pendencies are unlikely to abate, and
local disorders will continue to occur.
However, for the foreseeable. future, the
European authorities will retain the ca-
pability to restore order with their police
and military forces.
4. The Communist movement in the de-
pendencies is connected 'with that in the
respective metropoles and with the
WFTU, rather than with Communists in
Latin America, and we believe that this
situation will continue. The Commu-
nists are strongest in Martinique and
Guadeloupe, where the French authori-
ties impose no restrictions on ,their or-
ganizational or propaganda activities.
The 'Communists there could probably
organize serious disorders, and their ca-
pabilities in this respect are growing.
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Nevertheless, the. French authorities
could restore order unless the Commu-
nists were armed from overseas. If, how-
ever,-in the event of war or paralyzing
social disorders in France, the Commu-
nists were given arms and instructions to
seize power, loyal French security forces
in the area would probably be unable to
restore order without external assistance.
5. In the British West Indies, Commu-
nism is presently weak, but its influence
is growing, particularly in Jamaica and
Trinidad. In British Guiana its influ-
ence is strong. The Communists have
capabilities for sabotage in each of these
colonies, and they can be expected to
have an increasing capability in Jamaica
and Trinidad for fomenting or abetting
disorders. We believe that the control of
British Guiana will remain in the hands
of British officials backed by troops and
a strong police force. In British Hon-
duras there is as yet no evidence of Com-
munist activity, although the population
would be susceptible to Communist agita-
tion.
6. In.the Netherlands dependencies there
is as yet-no significant -Communist move-
ment.
7. Preservation of European authority in
the Caribbean dependencies tends to in-
sure the availability of the strategic ma-
terials and bases in the area. However,
US support for the European position
occasions difficulties in relations with
friendly but anticolonial powers, pri-
marily the Latin American republics.
DISCUSSION
1. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE
CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES
8. Geographic. The Caribbean dependencies
are of strategic importance to the US prima-
rily because of their geographic position. In
time of general war, US air and naval bases
and radar sites in most of the dependencies
would be essential to the security of strategi-
cally vital US and Western.Hemisphere areas,
installations,, and lines of communication. In
World War II, US forces used facilities in the
Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trini-
dad, Aruba, Curacao, and all the Guianas.
9. Conversely, control or even covert use of
any of the dependencies by enemies of the US
could in wartime threaten vital US interests,
since their location would make feasible their
utilization as bases or staging areas for infil-
tration, sabotage, or commando-type opera-
tions, and for submarine supply.
10. Military. Apart from the extensive
World War II naval and air base facilities,
most of which would have to be redeveloped
to support sustained military operations, the
military resources in the dependencies are
meager. Each of the three metropoles main-
tains small armed forces in the area.2 In
addition, each has colonial police forces and
reserve police units in its dependencies. The
mission of all these forces is to preserve in-
ternal security. In event of general war, they
could be augmented somewhat by local re-
cruitment, but they could not be expected to
perform missions other than local security.
The dependencies could provide an estimated
maximum of. 360,000 untrained men of poor
quality and limited utility for military service.
The entire burden of financing, training, and
equipping this personnel, however, would have
to be borne by the metropole or by the US.
11. In event of general war or imminent
threat of war, the British, French, and Dutch
Governments would almost certainly make
available needed base facilities and sites in
the dependencies to US forces. In addition to
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the present US naval station in Trinidad, the
US enjoys leaseholds through the year 2040 on
base sites in Trinidad, Jamaica, St. Lucia, An-
tigua, the Bahamas, and British Guiana.
Facilities in the French and Dutch possessions
could be obtained without serious difficulties,
provided friendly governments retained au-
thority. In any event, the seaward defenses
of the whole Caribbean area would almost
certainly fall to US responsibility.
12. Economic. The European dependencies
are important producers of two strategic com-
modities, bauxite and petroleum products. In
the event of general war, the importance of
the Caribbean sources of these commodities
would be greatly enhanced and might become
critical, owing to the distances and vulnera-
bility of other major sources: France and
West Africa in the case of bauxite, and the
Middle East in the case of petroleum.
13. Currently, Dutch Guiana (Surinam),
British Guiana, and Jamaica respectively pro-
duce about 25, 21, and 13 percent of the Free
World's supply of bauxite. Exports to the US
amount to about 80 percent of total US im-
ports of the ore, i.e., nearly 50 percent of the
total US supply. In addition, Canada obtains
the major part of its supply from the same
dependencies. The transshipment facilities
at Trinidad are important in the overseas
movement of bauxite from the Guianas. In
French Guiana, extensive bauxite deposits
have been proved, but exploitation. has not
yet begun.
14. The petroleum refineries at Curacao. and
Aruba are among the world's largest. Sup-
plied by Venezuelan crude, these refineries
have a capacity amounting to about 6 percent
of Free World capacity. The refineries pro-
duce virtually every kind of petroleum prod-
uct, including motor and aviation gas, jet
fuels, special fuel oils used- by the .US Navy,
and POL used. by the US Army. Trinidad
makes a minor petroleum contribution, cur-
rently less than 1 percent of both crude pro-
duction and refinery output of the Free World.
Trinidad's pitch lake is an important source
of pure asphalt.
15. Finally, relatively small quantities of the
strategic minerals, columbite and tantalite,
are produced in British Guiana, amounting in
1953 to 2 or 3 percent of Free World supply.
Manganese explorations in that colony show
promise.
16. Although the bauxite production of the
European territories in the Caribbean area is
of vital strategic importance to the Free World
and petroleum production is of considerable
importance, these territories generally are not
essential to the economies of the metropolitan
powers.
II. CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN THE
CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES
General
17. The Caribbean dependencies of the UK,
France, and the Netherlands have a rapidly
expanding population of. some 4.5 million.
The great majority is Negro-mulatto, and only
about 2 percent is white. There are large
Asian minorities in Dutch and British Guiana
and Trinidad.3 The economies of the de-
pendencies (excepting the Dutch West Indies)
are based wholly or largely on agriculture.
For the most part, the area is characterized
by political immaturity and depressed social
and . economic conditions, with increasing
overpopulation, chronic unemployment, high
disease rates, ignorance, and underdeveloped
economies.
18. Such adverse conditions, combined with
post-World War II political currents which
are operating in most of the world's dependent
areas, have produced widespread local pres-
sures (except in the French territories) for
improvement through increased self-govern-
ment and ultimate autonomy. Numerous
radical and demagogic native leaders - in-
cluding Communists and Communist sympa-
thizers - have risen in nearly all the depend-
encies to organize and direct mass followings.
The resultant tensions, which at times erupt
into disorders, have posed a continuous threat
to stability in most parts of the area, and
The estimated population and racial composition
of each of (the dependencies are contained in
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they require the metropoles to maintain in
the Caribbean trained military units as well
as large police forces.
19. The Communist movement in the depend-
encies is connected with that in the respective
metropoles and with the WFTU, rather than
with Communists in Latin America. This
pattern conforms to that of the dependencies
limited overseas contacts and is likely to con-
tinue indefinitely.
20. Despite the generally insignificant con-
tributions of the dependencies to the metro-
politan economies and the financial and
administrative burdens they impose, the UK,
France, and the Netherlands intend to hold
on to them, largely for prestige reasons. The
two basic problems which the metropoles must
meet if.explosive discontent is to be eliminated
from the dependencies are: (a) economic de-
velopment to provide adequate levels of living,
and (b) except in the French colonies, new
political relationships between metropole and
dependency involving concessions to local
pressures and aspirations.
21. In the postwar period, the metropolitan
powers have each sponsored increased native
participation in local government, but not at
the pace demanded by many native leaders.
For the improvement of economic and, social
conditions, the powers have sponsored and
financed investment schemes which have been
generous in relation to the metropoles'. own
postwar resources, but usually inadequate in
relation to the needs of the area, especially in
-view of -the rapid population growth. Thus,
the outlook for the abatement of tensions in
the Caribbean dependencies is not bright, and
occasional local disorders will continue to
occur.
British West Indies (Bahamas, Jamaica,
Leeward Islands, Windward Islands,
Barbados, Trinidad)
22. The central problem of the BWI is eco-
nomic. The area contains more people than
it can adequately support, and the population
is increasing rapidly. On the basis of exist-
ing trends, the population is expected to dou-
ble in the next thirty years. Even in the best
of times, unemployment is serious and living
conditions are extremely poor. Prospects for
relief through large-scale emigration and
birth control are practically nil. UK-financed
programs for agricultural and industrial de-
velopment, as well as some foreign private
investment in mining and secondary industry,
have helped to alleviate the situation. How-
ever, the feasible rate of such expansion and
development can probably do little more than
maintain present living conditions for the
growing population.
23. Poor living conditions, constant economic
difficulties, and urban crowding have pro-
duced chronic instability and occasional strife
in the region. Despite these obstacles to
orderly political development, and also the
political apathy and immaturity of the
masses, Britain has granted each of the col-
onies in the last decade new constitutions
containing substantial advances toward local
self-government. In the las t four years, the
major colonies - Jamaica, Barbados, and
Trinidad - all acquired virtual control of
their domestic affairs, although the British-
appointed governors retain ultimate emer-
gency powers. In view of the numerous haz-
ards to stability, as well as the factionalism,
corruption, demagogy, and inexperience that
characterize West Indian politics, these new
constitutional systems may break down, nota-
bly in Jamaica and Trinidad. In such event,
the British governors would act to enforce
order as in British Guiana in October 1953.
24. In the small islands, the powers of the
legislatures, which generally have leftist ma-
jorities representing the negro working class,
are still very limited, and the governors do not
hesitate to suppress disorders by force.
25. Within a few years, the BWI (excepting
the Bahamas) are likely to federate under a
constitution which grants something ap-
proaching Commonwealth status. With Brit-
ish financial aid for some years, which has
been promised, such regionalization of com-
mon problems may somewhat enhance eco-
nomic and political stability in the area.
26. Communism. The Communist movement
in the BWI is weak but growing in numbers
and influence. Trained Communist leaders
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are so far very few in number, but organiza-
tional efforts have been increased, with funds
and advice forthcoming from both the
British Communist Party and the Communist-
controlled World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU). No Communist party appears to
have been organized as yet in any of the
islands, but Communists and fellow-travelers
have been actively building front organiza-
tions involving political, labor, youth, cultural,
and "peace" groups. Considerable quantities
of Communist literature have been coming to
the BWI through the mails from Europe.
27. The typical Communist tactic in the BWI
is to organize study groups, and then turn
them into activist front movements. The
Communists generally concentrate on fanning
social and economic grievances, and on
preaching the evils of capitalism and imperi-
alism rather than on advocating Communism.
The. Communists advocate self-government, as
a necessary step toward Communist control.
28. Although there are some Communists
active in all the colonies, Communism has so
far emerged as a significant problem only in
Jamaica and Trinidad. Communist leaders
in both islands have maintained contacts with
European Communists and they appear to be
getting increasing aid and advice from Eu-
rope. However, no outstanding popular lead-
ers have emerged. In Jamaica, the Commu-
nists were expelled from the People's National
Party and from its affiliated Trades Union
Congress (TUC), which they had infiltrated.
Nevertheless, Jamaican Communists are ac-
tively proselytizing Jamaican youth, sugar
workers, and also the large Chinese commu-
nity. Prominent members of the latter group
belong to the Chinese Benevolent Society,
which is dominated by Communist China.
Other front organizations are the People's
Educational Organization, an embryo Com-
munist Party of possibly 500 members, and the
recently organized Federation of, Trade
Unions, a rival to the TUC. The influence of
both is small so far.
29. In Trinidad, Communists generally dom-
inate the Trades Union Congress and the re-
cently organized West Indian Independence
Party. Their Oilfield Workers' Trade Union is
the main union in the oil industry. In the
last two years, they have become increasingly
bold in propagating the Communist line.
However, the Communists suffered a setback
last November, when second-rank union lead-
ers forced withdrawal of the TUC from the
WFTU.
30. Spurred by the incidents in British
Guiana, British authorities are increasingly
alert to Communist activities. They have in-
creased their efforts to obstruct the inflow of
Communist publications and the intercolony
movements of Communist organizers. More-
over, the British will have the help of local
anti-Communist political leaders, who are in-
creasingly aware of Communist-aims. At the
same time, the British programs in the social,
economic, and political field may partially al-
leviate the worst popular discontents which
the Communists have exploited.
31. The outlook over the next few years is for
a limited increase in Communist numbers and
influence. Although the Communists will
have capabilities for sabotage and for foment-
ing disorder, the British will continue to be
able to maintain a reasonable degree of in-
ternal security. However, in. the event of a
serious economic recession in the area, Com-
munist strength and capabilities would prob-
ably grow rapidly, and the difficulty of main-
taining internal security would increase.
British Guiana
32. In the past few years, a few exceptionally
able Communists built in British Guiana a
well-organized, militant, and popular party,
the People's Progressive Party (PPP), with a
program for broad social and economic re-
form. The PPP last year swept the first elec-
tions to be held under a new, more liberal
constitution, and, as a result, took over the
important ministries of the local government.
The.subsequent disruptive and undemocratic
behavior of the PPP Ministers led the British
Governor in October 1953 to call in security
troops, suspend the constitution, and assume
control of the government.
33. Thus, the most immediate problem in
British Guiana is the replacement of a very
&MENMOTMIT
vwwowowwl
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popular Communist leadership in local poli-
tics and labor organizations. To deal with
the economic and social grievances which the
Communists have exploited, the UK has has-
tened to draw up a broad-scale economic de-
velopment plan, and has allotted funds to
finance it. This plan includes a program for
housing and other social welfare measures
which should alleviate the worst grievances.
The British hope that, in time, general eco-
nomic and social conditions will appreciably
improve.
34. Communism. Hard-core Communists are
probably few in number. Also, they may have
lost a small part of their mass following since
October 1953. However, they still control the
PPP, and they control or strongly influence
several leading labor unions. They maintain
contacts with the British Communist Party
and the WFTU.
35. The PPP is continuing to pour out propa-
. ganda against the government, employers,
opposition groups, imperialism, and capital-
ism. It does not openly advocate Commu-
nism, but rather advocates self-government
with sweeping social and economic reforms.
The Communists' immediate aim is probably
to extend their influence in the trade unions,
preserve PPP solidarity and popularity until
the next election, whenever that may come,
and stir up as much discontent and damage
to the economy as possible. Their ultimate
objective is a self-governing British Guiana
under Communist control.
36. Although the Communists will have capa-
bilities for widespread sabotage and for fo-
menting disorder, the British can almost cer-
tainly maintain general order in the colony.
They are restricting the movements of PPP
leaders within the colony, the holding of
meetings, and the circulation of propaganda.
They are making vigorous efforts to alleviate
the worst popular grievances and they are
holding out the promise of appreciably im-
proved living conditions in the future. Also,
they are encouraging opposition political
groups and are attempting to split the PPP
followers from their leaders.
37. However, the PPP remains in an advan-
tageous position to retain popularity. The
opposition is poorly organized and lacks any
broad appeal, while general- economic and
social improvement will come slowly. There-
fore, we believe that constitutional govern-
ment will continue to be suspended, and that
the control of the colony will remain in the
hands of British officials backed by troops and
a strong police force.
British Honduras
38. Like most other colonies in the Carib-
bean, British Honduras suffers from the poor
living conditions inherent in a stagnant-
plantation economy. Resultant discontents
boil up occasionally in disorders, fomented by
local extremist leaders who are anticolonial
and anti-British, but not Communist. Such
disorders are likely to 'continue to occur, but
the police and British troops will almost cer-
tainly retain the capability to cope with them.
Though the population would be susceptible
to Communist agitation, there is as yet no
evidence of Communist activity in British
Honduras.
39. Elections this year under a liberalized
constitution, if held, will probably reflect the
rise to dominant political influence of the
People's United Party (PUP). PUP leaders
are militant nationalists who appear to have
organized a mass following. They have prob-
ably received funds from Guatemala, which
has long aspired to absorb the-colony, but
British Hondurans see few attractions in such
a fusion.
French West Indies (Martinique and
Guadeloupe) and French Guiana
40. Like most other Caribbean dependencies,
the French colonies have underdeveloped,
plantation ' economies. Living standards are
low and disease rates high. Since the popu-
lations of Martinique. and' Guadeloupe are
growing rapidly, living standards are likely
to fall even further unless substantial eco-
nomic development is undertaken. France in
the postwar years has devoted substantial
sums to the colonies, mainly for education,
transportation, and sanitary improvements,
but economic development has not yet gone
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far beyond the survey stage. The inability of
the colonial economies to provide a satisfac-
tory living for the population is the source of
constant social tension. This tension is re-
flected in the resentment of the workers to-
ward the controlling interests, composed
largely of a few white families, and gives rise
to strong racial antagonisms.
41. In contrast to the British and Dutch de-
pendencies, the French possessions have a
mutually satisfactory political relationship
with the metropole. The three possessions
are "overseas departments," in theory assimi-
lated to metropolitan France. They send
-elected representatives to the Chambers of the
French Parliament and are administered by
the French Ministry of the Interior. There is
no significant opinion favoring local auton-
omy or separation from France.
42. However, this situation has had adverse
consequences for security and stability in the
French Caribbean territories, for the political
party divisions in France are mirrored in the
dependencies and aggravated there by local
antagonisms. In postwar elections, the Left
secured a dominant position in local politics.
The Communists gained a stronghold in Mar-
tinique and Guadeloupe which they have been
able to retain, since opposition parties are less
well-organized and have less dynamic leader-
ship.
43. Communism. Communism is consider-
ably stronger in the French West Indies than
anywhere else in the Caribbean. In Mar-
tinique and Guadeloupe, respectively, the
Communists' electoral strength is over 60 and
over 40 percent. The delegates they succeed
in electing to the French National Assembly
form part of the Communist bloc there. Com-
munist strength is concentrated in densely
populated areas, which include the important
administrative centers, and the Communists
dominate the labor force. The Communist
parties are under the direction of the French
party, with which they maintain easy contact
through their delegates to the French parlia-
ment and through periodic visits to the area
by French party officials. They have no
known intercourse with Communists in non-
French Caribbean territories.
44. Locally, the party has the standard cell
and politburo organization, but discipline ap-
pears to be much less strict than that of the
European parties. On the basis of scanty in-
telligence, we believe that the number of hard-
core Communists is small. The great major-
ity of Communist voters are concerned solely
with improving their material conditions.
The party's tactics appear aimed at preserv-
ing its electoral strength by advocating work-
er benefits, at improving party cohesiveness
by fanning economic grievances and racial re-
sentments, and at educating party members
and followers on international questions and
doctrine. The success of the last aim has
been dubious. At least in Martinique, the
party has a school for training militant
cadres. The long-range Communist objec-
tives depend on those of the French party.
45. The Communists of Martinique and Gua-
deloupe could probably organize serious dis-
orders, and their capabilities in this respect
are growing. Nevertheless, the police, the
elite security force, and the French military
in the islands could restore order, unless the
Communists were armed from overseas. If,
however, in the event of war or paralyzing
social disorders in France, the Communist
leaders were given arms and instructions to
seize power, loyal French security forces in
the area would probably be unable to restore
order without external assistance. If the
Communists could tie such an insurrection to
some popular emotion like racial bitterness,
and thus obtain wider cooperation, they could
probably seize power unless external assist-
ance was rapidly given the local French forces.
46. In French Guiana, Communist influence
is weak. There appear to be no tight party
machinery and few hard-core militants. Com-
munist electoral strength depends on the per-
sonal popularity of an individual who polled
21.3 percent of vote in the 1951 election to the
French National Assembly. Aside from the
small branch of the French Communist-con-
trolled trade union organization (CGT), the
Communists have created no front.organiza-
tions. Their capabilities will remain limited
to isolated acts of sabotage.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
47. Maintenance of internal security in the
French dependencies is the responsibility of
prefects appointed by and responsible to the
government in Paris. These officials prob-
ably maintain surveillance of Communist
leaders, but as long as the Communist party
remains a legal party -in France, they are
highly unlikely to restrict Communist organi-
zational or, propaganda activities in the de-
pendencies unless the local Communists pro-
duce a clear challenge to public security.
Netherlands West Indies (Curacao, Aruba,
and the minor -islands) and Dutch
Guiana (Surinam)
48. The main problem of the Netherlands de-
pendencies is the establishment of mutually
satisfactory political relationships with the
metropole. The NWI comprise the most pros-
perous European territory in the Caribbean
area, since the oil refining industry provides
a relatively high standard of living and virtu-
ally full employment. Dutch Guiana is poor
by contrast with the NWI, despite its impor-
tant bauxite industry, but it is relatively well
off when compared to other Caribbean terri-
tories.
49. The Netherlands in recent years has
granted a considerable measure of self-gov-
ernment to the dependencies in pursuance of
pledges to grant a status in the kingdom
equal to its own, but has retained decisive
authority in major fields. Occasional con-
flicts between the metropolitan and local au-
thorities are therefore likely. Local party
politics reflects the immaturity and extreme
factionalism characteristic of the whole Car-
ibbean area, and interparty and interracial
friction almost certainly will produce occa-
sional minor disorders. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that such disorders will pose a threat to
internal stability or the Netherlands position.
50. Communism. There is no significant
Communist movement or influence in the
Netherlands dependencies, though reports in-
dicate the presence of a few Communists and
the existence of a few minor fellow-traveling
groups with tenuous European connections.
A small amount of Communist literature is
smuggled in, mainly by seamen, but Dutch
security forces maintain a fairly efficient in-
telligence net. Immigration is strictly con-
trolled, and suspected subversives are sum-
marily deported. Local police and oil com-
pany police cooperate to prevent infiltration
of the oil industry of NWI. In Dutch Guiana,
security at the bauxite installations appears
effective, though transport is vulnerable.
III. THE ATTITUDES -AND POLICIES OF LATIN
AMERICA TOWARD THE.DEPENDENCIES
51. Throughout the Latin American republics
there has traditionally been a strong current
of opinion opposed to colonialism. This atti-
tude has been manifested officially in unilat-
eral and joint statements calling for elimina-
tion of European _ control over territories in
the Western Hemisphere. - Such expressions
have been voiced most often and most force-
fully by Guatemala, Argentina, and Chile,
countries whose interest in principle is rein-
forced by self-interest. Each has territorial
claims against the UK.
52. It is significant that most Latin American
official and public opinion denounced the
British action in British Guiana last fall,
subordinating dislike of Communism to that
of colonialism, despite US support for the UK.
However, the Latin American republics have
produced no positive program for action on
the colonial issue. For the foreseeable fu-
ture, they are unlikely to resort to direct
action, unless the people of a colony should
undertake to fight for independence. In
such case, unless the revolt was clearly Com-
munist-led, some republics might give mate-
rial aid to the revolutionaries, especially to
those in the mainland dependencies. Mean-
while, the republics will almost certainly air
the issue at every opportunity. The dispute
over the colonies between Latin America and
Europe, especially the UK, will continue to be
a source of some friction, but it will almost
certainly not seriously affect political or com-
mercial relations between the metropoles and
Latin America. -
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
IV. THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN CONTROL
OF THE DEPENDENCIES
53. For the foreseeable future, preservation of
European authority in the dependencies tends
to insure the availability of the strategic ma-
terials and bases.in the area. The levels of
stability and order maintained by the metro-
poles in the dependencies contrast favorably
with those of many of the independent Carib-
bean states.
54. Ultimate European responsibility for gov-
ernrrient and order in the dependencies pro-
tects from local political vagaries the opera-
tions of US and foreign companies engaged in
bauxite production, in the petroleum indus-
try, and in other enterprises. European re-
sponsibility for the economies probably re-
lieves the US of financial burdens; if the
colonies were independent, they would prob-
ably demand much greater aid than that
provided through FOA programs.
55. Since Britain, France, and the Nether-
lands intend to maintain dominance in their
possessions, any US opposition to such a posi-
tion would raise serious difficulties with these
allies.
56. European possession of the dependencies
occasions difficulties in US relations with-
friendly but anticolonial powers, primarily
the Latin American republics. Nationalist,
Communist, and other anti-US groups in these
countries make capital of the apparent dis-
crepancy between the traditional anticolonial
position of the US and its support of Euro-
pean "imperialism."
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
ANNEX A
ESTIMATED POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE
EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN
NEGRO-
MULATTO WHITE
ASIAN
OTHERS
TOTAL
PERCENT PERCENT
PERCENT
PERCENT
POPULATION
British Guiana 48.2 2.9
44.5
4.4
444,000
British Honduras 69.3 4.0
2.6
24.11
70,000
Jamaica 95.6 1.1
3.1
insig
1,464,000
Trinidad 61.0- 2.7
36.3.
insig
664,000
Barbados 94.8 = 5.1
insig
insig
218,000
Windward and Leeward Islands 96.1 1.3
2.3
insig
412,800
Bahamas 88.0 . 11.5,
insig
insig
83,000
French Guiana) ....................... over insig
insig
3.01
30,000
Martinique .) 95.0 1.0
insig
insig
261,000
Guadeloupe ) under 1.0
insig
insig
271,000
TOTAL French subjects
582,000
Dutch Guiana (Surinam) 49.0 under 1.0
48.0
1.01
208,000
Aruba ) .......................85.0 15.0
insig
insig
51,100
Curacao )
95,200
Other islands )
8,600
TOTAL Dutch subjects 362,900.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
ANNEX B
MILITARY FORCES IN THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES
British. Ground Forces. In Jamaica, the British have one metropolitan battalion (less one
company stationed in British Honduras) and one colonial battalion, which serve as
a security force for the entire British Caribbean area. The total strength of the two
battalions is 1,450 men. There are also 650 metropolitan troops temporarily in
British Guiana. It is planned to activate a second colonial battalion of 500 men in
Trinidad. There are active army reserve units of 360 colonials in Barbados and 200
colonials in British Honduras.
Navy. Royal Navy ships available for rapid deployment in the Caribbean area are
assigned to the Bermuda station. The squadron normally maintained on station
consists of one light cruiser and three frigates, one of which is usually in the Carib-
bean area. This force is expected soon to be reduced by one frigate. The remaining
three ships will have a total peacetime complement of about 1,100 men.
French. Ground Forces. The French army in the area is largely colonial, consisting of 700
troops in Martinique, 200 in Guadeloupe, and 200 in French Guiana.
Navy. The French maintain one submarine chaser and 30 men based on Martinique.
Dutch. Ground Forces. The Dutch have one metropolitan infantry battalion of 750 men in
Surinam and one marine battalion of 650 men divided between Curacao and Aruba.
Navy. Currently, one gunboat is on station at Curacao. Five hundred naval per-
sonnel are assigned to the ship and the naval operating base.
Naval Air Force. One squadron of conventional . engine fighters, with 75 officers
and men, is based on Curacao.
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 eclassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9