PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004600010001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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N1F 71_54
31 August 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 71-54
(Supersedes NIE-69)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTH AFRICA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and'the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 31 August 1954. Concurring were'the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
0o, UfAENT NO.
a iii CLASS
~ GLASSiFiEf) C
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COPY
NO).-
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
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1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover. and.,of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
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b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
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h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
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2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
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United States Information Agency
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L ~~71PL
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in North Africa.'
CONCLUSIONS
1.: The chief problem in North Africa is
the growing state of tension created by
the unresolved conflict between France
and the rapidly growing nationalist move-
ment in French possessions, especially in
Tunisia and Morocco. While nationalism
has nowhere yet developed the strength
to present a serious threat to over-all
French control, an increasing number of
North African nationalists have adopted
extremist tactics as the path to independ-
ence.
2. The nature of ties between France
and its North African possessions , and
France's determination to maintain these
ties make extremely difficult any recon-
ciliation between French interests and
nationalist desires for complete independ-
ence. At the same time, the French rec-
ognize the necessity for further reforms,
and over the next few years will probably
grant a degree of internal autonomy, first
in.; Tunisia and later in Morocco. How-
ever, in the short term, the French will
not make concessions which will endanger
their strategic control of the area or de-
1 The term North Africa, as used in this paper,
means French North Africa, Spanish Morocco,
Tangier, and Libya. This estimate supersedes
NIE 69, "Probable Developments in North
Africa" (12 September 1952).
stroy the privileged economic position of
the settlers of French descent (colons).
3. Despite any short-term accommoda-
tion between the French and the Tunisian
and Moroccan nationalists, we consider it
'almost certain that opposition to remain-
ing French controls will continue to grow
at an increasing rate, although temporary
periods of quiescence will occur. Limited
and gradual French reform programs are
unlikely to reduce tension more than tem-
porarily or to keep pace with increasing
nationalist demands. Extremists are like-
ly to gain effective control over the ma-
jority of politically active Tunisians and
Moroccans within the next few years, ex-
cept in the unlikely event that moderate
nationalists are able through negotia-
tions to make progress clearly- leading to-
ward ultimate independence for the .two
protectorates.
4. As the strength of the nationalists in-
creases, they will, in the absence of ade-
quate French concessions, almost certain-
ly resort to violence. They will intensify
their terrorist guerrilla-type activities,
and might eventually organize a large-
scale uprising. They would anticipate
that a campaign of violence would arouse
favorable world opinion and result in po-
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litical intervention, probably through the
UN. However, so long as French military
capabilities are not seriously reduced, we
believe that the nationalists, because of
their insufficient organization and their
military weakness, will not be able to oust
the French by force.
5. Nevertheless, increasing native resist-
ance will probably - within the next de-
cade (possibly even within 'the next three
to five years) - create a serious drain on
French resources, strain the determina-
tion of the French to maintain their dom-
inant position, and impede use of the area
as a base by France and by the US. In
the long run France will probably either
have to grant independence voluntarily or
resort to increasingly costly military re-
pression. In the latter case France may.
eventually be presented with problems in-
soluble short of complete withdrawal from
Tunisia and Morocco.
6. Increasing nationalist resistance to
French control in North Africa might
constitute a serious threat to the security
of US bases in the area, particularly if
the nationalist movements should estab-
lish a common front with the Commu-
nists. As long as nationalist leaders con-
tinue to hope for US support they will try
to restrain their followers - from attacks
on the bases. However, some extremists
may not obey their leaders, and, as the
situation deteriorates, sporadic demon-
strations and raids against the bases will
become increasingly likely.
7. The growth of organized nationalist
activity in Algeria will probably lag be-
hind that in adjacent areas. The objec-
tives of many Algerian nationalists are
likely to remain moderate in the next few
years, with emphasis on removal of dis-
crimination and on greater Moslem par-
ticipation in government. However, be-
cause of the large French population and
the fact that Algeria is technically part
of metropolitan France, the French al-
most certainly will not grant any con-
siderable degree of autonomy. French
concessions are therefore unlikely to be
sufficient to prevent the further growth
of the nationalist movement.
8. We believe that the Communists are
unlikely to capture control of the nation-
alist movements. However, once the main
body of nationalists has come to accept
the strategy of violent action, the Com-
munist parties - now small, weak, and
with little influence - are almost certain
to coordinate activities with the nation-
alists, and may come to be accepted as
allies.
9. The efforts of both sides to secure US
support confront the US itself with major
policy decisions and the prospect of a
serious strain on its relations with many
nations in the Free World. If the US ap-
peared to favor the North African nation-
alists, it would probably succeed in de-
terring nationalist-Communist collabora-
tion and in assuring the physical security
of its present North African bases for a
longer time. By doing so, however, the
US would invite serious complications in
its relations with France and in its utili-
zation of these bases. On the other hand,
if the US strongly supported its NATO
partner, it would almost certainly lose in-
fluence among the .Near and Far Eastern
states, as well as be subjected to inter-
ference at the Moroccan bases. Sharp dif-
ferences between the Arab states and the
Western Powers over North Africa would
almost certainly lessen the possibility of
Arab cooperation with the West in Middle
East defense.
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10. Libya will probably remain oriented
toward the West, but its economic weak-
ness, political immaturity, and unresolved
Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differences cre-
ate problems which may threaten its fu-
ture stability. Such increased internal
instability might impede, but almost cer-
tainly would not preclude, use of Libyan
bases by the US and the UK.
DISCUSSION
1. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF NORTH
AFRICA
11. North Africa is of major strategic impor-
tance chiefly because of its geographic loca-
tion and its extensive military base network.
North Africa provides a base for: (a) control
of the Western Mediterranean and its Atlan-
tic approaches; (b) invasion operations with-
in the Mediterranean basin; and (c) air
operations against Europe, the European
USSR, and the Middle East.
12. Military. French North Africa, with its
population of well over 20,000,000,2 is impor-
tant to France in particular as: (a) a reser-
voir of military manpower; (b) the site of
major bases and training areas; and (c) a
place to which the French and others could
retreat, if necessary, in event of war. Spain
utilizes Spanish Morocco as a source of native
troops and as a training area.
13. According to French standards for colo-
nial troops, there are 2,700,000 physically fit
natives of military age in French North
Africa. There are at present over 95,000
North African natives in the French Army
(approximately 14 percent of total French
forces). Of these, some 45,000 are in North
Africa and about 35,000 are in Indochina.
Important French naval bases exist at Casa-
blanca, Mers-el-Kebir, Bizerte, and at Algiers,
which is the headquarters of the NATO West-
ern Mediterranean Command. Morocco is
the chief basic training area for the French
air force. The US has completed three of the
four Moroccan strategic air bases provided
for in the 1951 agreement with the French.
It also has expanded the naval air base at
Port Lyautey, which is operated jointly with
the French. For at least the next 3 or 4
years the strategic importance of these Moroc-
can air bases probably will not decrease, even
though similar base facilities in Spain are de-
veloped.for US use.
14. Libya's location in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean region gives it considerable military
importance. The US and the UK each oper-
ate a large air base there. Libya also serves
as a British garrison area, the importance of
which has increased as a result of the Suez
settlement.
15. Political. North Africa is politically im-
portant because it is the scene of a growing
conflict between native nationalists and the
French. The French believe that their power
position depends largely on their ability to
retain North Africa. French efforts to retain
their position, however, will vitally affect na-
tive reactions toward the West and will have
major repercussions upon US-French rela-
tions. They will also influence Western rela-
tions with the Arab-Asian countries, since
colonialism in North Africa is a source of
great concern to these governments.
16. Economic. The predominantly agricul-
tural economies of North Africa are relatively
poor and underdeveloped, and the area's re-
sources developed thus far are not of major
economic importance except to France. The
chief minerals - phosphates, iron ore,-man-
ganese, lead, and zinc-constitute a rela-
tively small portion of Free World supplies
but are of importance to France. About 10
percent of French imports (mainly wines,
cereals, vegetables, vegetable oils, and min-
erals) come from North Africa, while about 20
percent of French exports go to that area.
France provides about 70 percent of North
Africa's imports and receives about 60 percent
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VaSAKWHIT
of its exports. On the other hand, French
North Africa's postwar budgetary and trade
deficits have been a burden on France. The
French have developed excellent port facili-
ties and a good transport network.
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FRENCH AND
SPANISH NORTH AFRICA
17. The French Position in North Africa. Al-
though the French protectorates of Tunisia
and Morocco are nominally sovereign states
under their own native rulers, the Bey and
the Sultan, in practice France controls and
administers each country. Algeria is admin-
istered as an integral part of France. French
security control of the three regions is main-
tained by a garrison of some. 141,000 troops 3
and 6,500 gendarmerie. At the same time,
French ability to control Tunisia and Morocco
through pro-French native elements is likely
to become weakened: (a) as a result of ter-
rorist activities, native officials are likely to
attend to their duties with increasing fear
and reluctance; (b) French-supported Mos-
lem religious confraternities are likely to lose
their fervor and influence as modernism
spreads; (c) outlying Berber tribes will be
drawn increasingly into the mainstream of
nationalist action as more and more of their
members migrate to the cities.
18. The French Government and the roughly
1,400,000 residents in North Africa of French
descent (colons) dominate the administration
and the economy in all three areas; most
technical and supervisory positions are held
by the French. A large majority of these
colons strongly oppose concessions to local
nationalists, advocate severe repression of
nationalism, and have shown a growing dis-
position to undertake vigilante retaliation
against terrorism. They have considerable
influence on the French Residencies in
Tunisia and Morocco and on Paris because
of their French citizenship and political and
financial connections in the metropole. This
group thus constitutes, a major impediment
to the formation and implementation of a
liberal French policy for North Africa.
' Includes two infantry divisions now being trans-
ferred from France.
19. The Rise of Nationalism in French North
Africa. The most serious problem in North
Africa is the growing state of tension created
by the postwar growth of nationalist senti-
ment, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. In
Algeria nationalist sentiment is less intense.
Among the Arab and Berber population, espe-
cially the small educated classes, there has
been a steady increase in political conscious-
ness and sense of national identity, largely as
a result of the continuing impact of Western
political, social, and economic concepts and
institutions, and the concomitant weakening
of belief in the traditions and social institu-
tions of Islam. The nationalists in general
look toward ultimate independence, but they
are split into moderate and extremist factions
which vary in their immediate demands.
Moreover, the nationalist movement in Al-
geria is still internally divided and in some
areas of Tunisia and Morocco it has been
deprived of effective leadership through ar-
rests. However, the nationalist parties in the
protectorates are developing a considerable
degree of organization, especially in Tunisia.
Because of French suppression of nationalist
activities, the leading parties have been forced
to operate on a clandestine basis.
20. Although nationalism has nowhere yet
developed the strength to present a serious
threat to over-all French control, the inability
of moderate nationalists in either Tunisia or
Morocco to secure substantial concessions
from the French has led to the growth of
extremism and to terrorist activities which
the French have been unable to repress. The
nationalists have been encouraged to press
their demands more actively by developments
in Iran and Egypt, and by the external sym-
pathy and support they have received. In
particular, Arab-Asian efforts to secure them
a UN hearing have served as a major stimulus
to their cause. Furthermore, France's de-
feat and loss of prestige in Indochina have
encouraged a growing number of nationalists
to regard extremist tactics as the path to
independence. And, while some nationalist
leaders may believe that the outcome in Viet-
nam demonstrated the dangers of being swal-
lowed up while collaborating with the Com-
munists, many of their followers probably
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believe that events in Indochina demonstrated
the effectiveness of Communist aid.
21. Terrorist Activities. Organized terrorist
campaigns have developed during the past
two years in Tunisia and since mid-1953 in
Morocco. The rise of terrorism has largely
been due to: (a) the inability of moderate
nationalist leaders to win concessions from
the French; (b) the reaction in Morocco to
the Sultan's deposition; (c) French arrest of
the recognized nationalist leaders, leaving the
field clear for more extremist elements; (d)
repressive actions which drove the nationalist
parties underground; and (e) the utility of
violent tactics as, a means of attracting inter-
national attention. There have been increas-
ing indications that moderate leaders who
have rejected violence as their major instru-
ment of political action are losing control over
extreme nationalists. Terrorist operations in
both protectorates indicate a considerable de-
gree of general guidance and coordination on
at least a regional level, but specific actions
and tactics do not appear to be coordinated
and some actions probably are spontaneous in
character.
22. In Tunisia, the terrorist activities of ex-
tremist nationalists in the cities have been
supplemented with raids by organized bands.
These fellagah 4 bands, probably totaling
about 1,200 men, are directed by leaders who
show evidence of considerable skill and train-
ing. Apparently Libya and the Arab League
are playing only a minor role at present in
supplying and training these terrorists. The
fellagah have assumed a measure of impor-
tance out of proportion to their numbers be-
cause they represent the first nationalist at-
tempt to create- organized armed forces to
combat French control of North Africa.
23. In Morocco, the terrorists initially at-
tacked pro-French natives, and turned
against French nationals only as their cam-
paign expanded. Similarly, terrorist activi-
ties at first were concentrated mainly in the
cities, but they spread to rural areas last
spring with the burning of crops and prop-
erties. No hostility toward the terrorists on
'An Arabic term for bandits and outlaws.
the part of the native population has thus far
been evident. -
24. Nationalists in both Tunisia and . Morocco
have also succeeded to a considerable extent
in enforcing boycotts against European or
modern goods, dress, and methods of farming.
This development is in sharp contradiction to
the Western-oriented program generally advo-
cated by dominant nationalist groups in
North Africa. It is possible that the expan-
sion of such a movement could lead to reli-
gious fanaticism and indiscriminate hatred of
the West, further exacerbating the problem of
North African nationalism.
25. Tunisia. The native society in Tunisia is
politically and culturally the most advanced
in North Africa and has been allowed, since
World War II, some participation in govern-
ment by the French. The principal Tunisian
nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, has long
had substantial support in rural as well as
urban areas, and appears to have a large
measure of control over nationalist activities.
The Bey is a less influential factor in the
nationalist problem than the Sultan of
Morocco. Thus the nationalist problem in
Tunisia, although as acute as that in Mo-
rocco, is less complex and lends itself more
readily to negotiation.
26. The Mendes-France government is deal-
ing first with Tunisia. The program offered
Tunisia is based upon: (a) the grant of in-
ternal autonomy, to be implemented within
a determinate period; (b) insistence on the
maintenance of France's control over foreign
affairs, defense, and for some time, finance;
and (c) guarantees to protect the position of
the colons. A new Tunisian Government, in-
cluding several Neo-Destour ministers, formed
as a result of the offering of this program, is
to negotiate its implementation with the
French.
27. French Morocco. French difficulties in
developing a rapprochement with the nation-
alists have been greatly increased by the con-
tinuing storm of controversy over France's
deposition of the popular, pro-nationalist Sul-
tan Mohammed V in the summer of 1953.
His pliable relative, the present Sultan, has
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not been accepted by most Moroccans. More-
over, the reforms imposed on Morocco by the
French after the Sultan's deposition have been
discredited, and there has been a further in=
crease in mutual mistrust between the French
and the nationalists. On the other hand, the
colons and the Berber chieftain, the Pasha of
Marrakech, are demanding that France stand
firm with the present Sultan and refuse con-
cessions to the nationalists. Much more
numerous than their compatriots in Tunisia,
the colons in Morocco also have more exten-
sive economic interests and play a larger role
in French political and economic control of
the area. The Pasha cannot claim the alle-
giance of most Berbers, who constitute about
half the population. Many of them appear
to have been attracted to the predominantly
Arab nationalist cause. The Pasha has con-
sistently collaborated with the French and has
aided them to marshal considerable numbers
of his tribesmen for "spontaeous demonstra-
tions" to give a semblance of native support
to French policies.
28. Support for the Istiqlal, the leading Mo-
roccan nationalist party, until recently con-
sisted of an educated middle-class minority,
with a popular base largely in urban laboring
-groups. The Istiqlal is now gaining support
in the countryside. In general, however, the
illiterate rural bulk of the population, while
it has been aroused by such a dramatic event
as the Sultan's deposition, is not easily
brought into organized opposition.
29. Algeria. In contrast to the situation in
the protectorates, Algeria has been relatively
tranquil since the large-scale uprising in 1945,
and there is no indication of impending vio-
lence. Longest under French control, Algeria
has the largest population of French descent.
The indigenous population is permitted
French citizenship, though participation in
government is severely limited by various de-
vices which insure the political predominance
of the French residents. The nationalist
movement is still largely factionalized: an ex-
tremist faction favors violent action to achieve
independence, while a moderate group appears
to favor gradual evolution within the French
Union. A third group, composed of ulema
(students of Moslem law and traditions) but
with a rather modern outlook, has been in-
creasingly active in trying to unify national-
ists under its leadership and may well have
growing success. The Algerian nationalists
on occasion cooperate with the Communists
on tactical issues, but the latter's frequent at-
tempts to bring about a closer relationship
have consistently failed.
30. Spanish Morocco and Tangier. Close
Spanish controls and some 50-60,000 troops
maintain order in Spanish Morocco. The
nationalist Islah Party has developed some
strength but lacks widely based support in a
poor region which has had little exposure to
Western ideas and technology. As part of its
policy of wooing the Arab States and em-
barrassing France, Spain has made gestures
favorable to native nationalism, but has not
materially relaxed its control. While Spain
may soon introduce reforms which give titular
administrative positions to nationalist leaders,
there is no indication that it intends to grant
any significant degree of self-government.
However, it probably will continue its attempts
to embarrass the French through an ostensi-
bly lenient attitude toward the natives in
Spanish Morocco.
31. Spain's demands for restoration of its pre-
war role in the administration of the Interna-
tional Zone of Tangier have been largely sat-
isfied by the other participating powers. How-
ever, Tangier is likely to remain an arena for
French and Spanish disagreements. France
would like to see stronger measures taken
against nationalist activities in Tangier, but
Spain will probably seek to use the Zone as
a safe haven for non-violent, anti-French, na-
tionalist operations.
32. Cooperation between the Nationalist Move-
ments. Prior to 1954 the nationalist move-
ments in French North Africa made only
limited efforts to coordinate their activities,
largely confining themselves to sympathy
strikes and "days of mourning" designed to
show Moslem solidarity. However, under the
sponsorship of the Arab League, a new Com-
mittee for the Liberation of North Africa was
founded in Cairo early in 1954 to supplant an
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earlier organization which had been seriously
weakened by personal rivalries and disregard
of its directives. Political and personal dif-
ferences and conflicts between moderate and
extremist elements are likely to continue, but
the long-term likelihood of increasing French
repression and the need for coordinated action
in the UN probably will produce greater co-
operation among the nationalist movements.
33. Communist 'Influence. The Communist
parties of Algeria, French Morocco, and Tu-
nisia maintain close liaison with, and are di-
rected and partially financed by the French
Communist Party. The Communist aim since
1946 has been the formation of a united.front
with the nationalists, but to date the small
North African Communist parties (about 15,-
000 members in Algeria and 2,000 in each of
the protectorates) have had only limited in-
fluence on the nationalist movements. With
the exception of a limited temporary alliance
in Algeria during 1951-52, the known nation-
alist leaders have consistently refused to ac-
cept any political working relationship, largely
because: (a) they realized that such ties would
alienate many sympathizers in non-Commu-
nist areas; (b) the local Communist parties
are known to be subject to control by French-
men; and (c) nationalist financial support
comes chiefly from the anti-Communist native
upper middle class.
34. There is no reliable evidence so far that
the North African Communist parties have
organized or joined in terrorist activites. The
Communists apparently desire to lead a wide-
ly-based nationalist movement rather than
"adventurist" factions. They -are also prob-
ably anxious to avoid arousing antagonism in
France by supporting terrorism in North Afri-
ca at a time when they are advancing the
united front theme emphasizing the benefits
of negotiations with the USSR, and the USSR
is attempting to separate France from the
Western Alliance. There is extensive coopera-
tion between the French Communists and the
North African workers resident in France who
are affiliated with the extremist faction in
Algeria. This cooperation probably results
in the conversion of many Algerian workers to
Communism, but so far it does not appear to
have facilitated closer relations between the
nationalists and Communists in Algeria itself.
35. Direct'Soviet activity in North Africa re-
mains limited, and the USSR has never
claimed its seat in the Committee of Control
at Tangier. However, although Radio Mos-
cow is still giving little attention to North
Africa, greater Communist interest in the
area is indicated by the recent inauguration
of a new quasi-clandestine radio station which
transmits in Arabic to North Africa via Buda-
pest. This station has given more attention
and support to nationalist movements than
has the official Soviet radio. -
36. Economic Problems. Large-scale indus-
trial development in North Africa is limited
by the shortage of fuel resources and invest-
ment capital, by low native purchasing power,
and by the low productivity and lack of skill
among workers. The growth of secondary in-
dustries has been seriously hampered by high
production costs and the competition of for-
eign products on both local and external mar-
kets. Roughly a quarter of the arable land
is under relatively efficient European cultiva-
tion, but native agriculture generally is less
than half as productive as European. The
population of North Africa is increasing more
rapidly than the indigenous food supply. If
the present rate of food production is not sub-
stantially increased, French North Africa will
be faced with a serious reduction in already
low levels of consumption.
37. The French have substantial investments
in North Africa which represent an important
source of income for a few French banks and
corporations and for the colons. The bulk of
private investment in North Africa, whether
from France or from local sources, is almost
entirely French, and only small amounts of
foreign capital other than French are entering
the area. Both political and economic pres-
sures for more rapid development are steadily
mounting. Therefore, the French have been
contributing larger amounts of public invest-
ment funds in the post war period. The first
French government development plan em-
phasizing large-scale public works projects is
being followed by a project - still in the plan-
ning stage - directed toward native agricul-
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ture and social improvements. The new pro-
gram, estimated to cost $1.6 billion, represents
almost 10 percent of the public investment
program of France and its overseas posses-
sions. The benefits of past programs have
largely gone to the colons; the lot of most
North Africans has not improved materially
during the past six years. The new emphasis
of the proposed second French plan probably
has come too late to enlist the sympathy and
cooperation of the native population, whose
discontent stems less from poverty than from
the economic and social inequalities between
the natives and the colons.
38. Growing insecurity and the accompanying.
decline in industrial and commercial activity
have resulted in a decline in private invest-
ment in Tunisia and Morocco. Public expend-
itures will have to increase considerably if
they are to make up for decreased private in-
vestment, and to avert the consequences of
growing population pressures. Heightened
French interest in developing the African
territories as a base for French power probably
will stimulate further increased expenditure
of public funds. But such an increase will
depend on the outcome of forthcoming ne-
gotiations between the French and the nation-
alists and probably would not survive a re-
sumption of extremist actions.
III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH
NORTH AFRICA
39. International Pressures. External sup-
port is playing a major and growing part in
the development of the nationalist movements
in North Africa. The chief source of this
support has been the Arab-Asian nations,
which not only sympathize with national in-
dependence movements, but in the case of the
Arab states have ties of cultural, racial, and
religious kinship as well. The Arab and
Asian states will almost certainly increase
even further their efforts to obtain favorable
UN action on the . Tunisian and Moroccan
cases. While the small resources of the Arab
states will limit their capabilities for material
assistance, they will probably help nationalist
exiles, provide increasing financial aid, and
assist in smuggling arms. Over the long run,
the USSR may apply greater pressure in the
area through Bloc action in the UN and clan-
destine support to nationalist activity. The
US has not supported North African national-
ism in the UN, but both the nationalists and
the Moslem countries will increase their efforts
to secure some form of US action which can
be construed as support for the nationalists.
40. It will probably become increasingly dif-
ficult, particularly if North African disorders
continue, for the UN to withstand Arab-Asian
pressures for concrete UN recommendations
on the protectorates. France probably will
not retreat from its basic position. that UN
consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan
problems is an unwarranted interference in
French domestic affairs. France probably
will ignore or reject any UN recommendations
relating to the protectorates, though it will
attempt to forestall such recommendations
through real or ostensible reforms on its own.
41. French Policy. The proximity of North
Africa to France, the large and well-
entrenched population of French descent, and
the extensive French investments in the area
have created a unique relationship between
metropole and colonial areas and make reten-
tion of these possessions a major objective of
France. Moreover, the contraction of the
French position in Indochina and the in-
creased violence in Tunisia and Morocco over
the past year have focused French attention
on the importance of holding North Africa.
The "Eurafrique" concept of France's inter-
national power position, according to which
the resources of France must be concentrated
on strengthening its Europe-Africa power'
complex as the means of matching a resur-
gent Germany and of retaining a respected
voice in the policies of the Western alliance,
has become a fixed element of France's foreign
policy. The collapse of French power in the
Far East has increased support for this con-
cept in all French political parties except the
Communist. The unique ties between France
and North Africa and France's determination
to maintain these ties make extremely diffi-
cult any reconciliation between French in-
terests and nationalist desires for complete
independence.
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42. At the same time French governments
have recognized the necessity for further
political reforms in North Africa; French
policy for the past two years has been based
officially on previous pledges to extend "in-
ternal autonomy" gradually to the protec-
torates. In practice, this policy has combined
suppression of nationalist activities with lim-
ited reform programs imposed on the protec-
torates. These reform programs have been
particularly unacceptable to the nationalists
because they provided for participation of the
colons in the newly created Tunisian and Mo-
roccan elective bodies under the principle of
"co-sovereignty." The present French gov-
ernment has shown unusual initiative in at-
tempting to satisfy moderate nationalist
aspirations. However, it is unlikely that this
policy will be continued indefinitely, and fu-
ture French governments will probably con-
tinue to act belatedly in response to external
pressures rather than try to reduce the threat
of local nationalism by fore-handed reforms.
43. French policies will vary in Tunisia, Mo-
rocco, and Algeria because of the differing
French ties with these areas and their dif-
ferent stages of political development. The
program which Mendes-France has proposed
for Tunisia envisages a substantial degree of
internal autonomy, and he probably would
accept such nationalist proposals as: creation
of a single, elected all-Tunisian Assembly; the
end of certain direct political controls; and
"Tunisification" of the civil service. Such a
program arouses.intense opposition not only
among the colons, but among many of the
Independent-Peasants and Radicals and some
of the ex-Gaullists in the French Assembly.
However, Mendes-France, if he stays in office,
is likely to secure a compromise settlement
which will attract broad Assembly support
and remove the more immediate causes of
nationalist. violence, while, holding out the
prospect of further negotiations on nation-
alist demands. Such a compromise probably
will bring about at most a temporary respite
from nationalist disorders.
44. France probably will also propose new
reforms for Morocco in the near future,
though on a more modest scale. There 'are
indications that Mendes-France intends such
action prior to the scheduled autumn session
of the UN General Assembly. We believe that
the French will first have to remove the
present unpopular Sultan because the instal-
lation of a Sultan satisfactory to the majority
of Moroccans is essential before a program of
reforms can be negotiated. However, the
need to uphold remaining French prestige
probably precludes the return of the former
Sultan. The enthronement of one of his sons
may be the only feasible alternative, provided
that the Moroccan populace is convinced that
the ex-Sultan favors such action. Further-
more, some of the discredited reforms imposed
on Morocco after the last Sultan's deposition
will have to be repealed or revised. If these
conditions are fulfilled, and if the French have
demonstrated good will in the Tunisian nego-
tiations, we believe that at least a temporary
halt in nationalist violence will also be secured
in Morocco.
45. Over the next few years France will prob-
ably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first
in Tunisia and later in Morocco. However,
we believe that future French governments
will insist at a minimum on retaining certan
key controls over the protectorates, particu-
larly in the fields of foreign affairs and de-
fense, and to some extent public finance and
justice. Control of defense forces would also
give the French a legal basis for acting in the
field of internal security. In addition, France
probably will insist on protecting the legal
rights and economic interests of the colons
through special agreements. France appar-
ently hopes that in the very long term Tunisia
and Morocco could be persuaded to become
Associated States in the French Union, or
some variant of that status. The French do
not contemplate granting autonomy to Al-
geria, but rather completing the integration
of Algeria into the metropole. Finally, what-
ever the extent of French concessions, France
probably will not hesitate to use force to con-
trol any further nationalist outbreaks.
46. Probable Further Growth of Nationalism
in Tunisia and Morocco. Despite any short
term accommodation between the French and
the nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco, we
consider it almost certain that nationalist
opposition to French control will continue to
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grow at an increasing rate, although periods
of quiescence will occur. As the French allow
greater native participation in local adminis-
tration, both nationalist desires and capabili-
ties for self-government will almost certainly,
increase. Limited and gradual French reform
programs are unlikely to reduce tension more
than temporarily or to keep pace with increas-
ing nationalist demands.
47. Moreover, the very success of their recent
terrorist tactics will present a constant temp-
tation to the nationalists to revert to violence
in order to gain their objectives. Resort to
terrorism is likely to increase if moderate
nationalist leaders are unable through nego-
tiations to make progress clearly leading
toward ultimate independence for Tunisia and
Morocco.
48. If the French should soon grant independ-
ence (which we consider highly unlikely), the
nationalists would in return almost certainly
accept close military and economic ties with
France, although they would not join the
French Union as presently constituted. How-
ever, unless such a settlement were made
within the next several years, the nationalists
would accept such ties only with great reluc-
tance and would probably repudiate them as
soon as feasible. If the deterioration in
French and nationalist relations continues,
even the nationalist leaders who have been
relatively moderate probably will in time re-
fuse to seek complete independence by peace-
ful and gradual means. They would proba-
bly join the extremists in further periodic
sabotage and terrorism calculated to attract
international attention and put pressure on
the French. French countermeasures might
temporarily put down aggressive nationalist
activity but would probably lead to its even-
tual resumption in even more violent form.
49. As the strength of the nationalists in-
creases they will, in the absence of adequate
French concessions, almost certainly resort to
violence. They will intensify their terrorist
guerrilla-type activities, and might eventu-
ally organize a large-scale uprising. They
would anticipate that a campaign of violence
would arouse favorable world opinion and
result in political intervention, probably
through the UN. However, so long as French
military capabilities are not seriously reduced,
we believe that the nationalists, because of
their insufficient organization and their mili-
tary weakness, will not be able to oust the
French by force.
50. Probable Growth' of Nationalism in. Al-
geria. The growth of organized nationalist
activity in Algeria will probably lag behind
that in adjacent areas. The objectives of
many Algerian nationalists are likely to re-
main moderate in the next few years, with
emphasis on removal of discrimination and
on greater Moslem 'participation in govern-
ment. However, ties with France are so close
that the French almost certainly will not
grant. any considerable degree.of autonomy.
French concessions are therefore unlikely to
be sufficient to prevent the further growth of
the nationalist movement. The conflict be-
tween the French and the nationalists in Al-
geria may in the long run prove most difficult
to resolve, particularly if Tunisia and Mo-
rocco receive a considerable degree of inde-
pendence.
51. Communism and Nationalism. The Com-
munists will probably continue their efforts
to exploit nationalist desires for independ-
ence by attempting to capture the nationalist
movements, but we believe they will be un-
likely to succeed. While Communist-natiori-
alist collaboration may increase, particularly
if France adopts repressive policies and ex-
tremists gain control of nationalist parties,
such collaboration on the part of the nation-
alist groups will probably be undertaken to
further their own aims and not because of
any basic sympathy for Communism. How-
ever, once the main body of nationalists has
come to accept the strategy of violent action,
the Communist parties - now small, weak,
and with little influence - are almost certain
to coordinate activities with the nationalists,
and may come to be accepted as allies. In
that event, Communist sabotage capabilities,
would be increased and opposition to the pres-
ence of Western troops and bases in the area
would be strengthened.
52. Effect on French and US Positions. In
the light of the above factors we believe
SECRET
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that the outlook remains one of growing in-
stability in North Africa, characterized by
sporadic crises and disturbances created by
the growing nationalist opposition to.French
control. While we believe that the nation-
alists cannot oust the French by force alone,
increasing native resistance in Tunisia and
Morocco will probably - within the next dec-
ade - create a serious drain on French finan-
cial and manpower resources and strain the
determination of the French to maintain
their dominant position. This in turn will
impede use of the area as a base by France and
by the US. Moreover, the reliability of French
North African troops might decrease under
the stimulus of nationalism, reducing the
value of this major military asset. In the
long run France will probably either have to
grant independence voluntarily or else resort
to increasingly costly military repression. In
the latter case the time may come when a
combination of nationalist insurrections and
external pressures will present France with
problems insoluble short of complete with-
drawal.
53. Increasing nationalist resistance to
French control in North Africa might consti-
tute a serious threat to the security of US
bases in the area, particularly if the nation-
alist movements should establish a common
front with the Communists. As long as na-
tionalist leaders continue to hope for US sup-
port they will try to restrain their followers
from attacks on the bases. However, some
extremists may not obey their leaders, and,
as the situation deteriorates, sporadic demon-
strations and raids against the bases will be-
come increasingly likely.
54. If France were involved in war, the na-
tionalists would probably take maximum ad-
vantage of the situation. Tunisian and Mo-
roccan nationalists would demand a guaran-
tee of complete independence from France.
If they should fail in their demands, they
would probably resort to violence and under-
take sabotage of North Africa's highly vul-
nerable communications, though they would
probably stage a general revolt only as a last
resort.
55. International Implications of North Afri-
can Developments. The growing conflict be-
tween the French and the nationalists in
North Africa will also have important inter-
national repercussions. Differences over
North African issues are likely to become a
source of increasingly serious friction among
the non-Communist countries. We believe
that North African developments will exert a
strong influence on Arab and Asian attitudes
toward the West both in the cold war and in
event of global conflict. Many Latin Ameri-
can countries are also anti-colonial in outlook
and might support the North African nation-
alists.
56. Differences between the non-Communist
powers as a result of North African develop-
ments will come to a focus in the UN. Fur-
ther Arab-Asian efforts to secure UN inter-
vention on North African questions might lead
to a split in the Western-oriented UN majority
which could be exploited on this and other
issues by the Soviet Bloc.
57. The efforts of both sides to secure US sup-
port confront the US itself with major policy
decisions and the prospect of a serious strain
on its relations with many nations in the
Free World. If the US appeared to favor the.
North African nationalists, it would probably
succeed in deterring nationalist-Communist
collaboration and in assuring the physical
security of its present North African bases for
a longer time. By doing so, however, the ,US
would invite serious complications in its rela-
tions with France and in its utilization of
these bases. On the other hand, if the US
strongly supported its NATO partner, it would
almost certainly lose influence among the
Near and Far Eastern states, as well as be sub-
jected to interference at the Moroccan bases.
Sharp differences between the Arab states and
the Western Powers over North Africa would
almost certainly lessen the possibility of Arab
cooperation with the West in Middle East de-
fense. The US might also prejudice its pros-.
pects for subsequent influence in any North
African state which might ultimately receive
its independence.
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR LIBYAN STABILITY AND
PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION
58. Prospects for Internal Stability. Libya,
independent since December 1951, has thus
far been unable to establish firm foundations
for political and economic stability. The pov-
erty and economic underdevelopment of the
country, the unresolved Tripolitanian-Cyr-
enaican differences, the weakness of the parli-
ament and the bureaucracy, and the limited
support for the ruling dynasty, all make for
an unstable future. Most important of these
factors is the continued cleavage between the
Cyrenaicans, who presently dominate the fed-
eral government, and the more advanced and
numerous Tripolitanians, who constitute two-
thirds of the population. However, the Tri-
politanians have not united to form a strong
opposition party, and they are not able to
challenge the present regime.
59. Despite his failure thus far to resolve pro-
vincial differences and unite his kingdom,
King Idris is the strongest^political force in
Libya. The incapacity of the Libyan Parlia-
ment, the political indifference of the people,
and the recent resignation of able Prime Min-
ister Muntasser have all strengthened the
King's hand. The transformation of the
Libyan Government from a constitutional to
an absolute monarchy will probably continue
over the next few years, provided King Idris
remains on the throne. Libyan political loyal-
ties, instead of crystallizing around national
groupings and issues, probably will follow the
traditional Arab pattern of shifting personal
and family alliances.
60. However, the king is 64 years of age, and
his designated successor has neither much
political support nor ambition. While ac-
cepting Idris, many Tripolitanians and some
Cyrenaicans only reluctantly pledged alle-
giance to his dynasty as well. Unless the king
survives long enough to consolidate his power,
his death might be followed by. a period of
intrigues during which the kingdom might
be dismembered. Such increased internal in-
stability .might impede, but almost certainly
would not preclude, use of Libyan bases by
the US and the UK.
61. The Libyan economy relies heavily upon
agriculture to maintain present bare subs sist-
ance standards, and is extremely limited in
other resources. Large-scale exploration for
oil is about to be undertaken, but the prospects
for extensive discoveries remain unknown.
Consequently, Libya has to rely almost wholly
upon foreign financial aid and technical
assistance in order to carry out even a min-
imum development program. The UK at
present provides over ten million dollars an-
nually to Libya, which also receives some tech-
nical aid from the UN and the US.
62. Probable Trends in Libyan External Re-
lations. Strong Western influence in Libya,
based mainly upon direct financial assistance,
is likely to persist for at least the next several
years. This influence would probably continue
in the separate provinces even if Libya should
be dismembered during that period. On the
other hand, UK influence, though still para-
mount in Libya, has declined appreciably, and
the Libyan Government has discharged a large
number of its British advisors. British policy
at present is to remain aloof from Libyan
domestic politics. Should the UK continue
that policy, a partial vacuum in Western po-
litical and economic influence might develop.
However, as a result of its need to station
in Libyan bases some troops formerly in the
Suez Zone, the UK might increase its interest
in Libyan affairs. A UK-Libyan base agree-
ment has been concluded. At the same time,
King Idris has expressed a desire for closer re-
lationship with the US, and has indicated that
he would prefer the US to assume the role of
chief benefactor and "protector".
63. The USSR has not yet attempted to open
diplomatic relations with Libya. There are
virtually no,Communists in Libya.
64. US-Libyan air base negotiations, virtually
completed, but not yet approved by Libya's
parliament, will provide Libya $40 million
over the 20 year period of the agreement, with
$4 million to be paid for the use of the base
each year from 1954 through 1960,, and one
million dollars annually thereafter. In view
of exaggerated Libyan expectations, parlia-
mentary disappointment over the size of the
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US financial contribution may result in delay
of ratification, scheduled for the fall of 1954.
However,. Libyan Government pressure prob-
ably will overcome parliamentary opposition.
65. Because of strong Libyan resentment over
French influence in the province of Fezzan
and French repression of the Moroccan and
Tunisian nationalist movements, there will
probably be increasing difficulties with France
in the near future. Many Libyan officials
have shown open sympathy and tacit en-
couragement for the Tunisian terrorists. How-
ever, France may succeed in its efforts to ob-
tain a base agreement with Libya, provided its
financial contribution is sufficiently attractive
to overcome anti-French sentiment.
66. Libya's inclusion in the Arab League early
in 1953 has not resulted in any fundamental
change in its pro-Western orientation. Libya
uniformly endorses the Arab League's pro-
nouncements on Israel and on North African
nationalism, but plays only a secondary role
in the League and has frequently adopted an
independent attitude. Libya has not signed
the League's collective security pact. How-
ever, growing Libyan political and cultural
ties with Egypt constitute an increasing chal-
lenge to the Western position. Nevertheless,
Libya will remain fearful of Egypt's greater
power. During the past year, Libya has also
developed diplomatic and military connections
with Turkey, which may come to overshadow
its liaison with the Arab League and Egypt if
sufficiently attractive inducements are offered.
Further growth of Turkish' influence would
probably help to strengthen Libya's pro-
Western orientation. In the long run, how-
ever, Libya is likely to follow the lead of the
other Arab states.
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APPENDIX: POPULATION OF NORTH AFRICA BY ETHNIC GROUPS
Latest
Foreign Population
Native
Census
Year French
Italian
Spanish
Other
Moslem ?
Jewish
TOTAL
French Morocco
1951-52 303,814"
13,500
26,100
19,400
7,442,015
199,156
8,003,985
Tunisia
1946 143,977
84,935
1,400
96,691-
2,832,987
70,971
3,230,952
Algeria
1948 921,239
5,959
33,155
13,376
7,679,078
na
8,652,807
Spanish
Morocco
1950 na
na
84,716
443
917,096
7,872
1,010,117
Tangier
1949 5,000
na
22,000
5,000
85,000
8,000
125,000
(est.)
TOTAL
1,374,030
104,394
167,371
134,910
18,956,166
285,999
21,022,861
Libya
1952 (UN estimate)
1,150,000
? Not a religious classification. Includes non-Moslem natives as well.
"Adjusted to balance totals.
Includes 87,454 non-native Moslems, i.e., Algerians and Libyans.
na not available; included under "other".
N. B. These out-dated official figures are unreliable in many respects, but they provide the only firm foundation for estimates of
present population. The UN Demographic Yearbook estimates the total population of these countries (excluding Libya) in
mid-1952 as about 21,977,000. Based on the widely accepted judgment that the rate of population growth in the area is 2
percent annually, the.estimated total population of these countries in 1954 is about 22,850,000.
"s 14
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