REMARKS BY WILLIAM H. WEBSTER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA SEPTEMBER 19, 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 19, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
SEPTEMBER 19, 1988
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
It really is a pleasure to be back again. I had the privilege of
addressing this organization a few years ago when Shirley Black, whose brother
was a career FBI agent, was on your Board of Trustees. It was good to hear
from my old friend and colleague, Phil Habib, that you might be willing to
have me come back again and talk to you.
When Phil Habib asked me to speak to you, he suggested that I discuss what
the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be. What Phil
suggested reminded me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist:
"Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that
cautionary note in mind, I will make a few predictions about some of the key
issues that now confront the Intelligence Community -- issues that we expect
to be with us well into the next decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view
held by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have
always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel
threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard
the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security,
I think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a whole
range of issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention --
international terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced
weapons, and technology transfer, to name just some of the issues that are
global in nature.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
This evening, I want to concentrate on three connecting geographical areas
that are and will continue to be of great interest to U.S. policymakers and,
thus, of great interest to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the
Soviet Union, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. And I would also like to
discuss two issues that are tied to these geographical areas -- the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and our continuing need for
effective counterintelligence.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence
collection and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities are a
continuing and serious threat to U.S. interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
The President told me an interesting story recently. Gorbachev sent a
representative out into one of the Ukrainian states to see how perestroika was
getting along. He went to one of the .small hamlets and asked to see the
mayor. After, talking to the mayor for a moment he said, "Do you have any
television sets in this village?" The mayor looked at him and said, "Of
A
course we have television sets. There is a television set in every hut in
this village. In fact, there may be two television sets in many of these
huts." The representative said, "That is very interesting. What about
refrigerators?" And he said, "Of course. We all have refrigerators." The
representative looked him in the eye and said, "Do you know who I am?" And
the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA agent would come into a
village with no electricity and ask questions like that?"
2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads.
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it,
today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering
largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to
innovate, room to inquire, and room to investigate.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. The Soviets
are leaving Afghanistan and eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under
the INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented on?site inspections of
Soviet military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way
between reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the
Communist system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could
destabilize the very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this
struggle will affect how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to
which central authority is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and
how competitive the Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
Neither we nor the Soviets know for certain where this reform is leading.
The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring Gorbachev to
overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
There are strong reasons to doubt whether a system designed to centralize
authority, maximize government control over its people, and concentrate
resources on building up the nation's military strength can become more
decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of its
people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other
regions of the USSR will test the Soviet system's ability to make reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything, it is that Gorbachev
is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the possibility that he
can pull off a "revolution from above" that actually increases authority
below. He must act with boldness -- and he is acting with boldness -- if he
hopes to alter the course of the huge, sluggish, Soviet leviathan.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some formidable challenges in analyzing the Soviet Union. We must pay closer
attention than ever to the political struggles and issues being raised as
Gorbachev challenges the established interests of individuals and
Institutions. Clearly, before he can speed up his reforms, he must capture
some of the sinews of power exercised by the party. This was, in our view,
his primary objective at the summer party conference.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Moscow's
military and economic capabilities and -- even more difficult -- just how
serious the Soviets are about moderating their international behavior.
Glasnost has produced an information explosion which, though welcome,
challenges us to sort out what is important and what is not, what is real
versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
U.S.?Soviet arms control talks provide the Intelligence Community with
further tasks. As these negotiations progress, we will increasingly be asked
to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions
of agreements. As we are finding out with the INF treaty, this task is
manpower intensive for the Intelligence Community.
Yet whatever Gorbachev's specific domestic and foreign policies, the
adversarial relationship we have with the USSR will remain. Gorbachev aims to
make the Soviet Union more competitive with the West -- both economically and
militarily -- and more influential in world affairs. For these reasons,
Soviet intentions and capabilities will remain the Intelligence Community's
primary focus.
Intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important to
policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet
Influence in the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue
other objectives. But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan will
remain a key foreign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the Soviets'
continued interest and its strategic location, Afghanistan will remain an
important concern in Washington as well.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest of
their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. At the same
time, Moscow will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic
and political means.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The
5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Soviet-backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the
withdrawal will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance
will continue its efforts to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the
ruling party's fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse
as the military initiatives of the resistance.
The post-Soviet period will probably find the Afghan rebels fighting among
themselves -- as they did throughout the Soviet occupation -- for political
power in Afghanistan. Given that most ethnic groups are better armed than
ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons from the
disintegrating Afghan army, we would expect to see tribal conflict continue
for some time after the Soviet withdrawal.
The United States cannot dictate or materially influence who will finally
emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central government is
unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually be matched by
some historical suspicions about the West. The good news in all of this for
us is not so much what has been gained, but what has been averted.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the
post-Soviet era well armed and well organized. Whatever the composition of a
future government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a
larger role in its operations and policies. But the nature and traditions of
Afghanistan make the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are
the primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts
by neighboring countries to exert influence in Afghanistan will also receive
our attention. In the longer term, we will examine the future government's
6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17 : CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
attempts to rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee
population -- more than five million people.
About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country that
has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of
strategic interest to U.S. policymakers, but the death of President Zia in a
plane crash last month raises new issues.
The initial response to President Zia's death has been a smooth,
constitutional transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate,
has taken over as Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president
must be elected within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. Ishaq Khan has
announced that the elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule.
Because of the closeness of our relationship and the strategic importance
of Pakistan, naturally, the U.S. Intelligence Community will be following
these developments with the keenest interest.
Another region of great strategic interest for the United States is the
Persian Gulf -- an area where tensions remain high despite the cease?fire
between Iran and Iraq. Although we are encouraged that the two nations are
holding peace talks in Geneva, these negotiations are likely to be protracted
and difficult. Both countries have sharply divergent views about the way the
talks should proceed and the key issues involved. The animosities built up
over eight years of bitter conflict will not suddenly disappear.
The Iran?Iraq war cost the two countries more than 350 billion dollars,
and even more in human costs ?7 more than 1 million casualties and 1.5 million
refugees. This war was one of the bloodiest of the century, and it will take
many years for the two nations to recover.
7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
The war has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran and
Iraq. The loss of oil revenues -- the primary source of foreign exchange and
economic growth in both countries -- has dragged both economies down.
Large-scale arms purchases have also weakened both economies, and the costs of
reconstruction will be a further drain.
Financing the war has virtually exhausted both states' financial
reserves. Both countries have imposed strict austerity measures and cut
economic development programs.
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resuming an
all-out conflict anytime soon, However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust
each other and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq
conflict, providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities of both
sides as well as the implications for the region and the United States. When
the U.S. presence in the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical
Intelligence support to naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command.
Our support has included reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites,
naval bases, airfields, and coastal defense installations. As a result, U.S.
forces have been able to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy and
protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing -- questions such as what effect the
cease-fire will have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the
political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact
the cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and
even the long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq -- and the rest of the world -- have learned from a war that involved the
first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and
the effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap
and readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more
powerful foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and
as many as 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
Mustard gas, a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one of the
favored agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of manufacture, its
long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability to incapacitate
those exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain
and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as
cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while
phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of other
countries to develop and produce chemical weapons. And with the increase of
ballistic missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to attempts by Third
World nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads.
9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons.
And this presents us with another intelligence concern.
Along with assessing capabilities to develop and produce chemical and
biological weapons, we must make judgments about what could prompt foreign
countries to use them. The United States supports international efforts to
prevent the use of these weapons, including participation in the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, which is trying to negotiate a chemical weapons
ban. The U.S. also restricts the export of certain key chemicals and
ballistic missile technology. Intelligence support is vital to the success of
these U.S. efforts.
For Israel, the spread of this capability among the Arab states --
principally Iraq, Libya, and Syria, represents a serious readjustment in this
strategic balance of power -- and has major implications for prospects for a
peaceful solution in the Middle East.
Assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missile
proliferation constitute some of the most difficult intelligence challenges we
face -- now and into the next decade. Any pesticide plant can become, in a
covert way, the producer of these deadly weapons. It is also one of our most
important tasks, and we will continue to provide U.S. policymakers with
accurate and timely information on this issue.
Another matter of great concern to the Intelligence Community is the
threat posed by hostile intelligence services. I want to briefly mention this
today, in light of the recent arrest in West Germany of former Army Sergeant
Clyde Lee Conrad, who was charged with passing classified documents to the
Soviet Bloc.
10
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
This case reinforces the fact that an effective counterintelligence
program requires vigilance on both the defensive and the offensive fronts.
First, we must protect sensitive information, technology, equipment, and
personnel. Second, we must detect, monitor, and counter the actions of
hostile intelligence services. As the Soviet Bloc intelligence services
become more sophisticated, our counterintelligence measures must grow
correspondingly stronger.
The Conrad case also points to the importance of tenacity and of close
cooperation among the various agencies within the Intelligence Community. The
FBI, the CIA, the Department of Justice, and Army counterintelligence worked
together for over five years in the investigation that resulted in Conrad's
arrest. In fact, most counterintelligence cases, including those that the
public hears about, are the result of years of careful work.
Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the age.
But intelligence is preeminently an affair of people. It is the caliber of
the men and women of American intelligence -- their creativity, determination,
brilliance, and courage -- that spells the difference between success and
failure.
I hope that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our
mission -- people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are
dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who understand and
play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a necessary part
of their life, but who can find in this difficult work an avenue to pursue
their highest aspirations for a safer and better world.
11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1
With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our
national security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect
of us, and I can assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
Thank you.
12
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/17: CIA-RDP99-00777R000302240003-1