ANALYTICAL IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100030015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 9, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NOTE FOR: ADDI
9 December 1985
SUBJECT: Analytical Improvements Since 1981
1. Dick, a couple of weeks ago, Herb Meyer
told me that the DCI had asked him to do a little
piece on analytical improvements since 1981, and
asked me for some draft inputs for such a piece.
I asked Herb, "just the NIC; or DDI, too?" Herb
thought maybe both.
2. So, I informally asked for some help re DDI
offices in the form of brief sub-contract inputs.
Later, running into Bob Gates, I asked him the same
question I had Herb. Bob said better to confine
Herb's piece to NIC. We have done so.
3. Hence I have some brief inputs left over
about DDI analysis (attached) which I send on to
you -- for your interest ant possible future use.
Cheers,
Attachments:
As stated (re EURA, ACIS, NESA, OGI, OEA, OCR,
SODA, ALA, and 0IA)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wa hngtan, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 05982-85
6 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Changes Since 1981 in Intelligence Community Support of
Policymaking
A. National Estimates
1. The uantit of Estimates (of various types) produced by the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) each year has risen sharply: from
some 40 in 1980, to some 100 this year.
2. The quality and utility of Estimates has likewise improved, in
several ways. Policymaking consumers have indicated that they find our
Estimates of the last few years improved in relevance, timeliness, and
ease of digestion.
3. The DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP) has explicitly confirmed
this, reporting (May 1985) that since 1981 national intelligence
production has, as compared with the period before 1981:
-- Presented more adequate threat perceptions: as compared to
the period before 1981 twice as many estimates have been
done on military matters, five times as many on non-military
subject matter.
-- Given better coverage of Third World problems by a factor of
four.
-- Improved periodicy of coverage and analysis by a factor of
more than four: principal such subjects revisited include
the Philippines, Central America and the Caribbean,
terrorism, and chemical and toxin weapons.
Fuller treatment of,previous relative estimate gaps:
principal subject examples include East-West trade,
CL BY SIGNER
1 DECL OADR
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Soviet-East Europe relations, Soviet-Asian relations,
technology transfer, nuclear proliferation, southern Africa,
and the world oil market outlook.
? -- Broken new ground by a number of pioneering estimates on new
questions: examples, USSR and the Third World, debt
problems of the major LDCs, African famine prospects,
narcotics trafficking, anti-American terrorism, and the
outlook for instability/sudden change in the Third World.
-- Involved fuller participation of the Intelligence Community
in the preparation of national estimates -- an expansion by
a factor of four: prior to 1981, the community was involved
(with full opportunity for input, concurrence, or dissent)
in less than one-half of the NIC's estimates; since 1981,
that participation has grown to more than three quarters.
4. Reflecting much fuller contact with the policymaking community
has been a rapid growth in the production of specially requested "fast
track" Estimates, usually concerning foreign crisis issues. Such
Estimates account for exactly one-half of the Estimates produced in 1985,
up from 15 percent of the Estimates produced in 1981. Prime examples of
such subjects in recent months include Qadhafi's challenge to US and
Western interests, West European terrorism and its threat to NATO and US
interests, radicalism in Lebanon, and the Philippine succession and the
US.
5. Similarly, many more specially requested especially sensitive
Estimates have been produced, some on a fast-track basis.
6. We have meanwhile insisted that our Estimates be written more
crisply, stressing especially the need for Key Judgments that are clear,
brief, and unequivocal, and yet faithfully distill the Estimates'
messages and tone.
7. We have also pushed the Community to make fuller use of
dissenting or alternative judgments, rather than to settle for
watered-down "coordinated" language.
8. Our Estimates have consciously included more emphasis than in
previous years on the implications of the given paper's message for US
interests. This has provided policymaking consumers more "handles" or
ideas, without in any way compromising intelligence objectivity.
9. Where appropriate we have added certain well-received new
sections to our Estimates: alternative scenarios, statements on
collection gaps, and intelligence bibliographies.
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10. Senior policymakers now receive advance copies of the Key
Judgments of certain Estimates in a specially printed executive format.
B. Parallel Improvements in the NIC
11. Through various means and settings, the NIC's National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs) have increased their contact with the
policymaking community and with the Congress. This has included
additional NIO access to top-level officials, including the President,
members of the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs; and briefings of joint
sessions of the House and Senate, in addition to special testimony before
all of the major Congressional committees. The NIC has also become the
Intelligence Community's chief point of contact with the academic and
business communities, whose judgment and expertise have contributed much
to our products.
12. NIC officers now produce several additional types of estimative
projects for the DCI. These include not only certain sensitive,
coordinated papers on given country's vulnerabilities, but various kinds
of in-house 'think" papers, what if? exercises, and certain papers which
treat special economic or other needed subjects which do not happen to
fit going art forms.
13. The DCI and the NIC have instituted a well-received new series
publication, the NIC Outlook, whose outside distribution is limited to
the President, the Vice President, and four other top policymakers.
14. The DCI has added certain specific new NIO portfolios which
permit the MC to support policymaking much more effectively in these
fields: foreign deception and intelligence activities; counterterrorism;
nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation; science and technology;
and narcotics.
15. In addition to individual contact with the DCI, the NIOs now
meet regularly with the DCI on pre-arranged substantive agendas, the
geographical and functional NIOs alternating every other week.
16. Closer NIO-DCI contact has been accomplished by a 1981
reorganization which placed the NIC directly under the DCI. Among the
benefits of this change has been a greater role for NIOs as the personal
representatives of the DCI in a variety of venues.
17. The NIC's Analytic Group has been strengthened in various
ways. Its 12 members now draft about one-third of each year's estimates,
do a lot of repair work on others' ailing drafts, fill in for absent
Assistant NIOs, and do special studies for the DCI.
18. The NIC has instituted informal measures to increase collegial
review and quality control of certain Estimates, particularly those whose
subject matter spans regions, issues, or disciplines.
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19. The DCI has instituted measures which make NIC products more
responsive to quality control suggestions from the DCI's SRP.
Herbert E. Meyer
cc: DDCI
ER
C/NIC
Ha l Ford
DDI Reg
H.-Meyer
4
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.Memorandum for:
I
IC Production Officer
I hope that the attached short statement
will help Mr. Ford respond to the DCI's
request for a summary of how our
intelligence support for policymakers
has changed since 1981. As we try to
make clear, the recurrent theme has been
"outreach" to the policy community. We
think that EURA is among the most active
DI Offices in several important ways that
we mention in the attached.
If you need more prose, please let me
know. Regards,
EURA/XO
2 December 1985
EURA
Office of European Analysis I
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Changes in Intelligence Support to
Policymakers Since 1981
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
One phrase sums up how support to policymakers from the Office of
European Analysis has changed since 1981: outreach to the policy
community. This has been in three fundamental ways:
-- most important, through rotational assignments to the policymaking
agencies. We now regularly detail managers-and selected senior analysts
to State Department bureaus (European and Canadian Affairs, and.
Political-Military Affairs) and to the Defense Department (to work on
nuclear forces and arms control policy). We hope to expand this program
to other agencies. These rotationals have served to alert us, in a more
timely way than normal channels can, to issues that require intelligence
coverage; and they have led to an increase in direct, specific tasking
of EURA analysts by policymakers who have gotten to know us better and
to appreciate our capabilities. (There has been a marked increase in
our production of specifically tailored typescript memoranda and
deskside briefings of policymakers.) And, of course, EURA people who
have gone on these rotations return to us with a sharpened understanding
of the policy agenda and how we can tailor our production to be most
helpful.
-- regular attendance at staff meetings where policy options are
debated, principally at State Department. For example, EURA managers
participate in weekly sessions of the Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs plus three of its regional offices (covering Southern, Eastern,
and Central Europe). This permits us to have direct input into
discussions of the options and to gain first-hand understanding of the
intricacies of these issues.
3 December 1985
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POST 1981 IMPROVEMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
TO POLICYMAKERS ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS
Since 1981, CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff has benefitted from a
threefold increase in manpower, substantial improvements in the technical
support availahle to these officers and upgrading of office space. The
selection process that led to a threefold growth in personnel stressed the
qualitative side. The officers chosen were mature, experienced individuals
who had distinguished themselves in previous assignments; at one point, in
fact, four of the senior officers assigned to the Staff were former special
assistants to the Director of Central Intelligence. Improvements in technical
support included substantial communication enhancement
The improvements undertaken at CIA were mirrored at other agencies within
the Intelligence Community. Moreover, the interagency body, the Strategic
Arms Monitoring Working Group under the chairmanship of C/ACIS was
reinvigorated and the representatives from other agencies were asked to play
more prominent roles, for example, at Congressional hearings. (S NF)
Of particular note is the fact that ACIS has undertaken a major effort to
improve and systematize methodologies for monitoring arms control
agreements.
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MEMORANDUM F
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STAT
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I I
Tuesday, December 3, 1985
ePj
Daily intelligence support to senior policymakers by CPAS over the past
five years has become more extensive, more sophisticated, and more
personalized.
The principal vehicle remains the President's Daily Brief. Five years
ago it went to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
for his use in briefing the President and the Vice President. Copies
were provided to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Today,
individual copies of the PDB go directly to the President, the Vice
President, the President's Chief of Staff, the National Security
Adviser, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of these PDBs are now delivered directly to
the principals by senior Agency personnel who can follow up on questions
and requests for additional information.
Qualitatively, more sophisticated printing techniques enable us to use
more and better graphics and to keep the PDB and the National
Intelligence Daily "open" later for updates that give us greater
currentness. New communications capabilities enable us to send the PDB
to its regular readers wherever they may be in the US or abroad.
Although we have not greatly increased the number of MID recipients, in
the interest of tightening control over its external dissemination, we
have beefed up its contents over the past five years with a significant
increase in our coverage of economic intelligence topics and
transnational issues such as technology transfer, terrorism and
narcotics.
We have increased current intelligence support most recently by
instituting a Midday Intelligence Report which provides to a select
readership of 20 senior officials in Washington an update of significant
reporting received by the CIA Operations Center from the time the NID
went to press until approximately 11 a.m. CPAS produces this
publication and delivers it by courier by no later than 1 p.m. each
working day, making the Midday Report not only the newest but the most
timely of our current intelligence publications.
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RANSMITTAL
SLIP
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2 Dec 85
TO: NI0/AC-
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ROOM NO.
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REMARKS:
FROM: EXO/NESA
ROOMM 2
BUILDING HQS EXTENSION
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 58 24 1 WHICH MAY BE USED.
STAT
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2 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR : NIO at Large/Director, Analytic Group
Executive Officer, NESA
SUBJECT : Changes in NESA's Support to Polcymakers
1. With no institutional memory to depend upon, it is somewhat
difficult to define how our policy support has changed over the past few
years. It is easy to describe what we do now but difficult to compare it
to what we did a few years ago.
2. Unquestionably, NESA does much more now than previously. The
volume of briefings, typescripts, etc. is up significantly over earlier
years. This is certainly true as far as Congressional support is
concerned. NESA's managers/analysts brief Congressional committees and
staffs two or three times a month on a wide variety of topics. In earlier
years such briefings were usually done by one or two key DI managers and
then very infrequently.
3. Feedback from our consumers indicates our products play an
important role in policy formulation. It is not unusual for the office to
receive a couple of kudos per week from key policymakers who want us to
know how valuable they find our analysis. The writers of the kudos range
from high level personnel at the Departments of State and Defense to key
individuals at the NSC. Their comments are based on a reading of an item
in the NID or to one of our Intelligence Assessments.
4. A very marked change in NESA's support has come about through the
use of typescripts--a one- or two-page memo that provides greater analysis
on a topic of current interest. Typescripts are done for a small, select
audience and allow our analysts the opportunity to detail the significance
.
of the topic and its impact on US foreign policy
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CONFIDENTIAL
(/r
ANALYTICAL IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 1981
il
1. The most notable improvement probably is the development of the
Model for analysing political environments to understand what infuences are
weighing on a policymaker and what choices he is likely to make. The approach
is based on microeconomic decision theory and examines the costs and benefits
associated with alternative policy choices. It enables the analyst not only to
predict outcomes but also to comprehend what will cause the decisionmaker to
choose a particular course of action. The model was developed under a contract
managed by the DS&T and has recently been taken over by the Political
Instability Branch of OGI for general application.
2. Other, very sophisticated models have been developed in the Economics
and Resources Divisions of OGI. The economic models are used for such matters
as predicting levels of indebtedness of developing countries and the impact of
debt burden on the international financial system. The Resource Division
modelling includes extremely complicated oil field models that have been used,
among other things, for predicting the decline of oil field productivity in the
Soviet Union and, I believe, the major points of vulnerability of Persian Gulf
oil fields.
3. Major analytical improvement has also occurred in the area of
indicators intelligence. OGI has pioneered the development of systematic,
comprehensive lists of indicators for tracking the potential for political
instability in all developing nations and for assessing prospects for
insurgency worldwide. It has also created systems for applying these
indicators at regular intervals and for reporting the results to the
intelligence and policy communities.
4. Significant advances have taken place in the last few years in OGI in
the development and application of major computurized data bases as an
analytical tool. These are now used not just for record keeping but also for
manipulating data on such widely diverse subjects as international and national
terrorism, conventional arms transfers, and a host of economic and financial
matters.
5. OGI's Geography Division has leaped light years ahead in the last
several years in the use and presentation of geographic intelligence as a
policymaking tool. Particularly noteworthy is the creation of their foldout
format briefs which bring together various kinds of maps and overhead
photography with political, economic, and sociological data to provide
policymakers with highly efficient overviews of such issues as the Falklands
War and the water dispute between Israel and Jordan.
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: Hal Ford
NIO/AL
FROM: Julian C. Nall
NIO/S&T
I hope that this helps you out. Please
let me know if I can be of further assistance.
Julian C. Nall
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JeT
Changes in Science and Technology Intelligence Since 1981
Introduction
The importance of assessing foreign sciences and technologies has been
recognized for many years, but since 1981 significantly increased emphasis has
been placed on such assessments. The role that today's science and technology
plays in understanding tomorrow's military and civil systems has been
increasingly appreciated. Not only the Communist countries but also the
developed Free World and Newly Industrializing Countries have become
important. Stretching farther into the future and understanding the effect
science and technology has on it has become a critical issue for the
Intelligence Community.
In recognition of the importance of assessing foreign science and
technology, the DCI established for the first time the position of a National
Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology. This position provides a
focal point for Community activities related to the assessment of foreign
science and technology. New initiatives include:
Stimulation of collection and analysis of Soviet science with the
recent publication of the first National Intelligence Estimate on the
Future of Soviet Science.
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Increased emphasis on an understanding of Soviet military
technologies by an improved version of the NIE Prospects for Soviet
Military Technology and Research and Development.
Increased emphasis on understanding the role foreign science and
technology play in economic competitiveness. An NIE on Foreign Free
World Advanced Technologies to be published soon addresses this
critical problem.
Because of the importance of science and technology to the newly
industrializing countries, an estimate is planned. It will provide
information to policymakers who can then use S&T as an appropriate
lever to help carry out U.S. objectives.
There are now periodic meetings of the S&T Principals which is
composed of the senior S&T person from each component of the
Intelligence Community. One of the major purposes of this group is
to improve collection and analysis of foreign S&T.
The DCI's Science and Technology Advisory Panel and its working
groups have been revitalized. The Panel's work is now focused on
critical areas such as foreign activities in Stealth, SDI,
mobile launch facilities, and technology surprise.
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The Office of Science and Weapons Research has adjusted its major thrust
and program to assure more emphasis on sciences and emerging technologies.
Some of their initiatives include:
Much greater emphasis, primarily through the Foreign Sciences
Assessment Center (FASAC), on assessing applied science in the Soviet
Union. Also there is more emphasis on identification of emerging
technologies.
Greater stress on application of quantitative measures for technology
assessments, consequently less emphasis on merely descriptive studies
of Soviet technology.
Much greater appreciation of the role of technology transfer in
Soviet technical achievements, hence greater efforts at stemming
technology transfer through all channels.
More emphasis on CW/BW motivated primarily by Soviet use of Yellow
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The Civil Technologies and Industries Division of the Office of Global
Issues has increased its efforts to provide for the policymaker an improved
understanding of foreign free world technologies. Such understanding is
needed because of the strategic importance of any U.S. dependence on foreign
sources for military technology and equipment, and any increased future
economic competition.
Recognizing the importance of S&T and the future, OTE has recently
initiated a training course on technology forecasting and one on emerging
technologies.
Processing of Overtly Collected S&T Information
Much S&T analysis is based on overt sources of information which comes in
huge quantities of often "low grade ore." Processing of such quantities prior
to being received by the analyst is a major problem which had not been
addressed seriously until recent years. Plans are now being made to take
positive steps to aid in solving this problem.
cc: AD/OSWR
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5 December 1985
NOTE FOR::
FROM:
SUBJECT:
OEA's Support for the Policy Community Since 1981
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1. Since 1981, OEA's direct support of the policy community
has increased significantly. Cumulatively, it far outstrips the
level of support maintained prior to 1981.
2. Several factors have contributed to this trend. First
and foremost, OEA has made a conscious and deliberate decision to
be more aggressive in providing direct, tailored support for our
policy consumers. We also made a conscious decision to move in
the direction of the typescript memorandum, drafted for a single
consumer or small group of consumers, as the principal policy
support vehicle. Over the past two years, we have produced about
250 typescripts. This has come at the expense of greater
production of longer range Intelligence Analyses and Research
Publications. In 192 OEA also decided to cease publishing an
office journal in order to free up resources for direct policy
support. This effort in our view has been justified.
3. Secondly, for whatever reasons, we have sensed a greater
receptivity to our product among many individual policy makers.
This is admittedly subjective--there will always be some who
don't want to play--but we are persuaded that it is so,
especially compared to circumstances prevailing before 1981.
Finally, in OEA's case, the broadening of the Sino-US
relationship has had a decided impact on the level of our policy
support. A wide array of US policymakers now have a stake in the
relationship and our policy support on Chinese issues has
increased dramatically.
4. The primary means of reaching policy makers--personal
briefings and specially tailored memos--remain pretty much as
they were prior to 1981. There are a few new twists, however.
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4 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
OCR Support to Policy Makers
Preparation of biographic profiles for the President, Vice President,
and the Intelligence Community has been a constant in OCR's support to
policymakers since 1981. Since 1981, however, the number of reports we
have delivered and the policymakers we have served has grown. We
estimate that now we deliver finished profiles to
policy level customers each year. Recipients of these reports now
regularly include senior officials at the Departments of Commerce,
Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and Energy. These once relatively
infrequent consumers of our products are now regular customers.
Like other offices in the DDI, the Office of Central Reference works
harder to anticipate policymakers needs. Thus, OCR is now a more active
participant in the DI's programmed research effort.
A related development, brought on by the broader range of our customers
is that we are more likely to research and analyze people in economic
fields than we had in the past.
Another way in which our policy support has evolved is in the nature of
our cooperation with other DDI components. About one half of our
programmed research is done in conjunction with analysts from other
offices. The result is that our biographic research and analyses take on
more policy relevance and contain the results of vigorous intellectual
exchange. By the same token, regional office analysts are more prone to
consult OCR analysts than they had in the past. This is especially true
in the production of current intelligence where NIDs and PDBs more
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frequently contain biographic profiles or perspectives than they have in
the past, a development that we believe has been welcomed.
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Changes in SOVA Support for Policymakers Since 1981
Reorganization at the Directorate level in 1981 and within the Office of
Soviet Analysis (SOVA) in 1985 have been important stimuli for aligning our
analytical efforts in accordance with consumer demands. Together, these
initiatives have enabled SOVA to do more and better interdisciplinary work and
to find more innovative ways of attacking the issues of concern to
policymakers.
Prior to the directorate reorganization, the policy community was asking
questions on Soviet issues that were broader than those posed in the research
programs of the former functional offices and which required integrated
answers that the disparate responses from those offices would not provide. In
terms of single papers that sharply focus on the essence of policy questions,
or that provide the broad multidisciplinary assessments and estimative answers
that the policymaker questions frequently seek, the record was less than
impressive.
The directorate reorganization put us in a better position to be
responsive to these questions. We began producing integrated analysis that
encompasses the full range of political, military, economic, and societal
factors that effect Soviet policy choices. A combined staff of political
scientists, economists, and military specialists, demographers, and
sociologists have been working together on more timely, effective, and
perceptive responses. Some examples are:
Although there had been much reporting on Soviet agriculture, energy,
and general economic problems and prospects, little was done to link
these developments to near-term Soviet foreign policy initiatives.
This broad topic was addressed in a major SOVA paper published in
1984.
There had been reporting on Soviet agricultural imports and on
several aspects of Soviet technology imports and absorption, but
nothing was done on the degree of Soviet dependence on US and Western
technology or the amount of US leverage. SOYA, working together with
OSWR's Technology Transfer Assessment Center, has been addressing
these issues.
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In formulating Warsaw Pact force projections, we have been looking at
economic and political factors that influence future defense plans.
We are integrating our force projection analysis with what we know
about such issues as the impact of economic and manpower problems,
changes in the Soviet perception of the NATO threat, Soviet strategy
in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and the Soviet perception of
China as a military force.
We also have demonstrated that we can succeed in analyzing problems that
cut across the missions and functions of the regional offices. An example was
when EURA and SOVA completed a joint project on the Siberian-to-Western Europe
natural gas pipeline. Dialogue between analysts in these two production
elements resulted in an interregional study that focused on both Soviet and
West European attitudes and options as well as on the implications of this
pipeline for the United States.
The intent of the more recent reorganization of SOVA was to further
increase the production of interdisciplinary analysis, to group analytical
endeavors more nearly according to consumer requirements, and to provide
better substantive review of our research and production. The benefits of
this reorganization are becoming apparent--most notably in the closer working
relationships among analysts and managers in producing Soviet defense
expenditure estimates that are of interest to many US Government officials.
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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
3 December 1985
STAT
The attached responds to your request
for a short piece on ALA?s perspective about
changes in intelligence support to policy-
makers since 1981.
Attachment:
As stated
STAT
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SECRET
Changes in Intelligence Support to Policymakers
From ALA's perspective, we have become increasingly responsive to policy-
makers' needs since the 1981 reorganization of the DI. The reorganization was
the first step in positioning ourselves better to meet those needs with an
institutional setup more in line with those of the State Department, the NSC,
and other agencies in the foreign policy and intelligence communities. As a
result of it, we have been able to provide more and better multidisciplinary
analysis and, therefore, increase the relevance of our production and the
utility of intelligence information as a tool for foreign policymaking.
Relevance and timeliness have been improved in recent years by institu-
tionalizing regular contacts from the desk to the deputy assistant secretary
level and above. We make a special effort to address specifically in our
papers the implications for the US of the many issues and events we focus on.
Our increased responsiveness to the policymakers is clearly reflected
in the topics we write about. For example, nearly 50% of ALA's research
production in FY 1985 dealt with countries and regions of the highest
policymaking interest--Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, South and Southern
Africa, and Ethiopia. We produce a weekly report on the tactical military
situation in El Salvador and Nicaragua and a comprehensive monthly report on
developments in Central America. Frequent favorable comments from downtown on
a wide range of our product is also indicative of the quality, accuracy, and
relevance of our effort. Simply focusing on South America--in many aspects
our quietest account--shows how our reports have been received:
? The IA on Colombian peace prospects was lauded by the State
Department's Director of Andean Affairs as "outstanding" and
"extremely timely."
? The typescript on the new administration in Peru was praised
by the Latin American specialist at the NSC.
? Assistant Secretary of State Motley read and praised the IA on
Chile's emerging party system.
? The IA on Latin challenges to,IMF programs was selected for
inclusion in Treasury Secretary Baker's briefing book for his
trip to South America.
Finally, our support to Congress has grown dramatically,
particularly in the form of briefings. These have been especially numerous
and thorough on Central America during the last four or five years.
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SECRET
OIA-223/85
3 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Production Officer, NIC
Executive Officer, Office of Imagery Analysis
Changes in Support to Policymakers Since 1981
1. Since 1981 there has been a noticeable increase in the number of
policymakers we support--at least indirectly--and in the ways that we commun-
icate with them. Over the past four years there has been a steady increase in
the distribution of OIA reports to policymakers or their staffs. Our publi-
cations are reaching many more customers in Commerce, Energy, Treasury,
Justice Department (FBI and DEA), and State than they did four years ago. In
addition OIA analysts are interacting more closely and more frequently with
the policymakers themselves or with their staffs through briefings and partic-
ipation in interagency committees. Our support on BW/CW, narcotics, and on
Soviet offensive and defensive weapons for START are obvious examples.
2. OIA is much more involved in policymaker support through the production
of current intelligence than we were in 1981. This is most dramatically il-
lustrated by our interaction with the NID staff, a development that has really
evolved over the past two years. An example of this is the Soviet arms trans-
fer issue. OIA works routinely with OGI in producing policy-relevant current
intelligence on this topic, one of the Soviet Union's main hard currency
earning accounts.
3. Probably the most dramatic change in OIA has been support of the USG
policy of increasing drug traffic interdictions and foreign eradication
programs. A Narcotics Branch has been formed in OIA to meet the increasing
demands for intelligence and operational support by both policymakers and en-
forcement agencies. The Narcotics Branch has played an important role in
several of the accomplishments in support of this policy noted in the
Executive Summary of the referenced document.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DI/OIA/ODIR
DI/OIA/EXO (3 Dec 85)
SECRET
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