DCI/DDCI MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ, AND MESSRS. WHITEHEAD, ARMACOST, ABRAMOWITZ, AND KAMPELMAN. 2 DECEMBER 1988 - 1115 HOURS - STATE DEPT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000500150007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOPiSECRET
TAB I Fallout from the U.S. Denial of a Visa for Arafat. The
Secretary may ask for your assessment of the reaction
to the U.S. denial of a visa for Arafat to attend the
UN General Assembly session in New York. In the
talking points at TAB I the argument is made that
Arafat himself views the denial as actually
strengthening his position with our Western European
allies and offering him a good chance of winning
support for a General Assembly session in Geneva.
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uuvaau a
Assessment of ISID's Military Policy for the Mujahedin
The following represents the Afghan Task Force's assessment of
ISID's current military guidance to the Afghan Alliance. This
should be caveated with the understanding that there is no direct
command relationship between ISID and Mujahedin commanders nor is
their any guarantee that Pakistani pressure to pursue a particular
policy will be successful. The Mujahedin and their seven Peshawar
leaders consistently demonstrate their independence of thought and
action.
-- Increase military pressure on Afghan regime military
garrisons and forces to include those located in cities.
-- Make every effort to avoid civilian casualties. Within the
Kabul area since September 1988, ISID has restricted long range
rockets to those commanders who have more accurate rocket
launchers and directed them to attack only the airfield. This
airfield continues to be used by the Soviets to support Soviet and
regime combat operations.
-- Do not interfere with or harass the Soviet troop
withdrawal. This has been a consistent ISID policy since the
signing of the Geneva Accord. Despite Soviet propaganda to the
contrary, there is no evidence to indicate that Soviet units have
had significant problems withdrawing from Afghanistan.
It is important to recognize that the current Soviet military
buildup of airpower in Afghanistan is not in response to Mujahedin
military pressure on Soviet forces. The bombings are taking place
in areas where there are no Soviet troops.
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DCII DISSEN
DDCI
DDI
A/DDI
D/CPAS
Page 1
RYUSAF
000
-L I BYA
DCI
Thu Dec 01 09:22:10 1988
LIBYA DENIES CHEMICAL ARMS FACILITY, WILL ATTEND CONFERENCE
ROME, Dec 1, Reuter - Libya denied U.S. accusations that it
has the means to produce chemical weapons and said on Thursday
it would attend an International conference In January banning
their use.
Libyan number two Major Abdel-Salam Jalloud told a Rome news
conference his country had neither the political will nor the
ability to make nerve gas or other toxic weapons.
"This is an American lie. The United States makes up these
lies because it is trying to prepare the world psychologically
for new aggression against us," Jalloud said.
He said Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was willing to Invite
journalists and Western ambassadors to Libya to see for
themselves that no such chemical facility existed.
He confirmed earlier reports that Tripoli would take part In
a January 7-11 Paris conference of signatory states to the 1925
!Geneva protocol on the non-use of chemical weapons.
Jalloud, ending a week-long visit to Italy to discuss
bilateral relations, also criticised Washington's denial of a
!visa to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in order for him to
!address a United Nations debate on Palestine.
"It shows absolute contempt for all the people and nations
of the U.N.," he said.
He said Libya had contacted all member states calling for
the permanent transfer of the United Nations seat from Its New
York headquarters.
REUTER JMS DJG
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, Angola:
Attitudes Toward a Angola/Namibia Settlement
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa are meeting in Brazzaville, Congo
this week in an attempt to finalize an agreement on a Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola and independence for Namibia. If this
meeting is successful, the parties are scheduled to meet again at
the United Nations to formally approve the accord. Nevertheless,
we believe a heads of state meeting in New York in December to
sign the agreement is unlikely. All the parties appear generally
pleased with the current accord and--despite last minute
maneuvering--appear intent on arriving at a final settlement.
The View from Moscow
The Soviets have publicly expressed their pleasure with the
outcome of the quadripartite talks and almost certainly see an
agreement as favorable to their interests. Although the Soviet
Union is not a party to the agreement, it has played an important
and supportive role in the US brokered negotiating process and,
on occasion, has acted to prevent the talks from stalling. We
are not aware of any plans by Gorbachev, however, to meet at the
UN with the heads of state of the countries involved in the
talks.
Moscow and Havana appear to be cooperating closely on reaching( a
settlement in Angola.
-- The Soviets gave logistic, intelligence,'and rhetorical
support to the augmentation of Cuban troops in Angola over
the past year They also
provided missiles, aircraft, tanks and other equipment to
augmented Cuban forces in southwest Angola, and made
additional military equipment deliveries to Cuba over the
past year to replace Cuban equipment deployed to Angola.
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SECRET
There are some indications, however, suggesting that Moscow and
Luanda have had some disagreements over the quadripartite talks.
Gorbachev had stressed to dos Santos in late October that
delaying a final agreement would make it more difficult to
reach a favorable settlement,
apparently believing that the proposals under
discussion were the best that could be achieved.
Moscow cut off subsidies of
Cuban troops in Angola in early October, leaving the Angolans
to pick up the tab. We believe this was an effort--
apparently successful--to induce the Angolans to be more
cooperative in reaching an agreement.
Moscow probably does not see any benefit to holding direct
discussions with UNITA leader Savimbi.
Moscow has counseled Luanda to pursue national
reconciliation and asked several African states to assist in
addressing the issue. We believe, however, that the Soviets
would prefer to avoid direct involvement in national
reconciliation talks.
A meeting with Savimbi also would probably complicate Soviet
relations with Luanda, since the Angolans vehemently oppose
any role for Savimbi in a settlement.
Cuban Attitudes
Cuban President Castro appears to be pleased with the
agreement, especially since he has achieved his major goals--the
end of South African involvement in Angola and movement toward
Namibian independence.
-- Castro probably believes that his role in achieving an end
to Pretoria's involvement in Angola and Namibia has enhanced
his image as a Third World leader and given Havana a voic6
in southern Africa regional politics.
-- The withdrawal timetable allows for the retention of
sufficient Cuban forces in Angola both to prop up the dos
Santos regime and prevent South African backtracking. It
also would permit a relatively rapid return home of Cuban
forces, a domestically popular step.
Castro probably would be reluctant, however, to become
involved in a multi-party meeting on Angola in New York.
-- He would likely question the necessity of such a meeting,
especially if it gave the appearance of legitimizing South
Africa's apartheid government.
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-- Castro's intense dislike of Presidents Reagan and Botha also
mitigate against his sharing the same platform with them.
Moreover, he also may believe that his attendance at such a
meeting could be upstaged by any Reagan-Gorbachev talks, a
prospect his ego would find unpalatable.
South African Outlook
South Africa is generally pleased with the negotiated settlement,
which links total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to
implementation of the UN independence plan for Namibia. Most
South African officials probably believe the agreement offers the
best way of eliminating both the Cuban threat in southern Africa
as well as the economic and military burden of Namibia.
-- Pretoria--concerned that the package may not be politically
acceptable to South African whites, particularly the right
wing opposition--can claim it achieved concessions from Cuba
and Angola without trading on its own security.
South Africa probably would support an all parties'
conference in New York because it would provide President Botha
with a rare opportunity to meet--and be seen with--top world
leaders. Botha has tried to arrange a meeting with President
Reagan for several years and the added bonus of General Secretary
Gorbachev--and perhaps even President-elect Bush--would make the
meeting a very attractive proposal.
The South Africans, however, do not seem to be angling for a
December meeting. South Africa apparently plans to sign the
protocol in Brazzaville, but Botha wants to delay the formal
signing ceremony in New York until mid-January,
-- In the interim, Pretoria hopes to earn domestic and
international capital from the Angola/Naiibia accord, its
reprieve last week of six antiapartheid activists on death
.row, and the announcement that prison restrictions on ANC
leader Nelson Mandela will soon be relaxed.
-- There are indications that Foreign Minister Pik Botha plans
to travel to several European capitals in December to
champion South Africa's diplomatic achievements. Finance
Minister du Plessis may seize this opportunity to encourage
European bankers to roll over South African foreign debt.
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Angolan Concerns
Angola has been willing to move forward on an agreement for Cuban
troop withdrawal because it believes that the accord will cut off
UNITA from South African support, the insurgents' most important
source of assistance.
-- Separated from South African support, Luanda believes that
it can deal serious military blows to UNITA during the
period before Cuban forces are completely withdrawn from
Angola, allowing them to negotiate with the insurgents from
a position of strength.
Although Angola has presented a united front with Cuba at the
negotiating table, it is probably unhappy with some details of
the agreement.
-- Because its own security is at stake and given its concerns
about what it perceives as a growing UNITA threat, Luanda
probably would have preferred a longer timetable than 27
months for the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
-- Despite differences over the pace of the Cuban troop
withdrawal, Angola has little choice but to follow the Cuban
lead. Luanda will probably receive additional assurances of
support from both Havana and Moscow to assuage its fears
over entering into an agreement.
The Angolan Government would probably welcome the opportunity to
take part in a multi-party meeting at the UN in order to
capititalize on international exposure associated with the
regional peace accord.
-- Luanda likely calculates that its role in the peace process
and the publicity surrounding a formal signing at the UN
would improve its professed image as a moderate, nonaligned
state.
-- Luanda also probably believes that increased attention in
international fora will undoubtedly improve its ability 0
attract badly needed Western loans and hopes to gain
membership in the International Monetary Fund.
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ANNEX: Soviet Relations with Cuba and Angola
Perestroika
Soviet ties with Cuba are currently quite tense over Havana's
misuse of Soviet economic assistance and the country's
deteriorating economy.
one of Gorbachev's major
purposes in visiting Havana is to assess for himself just
how bad Cuba's economic situation is.
We expect Gorbachev to use the visit to make clear his
concern that Cuba needs to revitalize its economy.
Since Gorbachev came to power, Moscow has implemented a number of
measures designed to cap assistance levels and strengthen its
control over how Soviet aid is used.
Since 1985, we believe the Soviets have held oil deliveries
to Cuba steady at 270 thousand barrels-per-day (b/d),
despite Castro's requests for more. Due to the drop in the
world market price of oil, this one step has caused the
value of Soviet assistance (in constant US dollars) to Cuba
to decline by about 20 percent from 1984 to 1987.
Moscow has tied development credits to specific aid projects
so that Castro cannot divert the materials or funds to his
pet projects.
Castro has compounded the problem by openly rejecting Soviet-
style economic reform as inappropriate for Cuba.
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-- His own reform program stresses moral suasion over material
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The Soviets and Angolans, by contrast, do not appear to disagree
over perestroika.
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similarity between the Angolan economic and iii
reorganization program and the USSR's perestroika. The
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On Other Areas of Foreign Policy:
-- The Cubans have joined Moscow in supporting the Esquipulas
peace plan in Nicaragua and-have praised Soviet arms control
initiatives.
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-- Havana may have boycotted the Olympics to show its
independence from Moscow--probably deliberately choosing an
area that would not harm Soviet interests.
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Talking Points for the DCI
1 December 1988
Pakistan: Prospects for the Bhutto Government
Benazir Bhutto, named Prime Minister on 1 December, has not yet formed
a governing coalition but should win a vote of confidence within the next
week.
--Bhutto has 106 delegates in the new National Assembly but must gain
at least 12 more votes to win a vote of confidence. Her two most
likely coalition partners the Muhajir Quami Party (14 delegates) and
a Sunni religious party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (12 delegates),
have proven unexpectedly difficult bargainers. The Muhajirs are
holding out for recognition as a separate ethnic group, which would
be unexceptable to Bhutto's Punjabi and Sindhi supporters, as well
as the the Army. Both are likely to support Bhutto on the vote of
confidence but may not join a Bhutto-led cabinet.
Bhutto is likely to be tested quickly as prime minister. Whether she
can govern successfully will depend on her ability to assuage the military,
manage an unstable coalition, and cope with Pakistan's serious ethnicland
sectarian problems.
--To maintain military backing, Bhutto must honor commitments she gave
General Beg that she would not change Pakistan's Afghanistan and
nuclear weapons policies, interfere with the military budget and
military personnel, reverse President Zia's Islamization reforms, or
seek a rapprochement with India, US diplomats report.
--Bhutto will also face serious ethnic and sectarian problems.
Bhutto's task will almost certainly be complicated by her need to
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preserve her support in Punjab, where more than half the party's
National Assembly delegates were elected, without disappointing her
supporters in Sind or alienating her Muhajir Quami Movement partners
who are suspicious of each other as well as Punjabis.
Bhutto is also likely to face serious difficulties in her relations
with the United States.
--Bhutto's commitments to the military on nuclear weapons development
suggest that she will prove no more flexible than past Pakistani
leaders on nuclear nonproliferation.
--If her party does go into coalition in the North West Frontier
Province with the Awami National Party, pressure at the provincial
level for compromise on Afghanistan and quick--possibly
involuntary--repatriation of Afghan refugees could mount.
--A North West Frontier Province coalition with the Awami Party, whose
leader has denounced US-sponsored narcotics control programs and
crop substitution projects, would almost certainly undercut our
efforts to lessen the flow of narcotics from Pakistan.
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
PROSPECTS FOR GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAM
This week's Central Committee plenum and Supreme Soviet session advanced President
Gorbachev's political reform agenda, although the extent to which Gorbachev had to
compromise is still unclear.
1. The Central Committee Plenum
Monday's plenum spelled out the role of the six party commissions created in September
and named their memberships.
o The commissions, whose members are drawn primarily from the Central
Committee and Central Auditing Commission, will be responsible for drafting
policy papers for the Politburo.
o The commissions effectively supplant the Secretariat, which had been
managed by erstwhile "Second Secretary" Ligachev, and will help Gorbachev's
efforts to shift authority from the party apparatus to elected officials.
Members of the commissions appear to represent a mix of reformist and
conservative views, but Gorbachev has prominent supporters on each
commission and should be able to manipulate them more successfully than
he did the Secretariat.
o The plenum also put the party's stamp of approval on legislative drafts
before they were submitted to the Supreme Soviet, although Politburo
member Medvedev indicated at a press conference that debate over the
drafts was lively.
II. The Supreme Soviet Session
The Supreme Soviet session went relatively smoothly for Gorbachev, who in his opening
speech emphasized the importance of checks and balances and tried to head off protests
in the non-Russian republics.
o Gorbachev said that while the powers of the president should be augmented,
"excessive concentration of powers in one person" would be ruled out under
the new system.
o He acknowledged the legitimacy of some complaints from the non-Russian
republics and supported increasing the representation of the republics in the
new national legislature.
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Secret
o Many non-Russian delegates favored greater republic autonomy.
Nevertheless, most non-Russian speakers supported Gorbachev's position
criticizing Estonia's declaration of "sovereignty."
o Gorbachev succeeded in limiting criticism of the proposed reforms and set
the stage for their approval at Thursday's closing session. Although the
extent of compromise will not be known until the new laws have been
published, Gorbachev announced that elections to the new Congress of
People's Deputies--to which the president will be accountable--will be held
on 26 March 1989 and the party plenum on nationalities will convene
sometime in June.
III. Outlook
Despite Gorbachev's achievements this week, the success of his political reforms is not
yet guaranteed.
o It remains to be seen how the individual party commissions will function in
practice, and whether Gorbachev and his allies on the commissions will be
able to press the reform agenda ahead.
o The transfer of power from party to state bodies has only been accomplished
on paper; the actual shift will not occur overnight and will undoubtedly be
accompanied by a fair amount of resistance in the party.
o While non-Russians in the Supreme Soviet generally lent their support to the
reforms, they are likely to keep pressure on Gorbachev to take additional
measures to guarantee regional autonomy.
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Talking Points for the DCI
Arafat's Moves Following Visa Denial
01 December 1988
PLO Chairman Arafat wants to address a United Nations General Assembly
session in Geneva--perhaps as early as mid-December--to build on growing
international support for PLO moderation, keep PLO hardliners in check, and
pressure the US to respond to PLO diplomatic moves.
--The denial of a US visa to Arafat has given PLO hardliners their
first boost since Arafat's dominance of the moderate proceedings of
last month's Palestine National Council in Algiers and made a
diplomatic success for Arafat at the UN even more important if he is
to contain internal critics of his moderate policy.
--Widespread European criticism of the US decision and aggressive Arab
lobbying among UN members give Arafat a strong chance of winning
support for a General Assembly session in Geneva.
Arafat's Strategy and Risks
PLO moderation--begun at last June's Arab League summit with the
release of a conciliatory-sounding statement on policy toward Israel--is
designed to earn Arafat a place at an international peace conference and
produce tangible political gains from the year-old Palestinian uprising.
--Arafat almost certainly believes the US rejection of his visa
application will strengthen support even among US allies in Europe
for a direct PLO role in future peace talks.
--Arafat, however, will probably be reluctant to give an explicit
recognition of Israel or unqualified acceptance of resolutions 242
and 338 at a Geneva session to avoid fueling hardline onnnsition a7
to preserve bargaining leverage with the US.
Implications for the US
Arafat almost certainly will continue to restrain his criticisms of the
visa denial to avoid foreclosing a possible dialogue with the incoming US
administration.
--He hopes such a dialogue will strengthen his position over PLO
hardliners and assure his standing among Palestinians in the
occupied territories.
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--Arab moderates with a major stake in a successful international
peace conference--such as Egypt and Jordan--are likely to redouble
their efforts to persuade Arafat to ignore pressure from PLO
hardliners to backslide from the PNC's positions.
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