FINAL DRAFT OF REVISED NSDD-32

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000300870001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 5, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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1200 11 Aug '86
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Remarks
To 5: Please prepare, for my signature, a note
of concurrence/comment (reflecting coordinated
views) on this final draft.
E xkiutive Secretary
6 Aug '86
3637 (!o-81)
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Final Draft: Revised 451MD 32
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NON-CIA ORIGINATOR (Dept, Agency) Control No., Copy No.
white Rouse 90475
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TOP SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH! NGTON
August 5, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN W. BITOFF
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Final Draft of Revised NSDD-32 (U)
90475
add-on
Attached for your review and concurrence is the final draft of
our update on national security strategy. (U)
There hame_been several minor changes to the draft approved
by e SIG-DP on 18 July. These have been discussed with your
sta in advance, e represent a departure from current
policy. For the longer changes (SDI and international economic
policy), we have applied language previously approved for other
Presidential documents. Changes to the SIG-DP version are noted
in the margins and underlined. This final draft also includes
compromise language on conditions for the "use of force," agreed
to by DOD and State after the meeting of the SIG-DP. (TS)
We would appreciate your concurrence by C.O.B., Monday, August
the 11th. (U)
Attachment
Final draft, Revised NSDD-32
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Rodne B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
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? 7/31/86
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Nationat Seeuxity Deciaion
Ditective Numbet
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (C)
DRAFT
Significant progress has been made during the past six years
in strengthening the position of the United States in world
affairs. The constancy of purpose we have demonstrated in
defending U.S. global interests and pursuing our policy
objectives has strengthened global security. Yet, important
changes have evolved in international affairs that must be
considered as we further develop our strategy of peace for
the future. (U)
This directive supersedes NSDD-32 and its supporting documents
as the primary source of U.S. national security strategy. It
shall serve as the starting point for further development of
policy and strategy where appropriate. Policy guidance now in
effect is being reviewed to ensure its consistency with this
document. Supplemental directives will be structured to ensure
conformance with this guidance. (TS)
Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy
The primary objective of U.S. foreign and security policy
is to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions and
promote a peaceful global environment in which they can thrive.
The national security policy of the United States shall serve
the following broad purposes:
-- To preserve the political identity, framework and
institutions of the United States as embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
To protect the United States -- its national territory,
citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from
military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack.
To foster the economic well-being
in particular, by maintaining and
nation's industrial, agricultural
and by ensuring access to foreign
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of the United States,
strengthening the
and technological base
markets and resources.
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DRAFT
To foster an international order supportive of the
vital interests of the United States by maintaining and
strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships
and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing
wherever possible and practicable, freedom, the rule
of law, economic development and national independence
throughout the world. (C)
Grand Strategy
The grand strategy of the United States is to avoid
nuclear war while preventing a single hostile power or
coalition of powers from dominating the Eurasian land-mass or
other strategic regions from which threats to U.S. interests
might arise. The success of this strategy is dependent on the
maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent, dynamic alliances,
and a Western-oriented world economy. It is also Upendent
successfully p competition for among developing countries( the ability to influence
events beyond our direct control, and ultimately, the ability to
project military power abroad in defense of U.S. interests. The
strength of this grand strategy is founded upon the convergence
of interests between the U.S. and the community of nations as
a whole. The national independence and individual freedoms we
seek to uphold are in harmony with the general desires and
ideals common to all mankind. The U.S. must therefore remain
the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of
others, and the proponent of free trade, commerce, and economic
stability. (S)
This grand strategy requires the development and
integration of a set of strategies to achieve our national
objectives, including political, diplomatic, military,
informational, economic, intelligence, and arms control
components. These strategies are necessarily shaped by our
values and our vision of the future; the national and
international policy objectives we have set for ourselves; by
dynamic trends in the global economy and the military balance;
and by the demands of our geographical position. Such strategies
must also take into account the capabilities and intentions of
those hostile countries or coalitions which threaten to undermine
the achievement of U.S. policy objectives. (S)
Threats to U.S. National Security
The primary threats to U.S. national security in the
years ahead will continue to be posed by the armed forces of the
Soviet Union and Soviet exploitation of regional instabilities.
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DRAFT
The geopolitical objectives of the Soviet Union include the
dissolution of. Western alliances in Europe and Asia, the
isolation of China, and the attainment of strategic position in
the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia,
and other key regions of the world. The U.S. faces potential
military threats to its interests across the entire spectrum
of potential conflict from multiple sources in widely separated
parts of the world. (S)
The most severe threat to the United States is the
offensive and defensive nuclear capability of the Soviet Union.
While the probability of a nuclear war appears low, and can
be influenced by the overall conduct of our relations, the
ongoing Soviet attempt to achieve nuclear superiority over
the U.S. threatens to undermine the credibility of our nuclear
deterrent which provides the basis for Western security policy.
The Soviet Union seeks nuclear superiority for the broad
political purpose of deterring the U.S. from threatening the use
of nuclear weapons in defense of Western interests; to increase
the effectiveness of its conventional military advantages; and
to increase the probability of a successful outcome, in relative
terms, if nuclear war should occur. The continued Soviet
modernization of their larger conventional forces, and the
growth of Soviet power projection capabilities, also challenge
the ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain an adequate
and stable military balance. (S)
The Soviet Union remains aware of the potential
consequences of initiating military action directly against
the United States or its allies. For this reason, a war with
a Soviet client arising from regional tensions or attacks
against U.S. personnel and facilities is more likely than a
war involving U.S. and Soviet forces in direct combat. In
a conflict with a Soviet client, however, the risk of direct
confrontation with the Soviet Union remains. (S)
The Gorbachev leadership is more vigorous and dynamic
than its predecessors since the late Brezhnev period. The
potential now exists for more creative and energized Soviet
foreign policies inimical to U.S. interests. Moscow will
continue to try politically to isolate and undermine the
efforts of Western governments to resist Soviet blandishments
in those areas of arms control and economic cooperation that
are detrimental to Western security interests. The USSR will
seek to capitalize on any changes in Western governments that
portend lesser resistance to Soviet interests and increased
friction with the United States. (S)
The intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its
surrogates will continue to present a strategic threat to U.S.
national security. This threat includes espionage, hostile
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SIGINT against U.S. telecommunications and automated information
systems, and the illegal diversion and acquisition of sensitive
U.S. technology. The Soviets will continue to attempt to
penetrate our most sensitive secrets in order to undermine our
political integrity and reduce the costs of their military
buildup. (S)
The Soviet leadership also will persist in its efforts
to consolidate previous Third World gains and will try to take
advantage of new opportunities which may arise. Unstable
governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies,
and local conflicts will continue to create opportunities for
Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world. Economic
uncertainty, terrorism, the trafficking of illicit drugs, the
dangers of nuclear proliferation, reticence on the part of a
number of Western countries, and the assertiveness of Soviet
foreign policy, all threaten Western interests. (S)
One of the most challenging issues confronting the United
States and its allies is the dedicated effort of the Soviet
Union and others to subvert democratic processes and interests
by whatever means. Western interests on all continents are
threatened by direct and indirect actions on the part of the
Soviet Union and its allies to undermine and take over other
governments. They undertake this through destabilization and
subversion, support of insurgencies, coups, infiltration and
domination of local security and military services, use of
propaganda and agents of influence, and other methods. (S)
Instability is not always the product of Soviet design nor
always harmful to U.S. interests. Historical and other forces
also shape the evolution of regional affairs. Nevertheless, the
Soviets share mutual interests with several radical and ambitious
Third World states, and use arms transfers and both direct and
indirect military support as catalysts through which such states
can upset regional military balances and threaten U.S. and other
allied interests. While the possibility of nuclear confrontation
or a major conventional conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union cannot be ruled out, the continuing and prolonged challenge
at this lower end of the spectrum of potential conflict (including
regional instability and organized terrorism sponsored by radical
states and hostile coalitions), exploited by the Soviet Union,
constitutes the most likely threat we face in the years ahead. (S)
The underlying competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union is in the realm of ideas and values, and in
our contrasting visions of the future and the conditions for
peace. Our way of life, founded upon the dignity and worth of
the individual, depends on a stable and pluralistic world order
within which freedom and democratic institutions can thrive.
Yet, the greatest threat to the Soviet system, in which the
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DRAFT
State controls the destiny of the individual, is the concept
of freedom itself. The survival of the Soviet system depends
to a significant extent upon the persistent and exaggerated
representation of foreign threats, through which it seeks to
justify both the subjugation of its own people and Soviet
military capabilities well beyond those required for
self-defense. (C)
The Soviet system challenges not just our values, but the
stable political environment in which they flourish. Few value
systems are as irreconcilable with our own, and no other has the
support of a great and growing center of military power capable
of threatening our national survival. While we will seek and
experience periods of cooperation with Soviet leadership, there
will be no change in the fundamentally competitive nature of our
relationship unless and until a change occurs in the nature of
the Soviet system. (C)
Global Objectives
In support of our grand strategy, and in response to the
threats we face, the national security policy of the United
States shall be guided by the following global objectives:
- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against
the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across
the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should
deterrence fail.
- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world
by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations
with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of
states friendly to U.S. interests, by promoting democracy,
and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and
information efforts.
- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and
military presence throughout the world, and to increase the
costs to the Soviet Union and other countries that support
proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.
- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its
influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers,
economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and
disinformation; weaken the links between the Soviet Union
and its client states in the Third World; and isolate the
radical regimes with whom the Soviets share mutual
interests.
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DRAFT
- To foster; if possible in concert with our allies,
restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet
adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by
forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic
shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and
nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied
countries.
To reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear
weapons and nuclear retaliation, by strengthening our
conventional forces, by pursuing equitable and verifiable
arms control agreements and insisting on compliance with
such agreements, and in particular, by pursuing technologies
for strategic defense.
To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the
U.S. military, by using both strategy and technology to
force the Soviets to redirect assets for defensive rather
than offensive purposes, and by preventing the flow of
militarily significant technologies and resources to the
Soviet Union, and others where appropriate.
- To prevent the reinstitution of a Moscow-Beijing axis of
strategic cooperation in international security affairs.
- To identify, counter, and reduce the hostile intelligence
threat to U.S. national interests.
- To discourage the further proliferation of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons.
- To ensure U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure
the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy
and mineral resources.
- To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.
- To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment
programs that promote economic development and the growth
of humane social and political orders ir,1 the Third World.
- To promote a well functioning international economic system
with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable
currencies, and broadly agreed and respected rules for
managing and resolving differences.
- To combat threats to the stability of friendly governments
and institutions from the international trafficking of
illicit drugs. (S)
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Requirements for Military Forces
DRAFT
The United States requires military forces that are
organized, manned, trained, and equipped to deter aggression
across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Our grand
strategy, global objectives, and the nature of the threat
require that we defend our interests as far from North America
as possible. In coalition with our allies we will continue
to maintain in peacetime major forward deployments for land,
naval, and air forces in both Europe and the Pacific, and other
deployments in the Western Hemisphere and the Indian Ocean. The
overall size and composition of the armed forces must be planned
accordingly. (C)
The challenge we face is dynamic and complex. Overall,
there remains a significant imbalance of forces which would
favor the Soviet Union in several important contingencies. In
addition, Third World states are increasingly armed with modern
and sophisticated military equipment. (S)
Comprehensive and imaginative integration of U.S. and
allied military capabilities is required to reduce future risks
to our national security. Since our political and social heritage
militates against our raising and supporting large forces in
peacetime, this impels us to seek security in America's national
genius for technological innovation, industrial efficiency,
and alliance cooperation. The U.S. must pursue strategies for
competition which emphasize our comparative advantages in these
areas. (C)
The full range of U.S. military capabilities must be
appropriately balanced among combat and support elements,
and mixed within active duty and reserve components. The
U.S. must have specialized forces for nuclear deterrence and
anti-terrorism; and must also have general purpose forces both
capable of sustaining high intensity conflict, and trained and
equipped for lesser contingencies and special operations. (C)
U.S. military forces must also be supported by plans and
doctrine which provide for their effective integration and
employment. While the possible use of nuclear weapons must
remain an element in our overall military strategy, nuclear
forces will not be viewed as a lower-cost alternative
to conventional forces. U.S. forces must be capable of rapid
deployment to deter wider crises or conflicts, and capable of
expanding the scope and intensity of conflict as appropriate
should deterrence fail. We must alsb have the capability to
exploit U.S. technological advantages across the entire
spectrum of conflict. The U.S. must maintain effective
and robust reserve forces, trained and equipped at levels
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DRAFT
commensurate with their wartime missions, as well as Coast
Guard and other capabilities which support the national
security establishment. The U.S. must also continue to
enhance its capabilities to surge or mobilize manpower and
key industrial resources, planning for the effective use of
available warning in the event of crisis or war. (C)
Strategic Forces
Deterrence of nuclear attack constitutes the cornerstone of
U.S. national security and that of its allies. Maintaining that
deterrence requires that Soviet war planners be assured that any
direct conventional attack, or an attack involving the use of
nuclear weapons, would result in an outcome unfavorable to the
Soviet Union. In strengthening deterrence, U.S. strategic forces
must be effective, survivable, and enduring. Such forces must
be able to respond flexibly against an array of targets under
a variety of possible contingencies. (S)
The U.S. will retain a capable, credible, and diversified
strategic Triad of land-based ballistic missiles, manned bombers,
and submarine launched ballistic missiles. While each leg of
this Triad should be as survivable as possible, the existence
of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by
surprise attack and guards against technological surprise which
could similarly undermine the effectiveness of a single leg. (C)
In addition to maintaining and strengthening deterrence
in the near term, the U.S. must now also take steps to provide
future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the
long term. We must do so in a way that allows us both to negate
the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces, and to
channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more
stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense
Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. Research
through the Stratevic Defense Initiative will investigate the
possibility of making deterrence stronger and more stable by
reducing the role of ballistic missiles and placing greater
reliance on defenses which threaten no one. (C)
The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear
deterrent by completing its five-part Strategic Modernization
Program, which includes the Strategic Defense Initiative, in
accordance with guidance provided in NSDD-178, except as may
be modified by new decisions concerning the basing mode for
the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. This Program will be
complemented by related programs to provide for the continuity
of government and civil defense. Strategic objectives and
concepts will be developed for future strategic offensive and
defensive forces to meet U.S. security needs early in the next
century. (TS)
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General Purpose Forces
General purpose forces support U.S. national security
policy in peacetime by deterring aggression, by demonstrating
U.S. interests, concern, and commitment, by assisting the forces
of other friendly nations, and by providing a basis to move
rapidly from peace to war. In wartime, these forces would be
employed to achieve our political objectives and to secure
early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and allies,
preferably without the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. general
purpose forces must, however, be prepared for both prolonged
conflict and the use of nuclear weapons if required. (S)
The U.S. shall maintain a global posture and shall strive
to increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and
improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable
U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security
assistance, and special operations. U.S. general purpose forces
must provide the flexibility to deal quickly, decisively and
discriminately with low-level conflict contingencies requiring
U.S. military involvement. The U.S. will further enhance its
capabilities for global mobility, including appropriate
protection and support for points of embarkation and debarkation.
The United States will continue to improve its conventional
warfare capabilities and to improve its ability to deter chemical
attack through the production of binary chemical munitions. (C)
Resource Priorities
In order to reduce the risk that we may not be able to
execute wartime strategy, the U.S. must undertake a sustained and
balanced force development program. This program must complement
our diplomatic, economic, and security assistance strategies, and
should be guided by periodic net assessments of U.S. and Soviet
nuclear and conventional capabilities. We must consider the
capabilities for which there would be immediate, high-level, and
sustained demand in the event of general war; capabilities which
cannot be provided by allies, and which cannot be mobilized or
produced within a short period of time. We must consider our own
capability for technological innovation, which represents one of
our most significant military advantages vis-a-vis the Soviets,
and consider how most effectively to explOTT?IT?IT) affect the
military balance in ways that are favorable to the U.S. At the
same time, we must balance expenditures among the vital needs of
readiness, sustainability, modernization and force expansion.
The relative priority of these four pillars is not the same in
all mission areas. (S)
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DRAFT
The-following general guidance applies:
In the overall context of Western security, it is
the responsibility of the United States to maintain a
nuclear balance with the Soviet Union. Thus, the strategic
modernization program (including SDI), and particularly
strategic command, control, communications and intelligence,
has the highest overall priority.
-- To preserve a credible conventional deterrent, we will
establish and maintain an appropriate level of combat
readiness and sustainability, and ensure the maintenance
of a robust logistics infrastructure.
- We must ensure that compensation, unit integrity,
and quality leadership are all maintained at a level
sufficiently high to recruit and retain our most
capable service men and women. In this regard, we must
emphasize individual and unit training in the active
forces and early deploying reserves through specific
training programs and major exercises.
- In achieving an appropriate level of sustainability,
preferential attention shall be given to meeting
inventory objectives for precision munitions and other
advanced guidance weapons systems which can multiply
force effectiveness, particularly in the critical early
days of conflict, and help alleviate the effects of
numerical imbalances between U.S. and Soviet forces.
-- To support the U.S. strategy of forward deployment and
rapid reinforcement, we must build and maintain adequate
strategic airlift, sealift, and tanker support to transport
and sustain our forces abroad.
-- Force structure expansion of U.S. maritime, air, and ground
forces shall be prioritized in accordance with the national
military strategy. This strategy recognizes that we must
continue to build and modernize national forces sufficient
to retain maritime superiority.
U.S. military systems which particularly stress Soviet
defenses, or require a disproportionate expenditure of
Soviet resources to counter, represent an especially
attractive investment relative to competing systems,
provided their cost and military effectiveness otherwise
warrant the systems' procurement.
-- In keeping with this approach, for general purpose forces,
modernization shall seek to exploit opportunities created
by the application of high-leverage advanced technology.
Particular attention should be paid to those areas with
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the'potential for near-to-mid-term payoff in significantly
enhanced combat capabilities. These include low observable
technologies; improved surveillance, reconnaissance and
targeting capabilities; new generations of "smart" and
"brilliant" weapons; and systems which extend the effective
strike range and survivability of conventional forces.
Tactical ground and air forces will have sufficient priority
for modernization to regain and maintain U.S. qualitative
advantages to offset the Soviets' quantitative superiority.
-- Special attention should be given to the continued
development and acquisition of capabilities which enhance
the effectiveness of joint or combined operations.
4.1.1 NMI
Special operations forces shall be expanded and forces
specifically designed for counter-terrorism shall
give priority to near-term readiness, deployability
and command, control, communications and intelligence
improvements. (S)
Priorities and Objectives in Peacetime
U.S. grand strategy is fundamentally a coalition strategy.
Its success depends upon robust and dynamic alliances based on
shared interests. The development of these shared interests
is built upon political and economic strengths of the industrial
democracies, a common perception of the potential threats, and
the continued importance of Third World resources. We not only
seek to strengthen our traditional bilateral and multilateral
alliance relationships, but to fundamentally broaden our base of
support abroad, influencing to the extent possible the pace and
direction of political change. The U.S. will assist democratic
and nationalist movements where possible in the struggle against
totalitarian regimes and will seek the cooperation of allies and
others in providing material support to such movements. We will
also pursue broader cooperation among all governments in the
fight against terrorism and the international trafficking of
illicit drugs. (C)
In peacetime, the achievement of our regional
objectives will be based on political, diplomatic and economic
strategies which promote the peaceful resolution of disputes,
regional stability, unrestricted trade and economic growth,
financial stability, and the further development of democratic
institutions. Such strategies will complement U.S. regional
military objectives. (C)
The international economic policy of the United States
is built upon the principle that economic growth is one of the
free world's greatest strengths. It is vital not only for our
standard of living but also for our political cooperation and
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mutual defense. The source of economic growth is individual
creativity expressed through the marketplace. The U.S. seeks
to foster an environment in which growth can occur through
domestic economic policies that minimize government
interference in markets, by ensuring stable exchanlie rates
through international cooperation, and by negotiating the
elimination of barriers to trade and investment flows. The U.S.
also must encourage cooperation among its Allies in preventing
the transfer to Soviet bloc and other countries of goods and
technologies that are critical to the military balance. (C)
In peacetime, we will seek to deter military attack against
the U.S. and its forces, allies and friends; to contain and
reverse the expansion of Soviet influence worldwide; to isolate
radical regimes hostile to U.S. interests; and promote regional
stability and the capabilities of allies and friends for
self-defense. In drawing upon the cooperation of allies and
others to support and protect our mutual interests, the growth
of Soviet power projection capabilities and indigenous regional
threats require stronger and more effective collective defense
arrangements between the U.S. and its allies. We will continue
to consider the status of these arrangements in military planning
concerning the size, composition, and disposition of U.S. forces.
(C)
Western Hemisphere
The defense of North America is our primary security
concern. In this context the U.S. must continue to
build on interests shared with Canada. We must modernize
the strategic air defense system for North America, to
include development of true strategic defenses against
both ballistic missiles, through the SDI, and against
air-breathing threats. In Central America we must reverse
the success of the Soviet bloc in developing Nicaragua into
a hostile base on the American mainland. In El Salvador we
will support the government's effort to defeat an insurgency
which poses the threat of another Soviet client state. The
U.S. must also continue to promote the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the trend towards democracy throughout the
Caribbean and Latin America. We must achieve greater
cooperation from Mexico and other governments in the region
to establish effective control over our southern borders,
and to reduce the threat to friendly governments and to our
own well-being from the trafficking of illicit drugs. The
U.S. must strengthen military-to-military contacts and
further develop the capabilities of Caribbean and Central
American countries, and their mutual cooperation, for
territorial defense. And we will seek to maintain and
acquire as necessary base and facilities access, logistical
support, and operating, transit, and overflight rights which
would support U.S. military objectives in crisis or war. (S)
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DRAFT?
Western Europe and NATO
The security of Europe remains vital to the defense of the
United States, and a strong and unified NATO indispensable
to protecting Western interests. The U.S. will maintain its
commitment to forward deployment and early reinforcement.
While encouraging all NATO allies to maintain and increase
their contributions in Europe, the U.S. should specifically
encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe
to allocate their marginal defense resources preferentially
to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and
European missions. We will work within the alliance
framework to achieve improvements in the modernization
of NATO's nuclear, chemical, and conventional deterrent,
including the further development of innovative operational
concepts. The U.S. will also seek additional bilateral
arrangements for host nation support and facilities access
which enhance the effectiveness of both U.S. and allied
forces. In addition to supporting the achievement of
approved force goals within NATO, we will promote as
priorities the resolution of the Aegean dispute, the
modernization of the armed forces of Turkey, and the
full integration of Spain into the alliance. (S)
East Asia
In the Far East and the Pacific basin, the foremost U.S.
peacetime objective, in conjunction with allies and other
friends in the region, is to prevent the Soviet Union and
its allies from expanding their influence in the region.
Most important to this strategy is a close alliance
relationship with Japan, encouraging its development of
military capabilities more commensurate with its economic
status. We will seek a Japan more capable of sharing
U.S. military and naval burdens in the region as well as
contributing on its own to regional defense And deterrence.
We will continue to develop our relationship with China in
ways which maintain China as a counterweight to the Soviet
Union, enhance the durability of Sino-U.S. ties, and further
lay the foundation for closer cooperation in the future as
appropriate. The U.S. will also seek the withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces from neighboring states in Indochina.
Within the United Nations context, we will maintain
sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean
Peninsula to deter aggression. While continuing to
strengthen longstanding relationships in this region,
the U.S. will continue to promote economic and political
development, and to assist regional states in a manner
that will reduce our vulnerability to Soviet exploitation
of potential instabilities. We must continue to maintain
and further develop access to forward bases, and other
logistical infrastructure, essential to the efficient
forward deployment of U.S.forces in the Pacific Basin. (S)
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Near East/Southwest Asia
DRAFT
The primary U.S. objective in this pivotal region is
to prevent the Soviet Union or its client states from
extending their influence in the region in a manner
that would threaten the security of our allies and
U.S. interests in Europe and Asia. To accomplish this
objective in peacetime, the U.S. must rely on regional
states to contribute to the extent possible to their own
defense. To deter direct Soviet involvement we will
continue to improve U.S. global capabilities to deploy
and sustain military forces in the region. The U.S. must
enhance its support for the development of balanced and
self-contained friendly regional forces, especially in
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and will increase peacetime
planning with friendly states for wartime contingencies,
including host nation support, prepositioning, and combat
roles for indigenous forces. The U.S. will continue to
actively oppose radical and terrorist elements in the
region, support moderate states against external aggression
and subversion, and maintain Israel's qualitative military
advantage over any realistic combination of Arab foes.
The United States also remains committed to securing
Western access to oil resources and maintaining freedom of
commerce in the Persian Gulf. We will maintain a strong
naval presence in the region, and seek to develop a land
presence to the extent regional sensivities and local
political constraints will permit. (S)
Africa
U.S. peacetime objectives in Africa, in concert with our
allies, are to preempt and defeat foreign aggression,
subversion, and terrorism sponsored by Libya or other
forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal
of Soviet and proxy forces from the continent; to ensure
U.S. and allied access to oil and mineral resources; to
prevent the Soviets from attaining strategic advantage; to
support accelerated reform in African economic policies so
as to promote stability, pluralism and the role of market
forces and reduce possibilities for hostile destabilization;
and to promote peaceful reform in South Africa while
maintaining U.S. influence. We will assist friendly
countries that are the targets of subversion, and we will
seek to create, and respond to, opportunities to weaken the
ties between the Soviet Union and regional governments. (S)
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DPP F
Foreign and Security Assistance Programs
Resources for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy,
including security assistance, economic aid, and public
information programs are vital parts of our peacetime national
security strategy. (U)
In meeting U.S. security objectives abroad, security
assistance is a cost-effective and essential complement to our
own force structure. Security assistance will develop indigenous
forces for local and regional defense, enhance interoperability
between U.S. and other forces, and promote the broader objectives
of our coalition strategy. Where local forces play a key role
in the success of our regional or coalition strategy, or can
significantly reduce our own military requirements, resources
for security assistance may share the same importance as those
resources devoted to U.S. forces. U.S. security assistance
objectives should be structured to give priority to the
requirements of countries with whom we are joined in formal
mutual security agreements, so-called frontline states which
confront direct threats from the Soviet Union or its clients,
and access states which enhance the global mobility of U.S.
forces. We must also help meet the needs of other states where
a prudent investment of resources can prevent subversion or
other broader regional problems. (S)
Economic assistance programs should support economic
growth in Third World countries through market-oriented policies
that will increase political stability. Public diplomacy
programs will also enhance U.S. objectives by promoting the
development of democratic institutions abroad. (C)
The U.S. foreign and security assistance program should
undergo periodic review to identify emerging requirements and
priorities. In addition, we will work with non-governmental
and commercial enterprises, and with other friends and allies,
to develop creative and flexible alternatives to direct U.S.
funding. (C)
Priorities and Objectives in War
Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture
makes the assessment of war outcomes by the Soviets or any
other adversary so dangerous and uncertain, under any
contingency, as to remove any incentive for initiating conflict.
Deterrence depends both on nuclear and conventional capabilities
and on evidence of a collective will to defend our interests.
If deterrence fails, we must have the capability to counter
aggression, to control escalation, and to prevail. (TS)
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DRAFT
In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, the United
States will rely primarily on indigenous forces to protect
their own interests. Commitment of U.S. combat forces will be
made only when other means are not considered viable. Such
commitment is appropriate only if political objectives are
established, our political will is clear, and appropriate
military capabilities are available. If U.S. combat forces
are committed, the United States will seek to limit the scope
of the conflict, avoid involvement of the Soviet Union, and
ensure that U.S. objectives are met as quickly as possible.
Planning for such conflicts shall be based on the assumption
that nuclear weapons will not be used. (TS)
In a conflict involving the Soviet Union, U.S. wartime
planning must consider the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet
conflict would expand beyond one theater. It may be in the
interest of the United States to limit the scope of any
U.S.-Soviet conflict, especially one originating outside
Europe, if war termination can be effected to U.S. advantage.
U.S. forces must, however, be prepared to exploit Soviet
vulnerabilities and deny the Soviets the ability to choose
a strategy of a single front war. Thus, we will take those
steps necessary to prepare for global U.S.-Soviet conflict
and, if necessary, to execute counter-offensives at other
fronts or areas where we can affect the outcome of the war.
Counter-offensives are not, however, a substitute for the
robust military capabilities necessary to protect vital
interests at the point at which they are threatened in the
first place. (TS)
Given the magnitude of the Soviet threat we must plan
to focus our military efforts in the areas of most vital
concern first, undertaking lesser operations elsewhere. This
sequential concept shall be a basic feature of our force
applications policy. Within this context, and recognizing that
the political and military situations at the time of war will
bear heavily on strategic decisions, the following priorities
apply for wartime planning: the highest priority is North
America (Hawaii, Alaska, friendly nations in the Caribbean and
Central America and the interconnecting LOCs and the Panama
Canal), followed by NATO and the LOCs leading thereto. The
next priority includes defense of U.S. Pacific allies, access
to the oil in Southwest Asia for our allies and ourselves and
protection for the LOCs leading thereto; and then the defense
of other nations in Latin America and Africa. (TS)
National military strategy for a global war with the Soviet
Union must be more than the sum of the Combatant Commander's war
plans. It is particularly important that plans developed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff supplement the geographic and functional
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plans of theCombatant Commanders with comprehensive,
integrated, national level plans which view a potential war
with the Soviet Union from a unified, global perspective.
Such plans must also address those warfighting concepts and
capabilities which transcend the responsibilities of individual
Combatant Commanders, for example, dealing with the global Soviet
command, control and communications system; operational deception
and perception management; allocation of strategic air and sea
lift; inter-theater coordination of sequential operations; or
employment of strategic reserves. (TS)
Chemical weapons will be maintained as a deterrent; we
will not plan for their use unless they are used against us.
While plans should not assume automatic authority for the use
of nuclear weapons, we will not hesitate to meet our obligations
to our allies by any means at our disposal. Deterrence of global
nuclear conflict, or, should deterrence fail, prosecution of
such conflict, will continue to rely on nuclear retaliatory
forces employed in accordance with NSDD-13. (TS)
In prosecuting a global conflict, although early U.S.
efforts will be directed at the denial of initial Soviet
objectives, United States conventional forces should have the
capability to place Soviet interests, including those within
the Soviet homeland, at risk. Successful war termination may
require seizure of strategically significant territory in order
to provide incentives to end hostilities and to create leverage
for favorable post-conflict settlement. It may also include
conventional attacks on Soviet nuclear capabilities, including
Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Such actions would be
intended to deny the Soviets the ability to operate from
sanctuaries and to deter or control escalation. Planning will
be based on the assumption that U.S. forces will not undertake
operations in neutral territory without prior consent of the
neutral state, but that Soviet forces will not be so
constrained. (TS)
In global war with the Soviet Union, our overall
objectives are to limit damage to the United States and its
allies, control the scope and intensity of the conflict, and
terminate hostilities on terms favorable to the United States
and its allies. This requires defeating the geopolitical
objectives of our enemies, preserving the territorial integrity
and political independence of our allies, and emerging from the
conflict with a global political orientation favorable to the
United States and in which the long term threat from the Soviet
Union is reduced and the prospects for lasting peace enhanced.
In implementing these objectives, we will seek to prosecute the
war as far forward and as close as possible to the sources of
greatest threat. The following regional objectives apply: (TS)
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Western Hemisphere
While the-defense of North America (including Hawaii,
Alaska and the contiguous Caribbean Basin) is the highest
U.S. priority, our wartime objective will be to secure the
region as soon as possible with a minimum of U.S. assets.
The U.S. must defeat those forces which pose the most direct
threat to the security of the United States, neutralize
Soviet and other hostile forces in the Caribbean Basin, and
control the LOCs in the Caribbean (including the Panama
Canal), the South Atlantic and the North and South Pacific.
At the same time, in a global war the U.S. will prosecute
the military and political dimensions of the conflict to
facilitate, to the extent possible, a postwar environment
in which Soviet client states would no longer pose a threat
to U.S. and allied interests in the region. (TS)
Western Europe and NATO
Primary U.S. wartime objectives in NATO are to protect or
restore the territorial integrity of Western Europe, defeat
a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with conventional forces
in a forward defense, and deter Soviet use of chemical or
nuclear weapons, in accordance with current NATO strategy.
The U.S. and its allies must be able to establish and
maintain control of Atlantic and other sea-lines of
communication and be able to sustain a war at least as
long as the Warsaw Pact. The success of U.S. and NATO
strategy is dependent on early warning and the political
mobilization of the Alliance which will facilitate the
forward positioning of forces and rapid reinforcement from
the United States. In conjunction with our allies, the U.S.
will seek where possible to minimize potential East European
support for, or participation in, Soviet-inspired aggression
against NATO. We will also seek to engage neutral states,
and other friends and allies, in the pursuit of our
objectives for this region. (TS)
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East Asia
Primary U.S. wartime objectives in East Asia are to maintain
control of the Pacific lines of communication, including
those to the Indian Ocean, and the bases needed to support
our global strategy, all as an integral part of the forward
defense of U.S. territory. The U.S. must also fulfill
security commitments to its Asian allies, while obtaining
allied support in a conflict. Overall, we will seek to
preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy its forces for use
against NATO. Japan, in particular, will be encouraged to
provide for its own defense, including SLOC control and
aerial protection to a distance of 1,000 miles from the home
islands, by active participation as a U.S. ally in regional
defense. The People's Republic of China will be urged to
assume a military posture which pins down Soviet ground,
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air, and naval forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories,
and discourages aggression by other hostile states in the
region. The Republic of Korea will be encouraged to defend
itself against the North Korean threat, and cooperate as
feasible in initiatives to neutralize Soviet air and naval
forces, within the context of potentially diminishing direct
U.S. support. (TS)
Near East/Southwest Asia
The primary U.S. wartime objective in this region is
to maintain access to oil while denying such access to the
Soviets, by preventing the subversion of friendly states,
and by securing, where necessary, oil fields, transshipment
points, and essential SLOCs. The U.S. will preserve the
independence of Israel and engage other friendly regional
states, Western allies, and other extra-regional states in
the execution of our strategy. (TS)
Africa
The primary U.S. wartime objective in Africa must be
to neutralize Soviet or other hostile--and especially
Libyan--forces in strategic locations in this region
and adjacent waters. In conjunction with friends and
allies, the U.S. must also protect access to the
region's mineral resources, key facilities, and LOCs,
while denying their use to the Soviet Union. (TS)
Supplemental Guidance
Warfighting strategy and contingency planning concerning
the potential employment of U.S. forces will continue to be
developed through operational plans which are prepared by
Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the
President. (TS)
Further development of policy and strategy, in both
regional and functional areas, should continue to emphasize the
need for coordination to ensure consistency with overall policy
objectives and maintain the interlocking character of supporting
strategies. (C)
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