STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. ODOM DIRECTOR, NSA/CHIEF, CSS FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 9 OCTOBER 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: October 9, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
swer Airr AgrA
4ir ? ---ar .aw Ana.- a air ..eW air air
EGREJ:
(Security Classification)
?ir ;
ROUTING
TO.
: . NAME AND ADDRESS
-c----
DATE
INITIALS
1
'
2
3
4
OIPECI I [PLY
oPt P''
ai
aisPAc,,
RECiTh MENIIiip,IN
C _
fiLF
RPUPi
I
PEMLRKS
Statement of
for the Senate
iIntelligence
L FROM. NAME
LTG Odom DIR, NSA/CSS,
Select Committee on
- 9 October 1985
ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Handle Via
OA
CONTROL NO.
COPY
0A
BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYH LE- COMINT
Channels
x1
0
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the followina snecific art' ? '
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
0 2-7
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
pp
0 1 I h ???
I
(Security Cid isification)
Ar Ar Air ar a a ar ar ass
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. ODOM
DIRECTOR, NSA/CHIEF, CSS
FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
9 OCTOBER 1985
THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET UMBRA, HANDLE VIA, BYEMAN?
TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY IN ITS ENTIRETY
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
Declassified, in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee,
I welcome the opportunity to submit this statement for the
record offering NSA's views on SIGINT capabilities which will
be required by the year 1995 and how we are planning to achieve
them.
I would like to begin with a brief discussion of our philosophy
of planning. Historically, long range planning has been a major
component of NSA management. The nature of our work requires that
we always stay ahead of our adversaries, or potential adversaries,
and this has always caused us to place emphasis on planning.
Our planning has evolved over the last several decades in response
to three major stimuli. First and most important is th threat
or target stimulus. We continually review our planning to ensure
we will be able to respond not only to targets of enduring interest,
but also to emerging targets and issues which will grow in
importance in the future. Secondly, there is th technic?)
stimulus. NSA continually reviews new and forecasted communication
technology. We are always aware that new technologies can
threaten our ability to produce intelligence. As a result of
these technological threats, NSA management seeks to implement
new programs that will maintain and enhance our ability to collect
and evaluate new signals.
Jet:min:aim Required
it',?1.1-COMINT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLX
Prervn potra-a WFSIetwat a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
TC:P
c2NP.AFLA
Finally, NSA management regularly strives for more fficie5/
and productive methods of operations, and this then, becomes the
third major stimulus for change within the SIGINT System.
The need for planning has never been greater. The threat to
our security is expanding. While the Soviet Union remains our
single most important target, new targets such as international
terrorism and narcotics will demand greater emphasis in our
future posture. We also must place emphasis on improving our
support to military commanders in peace, crisis, and war. In this
regard we are in the process of describing a SIGINT "architecture"
for each major combat region of the world. In these architectures
special care is being taken to truly understand the friendly
warfighting concepts and missions (e.g. deep attack, close air
support) and to articulate the threat so the relationship of our
capability-to-threat-to information need is clear and traceable.
Perhaps the greatest need for planning, however, is in th
technical area.
he explosion of technology in communications
will have a dramatic effect on all targets in the future. This
critical forecast was recognized by the Director of Central
Intelligence in 1983 and led to a comprehensive community study
called the "Future SIGINT Capabilities Study" (FSCS) with which
you are already familiar. NSA management made a major commitment
in manpower and time to help produce this study which describes
the technical challenges SIGINT will face in the next 10-15
LYE';..t -LI-C:::.NT
CON-Tit:2d_ 1STEMS JOINTLY
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
, .
years, and the capabilities we will have to achieve if we are to
continue to produce high quality intelligence. We regard the
FSCS as a major document in our planning strategy and much of
what follows in this statement is drawn from its findings and
recommendations. We routinely try to plan out to 15 years and
much of my statement focuses, like the FSCS, on the year 2000.
I will now discuss what we believe will be the major intel-
ligence issues through 1995 and beyond against which our planning
is directed; the technical challenges to the SIGINT System that
are threatening our ability to respond to these issues; and how
we plan to deal with these challenges. I will also report on
our planning for a survivable SIGINT system, and briefly touch
on our future plans in the communications and computer security
areas.
II. INTELLIGENCE ISSUES THROUGH THE 1990s
To understand the principal threats with which U.S. intelli-
gence in general and the U.S. SIGINT system in particular must
deal for the remainder of this century, it is necessary to review
the emergence and dynamics of the post World War II international
security order and the United States' central role in it. Our
country faces two principal challenges today and through the 1990s.
The first is a strategic -- primarily military -- challenge. The
second is a series of geopolitical challenges. Both are caused
???????Sx". ev.?"' rign7tAj4fl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
?,?
in whole, whole, or in part, by the growth of Soviet power, but this
primacy of the East-West axis in our security problems should
not be understood to mean that the North-South and the West-West
axes do not also pose threats to international stability and U.S.
interests.
For the first three decades after World War II, our security
commitments and intelligence responsibilities were based on two
strategic zones, Western Europe and East Asia. In the late 1940s
the U.S. met the Soviet challenge in Europe with a security alliance
and a massive economic recovery program. The result has been the
longest period of peace in Europe in recent centuries. In 1950
the U.S. was challenged militarily in Korea. It responded militarily,
developed a system of security agreements, and supplied large
economic recovery resources. The result has been an equally long
period of peace in Northeast Asia.
By the late 1970s, at least four developments had occurred
which created a qualitative change in the structure of East-West
competition:
- The Soviet military buildup reached a level and a
comprehensiveness unparalled in peace time arms buildups,
altering significantly the correlation of military forces in
the world.
- A diffusion of economic power had occurred, in no
small part due to the success of U.S. economic recovery programs
VA
8YEMAN-TAI ENT-KEYHOLE-COMM
CONTROL4 SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
-
for Europe and East Asia, which changed the relationship between
possession of economic power and the bearing of military obliga-
tions. In the 1950s, the U.S. carried all the West's military
responsibilities, but it also possessed the lion's share of the
economic wealth.
In the 1980s, it carries even larger military
obligations while possessing a proportionately smaller share of
the Western World's. economic wealth. Our alliance relations
today reflect, politically, the tensions created by such economic
change.
- The Persian Gulf - Southwest Asian oil producing
region has taken on a new strategic significance in light of
Western vital interests in access to the area's oil production.
This is critically true for Western Europe and Japan, but also
significant for the U.S. economy.
- US/PRC normalization of relations marked the end of
a slow process in the break up of the Sino-Soviet bloc and
a major realignment of power on the East-West axis. For the
first time since the early part of the 20th century, the U.S.
enjoys good relations with both China and Japan, a condition
that considerably reduces our military requirements to meet
security obligations in East Asia.
While other factors may also be added to this list, these
four are sufficient to demonstrate that we are in a new era of
East-West competition involving changed relationships with our
;71"_t"
i 3LE-COM INT
s..(srzms JOINTLY.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201/06/26 : CIA-IR6P87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
allies and expanded resources, particularly military resources,
in the hands of our adversaries.
The U.S. commitment to Southwest Asia to repel an external
military invasion commits us to yet a third strategic zone on
the periphery of the Eurasian land mass. Thus the international
security order, previously based on two strategic zones, now
rests on three interrelated strategic zones, and promises to
continue to do so for the rest of the century. The "interrelated"
nature of these three zones is also new, and it derives from the
vital reliance by Europe and East Asia on Mid-East oil. The first
and second zones are more related to the third than to each other.
To meet our security commitment in the first two zones, we must
retain access to the third zone. Soviet hegemony over Southwest
Asia would give Moscow enormous leverage vis-a-vis our NATO
allies and Japan, and it could easily lead to the neutralization
of our security alliances in Europe and Asia.
The growth of Soviet power has also brought qualitative
changes to the nature of U.S.-Soviet competition in the third
world. One can identify another three lesser strategic zones
where U.S.-Soviet bilateral competition overlays volatile and
dynamic domestic forces of change. They are Southeast Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. The center of gravity for competition
in these regions has shifted from Southeast Asia in the 1960s
and 1970s, to Africa, dating at least from Soviet-Cuban intervention
CONTR.:L. SY: TChIS JON
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
sitri.^?^P117,Z1
in Angola in 1975, to Latin America in the 1980s following the
collapse of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. The increasingly
interdependent international economic order and the indigenous
forces of political upheaval would challenge U.S. security
interests even if the Soviets were not involved in these regions.
The growing Soviet capabilities for power projection, however,
allow Moscow to exacerbate regional problems and to make the task
of U.S. policy more difficult, dangerously difficult in some cases.
Looking ahead toward the end nf_the_century, we can expect
to see some shifts in the_Lharacter-cl_he threat to U.S. interests
in all of these lesser zones. Latin America is likely to prove
troublesome at best and volatile at worst for the remainder of
the century with the intensity of insurgencies shifting into the
South American continent and possibly North to Mexico. Southeast
Asia, quiescent for about a decade, is likely to come back into
the limelight with developments in the Philippines. In Africa,
the danger of a black-white polarization becoming congruent with
a Soviet-Western polarization is precisely what Moscow seeks to
create and will have some success in achieving. The likehood
of regional wars involving U.S. vital interests is greatest in
Central America, next in some parts of Southeast Asia, and to a
lesser degree in sub-Saharan Africa.
Of the three interrelated strategic zones -- Europe, Southwest
Asia, and East Asia -- Southwest Asia is the most dangerous, the
7
r,:"7-7?;F:i.fit.;7tet\
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: 9IA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
most likely to involve U.S. military commitments, and the
region where U.S. and Soviet forces could most easily confront
one another in a local conflict. In East Asia, the greatest
uncertainties for the future are found on the Korean Peninsula
where the large North Korean armed forces could easily initiate
a conflict. The trends in Europe look less likely to lead us
into war and more likely to lead us into changing political
climates, complicated diplomatic relations, and economic
competition under the shadow of an increasingly adverse NATO-Warsaw
Pact military balance. At the same time, political change in East
Europe can easily lead to Soviet military actions against its
allies or Yugoslavia, creating the danger of spreading the conflict
beyond either Soviet or U.S. control. Such developments also create
opportunities for Western strategy to reduce Soviet influence in
East Europe.
The major factor of continuity from the pre-1980s to the
present and foreseeable future is the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet
competition to the international security order. The major
factor of change is likely to be the reemergence of the German and
Japanese questions for Europe and East Asia, questions that caused
World War II and which have been kept on ice for the past four decades.
In light of these present and project trends, what are the
implications for SIGINT? First, and most obvious, the Soviet
target is expanding, becoming more sophisticated in a qualitative
sense, and more extensive in its geographic and quantatative
dimensions -- more and larger forces in East Asia and Southwest
ernn 7; 7' 7 NA 1--1:41 A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
. . ,
Asia, a growing blue water navy and much greater power projection
capabilities to the three non-contiguous third world zones of
East-West competition. Second, support of our economic and
diplomatic requirements will necessitate more SIGINT collected
from new communication technologies in all the non-Soviet bloc
states. Southwest Asia, in particular, is a changing intelli-
gence target because of the difficulty in gaining access, the
disparate languages involved, and the rapidly developing communi-
cation capabilities in the region.
In the third world strategic zones, we will have to continue
the expansion of intelligence support in
In Southeast Asia, We are
requirements,
example,
target.
already facing growing intelligence
than we can meet them. For
is rapidly becoming a critical intelligence
probably much faster
Only somehwat less demanding will be the growing requirements
for collection over broad distances,
In brief, the policy-making demands for intelligence promise
to grow dramatically in the decades ahead. They will be larger,
against tougher targets in many cases, particularly the USSR,
and against many new targets, economic and diplomatic, as well
as military.
9
,T i Li7;SRA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
III. THE TECHNICAL CHALLENGE
As can be seen from the foregoing, our national intelligence
information needs in the future will be more diverse, greater in
quantity and quality, and against more difficult targets. In
addition, the need to satisfy effectively military tactical
requirements will increase in importance. Our major concern is
that our ability to satisfy all these requirements becomes progres-
sively more difficult.
25X1
The FSCS described in great
detail the technologies and related trends which threaten to
neutralize our present SIG= systems. Some of the more important
are summarized in the following paragaphs. As you know, the FSCS
concluded that failure to deal effectively with these technologies
will indeed cause a rapid decline in what our SIGINT system can
collect and process into useable intelligence.
A. Movement From Analog To Digital Communications
The most significant technical challenge faced by the
SIGINT system is the movement from analog signaling technology to
the more modern digital signaling systems. Digital communications
offer users increased efficiency and reliability over analog and
Sirir.IS JOINTLY
10
Yfl 7n71-771'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
are coming into use on both terrestial and satellite systems. The
real challenge from modern digital communications systems lies
in the multitude of signaling formats. The increased ease of
encryption of digital signals also concerns us. Of the various
signaling modes that use digital transmission,
B. High Data Rates
Digital communications facilitates the advent of high-speed,
high-capacity signaling.
The new communications systems we see
today are part of a hierarchy that now transmit data at 1.5
million bits per second (megabit) and is expected to show speeds
in excess of 800 million bits per second as the technology improves.
HANCLE VIA
DY7M.E...; -7 :LT: :::: iCLECCMINT
Co- 7- 0: JOiNITLY
11
Tr: TA :at 7,cs 7. I r?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
The principal adverse effect of these high data rates on the
SIGINT System is caused by the increased bandwidth and throughput.
Our current SIGINT equipment simply does not have the capacity to
collect either the current or projected use of these new equipment
systems.
C. Increased Volume of Communications
As new and more modern digital communications systems are
introduced and made operational, they generally are in addition
to, rather than as a replacement for, existing communications
systems.
Thus, the proliferation of systems continues! This
condition is exacerbated by the expanded use of microwave links
containing increased numbers of channels and complicated formats.
The problem of collection, recording, forwarding, processing, and
most particularly that of selectivity, will become most complex.
D. New Signaling Technology
The two most significant new signaling techniques coming
into use today are spread-spectrum and short duration or "burst"
transmission. Spread spectrum is a digital signaling technique
developed for its high reliability. Both have excellent anti-jam
and low-probability-of-intercept characteristics. The use of
spread spectrum is rapidly increasing in satellite communications,
and burst transmissions are being used in a variety of radio
frequency spectra. Both present a difficult detection and
CONTR2 SYSTZNIS JOINTLY
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
collection problem.
25X1
E. Growth In FIS Denial Techniques
Foreign Instrumentation Signals (FIS) are associated
with the command, control, and instrumentation of special space
and airborne systems. These systems include ballistic missiles,
re-entry vehicles, aerodynamic vehicles, cruise missiles, remotely-
piloted vehicles, and satellite systems.
The Soviet Union is determined to deny the U.S. SIGINT System
the content of these intelligence-laden instrumentation signals.
Soviet communications designers are applying new technology to
encrypt these signals and to make them more difficult to collect.
By 1990, we expect the use of digital technology and spread
to be extensive in transmission of instrumentation signals.
also expect the
spectrum
25X1
F. Growth in use and Sophistication of Encryption
One of the most serious SIGINT problems inherent in the
growth in digital communications is the relative ease of digital
encipherment. This, together with general awareness of government,
C;NTR.:1_ SLT,TE:43 jOINTLX
13
I?,..;.r?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
; !IN:17n
financial and industrial organizations of the need to secure
?
their communications has given rise to increased use of enciphered
communications. We expect the use of both indigenous and
commercial cipher systems to spread rapidly throughout the Third
World as they attempt to protect their valued voice, facsimile
and printer transmissions
25X1
G. Proliferation of Western Technology
Western equipment and technology have played a crucial
role in the advancement of Soviet electronic production capabilities.
The Soviets can be expected to continue their attempts to acquire
a broad range of western technologies, and they are known to have
established profitable working relationships with private companies
in West Germany, France, Italy and Japan. These relationships have
provided the Soviets access to many advanced technologies now
being used by the West. The third world countries are valuable
conduits either directly or indirectly, for advanced technologies
from the West.
H. Increased use of Communications Satellites
Throughout the world, there are now approximately 50
active communications satellites. That figure will jump to at
L _ jeltiTLY
14
177) '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Tr' 7') r?q,:r."?'"c1r n 1 ft
least 70 by 1986. Most of the signals transmitted through these
satellites will be high speed digital, and encrypted. Further
complicating the problem will be the introduction of highly
directional beaming, a technique that will deny collection
opportunities to many current collection sites.
Worldwide use of communications satellites is expected to
expand at the rate of 15% per annum through the year 2000. By
1986, new satellites will employ fixed or re-arrangeable multi-beam
switching techniques. Later in the 1990s, new satellites will
feature synchronous scan beam and on-board processing and routing.
These and other advancements are expected to improve, the
worldwide satellite capability so that by the year 2000, an
estimated 600 gigabits will be transmitted every second.
IV. THE RESPONSE - THE SIGINT SYSTEM IN THE 1990s
To meet the technical challenges of the 1990s, the SIGINT
system must be capable of dealing with changing technology and
responsive to intelligence requirements. It will use new
equipments designed with standardization and modularity in mind.
It will stress system flexibility and accessability while
placing data processing and reporting as far toward the collection
end of the system as is practical. It must, in all cases, provide
intelligence to the user during peace, crisis and war, in time
to meet his needs and to every extent practical must be immune
H.?7!17LE VIA
0.074/Lii
CONTROL SYSTCM5 JOINTLY
15
717,7 !"-Zr:77.77-7-7 ?,..,1PAPA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
I Lit" I LI h In A
to single point failure. The Soviet target will remain paramount
while the effort applied against China and the Third World will
approach that against the USSR.
Our cryptanalytic strength will be increased and computers
will play an ever increasing role including so-called "super
computers" not yet on the drawing board. Using such computers,
an intensive effort will continue on both the Soviet and Third
World targets. Automation will help winnow the large amounts of
data available to the future system even as processing and reporting
efforts are pushed toward the front end (i.e., the collector) to
ease the load on the system.
?
Search
will play an increasingly important role against the Soviet 25X1
target where technological advances are hidden. This contrasts
with the Third World where competing technologies are well
advertised. Remoted collection will be-more commonplace. Both
25X1
The communications, analytic
and reporting systems will be multilayered, flexible and accessible.
'LE-C:01,1:NT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for -Release . 2013/06/26: CIA-R5P87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
?
',?
To plan the USSS needed to meet the challenge, we have
looked across the SIGINT disciplines from two viewpoints; that is,
from a systems viewpoint for collection assets and from a cross-
systems viewpoint for the other disciplines. The resulting USSS
projected structure is described below.
R. Collections Systems Posture
1. Conventional Systems
Conventional systems represent the bulk of our
?
present and future SIGINT collection assets. They include U.S.,
Second and Third Party fixed sites as well as ground, sea and
air-mobile assets.
Also included are collection assets targeted
against foreign domestic and international satellite communications;
those charged with the geolocation of high frequency and line-of-sight
communications; radar emissions and foreign instrumentation
signaling; and finally, those which will detect and exploit new
signals as target technology evolves.
The traditional
fixed sites will remain in about
the same numbers as today. They will, however, be improved and
upgraded to extend their role; i.e., higher frequencies, automated
Morse code intercept capabilities, more extensive and next generation
use of remoting technology and new ELINT and foreign instrumentation
signals (FIS) tasks.
-L;TE;;:i JOiNTLY
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Lr2FA
The ground work for conventional overt site improve-
ments lies in the bauded, conventional, and high frequency
collection systems upgrades currently nearing completion. These
systems will be modernized as new technologies are mastered and
new systems added to provide SIGINT on missile and space targets.
ELINT collectors will be upgraded primarily by higher frequency
H Mj7L7. VLA
BYFrilAN KOLE-CO:4;NT
CONTRCI. :Y.S;TZ:v1.7. JO1t4TLY
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
' ta, :?77.ftinr,77- ?1,4nr.
3. Overhead Systems
25X1
25X1
As mentioned, one area of existing major agreement
is the need to
C:17 7 '.:'
aL:iNTLY
25X1
19
r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Wele;se2O-1?3/`67-e a
26: CiA -176P787M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in
Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/06/26:
The
for
CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
proposed
a minimum,
baseline architecture,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
subject to
validation, will be
at all times) program to replace
concept of operations requires
with common downlinking
station. The relay concept
reduces our dependence on
and could lead to further
posture.
The baseline
capability,
stations,
and reporting
mission ground
flexibility,
ground
provides operational
mission
processing
economies
in our
25X1
?
for
the
The Community continues
to study similar options
25X1
25X1
An intensive
for
study
some
effort
level of
is underway and should leadj
consolidation among these
to
recommendations
collectors.
At the same time that we are working toward future
systems architecture, efforts to make best use of existing and
already-funded programs have shown considerable progress. Here,
I am specifically referring to the use of
/can be, and are
being made for relatively low investment of our scarce crypto-
logic dollars. In August 1985, the program became I/
operational using a Sat-eilite which is being
with
c:
20
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified
in Part - Sanitized
Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
." -7 1....,N7PLA
as the ground station location. This provides, for
25X1
LOY\ I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
the first time,
system which
a
will be used against targets in
In September of this year, we began an
extended survey of the
4. Clandestine Systems
This category comprises a set of collection systems
which are at once highly specialized and very sensitive. Although
already important in the current SIGINT effort, that importance
will rise in the future as the foreign governments and certain
international groups (such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers)
apply denial techniques to prevent SIGINT access to their
communications.
B. SIGINT Communications
The current communications system can not keep pade
with the growth of the SIGINT system. The SIGINT architecture
\P.1
EY'77t1A:4-TALE:1C-KiTh3LE-C.OMINT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
21
a r:4 A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
4
calls for a producer/user network involving up to 500 elements
by the end of the century. A ten-minute restoration time is
specified for critical network components. Data rates in the 50-100
megabits/second range for major sites and processing centers
will be required during higher levels of stress. Additionally,
collection and processiny centers will be served by at least two
independent paths.
Within the system, the transmission path is the weakest
future link. Projected circuit availability, particularly for
'wideband service, is not sufficient to meet the projected load.
Department of-Defense communications carriers such as the Defense
Satellite Communications System will continue to be the primary
Combinations of other satellite systems, Second
Party assets and domestic commercial service will have to support
the remaining requirements. The final solution will require
considerable further study and is underway as a specific FSCS
follow-on effort.
To service users the future communications system will
rely on packet-switched technology such as
and
the Defense Data Network for automatic routing and high speed
service. Tailored system access will support a wide range of
user conditions while maintaining system security. In the
area of physical equipment, communications system security
technology is expanding sufficiently to achieve protection at
HANDT_S 'JA
EYE ,.L'Ar.1-T,7.L::.:14.:.:7}:3LE-COMINt
CONT?L. SYSIZNIS JOINTLY
SPC-1 LifviSPI
AA
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
the necessary higher data rates. Encryption technology will
extend into the one to ten gigabit range by the year 2000 and
multiplexer technology will be capable of handling several
independent transmission paths.
Although the future system design aligns itself well
with that proposed for reporting and dissemination, the bridge
to tactical users remains uncertain. The communications
architecture cannot be completed until interoperabiltty planning
matures.
C. SIGINT Processing
We have developed a concept for SIGINT processing from
which the future system will be designed. The character of the
future environment makes it unwise to continue and increase
centralization of SIGINT processing. Instead, a decentralized,
distributed system will be better suited to meet the dynamic
demands ranging from peace through crisis to war. Processing
will move toward the point of collection to the degree possible.
The User Interface System is our proposed scheme to achieving
greater decentralization.
The User Interface System is a three-tiered, modular
approach to performing the many processing tasks of the 90s.
The system begins at its lowest point with the Local Area; that/
is, interconnected workstations (personal computers) at the
HANDL::: WA
E":"7:71A
:Yfl.:.15.JOINTLY
23
TOP SFMMT iikAonA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
UMBRA
individual analyst level. This local network is, in turn, tied
to the Community Networks for broader access and sharing of data.
The final tier, the Global Network, consist of the large mainframe
computers of the future which will be required to perform tomorrow's
complex analytic tasks, particularly in cryptanalysis. Through
data-transfer systems such as
the User Interface
System will serve every level of the SIGINT system, including
its tactical arm.
Many questions remain to be answered with regard to
the development of this system including concerns for security
across a multiple-user network, and the danger of system overload
caused by increasing amounts of data. Both can be overcome. The
first through a-future "trusted" computer system that employs
RM.
sufficient hardware_and_s.oftware to allow for simultaneous
processing of a range of sensitive data while maintaining the
integrity of each working level or component.
The second,
overloading, will require careful analysis of the requirements
levied against the system. Distributing processing toward the
point of collection will help lessen the burden.
The entire concept will increase the survivability of
the total system and will enhance individual and system productivity.
It will also allow more detailed and more timely service to the
user including the broader aspects of SIGINT system interaction
with military commands.
f
CONTROL St STCMS JOINTLY
24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Finally, the move toward greater decentralization will not
deny us the capability to assert strong central control where a
collection problem requires it and when a military or other operation
can better be supported by central management of the USSS. We have
bought that capability, and it has served us well in a number of
crises and special collection problems. It is now time, however, to
restore some of the earlier decentralization but with new technology
that gives the entire USSS more flexibility and robustness.
D. Analytic Enhancements
SIGINT analysis now is closely tied to reporting and
will be more so in the future. The proposed processing and
communications architectures offer tiered and rapid service
and are well suited to analytic needs in the 1990s. Automated
analytic aids will be developed for use at NSA and at key field
sites and to support SIGINT producers on the battlefield. The
analyst will be served by large computer driven programs, by
data base internetting, through increased use of graphic output,
and through advanced programs to correlate disparate data. New
approaches to large volume data analysis will be developed to
assist our exploitation of targets such as computer-to-computer
communications already a reality in the Third World.
E. Reporting Posture
The future system will be vastly more streamlined than
today's to provide a semi-automated system. We are planning for
CYcri:AN-T. I.-IC:XI-I.:LE-CCM:NT
CONTROL SYSTCMS JOINTLY
25
5"1:"%sr. Pr, #01?",? 77-9" s 1&0112111ThA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
I N. say a ! : 1 I-1:V; $4;-ilri
a system which will allow a reporter, whether at NSA or in the
field, to generate a single report which the system then will
sub-divide and format to provide to users the information they
require. We will also seek more specific requirements to enable
us to provide better service and to key product distribution to
specific needs. Our goal is a highly responsive system with
rapid delivery of tailored SIGINT product.
F. Cryptanalytic Strength
Increasing volumes and complexity of worldwide communi-
cations, growing COMSEC-consciousness among nearly all Third World
nations (particularly noticeable in the Mideast), and constantly-
improving cryptographic technology (both techniques and hardware)
all contribute to the need for inf2.21:211.-a.E2-21121.4Zalytic
organizations of more manpower with advanced technical education
e
in mathematics computer science, engineering, and language; for
the in-house training of such personnel in cryptanalytic applications
of their skills; and for continual significant growth in computing
power. These same trends also will provide cryptanalysts with
additional opportunities for exploitation, provided we have the
means to find them among the huge masses of data that will be
available. Our present cryptanalytic work force and computer
installations already are strained to the limit.
We intend to instensify our recruiting programs for people
highly qualified in the skills we critically need, and we will
H:M7L7 VIA
rrir -7") vr? .-?7.2-CCii4INT
CO:.TROL SYSTC.IS JOINTLY
26
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
IMPP
update our in-house training programs as required. We must and
will make major upgrades in our computer capabilities and invest
in research to develop exponentially-more-powerful supercomputers
and improved software techniques for their efficient use. To
that end, NSA actively supports the initiative to develop the
Supercomputing Research Center. We also will make maximum
possible use of academic and industrial work in cryptology, and
will continue efforts to persuade public researchers in the field
to refrain from publicizing work that could be damaging to our
missions.
G. The Workforce
Finally, the health of the future system depends upon
the skill of the workforce. While this is true for all sectors
of the SIGINT system, it will be particularly visible at the
analyst level. Analysts and reporters, who in many cases
will be one and the same, will need to be skilled in a variety
of SIGINT disciplines. Over the next ten years our need for
highly skilled employees will accelerate. Training to achieve
this highly skilled and technical workforce is a formidable
task. Also, given the skill levels achieved by these individuals,
the projected competition from the private sector will make
retention a major issue. The SIGINT System will need sufficient
flexibility in personnel policies to cope with the competition.
'.1. A
OYEMAN-TALL:IT-KirrICCE-CCMiNIT
CCNTL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
27
tno 0,cr.RPT UMBRA
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26 : CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
-:37-1 SFCRFT77 UMBRA
V. SURVIVABILITY
Our definition of survivability is the ability to sustain
USSS capabilities through various levels of stress. Survivability
is not an absolute; it is attained in degrees and lost in stages.
To make SIGINT survivability meaningful, it needs to be both
target-and threat-oriented.
Our survivability planning has developed four levels of
stress and vulnerability (i.e. threat) upon which we can base
the development of target-oriented architectures. Those levels
are: LEVEL 1 - facilities accidents/natural disasters, LEVEL 2
intentional hostile attack, LEVEL 3 - limited nuclear war and,
LEVEL 4 - general nuclear war.
In one word, the biggest problem we have to deal with in
attempting to survive critical aspects of the USSS is - central-
ization. For many valid reasons, ranging from billet cuts
through technology, we have over the past 20 years centralized
a large number of key functions of the USSS. From a survivability
perspective, this action has made the system extremely vulnerable
to a wide range of threats, created potential communications and
processing chokepoints, and resulted in a degradation of field
experience and capability.
In building a global survivability architecture we are
examining various combinations of dispersal, redundancy, mobility
HANDLE VIA
EY12,7AN-TALEI,T-CYHOLc.COMINT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
28
1-n0 t ituir.iri A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
TOP SECHLT UMBRA
and hardness. Our planning is directed toward supporting a wide
range of users across many scenarios. We must provide for
support from the tactical commander's level in limited combat
to the President in his three roles (Chief Executive, Head of
State, and Commander-in-Chief) in a general nuclear war.
Finally, we are providing support to high priority COG
survivability, efforts.
In light of the above, we have implemented a planning
strategy which:
- addresses the entire USSS and a wide range of
threats,
- is consistent with customer requirements,
- makes maximum use of existing facilities and programs,
- employs phased implementation and "budget ramp"
concepts, and
- will be evolutionary in nature within the confines
of a global and nodal architecture.
Phase I of our planning takes advantage of actions currently
under way and, for that reason, has a definite Asian/Third World
"flavor". Phase II will be oriented almost totally toward the
addition, this phase will address the general nuclear war scenario,
OrinA7!-TALM:=1:i3LE-COM:NT
Ce;CRCL jOiNTLY
29
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
?-?
plan to distribute critical data bases, and develop an inter-connected
nodal architecture which makes use of Second Parties.
VI. COMSEC/COMPUSEC
The NSA is also charged with related vital national missions
in communications security and automated information systems, or
computer security.
The "COMSEC Revolution" is a result of the realization
that traditional ways of doing COMSEC business alone could not
cope with the expanding threat to our ever increasing system of
telecommunications. While not abandoning traditional procedures,
we are aggressively pursuing innovative approaches to development,
production and acquisition of COMSEC equipment and services.
Our goal is to secure classified information and protect
sensitive government information across the board. We are
developing new relationships to encourage industry to use private
resources for development of secure systems, and to permit direct
marketing of COMSEC equipment and services to government organiza-
tions and their contractors. NSA provides advice, endorsement and
authorization for these efforts, and, as a result, new systems are
being developed to provide large quantities of low-cost, dependable
equipment throughout government and industry.
We believe these strategies are succeeding and now are turning
our efforts to duplicate this success in the computer security
?7:7LIE VIA
TALL.T-KI:YHOLE-COMINT
CENTR30 SYSTEMS JOINTLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
I ' ? C 7 r 3RA
area. Today, the inherent capability of computer systems to
protect their data from foreign and criminal threats is very low.
To begin to improve this situation, I have directed the National
Computing Security Center, as part of the National Security Agency,
to foster efforts in government and industry to retrofit current
computer systems with minimum credible controls that will detect
and prevent unauthorized access, and to pursue a strategy in concert
with industry to create computer systems
designed in from the start. We are only
serious security challenge, but I expect
the next few years. Our goal is to make
with solid security features
beginning to meet this
significant progress in
security an integral
part of all U.S. manufactured computers so that computer-stored
information - not only of the U.S. Government but of U.S. industry
as well - will be secure from foreign or criminal attack.
VII. THE NEED FOR CONTINUED INVESTMENT
We face great challenges in the future and must achieve
significant new capabilities. We must meet and master new
target technologies, enhance our cryptanalytic strength,
provide enhanced support to the military, respond to expanded
needs for security in our communications and computers, and
achieve realistic survivability for our system. The technical
and financial costs will be high. Even with mission trade-offs,
we will need a program of continued major new investment.
Research and development is increasingly costly, and
deployment of new technology once established is likewise costly.
VA
SEMAN -TALENT -KEYHOLE-COMM
CC.:?1 TROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
31
-r-no error:7- IllUif:20/i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
We do, however, have the advantage of an exciting and meaningful
mission which has always attracted highly skilled and
motivated individuals. Given the requisite tools, they can and
will achieve the necessary successes.
It is a challenging and exciting future we face with
significant implications for our country's security. The next
few years will be critical in charting our course to meet that
future.
1-1.NnLE VIA
riCY:10LE-COMINT
r:CL S (STEMS JOINTLY
32
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
le#
40 Next 41 Page(s) In Document Denied
e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP87M00539R000500600037-8
25X1