ADDRESS BY GENERAL C. P. CABELL, USAF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO THE DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS DALLAS, TEXAS 12:00 NOON CST, 31 MARCH 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100580001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1960
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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FOR RELEASE AT 12:00 NOON, CST
31 MARCH 1960
ADDRESS BY GENERAL C. P. CABELL, USAF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO THE
DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
DALLAS, TEXAS
12:00 NOON CST, 31 MARCH 1960
SOME PROBLEMS FACING COMMUNIST LEADERS
I was certainly pleased to get your invitation and delighted
to accept. First of all, you have given me a chance to return to
Dallas. I like to do that whenever I can. Literally, I am at home
here. Moreover, I share with you the interest which you are showing
in international affairs, and I want to discuss an important aspect
of the international scene with you today.
I am going to talk objectively about some of the problems
which the Communists now face and the way in which these problems
may affect their future as well as ours. My purpose is to keep our
picture of the Communist world in proper focus. To anyone who is
trying to understand the international situation today, Communist
weaknesses are as important as their strengths. If we overestimate
the Communists' power, we are indulging in a dangerous distortion.
On the other hand, if we underestimate their strength, we may lull
ourselves into a sense of false security. At this point, let me
remind you that although I'm concentrating on Communist problems,
let no one think that I am predicting that these problems are presently
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serious enough to lead us to expect the Communist regimes to
collapse soon under their own weight. The fact of the matter is
we face a serious and growing threat from the Communist world,
and we must all recognize this.
From where I sit, International Communism continues to
give evidence of a determination to communize or otherwise control
the world. I want to be the last person on earth knowingly to
suggest that we can in any way relax our guard or diminish our
efforts in fighting Communism.
The Communists are doing everything in their power to
promote the belief that the day of inevitable victory, predicted
by Marx, Lenin, and all their followers, is coming nearer and nearer.
The Communists tell the world that the Soviet Union has overwhelming
military strength. They claim that the Soviet Union will soon over-
take the United States in absolute and per capita production. The
Communists say they represent the wave of the future, and that they
are admired by the vast majority of the people in the new countries
of Asia and Africa.
I do not believe any of those Communist claims. The facts
warrant no such conclusions. I believe the Soviet Union is in no
position at this time to launch a military attack on us without
suffering enormous and unacceptable damage to Russia. As far as
their industry is concerned, despite their great progress, they have
many economic problems, and their claims about overtaking the United
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States within the next ten years or so are simply not true.
Moreover, despite their efforts to export Communism as a way
of life, they have not been so successful in the so-called under-
developed countries as they would have us believe.
Now, as far as Soviet military strength is concerned, the
fact is that the Soviets are quite powerful. They have very good
rockets. Their technicians have shown a high degree of skill in
producing the steel, machine tools, the electronic and aeronautical
devices which have made possible their substantial achievements in
missiles and space vehicles. The Soviets are also quite accomplished
in atomic energy matters. Their modern military machine is based on
a solid technological foundation. This machine has resulted from
their deliberate, long standing decision to concentrate on that
aspect of their economy which is dedicated to the production of a
powerful military force. These achievements they have publicized.
On the other hand, the Soviets have done very little in the
way of producing consumer goods. They have a poor record when it
comes to building roads or houses. It is not that they lack the
inherent ability to do these things. They have simply chosen to
give overriding priority to the fast production of what they consider
the bulwarks of national power.
Their industrial progress is real. They are the second
largest industrial power in the world, and they insist that they
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will be satisfied with nothing less than first place. Their
slogan is to beat America. This slogan is painted on cowbarns
in the Soviet Union. It is the constant refrain of Soviet
politicans in public and in private.
Khrushchev is primarily responsible for current industrial
progress in the Soviet Union. He is also firmly entrenched as
the undisputed political leader. To understand the nature of the
Communist threat today, I believe it is essential that we set the
facts straight about what Khrushchev has accomplished and, equally
important, about what he has failed to do.
He inherited a difficult situation from Stalin. He staked
his future on several key policies and won. He believed that in
order to meet the demands of the modern age, Moscow's control of
the economy should be diluted to give more authority to regional
managers. He believed that Soviet agriculture, which had not kept
pace with the growth of Soviet population, had to be given a massive
transfusion. He believed that the belligerent foreign policy which
under Stalin's leadership had brought the Soviet Union close to war
on several occasions, should be made more flexible.
He did decentralize state control of the Soviet economy.
He has also whittled away at the power of the secret police and has
given fuller play to persuasion and material incentives to replace
the undiluted terror which the secret police had imposed on the
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Russian and satellite peoples. He launched a massive attack
on the farm problem, bringing 80 to 100 million acres of new
land under the plow. He began beating the drum for so-called
peaceful coexistence. He said other Communist countries should
develop along their own lines, but smashed the Hungarians when
they tried to claim a measure of freedom from Moscow's iron
control.
One thing Khrushchev has not done is to change the basic
Communist system and its aim of world control. He says that
Communism will bury capitalism.
Khrushchev's primary concern is with the Soviet economy,
and it is in the industrial field that he has had his greatest success.
It is in the economic arena that we face a Soviet challenge which
may be as great as their military threat. Nevertheless, his
economic programs do not all have clear sailing ahead. The Soviets
will probably meet, by 1965, many of the goals which they have set
for themselves, but that cannot accomplish all that they claim.
The Soviets are short of manpower. In recognition of this problem,
Khrushchev has announced a program to cut the armed forces by
1,200,000 men. Characteristically, the Soviets hail this as a move
toward peace. The fact is that with the introduction of more modern
weapons their over-all military strength remains unimpaired. They
need more men, particularly in the neglected areas of their economy.
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Because of their decision to concentrate on an increasingly
expensive military program, Soviet industrial progress has been
quite uneven. Certain basic industries, such as ore processing,
mining, and production of power, have been stepchildren and will
require much more investment than they have had. This investment
must be at the expense of another part of their economic program.
Soviet industry has reached the point where it must raise per capita
productivity. This calls for the introduction of automation and
other sophisticated techniques which the Soviet leaders themselves
admit presents serious problems. In their headlong drive for what
they consider the essential elements of national power, they have
completely neglected parts of what we consider a mature economy.
They do not yet accept the proposition that the wellbeing and
happiness of the citizen are true measures of national strength.
Even their present ambitin)s plans still keep the level of consumer
output low so that there will be no significant reduction in the
share given to heavy industry and military production.
The Soviet people are not informed about these and other
problems, but the leaders are aware of them and Khrushchev's actions
show that he is trying to solve these problems. However, he is in
turn creating new problems. For instance, in his efforts to raise
productivity, he has offered workers material incentives -- surely
a capitalist idea -- and one which in a Communist state is a potential
threat to the foundations of political power.
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Let me try to illustrate this. The Soviet Union is
extremely short of housing. When no one had adequate housing,
everyone was on an equal status. However, as time passed, the
Soviets discovered that the best reward for an efficient worker
was a new apartment. Discontent springs up among those who are
not rewarded, and pressures inevitably build up for a greater
share in the fruits of Soviet labor. Recently, one Soviet citizen
wrote to a Moscow newspaper stating that he was more interested
in new shoes than he was in Sputniks. He said that as far as
transportation was concerned, he was perfectly happy to ride the
streetcar. However, he pointed out, that his only pair of shoes
was four years old and that they wouldn't have lasted that long
except they were a Western brand. The Moscow newspaper printed
this letter calling the writer a slug and an earthworm, who was
incapable of understanding the higher flights of the Communist way
of life.
The fact is that these consumer pressures exist and are,
I believe, bound to grow. We can admire the idea of incentives,
and a stronger Soviet economy is in itself no evil threat. We
oppose Soviet efforts to export Communism as a way of life.
Please do not think for a minute that I am suggesting that
the Soviet people will rise up suddenly and dramatically and throw
the present leaders out of office because they, the people, want
more creature comforts. The Communist leaders themselves are not
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seriously concerned at this time about their ability to contain
such pressures from the people. There is no evidence whatsoever
that the present Communist leaders have any intentions of dropping
their goal of promoting the spread of Communism throughout the
world. Nevertheless, they face problems, and popular pressures
for a better life will almost certainly become more of a factor
on the Soviet scene. It has become increasingly difficult for
Khrushchev to pose as a champion of peaceful coexistence and at
the same time demand continued sacrifice from the Russian people.
Farming, which was very much neglected under Stalin, is
still the most backward area in the Soviet economy. Of the total
Soviet labor force, nearly 50% is still working in agriculture and
efficiency is quite low. By comparison, less than 10% of the
American labor force are farmers, yet they produce about one-third
more than the Soviets. Soviet farming lands are not well located
as far as climate is concerned and the Communists cannot control
the weather any better than anyone else. Given average weather,
the Soviets can probably increase their agricultural output by
about 20% by 1965. They claim they will gain some 55% to 60%, but
they have not revealed how. In farming, as in industry, the Soviet
leaders have only so much manpower and so much cash available. Any
massive transfusion to overcome their farm problems must be at the
expense of their industrial base, the foundation of their military power.
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Khrushchev is primarily a practical man, and he would
seem to have enough to do in trying to solve his domestic
economic problems, to run the vast Soviet bureaucracy and to
travel posing as the leading proponent of peaceful coexistence.
However, since he is, by his own constant confession, an avowed
Communist, he must pay attention to ideology which is the corner-
stone of International Communism. He himself is on occasion
scournful of ideology. He lifted an expression from Goethe when
he said: "Theory is gray but the tree of life is green." Here
he comes close to heresy because to the Communists ideology does
not mean abstract theory alone. Ideology means theory and practice.
They are inseparable. It is not only the goal which, since the
time of Marx, has been control of the world. It is also the means
by which one achieves this goal. The Communists have never
excluded any legal or illegal means.
Khrushchev's role in Communist ideology has created problems
for him in the Soviet Union itself, in Soviet relations with its
principal ally, Communist China, and in Communist relations with
free world countries.
Let me give you an example. Recently, a prominent Hungarian
historian, a good Communist, has written a book stating that it is
wrong to expect the inevitable collapse of capitalism because of
its internal weaknesses. This argument contradicts a basic Marxist
doctrine, and publication of this book is in itself a significant
sign of change in the Communist world.
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Khrushchev himself has called into question the
pertinence of Communist gospel as a guide for action in the
modern world. He has written: "If Marx, Engels and Lenin
could arise now, they would laugh at those bookworms and quoters
who instead of studying life of contemporary society and developing
theory creatively turn to the classics for a quotation about how
to act in connection with a machine tractor station." He has
also since abolished the machine tractor station, an institution
long regarded by the Communists as the key to successful collective
farming and actually a tool to control the farmers.
The Soviet leaders themselves recognize that much of their
propaganda has failed, not only abroad where it has not intimidated
any essential part of the free world alliance, but also in the
Soviet Union itself where it is no longer considered a spur to the
Soviet citizens. In a long and tortuous Central Committee resolution
in January of this year, the Soviet internal propaganda machine was
denounced as backward, dull and boring, and generally unsuited for
the "bright future" ahead. The propagandists were ordered to put
out "less political blather" and to concentrate their efforts on
ensuring the success of the seven-year economic plan.
The Soviets are here concerned with the basic problem of
motivation. If the Soviet citizen is no longer exhorted to work
harder because the imperialists are threatening to attack, then
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what is to be his reward? If the Soviet leaders are deterred
from military adventures, to what end will they devote their
increased economic wealth? The capitalist world cannot be
expected to collapse simply because the Soviets announce a
victory in production statistics. How then are the Communists
going to control the world?
The ideal Communist citizen should not have to be spurred
to greater efforts by material incentives, but the fact is that
Khrushchev has offered these incentives and must continue to do
so if prodntion is to be increased further. There are already
some signs that Khrushchev's liberties with Communist doctrine
are beginning to sink in. In the Soviet Asian Republic of
Kazakhstan, the Soviets have admitted that dissatisfaction and
work stoppage on the construction site of a great new metallurgical
plant stemmed from the lack of housing. The leader of the
Kazakhstan Communist Party concluded that: "The question of
housing and other construction connected with living conditions
should occupy the central place in the activity of Party, political,
and economic organizations of the Kazakhstan Republic."
The great majority of private dwellings in the Soviet
Union are being built by Soviet citizens in do-it-yourself projects.
The state favors apartments, and on his recent Asian tour, Khrushchev
told his Indian and Indonesian hosts that the desire for a private
dwelling was evidence of "peasant psychology".
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Perhaps the most serious and practical problem in
the Communist world as a whole is the disagreement between
the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. Their disputes about
Communist goals and the way to achieve them are now deeper and
more evident for everyone to see than ever before. Although
they have overriding reasons for sticking together, there are
stresses in their relations which could very well become strains
in the future.
The disagreement which is of most concern to us is
Khrushchev's obvious attempts to negotiate with the United States,
the country which the Chinese Communists consider their implacable
enemy. The Chinese Communists, lacking nuclear weapons, place
great stress on their enormous manpower reservoir. They argue
the free world is at a military disadvantage and that it is a
"weakness" to negotiate with them. The Soviet leaders, well aware
of the devastation which modern weapons can accomplish, are more
realistic. The Chinese Communists have served notice that no
international agreement on any important question is going to be
binding on them unless they are a party to it. The Chinese
Communists give every evidence of a dogmatic, militant approach
to world affairs and they have shown that they are perfectly capable
of stirring up trouble beyond their borders if only to distract
the Chinese peoples' attention from the serious domestic problems
at home.
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The Chinese Communists have embarked on their commune
program, the most drastic regimentation of human society ever
proposed. They did this without advance coordination with
the Soviets and without reckoning the costs either to their
economic situation or in human sacrifice. They are driving
ahead with reckless speed to communize their country. In doing
this, the Chinese have incurred Soviet opposition, particularly
when the Chinese recommend their own course of action as desirable
for other countries.
These basic differences, and there are others, have led
to sharp exchanges between the Soviet and Chinese leaders. Ideally,
we could sit back and watch this internal dispute as disinterested
spectators. Actually, however, we have a stake in the outcome of
this dispute. Should the Chinese prevail in their views, the
Communist world might revert to the harshness which characterized
the Stalin era. Should the Soviets impose their views, the united
Sino-Soviet program would still present a great challenge to us and
to the underdeveloped countries of the world. In any event, we
face a serious threat from both Communist camps.
Whatever the Soviet problems at home, they are well embarked
on a sizable and shrewd foreign aid program. They have offered
some three and one-half billion dollars to non-Communist countries,
and they have done it without any thought of accountability to the
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Soviet citizens at home. Their aim is clear. They want to
put themselves in a position to dominate the countries which
accept Communist aid. In some ways, they have scored some
gains. There are in the underdeveloped countries, groups of
people willing to accept the false proposition that it is the
Communist system which is primarily responsible for Soviet progress.
These people are more interested in speedy economic progress than
in anything else. They are impressed by Soviet progress and
propaganda, and the Soviets are constantly offering more aid to
more countries in wider areas of the world.
On the other hand, contrary to what many people believe,
the Communists' aid program has not been a smashing success. Their
representatives abroad are not all supermen. Many of their projects
have been designed to make a quick show and have no lasting benefit.
The Communists are generally isolated and aloof, and in many cases
they have no desire or ability to understand the local situation or
to get along with the people.
Many of the Communists' problems are material, but their
most essential failure is not. They simply do not understand the
idea of a free human being. They are skillful in manipulating
human beings for material ends, and both the Soviets and the Chinese
Communists have survived grueling military tests and some severe
internal political crises. Their leaders are extremely dynamic and
are driving their engines at an intense pace.
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The Communists have failed, I believe, to capture the
imagination of their young people. They admit that they are
still faced with the task of creating the new Soviet man. Since
Khrushchev's visit to the United States, there have been wider
contacts between Westerners and Soviet citizens. These citizens,
especially the younger, more thoughtful ones, are extremely
anxious to know more about our way of life. Despite being born
and raised under the Communist system, they hold non-Communist
ideas about truth, justice, government inefficiency, and personal
happiness. I wish I had time to tell some of the stories in
detail. Our contacts are extremely limited and the Soviet authorities
still try to intimidate their people, but one cannot help but wonder
how much of an iceberg of dissatisfaction really lies beneath the
surface.
The Communist leaders are brimming with confidence about
the future. They may be so blind to their own problems and so
desperate to create a diversion that we must face up to the constant
danger of some reckless action. They are increasing their subversive
activity and it is spreading to wider and wider areas of the world,
making its most recent impact among some of our Latin American
neighbors.
Khrushchev's tendency to talk of the future as though it
were already here is farfetched and fantastic. Let me give you
two examples. As far as material things are concerned, when he
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visited the American Exhibition in Moscow, he surveyed the
modern kitchen and announced airily: "We have all these things
in the Soviet Union only they are more attractive and better
made." Then, pointing to a common kitchen gadget, he asked:
"By the way, what is that?" On the non-material side, I can
tell you something which seems almost incredible. He is
reported to have ordered an approach made soliciting a nomination
for himself for the Nobel Peace Prize.
I have tried to indicate some of the main trends, based
on facts, so that each of us who has a role to play can guide
himself accordingly. I believe that we must continue to maintain
our military deterrent strength and we must, with our allies,
continue to set an example of strength and determination for the
people in the new countries of the world. We need certainly to
step up all of our efforts to get the truth to the Russian people
so they can see us for what we really are. It is especially
important we continue to rely on the facts in our dealings with
the Soviets, particularly the younger citizens. This is our main
hope for destroying their wrong impression of us as warmongers
or soft capitalists devoted only to the material comforts.
The key to the future does not lie in Moscow or Peiping.
They have no magic formula to success. The key lies, rather, in
our own determination to remain free and to hold out our example of
freedom and all its benefits to any country or people who freely
choose individual liberty.
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