CUBA: FOCAL POINT FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBENA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800840001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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f
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Cuba: Focal Point for Political Violence
in Latin America and the Caribbean
support for violence in the Latin American region.
you will find this memorandum a useful reference aid on Cuban
1. The attached memorandum assesses Cuba's role as a state
supporter of terrorism and political violence. It is our
judgment that Cuba continues to support a number of groups in
Latin America and the Caribbean that resort to political
violence. In particular, Havana appears to be providing a great
deal of assistance to radical leftists in Chile. We hope that
2. This paper was prepared b
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Counterterrorism Center and the Office of African 25X1
and Latin American Analysis, with a contribution b
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the Office of Central Reference.
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3. Your comments and suggestions are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Terrorism Assessment Branch of the
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Cuba: Focal Point for Political Violence
in Latin America and the Caribbean
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GI M-86-20115
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SUBJECT: Cuba: Focal Point for Political Violence
in Latin America and the Caribbean
CTC/OAG/PSB (9 May 1986)
Distribution:
1 - Kenneth Skoug, Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, State
Department
1 - Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, State Department
1 - Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, State Jepartrnen
1 - D/INR, Morton Abramowitz, State
1 - Robert Oakley, State
1 - INR/TNA, Belle Schell
1 - Donald Gregg, White House
1 - Admiral John M. Poindexter, National Security Advisor,
White House
1 - Senior Staff Member, Inter-America, Mr. Raymond Burkhart,
NSC
1 - Nestor D. Sanchez, Defense Department
1 - Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle, Defense
1 -'C/Latin America Division, Col. Brian Bosch, Defense
1 -
1 -
1 - Special Assistant to the Secretary, National Security,
Douglas Mulholland, Treasury Department
1 - Arthur Long, Senior National Intelligence Advisor, Treasury
Department
1 - Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - SA/DCI
1 - Executive Director/DDI
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - ltIO/LA
1 - NIO/CT
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - NIO/At Large
1 - NIC/AG
5 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OGI
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SUBJECT: Cuba: Focal Point for Political Violence
in Latin America and the Caribbean
DD/OGI
OGI/PG/Ch
OGI/EXS/PG
DDO/LA
ILS
OGI/Research Director
ALA/Research Diretor
C/MCD
MCD Files
MCD/CU Files
OCR
C/OGI/ISID/AT
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.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 May 1986
Cuba: Focal Point for Political
Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Summary
Cuban President Fidel Castro has not stopped selectively
supporting revolutionary activity in Latin America despite his
attempts to portray himself publicly as a responsible third world
leader. Cuba has developed a two-pronged revolutionary strategy:
o Establishing diplomatic relations where possible while
simultaneously encouraging a broad front coalition of
leftists and moderates to strive for political power.
o Maintaining contact with radical groups, providing them
training and other support to ready ready them for
violent activities should conditions become propitious
for a revolutionary push.
In our view, Cuba will continue to encourage radical
leftists to maintain their terrorist capabilities by providing
training and financial assistance. In the near term, however,
Cuba probably will be cautious and selective in its policy
regarding the promotion of violence for fear of jeopardizin
diplomatic relations with key Latin American governments. 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by
Counterterrorism Center, 1t e Office
Latin America Analysis, with a contribution by
the
of Africa and
the Office of Central Reference. Comments may be directed to
the' Chief, Policy Support Branch of the Counterterrorism Center,
GI M 86-20115
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 May 1986
Cuba: Focal Point for Political
Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Summary
Cuban President Fidel Castro has not stopped selectively supporting
revolutionary activity in Latin America despite his attempts to portray himself publicly
as a responsible third world leader. Cuba has developed a two-pronged revolutionary
strategy:
-- Establishing diplomatic relations where possible while
simultaneously encouraging a broad front coalition of leftists
and moderates to strive for political power.
-- Maintaining contact with radical groups, providing training
and other support to ready them for violent activities should
conditions become propitious for a revolutionary push.
t
This memorandum was prepared by I the Counterterrorism Center,
ffice of Africa and Latin America Analysis, with a contribution by
the Office of Central Reference. Comments may be directed to
the Chief, Policy Support Branch of the Counterterrorism Center,
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Cuba: Focal Point for Political
Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. Cuban Revolutionary Policy
1. Cuban President Fidel Castro has selectively supported a variety of radical
leftists, insurgents, and terrorist groups in Latin America as part of his overall
revolutionary program. We believe Castro's ultimate goal is the replication of the
Cuban revolutionary experience throughout Latin America. To achieve this, we believe
Cuba has developed a revolutionary strategy that seeks to:
Create from traditionally splintered radical groups, unified
fronts committed to armed struggle.
Train ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural
guerrilla warfare.
Encourage the use of terrorism as a revolutionary tactic when
local conditions warrant.
2. In countries where Havana has already managed to establish toeholds, it uses
them as bases from which it can foster broader, regional subversion. In our view,
Cuba clearly intended Grenada to be a staging area for subversion in the Caribbean,
just as Nicaragua is today, by providing safehaven, arms, training sites, and transport
facilities at Cuba's behest to selected Latin America insurgents.
3. The key element of this Cuban strategy is to encourage disparate leftist
groups to form more umbrella organizations such as the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Union (URNG). Such organizations enable Cuba to channel funds and weapons more
efficiently and exert a greater degree of influence and accountability over the various
revolutionary groups. Havana reportedly also provides logistics, material, and
propaganda support to smaller individual subversive groups many of which rely, at
least to some degree on terrorist tactics. For example
Cuba has long supported Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), training
its members, and assisting them in reinfiltrating into Chile--complete with Cuban-
supplied cash and false documents.
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4. Cuba also curries the favor of regional subversive groups by providing
safehaven to individuals. For example, following the M-19 seizure of the Dominican
Republic'; Embassy in Bogota, the M-19 guerrillas, together with some of the
hostages and the Cuban Ambassador were flown to Cuba and given asylum. Cuba
also has provided refuge for numerous airline hijackers affiliated with Cuban-
supported terrorist groups and abrogated its anti-hijacking agreement with
Washington in 1977. In fact, Castro's 26th of July Movement conducted one of the
first airline hijackings in the 1950s, although Havana to this day charges that the US
"invented" such operations to subvert Castro's regime.
5. On the question of terrorism, we believe Castro views it as a legitimate
weapon in his efforts to promote the revolutionary conditions needed to destabilize a
regime. During the 1950s, Castro's July 26 Movement bombed civilian targets and
employed assassinations to provoke the Batista government to become repressive, to
polarize Cuban society, and to attract recruits to armed struggle. Drawing on this
strategy, Castro encourages rebel groups to use terrorism when he perceives that
revolutionary conditions are ripe. Cuba currently is
supporting the use of terrorism by radical Chilean and Colombian groups.
A. Evolution of Revolutionary Strategy
6. An analysis of Cuban policy indicates that Cuba's revolutionary strategy
appears to have evolved through three phases, from 1959 to the late 1960s, from the
mid-1970s to the US action in Grenada (1983), and post-Grenada.
7. Initially Castro attempted to replicate his own success elsewhere but failed.
In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against the Dominican Republic, Panama, and
Haiti. During the early and mid 1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Peru all faced Cuban-backed attempts to instigate guerrilla movements. In seeking
indigenous groups with which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected the orthodox Latin
American Communist Parties, instead they lent their support to more militant groups
dedicated to armed violence even when their ideology was not fully developed.
8. Following these failures, Castro began to pursue normal government to
government relations in the hemisphere. By the mid-1970s, Cuba's isolation in the
Americas had eased, OAS sanctions were dropped, and full diplomatic or consular
relations were established with a number of countries. The successes of Cuban
conventional military forces in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid 1970s strengthened the
hand of -We hardline element in Cuban policymaking circles and led to enhanced
support of the Sandinistas in their struggle against Somoza in 1974 and 1980. The
victory in turn opened up a new era in which support for armed struggle again
became a major trend of Cuban foreign policy.
9. In the wake of the Grenada setback in 1983, Havana reassessed its regional
strategy, Apparently Castro believes conditions in
most target countries are generally unfavorable at this time for the promotion of
widespread terrorist and insurgent activity. Many leftist groups such as those in
Uruguay and Brazil are splintered and weak after years of repression under military
regimes. Cuba also fears jeopardizing recently established diplomatic relations with
new civilian regimes, leading Havana to counsel moderation to many groups it
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supports. Moreover, the Grenada affair almost
cautious ii pursuing its revolutionary strategy.
certainly has made Havana more
10. A study of Cuban revolutionary policy indicates the extent of support
Cuba provides to any revolutionary group is governed by a number of factors,
including the conditions in the particular country and the likely impact of Cuban
backing on the movement's chances for success. Havana also must take into
consideration whether a seizure of power by the group it is supporting will advance
Cuban goals without hindering Soviet policy aims.
11. In our view, Cuba is now focused on a strategy that emphasizes long term
goals, including rebuilding and unifying regional leftist groups, and encouraging
some to participate in the political process while at the same time maintaining their
military and terrorist capabilities. In the near term, however, Havana apparently
believes that radical elements within the region should remain calm and not react to
provocation.
II. High-Level Cuban Support
13. Cuba's special interest in Chile dates back to the Allende years and has
persisted during the Pinochet era. Following the overthrow of the Allende
government in September 1973, Castro promised those Chileans who opposed the
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military takeover all the aid in Cuba's power to provide, and offered maintenance
assistance for about 10 years without expecting in the near term that the radical left
would engage in violence. Only recently has Castro acted to increase his support to
Chilean terrorist groups, apparently viewing the time as propitious for an escalation
14. Of special interest to Cuba has been the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR). Havana reportedly has supported the MIR by providing substantial trainin
15. Cuba also supports the Manuel Rodriquez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a radical
leftist terrorist group affiliated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and
responsible for the bulk of terrorist incidents to date. The precise relationship
between Cuba and the FPMR remains unclear, but Cuba has provided training and
material assistance since the group first announced its existence in December 1983.
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16. Cuba has a longstanding relationship with several Colombian guerrilla
groups, particularly the 19th of April Movement (M-19). Relations between Colombia
and Cuba have not improved significantly since March 1981 following a Cuban-
supported guerrilla boat landing in Colombia, despite signs of warming after
President Belisario Betancur's inauguration in 1982. We believe President Betancur
would encounter substantial political and military opposition if he tried to reestablish
full diplomatic relations, chiefly because Havana has continued to provide extensive
support to Colombian guerrillas. The leading contender for the presidency in the
elections this spring--a Liberal Party member--is unlikely to be receptive to Cuban
17. Although a change in diplomatic relations is unlikely, we believe that
Castro will increase the level of Cuban assistance to Colombian terrorist groups.
Havana may have attempted to revive the sagging fortunes of the M-19 and may have
encouraged it to take the lead in uniting the various smaller terrorist groups into a
larger guerrilla coalition. Cuba could attempt to establish contact with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the only group that has nominally
honored the 1984 peace accords, and could encourage the group to return to
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III. Low-Level Cuban Support
18. In addition to offering support to terrorists in Chile and Colombia, we
believe Castro will continue to provide low-level assistance to radical leftists in
several other Latin American countries. In some of these countries, Argentina, Bolivia
and Uruguay, Cuba may seek to establish toeholds or bases of regional support to
facilitate the funneling of assistance to subversive groups in the region. Elsewhere,
such as the Caribbean, Cuba appears to be tempering its policy of revolutionary
violence while encouraging political organizing, recruitment of new members, and
exploitation of labor unrest. Cuba probably will maintain its ties to radical leftists
and former terrorists throughout Latin America, preserving for some future date the
19. Cuba's relationship with Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC), the most prominent and
active terrorist group in Ecuador, is difficult to assess. A number of AVC members
have received guerrilla training in Cuba. We believe that this training,
weak, ineffective organization, to one that has been able to spring prisoners from jail
and conduct raids on Ecuadorean police weapons arsenals. AVC's operations,
although not entirely bloodless, have focused for the most part on efforts to gain
maximum media publicity for its views while minimizing damage and casualties.
Although in our judgment the AVC poses no serious threat to the stability
of the Ecuadorean Government, it could become a more dangerous and lethal force if
it continues to recruit new members and if the Ecuadorean security services fail to
develop the capability to counter it.
20:-6 The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE)--ohe of the most
radical political parties in Ecuador--has advocated the use of terrorist tactics and has
received Cuban support during the past year,
After rejoining the legally certified Socialist party of Ecuador (PSE) in 1985, the PSRE
appears to be moving the mainline Socialist Party toward a more radical stance.
Several former PSE leaders have been replaced with more hardline PSRE members,
thereby opening the way for implementation of the PSRE's far more radical policies.
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B. Honduras
21. Honduras has in the past been the target of Cuban destabilization efforts.
In July 1983, about 100 Cuban-trained Honduran nationals reportedly were infiltrated
from Nicaragua into eastern Honduras. About a year later, another group of Cuban-
trained guerrillas entered Honduras. Both groups were annihilated by the Honduran
Army. Since then Havana has appeared to be cautious in its use of violence in
Honduras.
22. The destabilization of Honduras clearly would enhance the position of the
Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgencies. Havana also probably sees in Honduras a
chance to intimidate or destabilize the major base for anti-Sandinista insurgents
fighting in Nicaragua. Although Havana is not providing as much support to
Honduran terrorist groups as it has been to the established Central American
insurgencies, we believe Castro may attempt to bolster the divided Honduran left
with financial and training assistance. Given the failure of insurgency attempts,
Havana probably sees terrorists as its only mechanism in Honduras for pursuing its
regional goals.
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23. During the tenure of former President Siles, there was a great deal of
Cuban activity in Bolivia. Since the election in August 1985 of Paz Estenssoro,
however, both the Cubans and the Soviets have been kept at arm's length. Paz
Estenssoro probably hopes to gain greater access to US aid by adhering to US-
encouraged reforms.
25. Although Uruguay has not been plagued by a terrorist problem since the
decline of the Tupamaros in the 1970s,
resurgence of legitimate Tupamaro political activity.
has for many years provided safehaven to former Tupamaros. Many of these have
subsequently served with various Central American guerrilla groups.
Cuba does not view the time as propitious for it to support a
revolutionary strategy in Uruguay but may view the count as a possible staging and
transit area for Cuban subversive activity in the region.
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-- Cuba reportedly views Uruguay as an appropriate venue for
representatives of various terrorist/insurgent organizations
throughout Latin America to come together--much as they
do in Panama and Mexico.
-- Havana reportedly believes that the experiences of the
Tupamaro Movement must be reassessed before a
revolutionary strategy for Uruguay can be formulated.
E. Argentina
26. The Cubans have a long history of association with terrorists in Argentina.
The Cubans gave financial and logistical support to Montoneros and the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP)--the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of
leftist terrorism which swept Argentina in the 1970s. Cuba provided them with
training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla warfare. These terrorist groups were
virtually eliminated as a result of the Argentine military's brutal counterinsurgency
campaign, and Castro allowed the remnants of their leadership to relocate in Havana.
Since then, the radical left has remained extremely weak and factionalized and
Argentina has been free from leftist terrorism.
27. We do not foresee Cuba encouraging any indigenous radical groups to
pursue a path of terrorist violence because it would be reluctant to jeopardize its
newly-established relationship with the government of Raul Alfonsin. In fact, Cuba
probably is encouraging the Montoneros to attempt to acquire a measure of political
legitimacy. Cuba, may, however, at some future point begin to view the generally
relaxed environment for leftists as conducive to a renewal of subversive support.' In
that event, Cuba might seek to take advantage of its links to the Montoneros .to
renew subversive operations.
28. Cuba may be using Argentina as a possible staging area to provide
logistical support to Chilean radical leftists. As in the case of Bolivia, Cuba may be
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facilitating travel by, and logistics supply to, the Chilean terrorist groups, and may be
employing Montoneros in the supply network.
29. More than two years after its setback in Grenada, Cuba is struggling to
recover its political influence in the Caribbean. Our analysis indicates Castro
continues to support leftist political groups and promote political coalitions among
them, but he apparently views the strengthening of regional radicals as a long-term
effort unlikely to have a near-term impact. Cuban policy is to offer Caribbean leftists
political advice, organizational assistance and limited financial aid as the basis for a
foothold in the region.
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31. Jamaica is a good example of Cuba's current policy in the Caribbean.
Castro is pressing Jamaican radicals to support former Prime Minister Michael
Manley's party because Manley represents the best hope over the next few years for
left of center forces to come to power. Cuba may be providing limited aid to radical
groups in order to prepare for, and possibly encourage, a climate of instability. We
believe that for the most part, however, Cuba will continue to promote moderation
and foster increased leftist political activity.
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2. French Departments
32. Cuba has long viewed the French Caribbean as falling within its legitimate
sphere of influence, and we believe it would be reluctant to lose any leverage to the
Libyans who have become increasingly active in the region. Cuba reportedly has
responded to Libyan inroads with warnings to local leftists about the risks of
involvement with Qadhafi and Havana probably will step up its offers of training
3. Dominican Republic
33. In the early 1980s, Cuba encouraged leftist radicals in the Dominican
Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions,
Cuba also provided military instruction to members of small extremist splinter groups
such as the Social Worker's-Movement and the Socialist Party as well as to the pro-
Moscow -dominican Communist Party and the Dominican Liberation Party.
Havana is maintaining or, in some cases, restoring contacts
with opposition elements, ranging from moderate left to radical. Cuba believes that
the economic and political situation will continue to deteriorate, placing the radical
elements--and by association, Cuba--in a favorable position. Although the elections
scheduled for May 1986 could provide a focus for Cuban encouragement for the
leftist violence, we believe that Havana will be deterred from doing so because the
left remains fractured.
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. 35. The Cubans have had a relationship with Los Macheteros, the Puerto Rican
separatist group, for the past several years. Recent activity includes:
-- On 30 August in San Juan, Puerto Rico, US FBI agents seized
approximately $60,000, a small plane used to take aerial photographs of US
-military installations on the island, and a number of weapons in raids of
several Machetero safehouses. Investigations into the weapons supply
routes indicate that the confiscated weapons may have been supplied by
-- In addition, these raids netted 11 suspects in the $7 million 1983 Wells
Fargo robbery in West Hartford, Connecticut. The key figure in that
robbery received sanctuary in Cuba and may have provided the Cuban
Government with up to $2 million.
IV. Cuban Support for Insurgents
36. Throughout Latin America, many radical leftist groups seek at some point
to become insurgent or guerrilla organizations and maintain both rural and urban
fronts. Cuba has supported many of these groups in the past, and in some cases
has maintained the relationship over the years. Cuba generally provides these
groups with guerrilla and military training, rather than specific tactical or operational
support. t
37. Over the past two years, many of the insurgent groups in El Salvador and
Guatemala have been on the defensive and have adopted the tactics of urban
terrorism. Although Cuba has provided many of these insurgents with training in
urban tactics--and likely will continue to do so--we see little evidence of Cuban
operational direction or sponsorship of specific urban terrnrist aete
A. El Salvador
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38, Prior to 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small
numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political
conduit between Salvadoran extremists and leftists outside the hemisphere. During
the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the Sandinistas. After the
fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to
power in El Salvador. In fact, Cuba played a critical role in bringing together the
various fragmented elements of the Salvadoran left leadin ultimately to the forging
of th
F
b
e
ara
undo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).
39. As Cuba saw the level of violence escalate, it increased the flow of
weapons and financial support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Larger numbers of
Salvadoran guerrillas went to Cuba to receive political and military training and
returned to El Salvador to augment the guerrilla ranks. Cuban training increased
sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army capable of mounting
major offensives. A typical three month training program included courses in
guerrilla tactics, marksmanship, and use of artillery. In addition, Cuba provided
selected guerrillas more intensive training in specialized subjects such as underwater
40. Over the past few years, however, Cuba has been more cautious in its
support for the Salvadoran insurgency and has attempted to temper Salvadoran zeal
for dramatic terrorist attacks. Castro has concentrated his efforts on forging more
effective unity among the guerrilla groups and on making clear that the struggle
would be neither easy nor short. We suspect that Cuba will continue to exert a
moderating influence on the plans of the Salvadoran insurgents, especially if the
groups continue to suffer both military and political losses, and will attempt to
dissuade them from mounting indiscriminate terrorist attacks.
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41. Guatemala serves as an example of Cuban attempts to form a union of
disparate guerrilla groups. In November 1980, the four major insurgent organizations
signed an agreement to establish the National Revolutionary Union (URNG). Following
the signing ceremony, held in Managua, representatives traveled to Cuba and
presented the document to Castro. Despite the show of unity, however, the
Guatemalan groups have not become a cohesive organization and only occasionally
engage in joint terrorist operations.
42. At present, we believe the revolutionary groups seeking power in
Guatemala are far from achieving their objectives. The successful counterinsurgency
and civic action programs and the progress of the democratization process have
undercut their domestic support and give them little hope of success in the near
future. The URNG seems to have little real power, serving only as a propaganda
mechanism and political front.
43. We believe Havana will maintain its political and military training programs
but is not likely to encourage an increase in violent activity. Most probably, Cuba will
stress the importance of negotiating and seeking to achieve a measure of political
legitimacy.
V. Cuban-Libyan Rivalry
44. I (Havana is particularly worried that
Libya's increasingly close relations with Caribbean leftists may undermine Havana's
more cautious strategy. Moreover, Havana is worried that the United States believes
Cuba is cooperating with Tripoli in supporting indiscriminate violence,
Libya's meddling could provoke US retaliation against Cuba.
45. Already, Libyan activities in the Caribbean have prompted warnings by
Cuban officials to Caribbean leftists about the dangers of cooperating with Tripoli.
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46. In its attempt to counter growing Libyan influence, Havana has stressed to
various leftist groups the drawbacks of cooperating with Libya, citing Tripoli's
international reputation as a center for terrorism, and arguing that increased links to
Libya will prompt US countermeasures. Havana also has pointed out that it has
maintained longstanding assistance to regional leftist groups over the years as part
of its traditional Latin American revolutionary role.
47. The USSR and Cuba share a broad range of goals in Latin America and are
in general agreement as to policies concerning the use of subversion and terrorism.
At present we believe the shared strategy focuses primarily on unifying leftist groups
and strengthening regional cooperation among radicals in preparation for opportune
revolutionary conditions.
48. Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of
inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line
Communist Parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for
several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud
arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation"
struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North
Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.
None of these Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused
much popular support and they all failed.
49. At present, Moscow and Havana appear to favor a more active policy of
subversion in Chile, while guarding against damaging their political objectives
elsewhere. Unless Castro decides to promote armed revolution in countries such as
Argentina or Peru, where Moscow has important economic and political stakes--a
development we view as unlikely in the next few years--Mosl:ow and Havana
probably will continue to work along parallel tracks in the region.
50. Despite this general confluence of goals, however,) 25X1
the two countries occasionally work at cross purposes. For example, Havana has
maintained only formal ties with the Soviet-sponsored moderate elements of the
Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), the result of the PCB's refusal to support the efforts
of the Guevara in the late 1960s. Havana's 25X1
increasing involvement with leftist elements of the party and move to sup lant
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51. In our judgment, Castro will continue to selectively sponsor Latin American
terrorist activity as part of his commitment to the revolutionary struggle, while being
careful not to endanger his own regional interests or to come into conflict with
Moscow. Cuba will remain intent on maintaining deniability in order not to reverse
the diplomatic and political inroads it has made in several countries in Latin America
nor to forestall future breakthroughs on the diplomatic front.
52. Havana also recognizes, however, that its known ties to guerrilla groups
can present opportunities for exercising leverage on existing regimes. As the price
for restoration of diplomatic relations in the mid-1970s, for example, Havana pledged
non-interference in Colombia's internal affairs, a promise it quickly reneged on.
Uruguay hoped to make cessation of support to the Uruguayan guerrilla groups a
condition for diplomatic recognition of Cuba. Cuba had been reluctant over the past
several years to support indigenous Uruguayan terrorist groups, such as the
Tupamaros, for fear of jeopardizing the establishment of full diplomatic relations.
However, in the wake of the establishment of full relations in October 1985, Havana
may choose to pursue a more active relationship with Uruguayan opposition groups,
encouraging political activity but not violence.
53. Cuba probably will continue to place high priority on assistance to
terrorists in Chile during the coming year. In fact, Cuba has perceived conditions
there as rapidly becoming ripe for an increase in terrorist activity,
As the moderate and center left political parties view
accommodation with President Augusto Pinochet as increasingly unlikely, they may
become more tolerant of leftist violence and perhaps even offer support to radical
leftists.
54. In our view, Castro will continue encouraging the Chilean radical left to
reach a rapprochement with the moderate opposition in order to lessen its political
isolation and to strengthen prospects for the radical left to play a role in efforts to
oust Pinochet, as well as in a future, post-Pinochet period. However, Castro also will
continue to stress to the Chilean terrorist groups, especially the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) that they must remain committed to armed struggle and
political -olence as part of their overall strategy to maintain pressure on the
55. Havana probably will increase its support to Caribbean leftist groups,
possibly in an attempt to mitigate any decline in Cuban influence resulting from the
growing Libyan presence.* Havana is increasingly concerned that Libya's courtship of
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Caribbean leftists could prompt a US response. Moreover, Havana is worried that the
United States believes Cuba is cooperating with Tripoli in its support for
indiscriminate violence and fears that Washington could direct countermeasures
against Cuba.
56. Libya's growing involvement with leftists, both in the Caribbean and
elsewhere in Latin America, may spur Castro to step up his support to various
guerrilla groups, especially if these groups effectively use their ties to Tripoli as
leverage in an attempt to gain greater financial support from Havana. Cuba could
also make more effective use of what it has to offer--a logistical support base to
Caribbean leftists that is far more useful that what Libya can offer in the region--as
well as increased provision of scholarships and training.
57. Although Havana's ideological animosity toward the United States may
make targeting US installations and personnel tempting, we believe Castro fears
retaliation and would be responsive
confrontation with Washington. It
calculations on Castro's likely mode
to likely Soviet urgings that he avoid a
is nevertheless important when making
of behavior, to remember the "wild card"--
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Castro's own ego needs and his propensity for emotional responses when suddenly
confronted by actions he perceives as embarrassing to himself or hostile to his
regime.
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