SITE LAYLOUT AND SECURITY MEASURES AT ZAVOD NO. 96, IGUMOVO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100370007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18. Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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COUNTRY USSR (Gorkiy Oblast) REPORT
SUBJECT Site Layout and Security Measures at DATE DISTR.
5 February 1954
Zavod No. 96, Igumnovo
NO. OF PAGES 18
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO.
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PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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STATE
ARMY
59X I NAVY
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AIR
FBI
AEC
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conning Till.
REPORT
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COUNTRY s USSR(OorklySiblavt) DATE DISTR.23a1e.53
SUWECT a Site ;Await and Security Natures at Raved NO. OF PAGES 1T'
No. 96, IgUlMOTO
PLACE
ACQUIRED a
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF INFORMATION s
? THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. -
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NO. Of ENCIS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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'IMTRIONOTION
1. The Riershintk industrial ariavlocated apProximetisit 35-40 kilometers .
? weetoht Sorkly (46-201 4460010:along the llosoew-**ki* meihriiilroad
triekb was establiiheebj-the SeViet7goVernMent in 1934 aii',0144Of the
largest chemical industrreenteri of:thb USSR.. It is lilleired4that
the oity of Dserehinsk.(564-15 N 43-244), the oemtwoethie.induetrial
araeb Was estah/ished-during-theuamijeriod and was developed and
inrarged on elate Or sites formerly known as the villages Rastyapino , ?
aed Ohernoye.? Prior to the industrialisation of this area, the lends
sUrromnding Dsershinek.were laxgoly'oeVilred with impassable tomtits
and' sandymarshes. During the years fellet4ng 1934..these.foreste
? andaershes were gridually.cleared Sig drained, thus'makinglhe'niely
created flatland suitable for habitation and the proAsoted industrialist-
'
tion.
? ?
2. the,chemleal plant Zseed,96,.ori is nisi knells tolhe 'men specialists
? working there, Nevoditriy, Igmhitivelihilehge to the ehhii;oeitior
4iren chemical plants:demisting:4M the Diirehipsk aria.' the'eethal site
ifutavod 96 is knowniiirehevillkgelihd workers. settliient; IgUmneve
(56L16 N 42-37-2). bid Of sand ,b7 a railieid'AitiOn hawing
Watson name. Saved 96 le loeited approxiMatily.three Or four kilometers
? east of Dserehinsk aid elicit 300 imitersdoCith from the rail line *ening.
bitwedd-Dsershinsk and Clerkly.
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ZAVOD 96 AREA--SITR;LATOVT
5. The plant-is built on flat, sandy grounds and comprises an
area of approximately two square kilometers,
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50X1 The soft and sandy foundation of the ground within
the plant is not suitable for the erection of tall and heavy
- buildings. The sandy strip of land to the south of the plant,
whioh covers ,an, approximate diatancA:of.one kilometer,. forms,
a gradual decline toward the Oka River, a tributary of the
Volga. The banks of the Oka and the lower stretches of land
east and west of Dzerzhinsk Are regularly flooded every spring.
.These areas repaid. subierged to,a greater extent until the
middle_ of June. However, the *illagaq in the. vicinity are
not. Affected by the.riVerva?oVerflOW.;..The'buildinge,, plants,
workshops, and storageelledi,,iith ?the exdeption'Of some
.wooden etructUres, aremfirePredf.donsiructions. the'few
_roads within.the plant.Are:pa4ed with cobblestones. The
-yentirepLant. is surrounded.by a:double fence system. A
:JUunbar.ofImiPhtowers, each apprOxiMately eight to ten meters
higho'ipaded :at regular intervals,supporta the guard system
around..the.,plant.-.A.single,rail sptar?nects the. plant's
.rail het with the Station Igumnovo. This station also serves
as train stbp far the chemidal Plant Oka (zaVed-number unknown)
whieh ii.lboated apProximately 100 - 150 meters east of 2avod 96.
80yiet and,Girman employees residing in Dzerzhinsk can con-
veniently reach all plants of the ihduetrial area by bus and streeto
car, lines of which run along the entire length of the
dietiict. ,Tbe.plant Area contained few large buildings. 'Many
horizontal storage tanke:of.various dimeneions could be' observed
in tie ProxiMitY of. individual plants and installations".. Piping
bridges and very: few vertical tanks were visible. A polar plant
(PPint 29.beld*),ledated between,Zavo4,96 and the. Oka' Plant ,
seried ascthe?Oodroe of steam'and electric pewer for bbth plants.
Many?gasOineiere were 'visible near the oil cracking plant in the
eaetert.sic.tion of the.zavod. A number of cisterns or natural
wells were).Ocated,at.Marty pointe of the plant and near Various
installatiohd, such as, the 'ethylene chloride, oil' cracking,
And igelite plants. The temperature in the cisterns was lower
than that of the Oka waters.
4. I.haVe prepared a sketch Of the plant area feee. page ig
on whieh,I'have located.the.f011olin oints: (The many
unnumbered shaded blocks in the aketch represent huild-
ingir and inetallationsithe use an purpose of which is Unknown
tome.)
Point 1 AdMiniairatiOn Building
Thie building is boated outside of the plant area 80
metere froth the main gate (point 2). It is a fo06-
.Atoryi 20 dietere' high, brick cOnstruction, 90.g 40
matere. .It has ;a flat wooden roof covered With Sheet
Oetal The majority of the ground floor iindOwe are
protected]With:iron bar frames. 'No entrance paeses
were:required'for entry io the administrative.officee
lOcated On the ground floor. However, a special Pass,
held by both Soviet and German employees alike:117as
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necessary for admission, to the three upper flobre,of
the building. The entranOe to the top flights was
controlled by one or two Soviet guards on duty on.
the second floor landing leading to the Upper_part
of the building. The various offices and depart-
mente-dflhie'beilding:are4islollOWO
,
Ground floor - OffiCe'ef,the depUty director (KHRULOV); personnel
departteit.(KAMENCHEV);,eeditrook and offices of' the
plantlaldieCiPlitiary organa; employees health insurance
(Krankenkaiee),and oabhiei's, Often; plant and Party
committee'(akom andPartk6M)1 colifekence and inter,.
____viamiagAccms, otos /
Second floor - Technological department (KHRULOV); Manpower control
department (FROXICHEV); office of the business director;
? finance and bookkeeping; plant security section
(security of personnel! Installations, equipment, etc.);
design 'department (YONISHEV),
cfl.
Third floor - Office of the plant director (KAGANOVICH); office of
? the chief mechanical eagineer; building construction
department; and several administrativeoffices
(secretariat).
Fourth floor-- This floor was largely occupied with offices belonging
to the Design and TeohiciOgical Department known as
Brigade LEVINe otTas later changed to Brigade VILSON.
Thi e department 9onsApted.of a number of design,
technical, and ciiiputing sectime 41 which the largest
number of the German specialists Were employ*
(approximately IS eng/peOrs 4nedosignei*).?This :
brigade was known to td1attadhedt0,2aved'96 for
teepoiary work and it Wee dikectlY responsible to'
the Project Institute NO. 3, located?in Mosobw. This
institute is a design and planning department Of the
Ministry for Chemicalladustry in Moscow. The plant's
archive', records and file roome, and a special office
where classified documents were 'kept, were among
the other rooms located on this floor i; These offiOes
? could be entered only under esoort or. with specie/
Permiesion from a responsible Soviet supervisor.
DoOrsvand windows of these rooms were protetite4 witk
iron frames.
Point 2 Main Gate
This gate is primarily used for motor transport' ?
traffic. The gate wings were of solid'wood frames,
24 meters high, each three meters wide. During the
day, the gate stood ?pelt. It was under guard 24
hours a day. During day time there were two plant
guards on duty; their guard shifts were unknown.to,me.,
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Personnel Entrance and Pass Control Point
This personnel entrance was used by Soviet and German
employees alike. It is an oblong, partly two story
brick building, 10 x 5 meters, flat roof, probably
wooden. The permanent installation passes were kept
in this building and controlled by a number of
attendants belonging to the plant police detachment.
for detailed description of this point see paragraphs
5 to-8 below2
?
Point 2b Visitors Pass Office
This is a small two-story barrack type stone building
located to the right of the main gate (point 2).
Visitors could enter the plant through this building.
Several offices belonging to the personnel department
.were also housed in this building. Among them were ?
an office where pertehent installation passes were
prepared and issued; pass pictures taken and proceesed;
nidafew typists' rooms.
Point 3 Chlorine Electrolzeis Plant
This plant existed since the initial eitablishment of
Zavod 96, in 1934. ?i1955, exact date nnknownv the
equipment of this plant was old and of Soviet origin.
Itja a one-story, 8 meters high, brick construction,
0:m 35 meters. It has a flat reinforced concrete
oof, /with one framed skylight in the center. A 50X1-HUM.
chlorine laboratory, transformer station, as well as
a few rooms for the technical supervisors, werp ?
located in the west wing of this building. The GerMall
Chalets, KRASSEI; and SPNINGEMANN, both still in the
SSJIj worked in this plant. This plant was enlarged ?
and modernized with_disMantled equipment- brought;fred
Bitterferd:::Tfie- above-mentiaWd tWo--S-pen-ialiste.
ailThed in the development of this plant and'eupervised-
the technological proceassa involving qualitative and
econOtic aspects.' The present production capacity is
hot khein to me; however; since the Soviets did not
Utiliae'all Bitterfeld'egnipment at the time 'Of the.
modernization, it-is Moat possible that the prodnotive
onnacity May be increased in the future. A number Of
hOritontal Storage tanks were located behind the
building facing south. This plant worked 24 hours a
441 50 to 60 Soiriet workers worked in each of the ?
three daily Shifts. Gas masks with specie/ filters
were worn by some of the workers at this plant.
yoint)4 Cyclohexanol (Hydrogenator) Plant
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This plant was newly designed and constructed during
the period 1947-195/ with the dismantled equijwerit
br??glitI'fornLeuna Werke. It isa single-story., 12 .
brick construction, 70 x 20 meters, with
a flat roof. It contains an inside heavy equipmeni.,
traveling crane. KROECER and TROESTRUM were the GerMan
..specialists engaged in the design and supervision of
this project. ?
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Point 5 Adipic Acid Plant
This is a three-story, 18 meters high, brick construc-
tion, 50 x 30 meters. It has a reinforced concrete
flat roof.
The
equipment_ut111zed sor_tnis_instailatton was brought
from the Leuna Werke,
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After the plant was comple ed
bj-the-SOViets-p-no Germans were engaged in any work
at this plant.
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Point 6 Cyclohexanone (Dehydrogenator) Plant_(Ofe,nhaus)
This is a single-story, 18 meters high,Thrick con-
struotion, 60 x 25 meters. It has a flat saddle type
roof with a center skylight. Attached to this build-
ing is a three-story high annex where administrative,
technical offices and the plant laboratory were located.
Preparatory work on this project began in the latter
part of 1946.
The plans and designs for this
plant were based_on_records documented durin-g-the
dismantling process at the Leuna Werke in 1946. Equip-
ment-brought fiom Leuna was utilized for the construction
of this plant whichiSe -completed lik
in-1949. --------
Point 7 Distilling Plant (Lactam)
This is a single-story open. skeleton steel construction,
25 *fere:high, 40.x 15 meters, houeinglabout.eight
distilling columns. Adjacent to the skeleton brick
buil:din/was aAonstruction of the same?height, where
such distilling machinery equipment as measuring
instruments, pumps, separators, etc., were located.
This plant was constructed with dismantled equipment
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brought from Leuna Werke.
Point 8 Storage Tanks for Lactam Basic Liquids
This is a 40 x 15 meter reinforced concrete basin, built
about two meters above and one meter under the ground.
It contains approximately 15 o 20 steel storage tanks.
The tanks were in horizontal position. .The entire
equipment for this installation was brought from the
Leuna Werke,
Point 9 Last= Production Plant
This is a four-story, 35 meters high, brick construction,
approximately 80 x 50 meters. The light reinforced
concrete flat roof contained several skylights. This
plant was equipped with several traveling cranes and
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elevators. The entire aquipment_for_this-plantawas
brought from the Leuna Werke. This building is fire
and exPlosion proof. As the tallest --building within
the Zavod 96 area it contrasts conspLeucusly with the
other installations of the plant and presents a
definite landmark in this area. LOEWENBERG, STRIEGLER,
LOETZSCH, and a number of other German specialists worked
on the development of this project. '
Point 10 Storage Tanks and Shed for Melting Installation
This is a single-story brick shed, 12 meters high,
about 40 x 35 meters, with a reinforced concrete flat
roof, The interior of this shed, equipped with heating
pipes, pumping installations, and other pertinent melt-
ing apparatuses, can accommodate three rail tank cars
at the same time. Approximately 10 horizontal storage
tanks are located outside this shed.
Point 11 Distilling Plant
This an open frame steel construction, 12 meters high,
50 x 30 meters. The installation is old and its use
is unknown to me.
Point 12 Workshop Shed Hall
This is single-story shed type brick construction,
6 meters high, 90 x 20 meters. It has an ordinary
flat wooden roof. This hall contains all of the plant's
mechanical repair and maintenance workshops. I have
no details of the interior subdivision of this
construction.
Point 13 Ammonium Sulphate Plant
This is a three-story, 18 meters high, brick construction,
70 x 30 meters, with a saddle type reinforced concrete
roof. It is equipped with overhead travelling cranes
and elevators. The entire_equipment.for_this_plant_was
brought from Leuna Werke, KROEGER, TROESTRUM, myself,
? anrothers-worked on the development of this plant.
Igelite (Plaetics) Plant
This is a partly reconstructed old building. It is a three
story, . .20 meters high, brick construction, 120 i 30 '
meters, with a flat roof, construCtion material Un-
known. The entire.equipmput,for_this_plant was brought
from.Bitterfald.
Point 15 Main Laboratory
This is a two-story, 10 meters high, brick buildihg,
75 x 30 meters, with a tar-board-covered fiat roof.
This building contains all of the'plant'slaboratoiies
among which were the Lectern research and ekperiierital
laboratories established for the 4eported,Perman:
Chemists. LOEWEHBERG,.MEIER, STRIEGLER,,And BERNDT
were conducting researoh on Lectern processes in thia
building.
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Point 16 Oil Cracking Plant
This is a three-story, 20 -25 meters high, brick con-
struction, partly with steel skeleton frames, 100 x 60
meters. This plant existed prior to the arrival of
the German specialists. GERI= acted as consultant
for this project.
...Point 1 Linde Refrigerator Plant
This is a two-story, 12 meters high, briok building,
50 x 70 meters, with a low saddle roof, construction
material unknown. Administrative offices, laboratory,
and rooms for mechanical personnel are located in this
building. This construction was old and of Soviet
origin.
Point-at?. Methylene Chloride Plant_
?
This is a three-story, 18 meters high, old brick Wilding,.
50 X 40 meters. Adjoining this horse-shoe shaped build-
ing.are open steel skeletons for distilling dolumns and
tothersmachinery. This_plant_was_partly_equipped_with
Madiiihery:.:btought-from Bitterfeld. About eight hOrizontal
? .stotage tanks are located outside of the building. ?
EENNIG acted as consultant for this project. ?
Poiht:l0
This building is located outside the Zavod 96 area and
1?elOngs to the chemical plant Oka. It is a two- aril
partly 'three-story, 15 meterd high, brick building,
80 x 3 meters. I have nel information regarding this
plant other than it was surrounded by a fence and guarded.
7tint:c20 Meatball and Kitchen
? . ??
?
? ?
Three-story,.18 meters high, brick building, 60 x 25
Meters. It, is used as a messhall for the plants technical
pireonnel.and *orkthen.
Peint* 23--gt.-1---2--h1611S---11tataat
Faur-story, 25 meters high, brick building,.60 x 40
Meters. Ground floor contains a shopping center and
oanteen4dining rooms and kitchen are located on the
.20.,flopt; 3rd and 4th floors contain hotel and.olab
? reope and n library. These facilities are primarily
ettablished for housing personnel attached to. the zavod
On teMporarY asaighments; reception and accommodation
of high ranking visitors from.ministries and ?tar'
zavOcler-and as club and messing facilities for the
? plint!ti higher.officiale. The German specialiets
utilized the restaurant during the lunch periods.
. ,
Adtiniatre'tion Office for the Plant Facilities
Single-story, 5-6 meters high, barrack type brick butld-
ing, 40 10 meters, with, ordinary wooden roof.
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Mount 23 Central Measurement-and'Operations Control Department
This is-a two--story, 12 Meters high, brick building.
30,x 12 meters. It contains testing offices .for
analysis, measurement, Add evaluation of processes and
heir_deVelopmente;
!tint 24 East'Oate - Rail Traffibdontrol
Point 25 44W0ate Traffi6COntrol
Point 26 Waste Water And Filter Basins
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Point 27 Former Site of German PW Camp
As of 1949, Soviet. male forced labor camp. Many worked
as laborers at the plant
Point28 Restricted Area(Approximate location).
This is a guarded barbed wire enclosure, whiOh.could be
enteredonly With Special. paases. 1 have no inforMatio4
ad to the nature and purpOse of this lloipOund: ' ?
Taint 29 Steam and POWer Plant (Approximate Location).
_
'Source of steam and power for Zavod 96 and Pia plants. .
SECURITY MEASURES.
Descriution of Installation Pass
?
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One was exdlutivelithsed
pit-admission-to the,three upper floors Of the plant's administra-
44on.building (point 1); the other was required for entrance into
the chemical plant area. I have drawn a more?defaileLeketch'of
ale. personnel entraWlannxit.(point 2a) gee pag1.47. I have
'Also described botMlnstallaiiOn passes in detail ages 14 and
15 !..7. Persons desiring to visit the administrative offices
located on the.groUnd floor (see description of point 1) were_not '
required to present any sort of entrance passes
6. To my knowledge. both Soviet and German employees wolting.in the
adiinistrative building carried an identical-typebof pass, which
they were allowed to retain on their person at all;timeo. The
largest group of the German specialists, approximatels 18 engineers
and designers
However, permanent passes 'for
entry into tne plant area were also available to us. These were
permanently kept for our use in the personnel entrance building
(point '2a). The administration building pass did not contain
any'special markings other than those described fiage
Installation guards were always on duty at the stair, landing
leading to the.three top floors, controlling all personnel.
entering this part,of the building.
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7. The permanent liasSes.cor entry :into the main pant were. always.
kept after working tours in numbered box-type drawers located
in special booths of the personnel exit and entrance building
'See description on page'lg These passes were issued only after
the employee's deposit box number and name were given to the
booth attendant. During lunch hours and every time an employee
had to leave the plant, passes had to be deposited at the exit
booth. This permanent type of pass was also identical for the
Soviets and Germans. However, in addition to the regular personal
identification data, this pass contained a number of stamps and
markings placed in the lower part of the left page See page 14 J.
These special markings were stamped in various colors, primarily
'green, blue, and red. The exact designation or'theaning of these
special markings were apparently known to specific personnel
department officials, guards', and to the pass holder 'himself.
Presumably, these markings denoted varioue degrees of entrance and/
.or exit privileges allowed to certain'types'of employees, i.e.,
some were not subject to searches and periodic spot-checks at the
gate and personnel entrance; others could enter the plant at any
time of the day and night; certain employees were authorized to
carry in and out of the plant working papers, drawings, and other
documents; and on the other hand, many of the workers who can be
classified as laborers, service and cleaning persOnnel, were not
generally permitted to enter various restricted areas and sensitive
buildings within the plant. Strangely enough, we German engineers
and:sdesigners who worked in the administrative building were
permitted, to carry in and out of the plant our working materials
involving the projects assigned to us for development. We were
also not subjected to the periodic searches and spot-checks. .
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8. To my knowledge, both passes described above were valid for no other
purpose than identification for entry into the-plant area and
administrative building. I did not observe the existence of any
type of identification tags worn by Soviet or German employees
during or off duty hours. During .the first year ,of. our stay in
the'Dzerzhinsk -area we were in possession of a:temporary reeidence
permit known to us as P,sport.Dlys Inostranykh.Rabochykh -
(Residence Permit for Foreign Workers). This telpbrary document
Was withdrawn from us in the middle of 1947, after an incident
involving two of our deported compatriots, Dr. MEIER and Dr.
STRIEGLER. Both undertook a trip to Moscow on their own without
consulting the plant administration.
Passqlontrol System and Visitors' Passes.
9.
The responsibility for issuance and control of passes rested with
the personnel department, deputy director KAMENCHEV in charge.,
To-my knowledge, FAMUCHEV was also responsible for the plant's
security system and the plant police detachment. Permanent passes
were prepared and issued in offices located in a small building
(point 2b) near the main gate. There, questionnaires and applica-
tions had to be filled out and submitted to Soviet attendants
who-were also charged with the preparation of passport type pictures.
As 'far as I can remember, pass pictures for Soviet employees were
prepared in three copies (for the Germans, more copies may have
been printed). As standard procedure, one picture was affixed to
the pass; one attached to the questionnaire or Spplicatibni *and?.
the third forwarded to the personnel department for inclusion' With
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the individual's personnel jacket. The validity period for the
permanent passes was unknown to me. However, the passes were
renewed twice during our stay in this area. The only apparent
difference was in the colors of the special markings described
above.
10. The issuance of visitors' passes was also controlled by attendants
at this building., The exact type of visitor's pass was unknown to
me; however, the admission of visitors to the main plant area
required, coordination between the controlling attendant and the
various offices and/or persons to be visited. Visitors were not
allowed to enter the plant area without a Soviet escort.
11. The entrance into the plant area was controlled at point 2a.
It was a known fadt.that newly employed Soviets were obliged to
deposit theix.regular Soviet passports with the personnel depart-
ment, which in turn issued them a temporary worker's identification
valid only for the area of their employment. For trips involving
longer distances or leave travel, the individual's passport was
temporarily returned to him. Although Iliad a chance to see the
worker's residence pass, I am unable to give a description of it9
since at that time, I did not attach any importance to the existence
of such type of pass.
Loss of-Pass
12. The loss of a pass was dreaded by all Soviet employees. Persons
reporting the loss of a permanent pass, which could odour only
within the confines of the plant area, were generally detained,
interrogated, and eventually turned over to the plant's security
ind:disoiplinary organs. Monetary fines and/or imprisonment
ranging from one to four weeks was the punishment imposed by the
plant administration for this negligence.. In other eases, probably
considered more serious, individuals would ts turned over to state
security organs.
Guards
13. The guarding of the entire plant area was divided between two
separate guard detaohments.-the plant police and MGB. Both were
responsible to separate commands. The plant police detachment, '
approximately 50 strong, was responsible to the personnel depart-
ment chief, KAMENCHEV, and was primarily engaged in guarding the
entire inner plant area, gates, personnel entrance, and the
administration buildings. Their uniform was dark-blue and bore
no-special insignia.. They were armed with rifles and side arms.
?F'.1arge number of female guards was among the plant police detach-
ment. The ages for both male and female guards ranged between
20and 50. ,There were. approximately 150 guards in each duty:shift
posted at all points within the plant. Each duty contingent
worked on a#12-,hour atilt schedule. The plant police were poorly
paid (I-believe from 300 to 500 rubles per month). The male
? guards frequently took advantage of their female counterparts
by-assigning additional duties to them. However, some of the
females were sble to win for themsleves various privileges.
Considering the;poor pay and harsh duties, especially during
winter months, the female guards could-be induced by bribes.
Corruption in various degrees and levels is normal with the Soviets;
the?morals of.the plant guards were not on a very high level. A
bachelor colleague of mine maintained a friendship with one of the
Tiamters, female guards and from conversations with this person I
learned many details of their daily living conditions and standards.
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14. The.MGB detaohment was a regular military unit, It consisted of
130 to 150 soliders, who wore gray-brown uniforms with blue caps0
They were armed with sub-machine guns. TO my knowledge, this
detachment was responsible to the K711 or MOB headquarters
located in the city of Dzerzhinsk. It appeared that all chemical
plants in the Dzerzhinek area were. considered as-military objectives
and therefore guarded by similar MOB units. At.Zavod 96, this
military unit primarily guarded the outer perimeter of the plant,
manning walking posts around the fences and on.the?watchtowers
supporting the fence at numerous points. The exact division
of-their duty shifts were unknown to me. It appeared that during
summer months the guard shift consisted of an eight-hour stretch-
and 'during the winter months, from two to four hours eaoh post.
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Physical Security
15. The 'plant is surrounded by a double fence system-an outer, barbed
wire fence, two meters Thigh; and a solid board feces, 2 3
meterslaigb, topped along its 'entire length with litrips of barbed
wire. Both fences are separated by a security zone, about 4-5
meters wide. This security strip runs along the entire perimeter
of the plant and serves as path for the walking guard patrols. A
system of watchtowers, each 8 to 10 meters high, spaced at regular
200- or 300-meter intervals, further supports the fence system..
A-number of flood-lights are installed at many points within the
plant and on the watchtowers. I do not know whether an automatic
alarm system was in existence or whether watchdogs were kept at
the plant. The majority of the lower floor windows of the ad-
ministration building were protected with iron frames. Barred
windows could be seen at other buildings, especially those of
the main laboratory (point 15). A few installations within
the plant were protected by barbed wire. These points could
be entered only if the appropriate markings on the pass entitled
the holder to do so. I have no concrete information regarding
these highly restricted areas.
Periodic Searches of Employees
16. Periodic searches of employees entering and leaving the plant
were conducted at the personnel entrance and gates. The guards
searched primarily for matches, cigarettes, and other combustiblee.
It was strictly forbidden to smoke within the plant area. Some
ofrthe higher plant officials and those persons having appropriate
markings on their passes were excluded from the regularly conducted
sear-hes.
Classification, Identification, and Protection of Working Materials ,
17. To lay knowledge, all working materials at the plant were considered
Classified. Classification stampe?dould be observed on drawings,
reports, and other written matter on file in the archiveand records
room of the administration building. I observed the Russian word
Sekretno, meaning secret, on materials on file. This classi-
fication was stamped with red ink, iThe removal of-working materials
from the plant area was generally prohibited; however, as already
mentionod.above, some of the Soviets, by virture of the special
markings on their passes were permitted to handle materials out-
side of the plant. Many of the higher officials and engineers
frequently worked late hours, at times as late as after midnight.
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Plans and
'drawings, as far as I knew, carried the designation of the work
.section and a code number. The materials were signed or identified
. .by individuals concerned pp a square field provided for this purpose
ln the lower right corner of the document. The work was generally
identified by a number of Soviets and by those Germans who were
:engaged on the particular project. The illustratiOn below will
protray the procedure followed by the Soviets at Our brigade:
Work Section
.Chief- Eng.of the Project t
-Chief of the Brigade Vilson
Senior Technologist x Kuznetsov
Senior -Engineet/Mechanic x x
:Engineer/Mechanic g
Draftsman s Valk:5*a' s
etc. (if required)
Concurred by;
-
Space -for as many
signatures of GerMan
specialists involved
on any particular project.
The work section ana-7.napiercbluMns were in regular ?print followed
. by'aAiand signature of each responsible Soviet on the project.
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Civil Defense Preparations
20. During my stay in the Dzerzhinsk area I did not notice anY pre-
parations of active or passive defense measures against possible
air-raids. I believe that during World War II only reconnaissance
planes could have occasionally penetrated as far inland as the.
Gorkiy and Dzerzhinsk areastand therefore I presume that the
.Soviets at that time did not make any extensive preparations
against bombings. The Dzerzhinsk houses have ordinary basements
and many of the wooden houses in this area contain no basements
or cellars at all. I did not observe any indication that the
available basements were being prepared as air-raid shelters,
nor did I notice any air-raid drills,' practice alerts, etc. I
did not observe any defense preparations at Zavod 96 or in the
vicinity. I know nothing of the existence of civil defense
-organizations in the USSR. Public announcements were disseminated
by means of loud-speakers installed in city squares and street
corners. Apartments in the Dzerzhinsk area are equipped with
wired loud-speaker outlets. I have no further concrete informa-
tion relative to civil defense preparations in the Soviet Union.
INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
21. In.:my opinion, most of the high positions are held by members
of the party. To cite only a few known to me, I would include
the plant director, KAGANOVICH; chief of the manpower control,
FROMICHBV; personnel director, KAMENCHEV; chief design engineer,
YONISHEV; and a number of other chiefs and supervisors.
KAGAROVICH was never seen alone. During his visits to the plant,
at meetings, and at sport events in town he was always esoorted
or followed by a number of the plant's party functionaries and ,
officials. The Germans often remarked, "Here comes the director
and his shadows." Undoubtedly, party members and party
'functionaries of the plant exercised considerable control over .
personnel, policies, and work performance at various levels. .
Bulletin boards displayed at various major workshops and
installations carried such information as fulfillment of norms
by individuals and whole sections, statittics of production
outputs, eto. A great deal was allotted to the praise and
excellence of Stakhanovites., All these bulletins and memos.were
signed first by the shop's party functionary and then 'came the
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signature of the technical manager or the trade-union representa-
Aive. I had the impression that the party's influenoe at the ?
plant was Continuously fostered* and stimwlatedby the party
Officiali and probably by directives-freni(agher headquarters.
SAMPLE,OF.PERMANENT PASS FOR ENTRY INTOriiii.PLANT AREA. ZAVOD 96
't1
44(2,400-0-
1442?: ? gActif
Omvecmeor 14444ifinit
Omaeoteme Rat , rent
miute4cmtpcm to ke,t, K ?
tip o-er v at 4 ettficnin
34.6ka ma 95.
Description and Translation:
}Jen Page : Identity Photo
Signature of Holder
Stamps and Markings
of Unknown Meaning,
Right Pats ?
Last N et IVANOV
First/NamesIVAN
Patronym tIvanovioh
' Section i Section '
Chief
Ministry for Chemical
Industry Zavodlo.96
Triangular stamp with
Zavod number
Signature of-Personnel.
Officer
This Imes was medium weight, dark violet-colored cardboard,.
apPrbximately 7 cm. wide, 13 cm. in length. The inei4e pages
of the pass are white. The back cover is of a Cotton type
material, with a very smooth surface, similar to thatuded
for hook-covers. The pass folded in the middle. The'colore ?
of the special markings in the lower side Of- the left page
varied in shades. The exact designation of thesemarkingris
unknown to me. The required personal information was in print.-
the identification data entered by hand in black ink. The
stamps iiwere in black ink. This pass was at all times kept in
the deposit booths of the plant's personnel entrance; Thoint 2a
in the sketch).
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AMPLE OF PERMANENT PASS FOR ENTRY TO'TRE,ADMINISTRATION BRILDING
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Aa
Translation and Brief Description:
aft sides '-Unmarked Right side:
Last Name
First Name
Patronyi
Section'
.Stamp '
! IVANO,
; Ivan
IvanoTich
1:Bookkeeping
Signature of
Personnel
? .Officer
*4is piss was a grayish blue, middle-weight cardboard., folded,.
4$?the,midd1e. apProximaAely 5 cm. Wide, 13 cm. in length, when
in open position., The inside pages orthe pass are white. The
back devertexture resembles MateriaLgenerally'used for book
covers.. The identification data was entered by hand in black
ink. The etamp was also in black itik. I do not remember if
the stamp On thid pass !serried the identification number of
the plant. There were no other markings on the pass than those
shown on the above drawing.
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-1-Vi_LN?3CIt.No")
-Tteltsiation..
1. Open square in front of
,entranoe.
2. ' Yard- inside the plant
%,
in
70.
ret
3..? Entrance guards .
Silt- guards
- 5. Wocithsrehere passes were
. knt.
6. Wooden barrier ?
-7.. Guard,
8. Turnstiles, in and out
!
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Page 17
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2
1 ?a1214
,
KE:TCH) OF 7AVOD No. 96, teutoNovo
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