ZIMBABWE-THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 22, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central 25X1
Intelligence
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Cf.Ain 14.
The Next Six Moils2)
Secret
NI IIM 80-10008
_.22 April 1980
Copy 2.60
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ZIMBABWE THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
Information as of 17 April 1980 was
used in the preparation of this paper.
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PREFACE
Zimbabwe became independent on 18 April 1980, six weeks after
the surprise election of Robert Mugabe was announced. In this period,
Mugabe has revealed some of the outlines of the policies he intends to
pursue, but they are too few and too uncertain to permit firm
conclusions about the direction his government will take. Hence, the
following study covers only a short period and is, necessarily, tentative.
7A longer term assessment is scheduled for later this year.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It
has been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at
the working leve1/7-
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CONTENTS
PREFACE
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
DISCUSSION
3
Internal Dynamics
3
The Economy Under Mugabe
6
The Military
8
Regional Implications
9
External Factors
10
US Interests
11
Contingencies
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Zimbabwe as Transportation Hub of Southern Africa
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Over the next six months, the prospects for internal stability and
moderate economic growth in Zimbabwe are good. During that time
Prime Minister Mugabe will pursue a course of moderation. He
eventually may try to change that course, in view of his self-avowed
Marxism. But for the near future, at least, he believes that Zimbabwe's
interests and his own would be best served by continuing to build on the
existing capitalist structure:
? Mugabe's election landslide and radical credentials have given
him time in terms of meeting black demands for change.
? His conciliatory posture toward his former adversaries and his
moderate economic policies have reassured the whites, South
Africa, and foreign aid donors and investors.
In spite of this general optimism, Zimbabwe and Mugabe face a
number of serious problems and pitfalls?these are not likely, however,
to upset the new regime over the next six months:
? Zimbabwe has inherited a war-ravaged country, racial and
ethnic bitterness, three still-independent armies, and some 1
million refugees and displaced persons The integration of the
armies is the first and perhaps most difficult order of business.
? Mugabe's substantial popular support affords him considerable
margin to deal with his potential adversaries. But these
supporters also are likely, before long, to demand economic and
social change. Militants in Mugabe's own highly factionalized
party, the Zimbabwe African National Union, will press for
vindication of and rewards for their long years of fighting. They
could curtail Mugabe's freedom of action and drive him to
pursue more radical policies than he has indicated he wants to
at present.
Mugabe's former -partner,- Joshua Nkomo, with a sizable army
and an important minority ethnic base of support, is now only a
junior partner in the government. If his ambitions or the
interests of his followers are ignored, he might try to undermine
the Mugabe regime.
Mugabe is under pressure to join a proposed counterconstellation of
black southern African states opposed to the constellation advocated
by South Africa, and to support the anti-South African liberation
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movements. But he recognizes Zimbabwe's economic dependence on
Pretoria and is unlikely soon to cut those links or permit anti?South
African guerrillas to have bases in Zimbabwe.
Mugabe is deeply suspicious of Moscow, which had backed Nkomo.
The Soviets will try to recoup, either through offering arms to
Zimbabwe or, over the longer run, through their ties with Nkomo's
military leaders whom they have trained. China, which had close ties to
ZANU, is unlikely to play a significant role, nor are other Communist
powers.
The West has significant interests in Zimbabwe and good prospects
for assisting and enhancing its relations with the new country.
Zimbabwe is important to the United States because of its mineral
resources and its potential regional influence. Although the West is
providing substantial economic aid at present, if Mugabe believed that
it were not sufficiently supportive, he would turn elsewhere for major
assistance.
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DISCUSSION
INTERNAL DYNAMICS
1. The startling victory of the Zimbabwe African
National Union in the late February election repre-
sented a clear-cut mandate for change. ZANU's leader,
Robert Mugabe, is a self-professed Marxist, and ZANU
is the most radical of the country's black parties. Its
army was the major guerrilla force during the war.
ZANU's unambiguous victory?winning over 63 per-
cent of the black vote and 57 of the 80 black seats in
the 100-member Parliament (the other 20 are reserved
for whites)?gave Mugabe considerable license to
press for change.
2. Since his victory, Mugabe has been conciliatory
to his enemies (including South Africa), moderate in
his statements of goals, and has won the tentative
acceptance of the white community.
3. Notwithstanding his desire for change over the
long term, Mugabe is pursuing the politics of concili-
ation for a variety of reasons:
? The whites retain the economic and military
power to undermine Mugabe's policies. A radical
tack could well precipitate a white exodus and,
possibly, an attempted coup.
? Rhodesia's long and bitter guerrilla struggle and
consequent civil upheaval; racial, tribal, party,
personal, and ideological enmities; and years of
international isolation imperil the new and frag-
ile political order and make even gradual social
reconstruction a daunting task.
? The existence of three independent armies (plus
the auxiliaries of Ndabaningi Sithole and those of
Robert Mugabe: A Profile
Robert Mugabe is intent on establishing a socialist
society in Zimbabwe, free of racial discrimination. As a
political activist in the early 19608, he became convinced
that whites would never peacefully concede political
power or equal social status to blacks. His recent con-
ciliatory statements are a pragmatic response to the need
for white participation.
Mugabe's African identity has been modified by his
quest for respect in Rhodesian society. Born 56 years
ago, he was raised at a Catholic mission near Salisbury.
He accepted many of the missionaries' ideas and taught
in Rhodesian, Zambian, and Ghanaian schools for 20
years. He holds several university degrees. He perceives
a common thread of social responsibility in African,
Christian, and Marxist value systems.
Personally reserved and austere, Mugabe is an intel-
lectual who needs to act in pursuit of his goals. After his
release from a decade of detention for nationalist activ-
ities, Mugabe became the chief spokesman for ZANU in
1976. But his election as the leader of the party identified
with the Shona-speaking majority (a cluster of politically
separate tribes) does not give him a mandate to dictate
policy. He must cope with Shona traditions of consensual
decisionmaking and party factions based on personal and
subtribal relationships. He has tried to remain aloof from
factional infighting, but in his new role he will have to
maneuver adroitly to achieve party and national unity.
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former Prime Minister Bishop Muzorewa and the
large number of weapons in private hands) con-
stitutes a serious threat to law and order.
? International, principally Western and South Af-
rican, support is necessary if Zimbabwe is to
receive the extensive economic aid and invest-
ment it requires for reconstruction and an ex-
panding economy that can provide jobs and
revenues.
4. Mugabe's moderate statements and actions are
designed, therefore, principally to maintain stability
and to allow him to consolidate his grip on power. But,
at the same time, he appears to recognize that Zim-
babwe's interests?and his own?would be served best
by building on the existing, well-developed economic
base. Mugabe is well aware of the economic shambles
in Mozambique and other African countries brought
about by hasty efforts at radical change. Whatever
Mugabe's own intentions may be?and we are far
from certain what they are?he must take account of
Zimbabwe's unsettled conditions and his own still
unconsolidated leadership, both of the country and his
own party.
5. In any case, Mugabe's apparent popularity with
the majority Shona peoples (roughly 70 percent of the
population) and his radical credentials have enabled
him to pursue a moderate course without fear of an
immediate black backlash. Moreover, there is a strong
conservative strain in Zimbabwean society, especially
among urban blacks. Mugabe's principal actions so far
have been:
To appoint prominent whites as Ministers of
Agriculture and of Commerce and Industry, and
an able, moderate black to Economic Planning
and Development?thus signaling to white farm-
ers, businessmen, and civil servants that their
property, investments, pensions, and jobs are
safe.
To ask the former Rhodesian military com-
mander, Lt. General Peter Walls, to stay on to
oversee the integration of the guerrilla and white
forces into a single army, and the British to help
train it. These actions are aimed at overcoming
the whites' fears for their security and placating
the white officer corps and Pretoria.
Zimbabwe's Cabinet Members
Position
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of State
Home Affairs
Economic Development and Planning
Manpower Planning and Development
Finance
Justice and Constitutional Affairs
Public Service
Labor and Social Welfare
Transport and Power
Local Government and Housing
Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development
Commerce and Industry
Agriculture
Information and Tourism
Natural Resources and Water Development
Education and Culture
Health
Public Works
Posts and Communications
Mines
Youth, Sport, and Recreation
Name
Robert Mugabe
Simon Muzenda
Emmerson Munangagwa
Joshua Nkomo
Bernard Chidzero
Edgar Tekere
Enos Nkala
Simbi Mubako
Richard Hove
Kumbirai Kangai
Earnest Kadungure
Eddison Zvobgo
Sydney Sekeramayi
David Smith
Dennis Norman
Nathan Shamuyarira
Joseph Msika
Dzingai Mutumbuka
Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze
Clement Muchachi
George Silundika
Maurice Nyagumbo
Teurai Nhongo
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Party
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZAPU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
ZANU
Rhodesian
Front
ZANU
ZAPU
ZANU
ZANU
ZAPU
ZAPU
ZANU
ZANU
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? To invite Joshua Nkomo to join his government
as Home Minister and to choose three lesser
ministers. Nkomo, Mugabe's former colleague in
the Patriotic Front (PF), heads the Zimbabwe
African People's Union (ZAPU), the party which
won 24 percent of the black votes and 20 seats in
the election. This move is aimed at co-opting the
sizable and important Ndebele-speaking minor-
? ity (18 percent of the black population) and
ZAPU's approximately 20,000-man army. This
tribal division will remain a critical factor, and
the Ndebele speakers will, much like the whites,
be watchful of their stake in the new, Shona-
dominated order.
? To appoint leaders of the several factions of his
own party to the Cabinet.
6. Nkomo is undoubtedly frustrated in his role as
junior partner, and he will look for opportunities?
now limited?to expand his power or to replace
Mugabe if the latter falters. There may still be some
whites who would support an Nkomo bid for power.
7. Eventually Mugabe's greatest challenge will
come from the black population and his own party.
They will expect ZANU to honor its promises of land
reform, jobs and higher wages, free public schools, and
better housing and health care.
8. ZANU militants will expect to see results that
vindicate the long years of fighting and ZANU's
electoral victory. ZANU is, in effect, an amalgam of
personal, subtribal, and ideological factions. Mugabe
has maintained his leadership because he has been
able to balance the various factions, and to maintain a
consensus within and between the separate political
and military wings of ZANU. ZANU's spectacular
electoral victory has, moreover, raised Mugabe's stat-
ure in the party. Now, holding the premiership and
Ministry of Defense, he will attempt to broaden his
own powers. But it is too early to say that he will be
able to contain ZANU's factionalism. If serious strains
develop within ZANU, Mugabe's freedom to pursue
his current policies would be severely curtailed.
9.. Mugabe has begun to assert the symbols and
some of the substance of black rule. For example, he
has eliminated the use of South African news broad-
casts on state-run radio and television networks, is
preparing to Africanize the civil service and restruc-
ture the separate white and black systems of local
government, and is streamlining the judicial system to
permit Africans to appeal decisions from tribal courts
to civil courts.
Joshua Nkomo
10. Notwithstanding these plans and promises to
redistribute land and upgrade social services, we ex-
pect Mugabe to proceed cautiously, for the short term
at least. He will move slowly because he wants. to
avoid disrupting essential services, to allow time for his
appointees to learn and master the mechanisms of
government, to reassure the whites, and to attract
foreign capital and Western economic aid.
11. Mugabe has some room for maneuver, but he
may not have it for long. The whites do not expect him
to be as malleable as was Muzorewa, but each step that
diminishes their perquisites will arouse the concern of
the waverers and confirm the worst fears of unrecon-
structed white supremacists. At the same time, some
black workers have already indicated their impatience
and concern in a flurry of wildcat strikes for higher
pay, protection of their pensions, and other benefits.
And ZANU's radical elements reportedly are disturbed
by Mugabe's moderate posture and gestures to accom-
modate Pretoria.
12. These contradictory pressures would be hard to
resolve in ordinary circumstances. They may well get
out of hand in the aftermath of a bitter war, persistent
racism and white privilege, unleashed black expecta-
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tions, and the international pressures that may soon
buffet Zimbabwe.
13. Mugabe's choices may not be so stark if he can
somehow prepare the whites for change while per-
suading blacks to defer some of their demands. But,
faced with a choice between maintaining a slightly
amended status quo and making basic changes,
Mugabe will favor change. He is committed to restruc-
turing the system so that blacks get a far greater share
of the economic and social benefits.
THE ECONOMY UNDER MUGABE
14. Zimbabwe will probably resume moderate eco-
nomic growth (in the 3- to 5-percent range) during
1980, following five years of deepening recession. This
optimistic forecast is based on the judgment that at
least during the next six months economic as well as
political self-interest will compel Mugabe to move
slowly. His ability to walk the tightrope between
maintaining white confidence and meeting black ex-
pectations may be significantly improved by the social
and political dividends from an economic recovery;
the availability of some land for immediate resettle-
ment; and Western economic support and investment.
15. If Mugabe honors his promise to respect prop-
erty and pension rights, it would greatly boost consum-
er and investor confidence and allow the economy to
take full advantage of the end to the war and interna-
tional sanctions. This upturn could restore up to the
estimated 40,000 jobs lost by black wage earners since
1975. But unemployment will continue to be a serious
problem. The number of jobseekers has probably
increased by 250,000 in the last five years, and will
grow with the demobilization of many of the guerrillas
and the return from abroad of some 250,000 refugees.
16. If peace and order hold this year, Zimbabwe
could attract $100-200 million in Western private and
public sources to finance economic recovery and social
reform programs. The United Kingdom, West Ger-
many, the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands,
and the European Community have already pledged
$140 million in assistance so far this year and will
provide more later.
17. Although new investors are remaining cautious
until the intentions of the Mugabe government are
clearer, foreign mining companies appear to be ex-
panding their operations. For example, a subsidiary of
a South African company reportedly approached the
Export-Import Bank in April for a $20 million loan to
purchase one of the largest American-made draglines
for the Wankie coalfields. A British-owned company is
proceeding with projects in platinum and gold with an
eventual price tag of $90 million. Although much of
the financing for such projects will be raised in
international capital markets, British, American, and
Canadian companies can also draw on their estimated
$120 million in profits and dividends that have been
blocked in local banks since 1965.
18. Meanwhile, another $500-600 million could be
generated or saved in 1980 by the elimination of the
costs of circumventing trade sanctions and spot market
oil purchases; reentry into markets lost during the UN
trade embargo; continued buoyancy in gold and
chrome prices; and reductions in defense spending and
war-related economic subsidies. Much of this addition-
al liquidity, however, would be absorbed by a pro-
jected $600 million budget deficit in FY 1980-81
unless South Africa resumes budgetary assistance (sus-
pended in March), which totaled an estimated $500
million in 1979.
19. Mugabe, although he has been considered Zim-
babwe's most radical black nationalist, appears from
his early economic policy statements and his appoint-
ment of two white ministers to want to retain white
skills, capital, and purchasing power. His initial land
reform proposal would leave commercial agricul-
ture?Zimbabwe's leading wage employer and foreign
exchange earner?virtually intact. Mugabe also says he
has no plans to nationalize local industry, although
state participation in foreign-owned mining operations
seems inevitable.
20. The availability for purchase of underworked
white farmland gives Mugabe some immediate room
for maneuver in satisfying African land hunger with-
out seriously disrupting commerical agriculture. But
over the longer run, the government will have to
acquire at least some productive white farm holdings,
since the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), where most
Africans live, are 80-percent grazing land with at least
four times the population density of neighboring white
farm districts. This overcrowding will be further ag-
gravated by the gradual influx of the hundreds of
thousands of persons displaced by the war. Relieving
the population pressure requires substantial inputs of
capital, farm implements, fertilizer, seed, and techni-
cal services over a prolonged period to both resettle-
ment farm communities and subsistence farmers who
remain in the TTLs.
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150 Kilometers
75 Statute Miles
Land Apportionment
in Zimbabwe
Tribal Trust Land
I I
MAfrican Purchase Land (formerly
reserved for blacks)
General Land (formerly
reserved for whites)
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National Land
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21. Nevertheless, during the next six months the
government will probably be able to make some
headway in land reform. Mugabe has announced plans
to buy up over 4.3 million hectares of land?roughly
one-fourth of white farm holdings?that were either
abandoned during the war or are underutilized. About
one-third will be immediately available for resettle-
ment in the relatively fertile area southeast of Salis-
bury. The remaining two-thirds is in the dry southeast
of the country and, although superior to adjacent tribal
lands, is suitable for cultivation only if irrigated. The
price tag for this largely idle white land will be $100-
150 million, with at least another $50 million required
to resettle black farm families.
22. Besides land reform, the new government has
set other goals to improve black living conditions.
These include:
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? Increased funding of African education, health
care, and housing.
? Higher minimum wages and improved working
conditions for Zimbabwe's 900,000 black wage
earners.
? More recruitment, training, and career advance-
ment of blacks, especially in the civil service.
? Increased participation of black workers in man-
agement decisions made in the private sector.
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Probably only preliminary steps will be taken in these
areas over the next six months.
23. Mugabe has so far announced only those eco-
nomic changes that will not seriously disrupt the
white-dominated, capitalist base of the economy. With
Zimbabwe in the midst of a two-year drought, Mugabe
probably will not risk seriously antagonizing white
commercial farmers. If he is able to consolidate his
hold on the government, Mugabe could change his
course, especially if he felt that the white community
and the West had not been sufficiently forthcoming in
underwriting land and social reforms benefiting the
black majority.
THE MILITARY
24. One of Mugabe's most urgent tasks is to estab-
lish government control over an armed population?
including almost 100,000 uneasy and, for the most
part, idle guerrillas, security forces, paramilitary
groups, and other Zimbabweans who are located
throughout the country and in Mozambique and Zam-
bia. Failure to accomplish this quickly risks upheaval
and a resumption of hostilities. If and when it is
done?and there are many pitfalls?Zimbabwe's lead-
er can then turn to the longer run issue of reorganizing
the military as a bona fide defense force.
25. Mugabe's plans for integrating the two guerrilla
armies with the former government's security forces
are unclear and probably unformed. It may be pre-
sumed that the white-led Rhodesian Security Forces
(RSF) will provide the core around which the new
unified military establishment will be formed. But
there are limits on the speed and extent to which the
integration can take place. The 13,000- to 15,000-man
RSF (including air elements) cannot be rapidly ex-
panded to absorb all the guerrillas without exceeding
the capacities of trained personnel and physical
wherewithal, overburdening the economy, and fright-
ening whites.
26. Integrating all the guerrillas with the RSF
would create a force well beyond the security needs
and financial means of the country. Therefore, several
stopgap measures will probably be taken in combina-
' Rhodesian Security Forces 13,000-15,000
Rhodesian Paramilitary 12,000
Rhodesian Auxiliaries 16,000
ZANU 21,000-23,000
ZAPU 19,000-23,000
Police 8,000
Total 89,000-97,000
tion by the new government. Some "surplus" forces
could be:
? Demobilized. But, in view of other demands on
the economy, perhaps only a few thousand com-
batants can be returned immediately to civilian
life.
? Directed toward civic action. Guerrillas could
be returned to their former rural areas of oper-
ations to help repair war damage, reintroduce
basic services, and build an economic infrastruc-
ture.
? Assigned to paramilitary service. For example,
they could serve as border patrols in remote
areas, where they would not worry skittish
whites.
? Placed in reserve units. This would reduce the
service obligation of the current white reservists.
27. The role and organization of the new Zimbab-
wean Army will reflect Mugabe's need to accommo-
date conflicting political pressures?from the whites,
Nkomo's former army, and Mugabe's own military
commanders. The chain of command is likely to
extend from Mugabe, as Defense Minister, through
General Walls and his guerrilla counterparts to field
commanders and their troops. Reportedly, these three
men will form a joint collegial command with Walls as
chairman. We expect Mugabe eventually to assert
more direct authority over the military.
28. A fundamental difficulty in integrating the
three forces is their different structures. ZAPU's con-
ventionally trained units could be more easily inte-
grated with the RSF, but ZANU has been trained and
organized as a guerrilla force.
29. Mugabe will eliminate certain RSF units, such
as the counterinsurgency Selous scouts. Any change in
the RSF, however, may have to be made carefully
because of the whites' feeling that their security and
the country's economic stability depend on a reliable
security force.
30. The primary immediate role most likely to be
assigned to Zimbabwe's new military will be the
maintenance of internal security, for example, against
recalcitrant guerrillas. Mugabe will continue to rely on
trusted ZANU elements for his own security, while
looking to General Walls to establish the necessary
organizational framework for maintaining internal
order, defending the borders, and for integrating the
government and guerrilla forces.
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Peter Walls
31. The borders adjacent to Botswana and South
Africa will also probably be monitored by the new
Army. An effective border patrol is important now
because of potential insurgent activities by the African
National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress against
South Africa. Mugabe has announced he will support
these organizations politically and diplomatically, but
not militarily.
32. Mugabe probably perceives South Africa as the
primary threat to Zimbabwe. Eventually, he will need
to procure air defense systems, armor, artillery, and
both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. Because the
United Kingdom will assist in a military training
program, it and other Western states will be looked to
initially as primary sources for arms. Failure by the
West to respond satisfactorily would prompt Mugabe
to seek assistance elsewhere.
33. Joshua Nkomo may have no alternative to
integrating his ZAPU forces quickly, but he may insist
that his five conventionally trained battalions be kept
intact. Nkomo's concerns have some basis in the
probable ethnic composition of a new security force.
The Shonas, who are a majority in ZANU, are also
predominant in the RSF; whereas Nkomo's force is
predominantly Ndebele. He probably believes his
forces represent his only real leverage against Mugabe
for political gains in the future. A confrontation
between Mugabe and Nkomo could jeopardize inte-
gration. Mugabe will have to work hard to keep
Nkomo's cooperation by convincing him that ZAPU
will be treated fairly.
34. Many white officers and NCOs will probably
leave the military over the next six months. Their
reasons will vary from the inability to adjust to the
new realities of a black government to uncertainties
over promotion, pay, training, leadership, and morale.
The loss of their experience and expertise would delay
training and impede integration.
35. Mugabe may have trouble gaining acceptance
for the integration of forces by ZANU's rank and file,
who are prone to follow their own military command-
ers and not the leadership of the party. ZANU's
military arm is led by Rex Nhongo who, along with
Edgar Tekere, ZANU's Secretary General (now Minis-
ter of Manpower Development and Planning), may
not be favorably disposed toward full cooperation with
the white-led Rhodesian Security Forces. Although
both men are from minority subtribes of the Shona
ethnic group, they are strong personalities whose
disaffection could create problems during the integra-
tion process. But the Karanga, the largest subtribe of
the Shona ethnic group and the largest element in the
RSF and ZANU's army, would probably not support
Tekere and Nhongo. Therefore Mugabe will probably
be able to check opposition to integration from within
ZANU in the immediate future.
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
36. Zimbabwe's independence brings southern Afri-
ca closer to the pan-African goal of continental black
majority rule. Thus, it opens up a new, highly vola-
tile?perhaps revolutionary?era in the region. At the
same time, paradoxically, the end of the war in
Rhodesia has signaled a retrenchment in the region,
not only in Zimbabwe, but in Mozambique and Zam-
bia as well, as all three seek to repair the economic
damage and dislocations caused by the past five years
of warfare. Namibia remains the most urgent question
on the African liberation agenda, and we expect
Zimbabwe's independence to produce pressures on
both South Africa and SWAPO (Southwest African
People's Union) to resolve this issue relatively soon.
37. Statements made on 1 April at the summit
meeting in Lusaka of black southern African states
seemed to acknowledge this ambiguity. The leaders
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expressed their customary hostility to South Africa, but
also their intentions not to upset the vital economic
links with Pretoria, upon which their economies de-
pend. The nine agreed to work toward closer econom-
ic integration, however, to reduce their dependence on
South Africa in a counterconstellation to Pretoria's
own constellation, which seeks to expand its influence
over its neighbors.
38. Neither side has serious prospects for success in
the near term. Nor will the black southern Africans be
able to disengage economically from South Africa. But
the ideological commitment of many Africans to the
liberation of South Africa?reinforced by the clamor
from the Soviets and their clients and from exiled
South African nationalists?often outweighs practical
considerations and should not be underestimated.
39. In consequence, Zimbabwe will be buffeted by
cross-pressures to maintain its links with Pretoria and
to support a new Frontline 2 economic and political
association. Mugabe's victory and Zimbabwe's proxim-
ity to South Africa will make him the cynosure for
African nationalists in exile and for sympathizers
outside the region. The two liberation groups?Pan
Africanist Congress and the African National Con-
gress?the OAU (Organization of African Unity), and
states such as Nigeria and Tanzania will all expect
Mugabe to support the cause.
40. However much he may sympathize with the
South African liberation groups, Mugabe will try to
avoid antagonizing Pretoria. Zimbabwe's economy de-
pends heavily upon South African investment, trade,
road and rail links, and port facilities. Economic
dislocations in Mozambique will keep landlocked Zim-
babwe dependent upon South African entrepot facili-
ties for at least several years.
41. Mugabe has publicly sketched the outlines of an
accommodation with Pretoria, based on mutual nonin-
terference. He has promised to honor Zimbabwe's
$525 million debt, and has to
persuade Pretoria to resume the substantial financial
subsidies that it had been providing Salisbury in recent
years. Mugabe is likely to hold to these policies over
the next six months, at least, notwithstanding his
commitment to or pressures from other Africans to
support South African liberation. Outside the region,
Zimbabwe has joined the Commonwealth and applied
The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, and Zambia.
for membership in the Lome Convention as well as
the OAU and UN.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
42. The Soviets, who had contributed heavily to
Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU since the 1960s, were stunned
by Robert Mugabe's clear-cut electoral victory. De-
spite ZAPU's participation in the government, the
Soviets are unlikely to be able to capitalize on their
link to ZAPU as long as Mugabe exercises a firm hold
on power. For the moment, Moscow's goal is to recoup
its position by portraying the Mugabe victory as a
triumph for the entire Patriotic Front, and thus shared
by Nkomo, and by emphasizing the need for contin-
ued ZANU-ZAPU cooperation. Over the longer term,
the Soviets will try to reduce Western and Chinese
influence in Zimbabwe.
43. Moscow hopes to establish a diplomatic pres-
ence in Salisbury. It will also probably attempt to build
some bilateral links, most likely by offering scholar-
ships, cultural and sport exchanges, and, perhaps, by
trying to open avenues such as airline and news
offices. Moscow has indicated its willingness to extend
some military aid to the new Zimbabwean Govern-
ment. Mugabe is suspicious of the Soviets, particularly
because of their close relations with Nkomo, and will,
for the time being, resist a close Soviet relationship.
Moreover, too close an embrace could help trigger a
white and South African reaction. Moscow is using its
ties with the Frontline States to press for Mugabe's
comradeship, and it hopes that he will come to see the
utility of a Soviet link as a source of leverage on the
West.
44. The Soviets are still counting on their special
relationship with Nkomo and ZAPU's military arm to
assure them continued influence, especially as the
latter is folded into Zimbabwe's new security forces.
Over the last three years, the Soviets and Cubans have
trained an estimated 20,000 ZAPU recruits in Zambia,
Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba, and the USSR. Many have
received training in conventional tactics and weapons,
and the Soviets probably hope that these individuals
will help form the core of the new Zimbabwean
military's noncommissioned and junior officer corps.
Moscow has reportedly offered to provide training in
the USSR for the first group of ZAPU officers sched-
uled to be integrated into the new security forces.
3 A preferential trade and aid arrangement between the Euro-
pean Common Market and almost 60 African, Caribbean, and
Pacific developing countries.
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45. Although the Soviets may see their short-term
opportunities in Zimbabwe as somewhat limited, they
expect that Salisbury ultimately will join the Frontline
States' struggle for the liberation of South Africa. The
Soviets will be ready to provide military hardware and
training.
46. Mugabe invited the USSR, Romania, Yugosla-
via, Bulgaria, and Albania to Zimbabwe's independ-
ence ceremonies. His failure to invite East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia shows his re-
sentment of the Soviets and their allies for their lack of
direct support for ZANU and their close ties with
Nkomo. Romania and Yugoslavia have had good
relations with Mugabe and ZANU over the past few
years, providing training, small arms, medicines, and
other equipment. Mugabe has publicly stated his
intention to maintain these relationships and will look
to these two countries for continued support, which
they are likely to provide in modest amounts.
47. In view of Mugabe's past links with China,
Moscow is undoubtedly worried about an increased
Chinese role. Beijing and Moscow have already traded
accusations on who is trying to destabilize Zimbabwe.
Moscow may be overly concerned?in the last year of
the insurgency, the Chinese refused to increase aid to
ZANU and have said they have little real leverage over
Mugabe. Since last August, Beijing has supported
British negotiating efforts. Even before the election
the Chinese said they would not support Mugabe if he
lost and decided to return to the bush. At the moment,
in view of their limited resources, the Chinese appar-
ently see their best option as encouraging regional
stability in order to prevent an increase in Soviet
influence.
48. Iraq has recently provided considerable assist-
ance to Nkomo's ZAPU. We do not believe that
Mugabe would be constrained from accepting direct
aid, in spite of Baghdad's earlier partiality, particu-
larly if it were offered in substantial quantities and
shorn of Soviet ties, as has been Iraq's recent practice
in the Third World. Saudi Arabia and other moderate
Arab states are also likely to be approached for
assistance.
49. Mugabe and other Zimbabwean nationalists
have held the United Kingdom?and by association,
much of the West?responsible for the country's
unhappy history. Until the election, Mugabe regarded
British efforts to solve the crisis as highly biased
against ZANU. But he seems to be willing to put aside
past grievances, now that the British have transferred
power to him. More important, Mugabe is looking to
the West for aid and investment and appears to
recognize its importance to Zimbabwe's economic
development. For their parts, the United Kingdom
and South Africa?with at least $200 million and an
estimated $1 billion in investments, respectively, in
Zimbabwe?have a stake in the peaceful development
of the country. US investment in Zimbabwe amounts
to approximately $105 million. The importance of
access to Zimbabwean chrome, gold, and other strate-
gic minerals enhances Zimbabwe's significance to the
West, as does its critical location and potential impor-
tance in the region.
US INTERESTS
50. Apart from the importance of access to strategic
minerals and a relatively modest, private investment,
US interest in Zimbabwe is largely indirect. That is,
the United States desires peace and stability in south-
ern Africa both to enhance its own economic, diplo-
matic, and possibly strategic access to the region, and
also to deny the Soviet Union opportunities for adven-
turism. Prolonged stability in Zimbabwe could provide
a positive example to South Africa and facilitate the
search for a peaceful settlement in Namibia.
51. Zimbabwe, rich in resources, already a trans-
portation hub, and with a relatively highly diversified
economy, stands to play an important role in southern
Africa. It may come to exercise influence over its
African neighbors, and, depending upon the character
of that influence, the region could develop moderately
and peaceably or move toward more radical economic
experimentation and anti-Western external policies.
Hence, Zimbabwe's importance to the United States
resides not only in itself, but in its potential influence
over the several nations that constitute the southern
third of Africa.
CONTINGENCIES
52. A number of contingencies?for example, the
assassination of Mugabe, or an outbreak of fighting
among the guerrillas that escalated to widespread
conflict?could occur over the next six months and
upset the fragile political balance in Zimbabwe. Such
events are possible, but not predictable. Some of the
situations that might begin to develop during the near
term, but probably not culminate until some time
later, are considered below. Their impact would be
substantial, would force a change in our assessments,
and bear watching.
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53. White Flight. Few whites appear to have left
Zimbabwe because of Mugabe's election, but many of
those remaining may only be marking time. When,
inevitably, Mugabe pushes for more jobs, higher
wages, and expanded social services for blacks, the less
adaptable whites may begin to leave. If Mugabe
inaugurates programs that impinge more deeply on
white perquisites and security?for example, workers'
participation in management and accelerated African-
ization of the security forces?a second wave may go.
White emigration could begin to gather impetus. Not
only would this hurt the favorable short-term eco-
nomic prospects, upon which the judgments of this
memorandum are based, but foreign (especially South
African) investors and aid donors might conclude that
their cautious optimism and support was misplaced,
and they could begin to scale down their help.
54. Nkomo Goes Into Opposition. Nkomo report-
edly is deeply depressed at his political eclipse and the
stripping from his ministry of police intelligence and
rural administration functions. He undoubtedly real-
izes that the longer Mugabe holds power, the firmer
his grip on it is likely to become. Moreover, once
Nkomo's army is demobilized or integrated, his re-
course to armed force would be lessened. Although we
doubt that he intends to make an armed bid for power
at this time, he might seek to take advantage of
Mugabe's problems and divisions within ZANU to
forge an alliance with the whites and disenchanted
blacks. He might, therefore, seek to stall integration of
his army, envisioning a need for such forces in an
ambiguous political situation. Even the hint of such
intentions would undermine Mugabe's current concil-
iatory policies, and could lead to civil war.
55. Mugabe Turns to Moscow. We have discussed
elsewhere the possible consequences of Mugabe's dis-
appointment if Western aid and investment do not
bring immediate advantages to Zimbabwe's black
population. Conversely, Mugabe will be alert to what
he would perceive to be selling out Zimbabwe's inde-
pendence by too great a dependency on the West and
South Africa. Hence, possibly within the next six
months, Mugabe may seek to demonstrate his inde-
pendence of the West in some gesture to Moscow, both
to placate his own radical wing and to be in a position
eventually to obtain Soviet aid. Those who distrust
Mugabe would find their doubts vindicated. An ad-
verse Western reaction could, much like white disen-
chantment, become self-reinforcing and lead to hostil-
ity and a break, leaving Mugabe no option but to seek
closer ties to Moscow.
56. Deterioration in Zimbabwean-South African
Relations. Notwithstanding Mugabe's intention to
avoid antagonizing South Africa, his sympathy for
liberation groups and the pull exerted by the potential
new regional counterconstellation?in which Zim-
babwe would play an important role?could adversely
affect relations between the two nations. Each side
will be wary of the other and might misinterpret or
exaggerate otherwise innocuous behavior. Pretoria has
a number of ways to put pressure on Salisbury?
withholding budgetary support or impeding the trans-
port of Zimbabwean goods. If the ANC and PAC were
to use or transit Zimbabwean territory for military
purposes?even against Mugabe's wishes?Pretoria
would not hesitate to mount punitive or "hot pursuit"
expeditions against their bases.
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