BREAKFAST WITH SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400070005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Acting Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senator Arlen Specter (R., PA)
1. You will host Senator Specter for breakfast at 8 AM on
Tuesday, 26 July. Dick Kerr, Dick Stolz and of the 25X1
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Office of Congressional Affairs will join you. At t
Senator's request, his Intelligence Committee staffer,
will also attend. This breakfast is at our 25X1
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2. Senator Specter began serving on the Senate
Intelligence Committee in January 1985. Either Senator Specter
or Senator Murkowski will become Vice Chairman of the Committee
when Senator Cohen's term expires in 1991. Senator Murkowski
has the option of becoming Vice Chairman of the Intelligence
Committee or retaining his Ranking Minority status on Veterans
Affairs.
3. With the Panama hearing scheduled for Tuesday afternoon
(Stolz, Kerr, Armacost, and Armitage will brief the Committee),
the Senator may well bring up that issue. Talking points are
attached.
4. After consultation with Senator Specter's staff, we
believe an appropriate key topic for this breakfast would be
discussion of his requests to use classified information to
indict and prosecute suspected terrorists and to declassify
intelligence data to inform foreign leaders about terrorist
activities of the PLO. You may wish to draw from the attached
background paper and talking points covering those issues.
Senator Specter is also interested in the chemical/
biological nuclear threat from missiles available in the Middle
East. Talking points on that issue are attached.
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5. On 20 June, Senator Specter sent you the attached
letter requesting fact sheets summarizing the evidence of
Arafat's role in international terrorism. The fact sheets
would be used to inform foreign officials about Arafat's
activities. This request was prompted by Senator Specter's
trip to Yugoslavia last winter during which Yugoslav officials
professed no knowledge of Arafat's involvement in terrorist
activities and made positive statements about Arafat and the
PLO. We have not responded to this letter. This breakfast
discussion will serve as our response.
6. We have included talking points on the generic question
of whether to reveal intelligence sources in a criminal
prosecution. Because the subject of the Arafat prosecution is
so contentious, you may find them useful in guiding the
discussion to a more philosophical plane. Both Dick Kerr and
Dick Stolz can discuss the facts of Arafat's involvement in
terrorist activities and problems with using intelligence
information, Agency officers and agents as witnesses in a trial
of Yasser Arafat or another terrorist.
2
TOP SECRET
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25 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Arafat item to be Discussed at Tomorrow's Specter Breakfast
1. I am a bit concerned about the talking points that you have been
given on Arafat's involvement with terrorism. I think we can conclude, based
on intelligence information, that Arafat has been involved in major terrorist
acts including the assassination of our ambassador and DCM in Sudan and the
Achille Lauro. The information we have is reasonably persuasive that he had a
personal involvement in these instances and his senior lieutenants were also
clearly involved.
2. I believe our argument with Specter is not unlike the argument
surrounding the issue of Noriega's involvement in drugs -- intelligence
information is often not the kind of evidence required to obtain a conviction
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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SECRET
Sharing Intelligence on Terrorism with Foreign Governments
I am aware of your longstanding interest in the problems of
international terrorism and your particular focus on efforts to bring
international terrorists to justice. As you may know, the magnitude of the
terrorism problem caused the Agency in February 1986 to create a
C nterterrorist Centex-comprised of officers from all four Directorates to
bring eir expertise to bear on this issue.
Through the efforts of the Center, in close cooperation with US law
enforcement agencies and friendly foreign governments, a number of
international terrorists are now behind bars.
We have an aggressive program of shag ring sensitive intelligence
information on terrorists and their activities with foreign liaison
services, and, through the Department of State, with other senior foreign
officials. Some of these relationships are longstanding, but many are
fragile, fledgling efforts with governments long resistant to sharing their
information about terrorists with us.
o It is a new experience for some of these liaison services to share
data internationally when traditionally it is not shared
internally with other parts of their own governments.
o Public release of information provided both by other liaison
services and by our own unilateral sources seriously jeopardizes
these relationships, often results in loss of access to further
information, and may result in the imprisonment or death of
sources.
o The Agency must protect the sources and methods of its collection
efforts from public disclosure.
In our experience, unclassified fact sheets have not proven effective
in changing foreign government attitudes towards terrorism or its
perpetrators. Quiet, but persistent, diplomatic efforts and official
intelligence exchanges with foreign intelligence services have, however,
borne increased cooperation and some notable successes in bringing
terrorists to justice.
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o Despite praise heaped on Arafat by some of the Eastern European
and Middle Eastern leaders with whom you have spoken, they have,
b men apprised of US government views ey~dence_ omega., ar d~*a$._`
in erns ional terrorist activities of individuals and groups
with n he-PLO framework"
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SECRET
Senator Arlen Specter has been seeking information from the Agency
since December 1985 that could be used in a US court of law to indict Yasir
Arafat for his role in international terrorism. Specifically, he has
sought evidence related to Arafat's personal role in the assassinations at
the Munich Olympics in 1972, the 1973 killings of the US Ambassador and DCM
in Khartoum, and the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking. Each solicitation has
included requests for detailed information on our sources of information
and for an unclassified version of the data.
evidence that Arafat personally planned or ordered the execution of the
terrorist incidents in question--or of any other international terrorist
Despite the Senator's conviction to the contrary, we have no conclusive
The Senator has received comprehensive written and verbal responses to
his requests but continues to be dissatisfied with both the CIA analysis of
the evidence and our refusal to release it for his use with domestic and
foreign audiences:
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err ~r,c,xr:r
o Briefings were presented on 25 and 31 March by NESA and CTC
officers. Despite hostile interrogation of the briefers during
the first session, no information was withheld and following
guidelines provided by NE Division, descriptions of the sensitive
sources and their access were provided. The briefers were advised
that the Senator would formally request the Agency make its
information available for domestic and foreign release.
o On 20 June, the Senator once again requested unclassified fact
sheets summarizing evidence of Arafat's role in international
terrorism.
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 ARLCN art.. I tK
JUDICIARY
PENNSYLVANIA APPRnPRIATIf1NS
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INTELLIGENCE
united states I$enate
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
June 20, 1988
On March 25 and 31, 1988, I was briefed by CIA Analysts on
the role of Yasser Arafat and the, PLO;.in international
!terrorism.
I have been motivated in this review by the lack of
knowledge among leaders and officials in European and Middle
East countries of the role which Arafat has played either
directly or indirectly in the planning and managing of criminal
acts of terrorism as an instrument of PLO policy.
The briefings I received were most helpful in helping me
understand the deta' laps and'acts and I
would like to thank for
their efforts in summarizing those details. But, providing
classified information to a Senator does not satisfy the need
to inform foreign leaders and officials on what we know.
Unless they are better informed we cannot expect their
cooperation in thwarting terrorists.
I am therefore requesting that fact sheets be prepared
which would summarize the evidence and other indications, for
use with foreign officials of the role Arafat has played in
international terrorism.
Arkin Specter
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Intelligence Information & Criminal Prosecutions
The conflict between protecting intelligence information
and prosecuting violations of law is an old yet ever-present
one. Not susceptible to easy solutions, it's usually best
dealt with on case-by-case basis. Often, especially difficult
cases have to be resolved at the highest levels of the
government.
The problem occurs when two constitutional duties of the
Executive Branch come into conflict: the duty to enforce the
laws of the United States and the duty to provide for the
national security (i.e., foreign relations and national
defense) of the United States, of which the collection and
protection of intelligence information are part.
The issue is often further complicated by differing
perceptions of a "source". Generally speaking, the law
enforcement community sees a source as something to be revealed
in order to successfully prosecute a criminal case while the
intelligence community views a source as something to be
protected in order that it might continue to provide
information.
Despite these tensions, there have been positive
developments in the area. The passage of the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) substantially reduced the
problem of "graymail" which theretofore had been an obstacle to
prosecutions involving classified information. The requirement
in Executive Order 12333 (and its predecessor) to report
violations of law to the Department of Justice avoids the
situation where intelligence information concerning suspected
violations remains "bottled up" in intelligence channels.
Often this allows prosecutors to develop alternative means of
pursuing the crime.
In many cases, the competing interests can be reconciled.
In the few cases, however, a decision must be made on whether
or not to release intelligence information. We seek to protect
the information for several reasons. First and foremost,
revelation obviously "blows" the source, thereby depriving the
United States of that information which usually cannot be
easily or inexpensively replaced. Revelation of a source can
present foreign relations problems: creating/exacerbating
problems with particular countries and/or making more difficult
future intelligence collection. Revelation of a source makes
recruitment of future sources more difficult.
We realize this is a difficult area and we cooperate with
the Department of Justice to reconcile areas of conflict where
possible.
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BIOGRAPHY
Name: Arlen Specter (R., PA.)
First elected: 1980 Up for re-election: 1992 Winning %: 56
Past service on intelligence committee: Yes: No: X
Current service on intelligence committee: Yes: X No:
Term on intelligence committee expires: 1993
Other committee assignments: Judiciary
Veterans Affairs Appropriations
Major intelligence/legislative interests: Terrorism
Middle East Issues
Key votes: Boren/Cohen--YES
February Contra Aid Vote--NO
Last contact with DCI/DDCI: DDCI Courtesy Call 5 February 1987
Recent correspondence: 20 June Letter Requesting Declassification
of Information on Yasser Arafat and PLO terrorist Activities
STAT
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Arlen Specter (R)
Of Philadelphia - Elected 1980
Born: Feb. 12, 1930, Wichita. Kan.
Education: U. of Pennsylvania, B.A. 1951; Yale U.,
LL.B. 1956.
Military Career. Air Force, 1951-53-
Occupation; Lawyer; law professor.
Family: Wife, Joan Levy; two children.
Religion: Jewish.
Political Career. Philadelphia district attorney, 1966-
74; GOP nominee for mayor of Philadelphia, 1967;
defeated for re-election as district attorney, 1973;
sought GOP nomination for U.S. Senate, 1976;
sought GOP nomination for governor, 1978.
Capitol Office: 303 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-4254.
In Washington: Specter is an intense,
abrasive individualist whose style seems to re-
flect his years as prosecutor and candidate in
Philadelphia's tough political wars. He is a
loner in the Senate, both in personal and politi-
cal terms.
A former Democrat, he is regularly at odds
with the Reagan administration and the con-
servative GOP mainstream. In the Senate dur-
ing 1986, Specter opposed the President's posi-
tion 65 percent of the time and went against a
majority of Republicans in two out of every
three votes. No other GOP senator came close
to matching that record of independence.
Specter is rarely part of any organized
group; with his individualistic style and tem-
peramental personality, he generally seems to
prefer striking out on his own. Though he often
agrees with the moderate Republicans who
have organized to defend social programs
against Reagan-proposed cutbacks, Specter has
not helped lead that group.
Even when he does go along with the
Reagan administration, Specter takes care to
cultivate his self-reliant image. That was
clearly shown in early 1985, when he found
himself a key undecided vote on the Reagan-
backed MX missile.
Originally opposed to the MX, Specter
gradually grew more sympathetic to it as a
bargaining chip for arms-control negotiations
with'the Soviets. But shortly before the crucial
vote, his incipient change of mind was stalled
when White House aides began hinting that
Republicans who did not back Reagan on key
issues would be denied White House help in
fund raising for 1986.
Outraged by the apparent threat to his
political independence, Specter angrily con-
fronted Reagan at a meeting with GOP Sena.
tors. Finally, Specter did back the missile, but
only after publicly vowing not to accept any
campaign help from the president.
Although his go-it-alone manner and reluc-
tance to trade favors may sometimes damage
his prospects for legislative success, Specter has
no apologies for the way he operates. "They
can't say I'm dumb or crooked, so what do they
say?" he once asked a reporter. "That I'm
calculating or ambitious? I have always thought
those were good qualities."
During the 99th Congress, Specter was
extremely ambitious in opposing one of the
Reagan administration's pet projects - selling
federally owned Conrail to private industry.
When the Department of Transportation ad.
wised Congress to accept Norfolk Southern's
$1.2 billion offer for the national freight sys-
tem. Specter called it "the biggest giveaway
since the Dutch obtained Manhattan Island
from the Indians."
Specter's concern was not only Uncle
Sam's pocketbook; it was the shipping costs of
his constituents. He and several other senators
from states served by Conrail and Norfolk
Southern worried that a merger of the two
would stifle competition and drive up the price
of shipping by rail.
Even though the Judiciary Committee had
no formal jurisdiction over the Conrail sale.
Specter used his seat on the panel to pressure
the Justice Department into studying whether
the merger would violate antitrust laws. When
a department official testified that he saw no
problems, Specter persistently grilled the bu-
reaucrat, rebuffing Chairman Strom Thur-
mond's efforts to go on to other matters.
With filibuster threats, opponents of the
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sale dissuaded the Senate from considering it in
the December 1985 rush toward adjournment.
That delay and subsequent strong resistance to
the sale in the House played a part in Norfolk
Southern withdrawing its purchase offer in
1986. Instead of merging Conrail with another
company, the government finally decided to
keep it intact and sell stock in the company to
private investors.
As chairman of the Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Juvenile Justice when Republicans con-
trolled the Senate, Specter resisted Reagan
proposals to eliminate the Office of Juvenile
Justice within the Justice Department. "The
real thrust ought to be expansion of juvenile
justice programs as opposed to contraction," he
said in 1985. "There are a lot of problems
involving juveniles that are going unanswered."
Reagan wanted states to take over the
functions of the office, but with an array of
groups supporting its continuation - from the
National Governors' Association to the Girl
Scouts of America - funding for the office
continued.
On the theory that young people are less
likely to turn to crime if they earn high-school
diplomas, Specter has urged that the federal
government play a role in curbing the high-
school dropout rate. A bill to do that was
approved by the House in the 99th Congress,
but Specter could not move similar legislation
in the Senate because of a provision calling for
pregnant teenagers to receive counseling. Abor-
tion opponents feared the counseling might
encourage the termination of pregnancies.
On most social issues, Specter is allied with
the liberal Democrats on Judiciary. He opposes
legislative efforts to curb busing and abortion,
and is against a constitutional amendment to
allow voluntary school prayer. In fact, Specter's
most conspicuous role on Judiciary in the 99th
Congress was as a crucial defector from the
GOP in several highly publicized votes on
presidential appointees who were opposed by
civil rights groups.
Republicans held a 10-8 advantage on Ju-
diciary, but they lost Specter and Republican
Charles McC. Mathias Jr. on the votes to
endorse William Bradford Reynolds to be asso-
ciate attorney general; Daniel A. Manion to be
a federal appeals judge; and Jefferson B. Ses-
sions to be a federal district judge.
After voting against each man, Specter
then rejoined GOP ranks and voted to send the
nominations to the Senate without recommen-
dation. That second step may have annoyed as
many Republicans as it appeased; some said
Specter was pleasing no one by trying to please
everyone. Of the three nominations, only
Arlen Specter, R-Pa.
Manion's made it to the floor and was ap-
proved.
On two other nominations of vital concern
to Reagan, Specter went along, backing Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist to be chief justice of the
United States and Antonin Scalia to be a
member of the Supreme Court.
Specter has used his Judiciary assignment
and his seat on the Appropriations Subcommit-
tee on Foreign Operations to call attention to
the plight of Pennsylvania's struggling "Rust
Belt" industries.
On Appropriations. Specter has voiced
skepticism about giving U.S. aid to interna-
tional agencies that lend money to countries
whose subsidized industries compete with U.S.
manufacturers. "It's very hard to support for-
eign aid or contributions to the World Bank
given the economic climate in western Pennsyl-
vania in the steel mills and the coal mines,"
Specter said in 1986.
The Foreign Operations Subcommittee
also affords Specter a platform to voice his
strong support for Israel. When the administra-
tion defended its 1986 proposal to sell arms to
Saudi Arabia by saying the country had worked
"quietly" for peace in the Middle East, Specter
retorted, "It's been inaudible as far as this
senator is concerned."
On one issue in the 99th Congress, Spec-
ter's interest in foreign affairs, his prosecutorial
background and his penchant for attracting
publicity all converged. In 1985, as the nation
watched news broadcasts of TWA passengers
being held hostage in Lebanon, Specter won
notice by proposing a bill to give U.S. courts
the authority to try anyone who murders or
seriously assaults U.S. citizens abroad. In 1986,
the Senate approved Specter's plan, which he
had first offered after the bombing of Marine
barracks in Lebanon in 1983.
At Home: Democrats began the 1986 cam-
paign hopeful that they could defeat Specter
and end their 24-year drought in Pennsylvania
Senate elections. They ended the year buried
under the third-largest landslide in the state in
the last half-century.
Specter won with money, high name recog-
nition and the type of moderate Republican
image that has enabled GOP candidates to
monopolize recent Keystone state Senate elec-
tions. A spectacularly unsuccessful fall cam-
paign by his Democratic rival, Rep. Bob Edgar,
enabled Specter to win big.
A liberal from the Philadelphia suburbs,
Edgar seemed miscast for a statewide race in
heavily blue-collar and ethnic Pennsylvania.
But from his first House victory in 1974 to his
narrow win in the Democratic Senate primary,
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Pennsylvanio - Junior Senator
he was able to combine an ardent grass-roots
organization with a thoughtful and non-threat-
ening persona to defeat a string of opponents
who underestimated him. State Auditor Gen-
eral Don Bailey, Edgar's victim in the Senate
primary, was one who took Edgar too lightly:
Specter was not.
An intense campaigner, Specter by No-
vember 1986 had amassed a multimillion-dollar
campaign treasury that. far exceeded Edgar's.
and he claimed to have visited each of Pennsyl-
vania's 67 counties at least four times.
Specter cleared a big hurdle long before he
ever faced Edgar. During the fall of 1985,
popular GOP Gov. Dick Thornburgh had
weighed a primary challenge to Specter,. but
decided in December not to run. If Thornburgh
had run, he might have beaten Specter. But
against Edgar, Specter had surprisingly few
problems.
Edgar sought to portray him as a flip-
flopper who claimed to be independent but
actually supported the Reagan administration
on key issues. But with superior financing.
Specter was able to emphasize his political
moderation and dominate the airwaves with
skillfully crafted, locally targeted ads that illus-
trated how he had steered federal money into
the state from his Appropriations Committee
post.
Edgar's hopes for an upset depended on
geography. His goal was to neutralize Specter
in the metropolitan Philadelphia area, hold
down the normal Republican advantage in ru-
ral central Pennsylvania, and then win the
election in the traditionally Democratic coal
and steel country of western Pennsylvania.
But Specter blunted Edgar virtually every-
where. He won 61 counties, including Allegheny
(the centerpiece of western Pennsylvania) and
Delaware (Edgar's base in the Philadelphia
suburbs). Even Philadelphia gave Edgar only a
60,000-vote majority.
For Specter, the impressive victory added
luster to a political career that seemed on the
verge of expiring just six years earlier. To some
in Pennsylvania, Specter's 1980 Senate cam-
paign seemed like the last gasp of a fading
politician. Once the bright young star of Penn-
sylvania GOP politics, he had lost. much of his
appeal following defeats for mayor of Philadel-
phia in 1967 and for re-election as the city's
district attorney in 1973. When he lost two
more statewide primaries, in 1976 and 1978, it
appeared that his triumphs were behind him.
But he decided to make one more try when
Republican Richard S. Schweiker announced
he would leave the Senate in 1981.
Although Specter's past campaigns had
given him greater statewide exposure than any
other GOP candidate, he was thought to be
laden with too much baggage even to win the
nomination over Bud Haabestad, the state
GOP chairman.
But Haabestad, Thornburgh's hand-
picked state chairman, was disliked by orga-
nization Republicans. Thornburgh had abol-
ished much of the traditional GOP patronage
system in Pennsylvania, and Haabestad had
borne the bad tidings to Republican workers.
This issue allowed Specter to win the primary.
In the general election, Specter had the
good fortune of running against a Democrat
who was also a two-time statewide loser -
former Pittsburgh Mayor Pete Flaherty. Im-
mensely popular in the western part of the
state. Flaherty had suffered in the past from a
tendency to run his statewide campaigns on his
own, disdaining modern campaign organization
and financing. In 1980, determined not to make
the same mistake, he put more effort into
building a statewide network.
It was not enough. Thornburgh and Heinz
agreed to support Specter after the primary,
and with their help, he made inroads on
Flaherty's territory in western Pennsylvania.
At the same time, Flaherty could not overcome
the longstanding suspicion of him in the Phila-
delphia area. Specter carried Philadelphia by
12,000 votes and won immense margins in the
Philadelphia suburbs, enough to offset
Flaherty's showing in the west.
Specter's roots in Philadelphia politics
reach back to the early 1960s, when he was an
assistant district attorney making a name for
himself among Democrats as a hard-working
young reformer. After a stint with the Warren
Commission, where he was chief author of the
theory that a single bullet hit both Kennedy
and Texas Gov. John B. Connally, he returned
to conduct an investigation of Philadelphia's
judicial system for the state attorney general.
In 1965, he released a report calling the
system a "cesspool" of corruption. The same
year he challenged his former boss, James
Crumlish, for district attorney. When Crumlish
was renominated by the Democrats, Specter
ran as a Republican and won.
Two years later, Specter took on Mayor
James Tate directly. The Democratic Party
had been split by feuds between machine regu-
lars and reformers, and the mayor seemed in no
shape to fight off a concerted GOP challenge.
Specter and his "clean government" campaign
were expected to romp.
They did not. Tate, rejected by the orga-
nization, nonetheless won the Democratic
nomination easily. Then, as riots were breaking
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out in other cities, he and his new police chief,
Frank Rizzo, clamped a "limited emergency"
on the city to prevent disturbances. Specter
could not prevent Tate from riding voters'
gratitude to a narrow victory.
By 1973, as he completed his second term
in the district attorney's office, Specter was
considered the favorite candidate-in state GOP
circles to wrest the statehouse from Democrats
the following year. But the speculation ended
abruptly when he lost his campaign for a third
term as district attorney that fall.
Specter announced he was going into. pri-
vate law practice, and for the first time in over
a decade, his name left the front pages. It did
not take long to resurface. In 1976 he entered
the GOP primary to replace retiring Sen. Hugh
Scott. The front-runner in the contest was
then- Rep. Heinz, whose tremendous financial
resources gave him a clear edge. But Heinz had
been hurt by disclosures that he had received
illegal contributions from the Gulf Oil Com-
pany, an issue Specter kept alive throughout
Committees
Arlen Specter, R-Pa.
the campaign. At the end of a bitter contest
that kept relations between the two delicate for
years, Heinz scraped past Specter.
In 1978, with Democrat Milton Shapp re-
tiring as governor, Specter tried for that office.
His chief rivals for the GOP nomination were
former U.S. Attorney David Marston, who had
been fired by the Carter administration earlier
in the year, and Thornburgh, a former assistant
attorney general in the Ford administration.
Although Marston was the best-known of
the three, he had no organization or funding; by
contrast, Specter was able to round up strong
financial and organizational backing from the
Republican Party in the Philadelphia area. But
Thornburgh, with equally strong support. in the
west, had that part of the state to himself,
while Marston and Specter vied for votes in the
east. Marston and a fourth candidate took
enough votes from Specter in Philadelphia's
suburban counties to help Thornburgh over the
top, forcing Specter to wait two more years to
realize his statewide ambitions.
Voting Studies
Appropriations (10th of 13 Republicans)
Presidential
Party Conservative
Military Construction (ranking); Agriculture Rural Development
and Water Development; Foreign
encies
Ener
and Related A
Support
Unity Coalition
gy
g
;
Operations: Labor. Health and Human Services, Education and
Year
S
0
S 0
S
0
Related Agencies.
1988
31
65
27
68
29
64
Judiciary (5th of 6 Republicans)
1985
61
34
51
43
58
37
Monopolies and Business
Constitution (ranking); Antitrust
1984
65
35
67
32
55.
45
,
Rights
1963
59
41
46
54
45
55
.
1982
55
44
50
49
40
59
Select Intelligence (5th of 7 Republicans)
1981
77
22
64
34
51
47
Vetarana' Affairs (5th of 5 Republicans)
S = Support
0
= Opposition
Key Votes
1986 General
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Y
Y
Arlen Specter (R)
1,906,537
(56M.)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Y
Bob Edgar (D)
1,448,219
(43%)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Y
1986 Primary
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Y
N
Arlen Specter (R)
434,623
(76%)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Y
Richard A. Stokes (R)
135,673
(24%)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Y
Previous Winning Parentage:
1980
(51%)
Interest Group Ratings
Campaign Finance
Year ADA ACU AFL-CIO
75 33 87
CCUS
44
Receipt, Expand*
Receipts from PACs itures
1966
Specter(R) $5,450,763 $1,256,626 (23%) $5,993,230
Edga'(D) $3,905,186 $793,871 (20%) $3,872.779
1986
1985 55 36 71 55
1984 50 36 45 68
1983 80 16 76 37
1982 70 26 56 35
1961 50 40 58 72
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 'STAT
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10
Ise,
PA
40P
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
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BREAKFAST WITH SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER
Tuesday, 26 July 1988, 8:00 a.m.
DCI Dining Room
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