LETTER TO DAVID L. BOREN FROM JOHN L. HELGERSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000300320008-0
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 17, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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Sgez,r; PY
(5C/9 / Fs/ /g53,2
SUBJECT:
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cenSir?Iteiligence Agency
WashingtoRDCW9M
OCA 88-1852
17 JUN 1988
The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
concerning the conflict in Angola. The enclosed answers to
your questions reflect our analysts' best judgments about
prospects for a negotiated settlement and associated issues.
We fully appreciate the complexity of this issue. We share
your concern that the conferees have the best possible
information as they consider the issue during the upcoming
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1989.
This reply is also being sent to the Vice Chairman.
Enclosure
as stated
Distribution
Origina - Adse
- Executive Registry
1 - DiOCA
1 - OCA Registry
1 - RR Chrono
OCA:Senate:RR:sf (9 June 88)
qinr,prplv
John L. Helge-Lson
Dir tor of Congressional Affairs
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9 June 1988
RESPONSE TO SSCI QUESTIONS ON ANGOLA BY NIO FOR AFRICA
AND CIA'S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The long-term track record of the negotiations and reporting on
both infighting within the MPLA and with the Cubans indicate that
the MPLA and Cuba would prefer a straightforward military victory
over UNITA that involves no deals, compromises, or negotiations.
Serious consideration of a negotiated settlement that links a Cuban
troop withdrawal to implementation of UN 435 and a South African
withdrawal from Namibia, hinges on the perception in Luanda that
UNITA's strength and backing makes an outright military victory too
costly. In Luanda's view, there will be a net improvement in its
position if UNITA can be seriously weakened by a withdrawal of
outside support--primarily South African--even if there is some
trade off in loss of Cuban support.
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Has the Intelligence Community been tasked by the
administration to report on.. .Cuban political, diplomatic, and
military intentions...MPLA negotiating strategy and MPLA-Cuban
relationship...South African intentions toward withdrawal from
Namibia and Angola.. .Soviet political, military, and diplomatic
intentions? What are the results?
As part of a southern Africa policy review in early 1987, the
NSC tasked the Intelligence Community to produce several
assessments, including:
-- Soviet and Cuban objectives and likely courses of action in
southern Africa over the next two years; and
-- Prospects for the Angolan civil war over the next year.
In response, under the auspices of the NIO for Africa,
Memoranda to Holders of existing estimates were issued:
SNIE 71-86, Prospects for the Angolan Civil War in 1987
February 1987, concluded that neither side likely would gain
a decisive advantage and that the Angolan government's
concentration on a military solution underestimated UNITA's
political and military strengths and South Africa's
commitment, making movement toward reconciliation with UNITA
very unlikely.
NIE 11/70-85, Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in
Southern Africa Through 1988 (S), February 1987, concluded
that the Soviets and Cubans will continue actively to pursue
their goals in the region and are probably willing to
escalate their support to the Angolan government to contain'
the UNITA threat.
Often, the Intelligence Community does not wait for specific
tasking but responds to what are generally regarded as key
intelligence issues. In anticipation of policymaker requirements,
for instance, the NIO for Africa initiated IIM 87-10007, Namibia:
Prospects for a Solution, July 1987, which concluded that prospects
are bleak for an internationally recognized Namibian independence
settlement during the next five years, primarily because South
Africa will not agree to a plan that it believes would allow SWAPO
to take power in Windhoek.
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Finally, in response to requests from the NSC and State
Department, the Intelligence Community issued NI SIIM 88-10001,
Angola: Implications of a Cuban Troop Withdrawal for the Military
Balance (C NF), January 1988. It concluded that neither the Angolan
government nor UNITA would likely gain a decisive advantage were a
plan implemented for Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola
and Namibia, respectively, but that UNITA would be the net gainer if
outside aid continued.
In addition to the above Intelligence Community efforts, the
separate agencies have each devoted considerable attention to
problems and prospects for negotiated settlements in the region.
The agencies for the most part have not received formal, written
taskings from policymakers for analysis on this subject which,
nonetheless, is a key topic in community day-to-day current
intelligence reporting and longer term analysis. Most products were
instead self-initiated or the result of informal discussions between
policymakers and intelligence managers. Efforts to anticipate and
respond to policymaker requirements figure in our formal tasking of
various intelligence collectors.
A complete listing of each Agency's analytic products on these
topics would be encyclopedic. Rather, a sampling follows:
State/INR has responded to policymaker requirements either in
the Secretary's Morning Summary or in Info Memos to senior
officials. For example:
South African Anti-SWAPO Military Operations in Angola,
January 1986. Pretoria builds up its anti-SWAPO campaigns
both to provide cover for its support of UNITA and to
justify its positions on UNSCR 435, which they would either
like to change or evade in the context of a regional
settlement.
Angola Negotiations, September 1987. Luanda has solid
reasons to want to negotiate seriously on CTW; Moscow and
Havana have good reasons to go along.
Angola: Cubans--Reluctant Internationalists, February 1988.
Havana has reinforced Luanda substantially, but appears
reluctant to become directly engaged in large-scale
fighting. So far, continued combat has not impeded progress
in CTW talks.
Angola: Maneuvering for Political and Military Advantage,
May 1988. Luanda and Havana believe Cuban reinforcements
have turned the tide but appear to recognize the need for a
political settlement. South Africa has responded
cautiously, but further fighting is likely as both sides
seek to turn battlefield strengths into political
advantages.
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-- Angola: Prospects for National Reconciliation, June 1988.
Despite the legacy of civil war and foreign involvement,
national reconciliation could occur and could take several
forms.
DIA in response to formal or informal requests has produced at
least seven papers and four briefings on these issues during the
past few years. In addition, it provided the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (ISA) with at least a dozen informal deskside
briefings. Beyond these contributions, DIA has issued several major
studies of relevance, among them:
Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications,
May 1986. The offensive was distinguished by a marked
increase in government military effectiveness (for example,
new weapons and tactics) and possibly greater Soviet and
Cuban involvement.
Angola: Air Defense Capabilities, November 1986. An
important element of Angola's strategy is an air defense
network in southern Angola designed to end South African air
superiority.
Cuban Military Involvement in Angola: Benefits Outweigh
Costs, December 1987.
Insurgency Force Study: UNITA, June 1988. UNITA has a wide
range of capabilities and has grown to at least 60,000
combatants.
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence has not been formally tasked
to report on these issues specifically, but they have been key
topics in its research program and longer term analysis as well as
day-to-day current reporting and briefings. For instance:
Angola: UNITA's Prospects in 1986, February 1986. Savimbi,
with his hopes of forcing Luanda into negotiations dimmed by
the 1985 government offensive, is prepared for a protracted
conflict. There is a growing danger that Soviet, Cuban, and
South African support to their clients in the offensive this
year may draw the outsiders into more direct conflict.
South Africa: Implications of Angolan Intervention,
December 1987. South Africa's military intervention at
Mavinga to help UNITA defeat the Angolan offensive may
presage more active support in the fdture. Pretoria
probably believes its actions have sent a clear message to
Western governments that a successfully negotiated
settlement requires South African approval.
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Angola: Dynamics Within the MPLA Leadership, March 1988.
Pervasive Soviet and Cuban influence in MPLA policymaking,
arising from their critical military assistance, limits
Angolan flexibility on foreign policy issues. MPLA
political dynamics will remain essentially unchanged over
the next year and probably constrain Luanda's ability to
implement or even propose a more flexible CTW timetable that
might satisfy South Africa.
Angola: More Cuban Troops Likely, May 1988. Cuban likely
will augment its forces in Angola, probably with an eye to
inducing South Africa to pursue negotiations seriously or
risk getting drawn more directly into the fighting. Castro
almost certainly has decided he must deal with Pretoria from
a position of strength.
USSR: Two-Track Approach on Angola, May 1988. Moscow has
been discussing possibilities for resolving the conflict in
Angola and Namibia with several countries, but it continues
to send enough military assistance to ensure the needs of
Angolan and Cuban forces. The Soviets are unlikely to push
Luanda and Havana to sign an agreement in the near term or
to press Angola to consider national reconciliation before a
settlement is achieved.
What tasking has the Intelligence Community received on South
African intentions toward withdrawal from Namibia and Angola? What
evidence is there of South African commitment to withdrawal from
Namibia and Angola? Beyond oral assurances? Is there any
intelligence reporting indicating specific discussions of withdrawal
plans?
Beyond the informal taskings for separate agencies mentioned
above, the Intelligence Community as a whole has not received
specific requests for analysis on South African intentions toward
withdrawal from Namibia and Angola. Evidence about South African
intentions on this matter is ambiguous and contradictory.
Intelligence Community analysts believe that recent participation in
international and bilateral talks suggests Pretoria has moved closer
than it has ever been toward agreeing to some formula for
withdrawal--but there is no compelling evidence that South Africa
will agree to implementation of UN Resolution 435 without extracting
significant concessions, particularly regarding withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola.
What are South Africa's minimum conditions concerning Angola
for implementing U.N. Resolution 435? Do these conditions go beyond
Cuban troop withdrawal? Has recent South African reiteration of
their commitment to U.N. Resolution 435 been interpreted as a new
and significant development?
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The recent deployment of Cuban troops near the Namibian border
has amplified South African desire for a complete Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola, but Pretoria would almost certainly ask that
additional conditions be met before it agreed to implement the UN
independence plan for Namibia. We believe the South African
government at a minimum would ask the Angolan government to agree to
a nonaggression pact--which would put an end to Luanda's support for
South-West Africa People's Organization and African National
Congress insurgents--before implementation of UN 435. Additionally,
Pretoria would probably press for some form of participation by
UNITA in the Luanda government as part of a settlement package. The
South Africans, in our view, may also insist on a pre-independence
constitutional framework for Namibia--which would provide guarantees
for minority (white) rights--or even a UN resolution affirming South
African sovereignty over Walvis Bay?an issue now deferred until
after Namibian independence. South Africa would probably also call
for some revisions of the ten year-old plan to accommodate internal
Namibian developments--such as the expansion of the South-West
Africa Territorial Force--not provided for when UN 435 was approved.
We would not characterize recent South African statements of
commitment for UN 435 as an important or significant departure from
previous policy. Since the passage of UN 435 in 1978, the South
African government has paid lipservice to the resolution but avoided
implementation by linking it to Cuban troop withdrawal. Pretoria,
however, has raised other objections to the UN plan, including
alleged UN bias toward SWAPO, and experimented with several internal
Namibian political structures in order to establish a government
capable of competing with SWAPO in UN-sponsored elections or running
the country if South Africa declared unilateral independence for
Namibia.
Is there intelligence reporting which suggests South Africa is
prepared to accept a settlement in which UNITA does not form part of
a new Angolan government? What intelligence is there on South
African support for UNITA participation in a government in Luanda?
Is such a power-sharing arrangement a realistic prospect?
We have no information which suggests that Pretoria is willing
to accept a final settlement of the Angolan situation without UNITA
participation. South African officials have consistently stated
that there can be no real settlement to the Angolan civil war
without national reconciliation. Pretoria, in our view, considers
UNITA's participation in a future Angolan government as its only
guarantee of a friendly neighbor.
A power-sharing arrangement between the MPLA government and
UNITA, especially one that includes UNITA President Savimbi, is
unlikely at this time, in our judgment. The MPLA leadership appears
unified in its rejection of reconciliation with UNITA because they
fear Savimbi's presence in a coalition government could jeopardize
their hold on power. We believe some Angolan officials may be
willing to negotiate with UNITA--but not Savimbi--to reach an
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accommodation. Such negotiations would probably be designed
primarily to sow discord within the insurgent group by suggesting
that a solution is possible if Savimbi relinquishes power.
What are P.W. Botha's long-term intentions and immediate plans
regarding South Africa's presence in Namibia and Angola? How do
these compare with those of the military and security forces? How
are they likely to be affected by further buildups and possible
escalations of combat between Cuban and South African forces along
the Angolan-Namibian border?
President Botha probably is content for now to pursue his
two-track policy of paying lipservice to UN 435 while working--
albeit ineffectively--toward the establishment of a credible interim
government capable of governing an independent Namibia or of
competing with SWAPO in UN-sponsored elections. Pretoria likely
sees its participation in the current round of negotiations as
prudent in light of the increased Cuban presence near the Namibian
border. We do not believe, however, that Botha is anxious to
implement the UN independence plan for Namibia, and he probably
would prefer to delink the timing for implementation of the UN
independence plan for Namibia from the Cuban troop withdrawal issue.
Despite the Cuban augmentation, South African forces continue
to operate in southern Angola. We believe Pretoria is intent on
maintaining forces there to operate against SWAPO insurgents,
although the Cuban deployments probably have already limited South
African freedom of movement in the area.
Over the longer term, President Botha probably would like to
conclude a deal on Namibian independence that ensures South African
regional security and protects him from rightwing criticism that he
had "sold out" Namibian whites. To that end, Botha would probably
insist upon additional conditions for an independence settlement
that could include: a nonaggression pact with Angola, participation
by UNITA in the Luanda government; a written constitution agreed
upon prior to independence which guaranteed minority (white) rights
in Namibia; third party guarantees for peaceful implementation and
adherence to the plan; and retention of the Namibian territorial
force created by--and, for the most part, loyal to--South Africa.
There are no major divisions between President Botha and. the
South African military establishment regarding plans and intentions
toward Namibia, in our judgment. For both, the Namibia issue is
largely a question of security. President Botha and senior military
officials are committed publicly to preventing a hostile SWAPO-led
government in Namibia and probably believe they
defeat SWAPO militarily.
can eventually
The deployment of additional Cuban troops near the Namibian
border or an escalation of the military conflict would probably
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harden South Africa's negotiating positions. Despite the risks
inherent in an expanded military conflict, President Botha's concern
for South African regional security interests and over rightwing
criticism at home would make it difficult for him to back down in
the face of Angolan/Cuban military advances.
What military installations would the South Africans have to
give up if they were to effect a withdrawal from Namibia? From
Angola? What threat from the ANC, SWAPO or other groups might they
anticipate if they were unable to maintain their operations against
these groups from their present forward bases? What resource losses
might they anticipate?
South Africa would theoretically have to give up at least five
military bases in Namibia except its small garrison at Walvis Bay
which Pretoria claims is an integral part of South African
territory. The expansion of the indigenous Namibian Army--the
South-West African Territorial Force (SWATF)--over the last few
years, however, complicates the withdrawal issue. UN 435 does not
provide for SWATF, which is loyal to South Africa and now numbers
some 14,000 men.
The territorial forces and the Namibian police are primarily
responsible for counterinsurgency operations against SWAPO
guerrillas. Counterinsurgency forces conduct preemptive strikes on
SWAPO insurgent camps in southern Angola. South Africa maintains no
permanent military installations in Angola.
If SWATF forces remained at forward bases in northern Namibia
and the South Africans continued to supply SWATF, South Africa's
counterinsurgency efforts against SWAPO would not be substantially
weakened, in our judgment. Moreover, Pretoria is unlikely to
withdraw from Namibia unless an agreement has been reached on
Namibian independence. The South Africans are unlikely to accept a
settlement which does not include a nonaggression pact limiting
SWAPO and ANC use of Angolan territory, although South Africa
probably would have no guarantee that Luanda would adhere to the
pact. South Africa would potentially face a more significant
security threat if its withdrawal from Namibia led to a SWAPO
takeover.
What commitments have been made by all parties involved in the
recent meetings in London? What might constitute concrete evidence
of a commitment by any side to begin the withdrawal process?
No commitments were made in London except for the agreement to
continue the discussions at an African site. The Angolans and
Cubans reaffirmed in principle their commitment to a total Cuban
withdrawal and Pretoria restated its commitment to UN 435 as a basis
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for Namibian independence. The agreement on an African venue,
however, has recently broken down and, although all parties assert
that they want another meeting soon, there is no consensus on where.
The only concrete evidence of a commitment to begin the
withdrawal process would be for South Africa to agree on a specific
date to implement UN 435 in exchange for Angolan and Cuban agreement
on a date to begin withdrawal of Cuban troops.
Is there any evidence of disagreement among the MPLA, Cubans,
and the Soviets regarding conditions for MPLA-UNITA reconciliation?
What are the maximum terms the MPLA is prepared to offer?
There is no evidence of any substantial disagreement among the
Angolans, Cubans, and the Soviets over conditions for an MPLA-UNITA
reconciliation. There are some indications that the Soviets believe
UNITA must eventually be taken into account politically--because
they believe UNITA enjoys the support of a significant portion of
the population.
At present, the MPLA refuses to consider any form of
reconciliation and power-sharing with a Savimbi-led UNITA. Instead,
Luanda offers clemency for individual UNITA members, excluding
Savimbi, in what it calls its "harmonization" program that would
integrate UNITA members into existing Angolan social, governmental,
and political organizations dominated by the MPLA.
If the MPLA Government, with Cuban support, offers a reasonable
Cuban troop withdrawal proposal, how is South Africa likely to
react?
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We believe that a Cuban troop withdrawal proposal considered
reasonable by the MPLA, and perhaps even by other governments, could
still be rejected by the South Africa government. For example,
Pretoria might well reject a plan even going as far as simultaneous
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and implementation of UN 435 if
it precluded any chana7 of the UN independence plan for Namibia.
If South African resists such steps, how else could Cuba be
motivated to remove it troops from Angola?
Cuba's negotiating flexibility continues to be tied closely to
tactical events in Angola, and Cuban President Castro is determined
to pursue negotiations that would allow him to claim a "victory" in
Angola. That "victory" would entail implementation of UN 435, South
African withdrawal from Namibia, and a cutoff of assistance to
UNITA. Short of that there are no ready inducements or threats that
would motivate a Cuban troop withdrawal.
Pressure from the Soviet Union to withdraw could be
effective motivator, but the evidence indicates that the
not yet willing to apply such pressure in the absence of
settlement that includes South African implementation of
an
Soviets are
a regional
UN 435. A
Havana
migrit, give some consiaerarion to an otter Dy tne united states to
partially lift the US trade embargo against Cuba or to reestablish
full diplomatic relations with Havana, but, absent any guarantees
for Angolan security, Havana is likely to see such a proposal as a
sellout of its Angolan allies. Even the threat of a major
engagement with South African troops or a defeat at the hands of
South Africa is more likely to cause Castro to dig in his heels than
encourage a withdrawal.
The MPLA government has also indicated that it hopes a
successful mediation effort will result in diplomatic recognition by
the US Government. Under what conditions does it expect US
recognition.
Although the issue of US diplomatic recognition has emerged on
several occasions over the years, it has never been central to the
negotiations over a regional settlement. Luanda apparently accepts
the view that US recognition could be discussed following a regional
settlement and it has not pushed strongly for US recognition.
How do the MPLA, the Cubans, and the Soviets perceive US
Government policies in southern Africa? Do they perceive the
combination of mediation and aid to UNITA as pieces in a complicated
tactical maneuver or as evidence of policy disagreement within the
US Government?
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I/
?
Despite years of name-calling, the MPLA, Cuba, and the Soviets
), believe that the US-mediated negotiations offer the best chance of a
regional Rpttiamant loaf-liner tn a Smith Afrin withdrawal from
Namibia.
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- Angolan officials attuned to ti 25X1
political dynamics have reported on Congressional opposition to
administration policy and have recommended that Luanda intensify its
lobbying efforts on the Hill. 25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
Ntshington. D C.20505
OCA 88-1851
1 7 JUN 198'8
The Honorable William S. Cohen, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
concerning the conflict in Angola. The enclosed answers to
your questions reflect our analysts' best judgments about
prospects for a negotiated settlement and associated issues.
We fully appreciate the complexity of this issue. We share
your concern that the conferees have the best possible
information as they consider the issue during the upcoming
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1989.
This reply is also being sent to the Chairman.
Enclosure
as stated
Distribution
Origina - Adse
- Executive Registry
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Registry
1 - RR Chrono
OCA:Senate:RR:sf (9 June 88)
Sincerely,
John L. Helgerso
tor of Congressional Affairs
S7ZET
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16'17*
g Li
Director of Congressional Affairs
10 June 1988
Senators Boren and Cohen recently sent us
a letter asking a number of specific questions
on Angola. The NIO and the DI have crafted
a first-rate response. You noted you wanted
to see our response before I send it to the
Senate Committee. When I receive your
approval, I will sent these letters. The
Committee has requested our response by
15 June so that it will be useful for their
mark-up of the 89 Authorization Act.
Please advise.
Attachment
John Helgerson
STAT
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,
TO : D/OCA .
CONTROL it OCA
88-1851 & 52
DATE OF REQUEST
tA.
- M'ay 1988
FROM?
V'
SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT: ,.
Letters to Chairman Boren and Vice Chairman Cohen
enclosing answers to their questions on the conflict
in Angola
NOTES
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP90G01353R060300320008-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP90G01353R000300320008-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director of Congressional Affairs
10 June 1988
Judge Webster:
Senators Boren and Cohen recently sent us
a letter asking a number of specific questions
on Angola. The NIO and the DI have crafted
a first-rate response. You noted you wanted
to see our response before I send it to the
Senate Committee. %ben I receive your
approval, I will sent these letters. The
Committee has requested our response by
15 June so that it will be useful for their
nark-up of the 89 Authorization Act.
Please advi.
Attachnent
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18: CIA-RDP90G01353R000300320008-0
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? Central Intelligence Agency
?
Washington. D C. 20505
The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
concerning the conflict in Angola. The enclosed answers to
your questions reflect our analysts' best judgments about
prospects for a negotiated settlement and associated issues.
We fully appreciate the complexity of this issue. We share
your concern that the conferees have the best possible
information as they consider the issue during the upcoming
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1989.
This reply is also being sent to the Vice Chairman.
Enclosure
as stated
,
Sincerely,
John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional
SE T
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingorip.C.MW5
The Honorable William S. Cohen, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
concerning the conflict in Angola. The enclosed answers to
your questions reflect our analysts' best judgments about
prospects for a negotiated settlement and associated issues.
We fully appreciate the complexity of this issue. We share
your concern that the conferees have the best possible
information as they consider the issue during the upcoming
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1989.
This reply is also being sent to the Chairman.
Enclosure
as stated
Sincerely,
John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affair
SE ET
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