SEISMIC VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000300100023-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 27, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP90M00005R000300100023-8
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD
MORRIS K UDALL ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN
TED STEVENS. ALASKA. VICE CHAIRMAN
ORRIN U HATCH, UTAH GEORGE E BROWN JR CALIFORNIA
CHARLES E GRASS LEY IOWA JOHN D DINGELL MICHIGAN
EDWARD M KENNEDY MASSACHUSETTS CLARENCE E MILLER OHIO
ERNEST F HOLLINGS SOUTH CAROLINA DON SUNDOUIST TENNESSEE
CLAIBORNE PELL RHODE ISLAND AMO HOUGHTON. NEW YORK
JOHN H GIBBONS
Congress of the Initrb'tates
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025 4 88-2275X
May 27, 1988
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
I am pleased to enclose OTA's Report, Seismic Verification of Nuclear
Testing Treaties.
JOHN H GIBBONS
DIRECTOR
As you know, the debate over nuclear testing has many facets.
Verification, however, iE a central issue to th?. consideration of any treaty.
The force of an underground nuclear explosion, ike an earthquake, creates
seismic waves that travel through the Earth. A seismic network must be able
both to detect an underground nuclear explosion and to distinguish it from
earthquakes and other sources of seismic waves. In the case of monitoring a
treaty that limits testir:g below a certain size of explosion, the seismic
network must also be able to estimate the size with acceptable accuracy. All
of this must be done witf, an assured capability to defeat adequately any
credible attempt to evade or spoof the monitoring network.
This Report analyzes the issues of detection, identification, yield
estimation and evasion to address two critical questions: (1) Down to what
size explosion can underground testing be seismically monitored with high
confidence? and (2) How accurately can the yields of underground explosions be
measured? To answer these questions, OTA assessed the contribution that
could be made if seismic stations were located in the country whose tests are
to be monitored, and other cooperative provisions that a treaty might include.
These questions provide the technical information that lies at the heart of
the political debate over: (1) Down to what yield can we verify Soviet
compliance with a test ben treaty? (2) Is the 1'76 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
verifiable? and (3) Has the Soviet Union compli?.d with present testing
restrictions?
I hope you will fino the Report useful and informative.
t-H Gibbons
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SEISMIC VERIFICATION
of Nuclear Testing Treaties
BERG
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RSON
ltah
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OSS
-ch Service
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
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Office of Technology Assessment
Congressional Board of the 100th Congress
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona. Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Senate
ORRIN G. HATCH
Utah
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY
Iowa
EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Massachusetts
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS
South Carolina
CLAIBORNE PELL
Rhode Island
JOHN H. GIBBONS
(Nonvoting!
Advisory Council
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
California
JOHN D. DINGELL
Michigan
CLARENCE E. MILLER
Ohio
DON SUNDQUIST
Tennessee
AMO HOUGHTON
New York
WILLIAM J. PERRY, Chairman
H&Q Te
h
l
S. DAVID FREEMAN
c
no
ogf? Partners
Lower C
l
JOSHUA LEDERBERG
DAVID S
POTT
o
orado River Authority
Rockefeller Uni
i
.
ER, Vice Chairman
General M
MICHEL T
HALBOUTY
vers
ty
otors Corp. (Ret.)
.
Michel T
H
CHASE N. PETERSON
EARL BEISTLINE
.
albouty Energy Co.
University of Utah
C
NEIL E
HARL
onsultant
.
I
SALLY RIDE
CHARLES
owa State University
Stanford Uni
i
A. BOW SHER
Gener
l A
JAMES C
HUNT
vers
ty
a
ccounting Office
.
U
i
JOSEPH E
ROSS
n
versi t v of Tennessee
.
Congressional Research Senvic,-
Director
JOHN H. GIBBONS
Th? Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report. The vieK rzxpressed in ti. - -,
_
of the Board, OTA Advisory Coun i , or individue members mbers the `ep are not necessarily t~
Cover design by John Bergling
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Foreword
Since the advent of the atomic bomb there has been interest from both an
arms control and environmental perspective to restrict the testing of nuclear weap-
ons. Although the debate over nuclear testing has many facets, verification is a
central issue to the consideration of any treaty. At the requests of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, OTA undertook an assess-
ment of seismic capabilities to monitor underground nuclear explosions.
Like an earthquake, the force of an underground nuclear explosion creates
seismic waves that travel through the Earth. A satisfactory seismic network to
monitor such tests must be able to both detect and identify seismic signals in
the presence of "noise," for example, from natural earthquakes. In the case of
monitoring a treaty that limits testing below a certain size explosion, the seismic
network must also be able to estimate the size with acceptable accuracy. All of
this must be done with an assured capability to defeat adequately any credible
attempt to evade or spoof the monitoring network.
This report addresses the issues of detection, identification, yield estimation,
and evasion to arrive at answers to the two critical questions:
? Down to what size explosion can underground testing be seismically moni-
tored with high confidence?
? How accurately can the yields of underground explosions be measured?
In doing so, we assessed the contribution that could be made if seismic stations
were located in the country whose tests are to be monitored, and other coopera-
tive provisions that a treaty might include. A context chapter (chapter 2) has been
included to illustrate how the technical answers to these questions contribute to
the political debate over:
? Down to what yield can we verify Soviet compliance with a test ban treaty?
? Is the 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty verifiable?
? Has the Soviet Union complied with present testing restrictions?
In the course of this assessment. OTA drew on the experience of many organi-
zations and individuals. We appreciate the assistance of the project's contractors
who prepared background analysis, the U.S. Government agencies and private
companies who contributed valuable information, the project's advisory panel and
workshop participants who provided guidance and review, and the many addi-
tional reviewers who helped ensure t},. accuracy and objec,ivity of this report.
~) JOHN H. GIBBONS
Direc,o-
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Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................... 3
2. Seismic Verification in the Context of National Security ................. 23
3. The Role of Seismology .................................. .......... 41
4. Detecting Seismic Events ........................................... 55
5. Identifying Seismic Events .......................................... 77
6. Methods of Evading a Monitoring Network ............................ 95
7. Estimating the Yields of Nuclear Explosions ........................... 113
Appendix. Hydrodynamic Methods of Yield Estimation ....................129
story
ences
atory
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP90M00005R000300100023-8