NIE 22-56: OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL STABIILTY IN FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007200030014-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 7, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'7 March 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel H. J. Lemley, Jr., USA (AC/SI)
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (CMI)
Colonel Willis B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Charles H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA (JIG)
SUBJECT
NIE 22-56: Outlook for Political Stability
in France
1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the
meeting of the IAC representatives on Wednesday, 7 March.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section
within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this
office by the close of business on Wednesday, JS April.
Distribution "Pi
CECRET
PAUL A. BCREL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7 March 1956
SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 22-56: OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE
THE PROBLEM
To assess the situation in France with particular reference
to prospects for short and long term internal political stability;
to evaluate France's foreign and domestic policies in relation to
Western security; and to estimate the effect of probable developments
upon France's probable courses of action with respect to major
international issues.
SCOPE
This estimate will examine France's current problems with a
view toward estimating short and long term prospects for internal
stability and French courses of action with respect to major inter-
national issues. In reviewing basic political factors principal
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attention will be devoted to the prospects for fashioning parlia-
mentary combination3copable of governing or -- in their absence --
the prospects for increased public and parliamentary disorder and
a possible recourse to extreme solutions. The impact of develop-
ments in North Africa and the current trends in Soviet tactics will
also be viewed in relation to France's stability and international
posture. We propose to examine the French economic situation in
so far as it affects or is affected by political problems. We
further propose to re-examine French military strength and capabilities
not only in connection with North African problems, but also in
relation to French commitments to Western defense.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
1. In what wigs does the present French situation differ from
that which obtained a year or two ago?
2. What is the present composition of the various National
Assembly blocs and alignments? How fluid are they? What is the
likely course of alignments over the next year or two?'
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3. In addition to the new distribution of seats among parties,
do any general trends emerge from the election results?
4. What is the political outlook of the Poujadist group? What
is the nature of its support in the country? How stable is that
support? How unified is the parliamentary delegation? What is the
policy of the moderate right toward the Poujade faction? What is the
likely course of Poujadism during the next several years?
5. What are emerging as the principal elements in Communist
policy in France? Do the Communists have any expectation of bringing
about a Popular Front in which they would participate in policy-making?
Hew long would they support a government in which they did not
participate? Will they try to discredit parliamentary government or
attempt to use it to enhance their respectability and advance their
program even without participation in the covernment? Assuming
continuation of a leftist non-Communist government, what capabilities
do the Communists have for influencing its policy through parliamentary
maneuvers? Through grass roots pressure and collaboration with left-
win;:: Socialists? Through infiltration? 'Jhat policies are they likely
to follow in the trade unions?
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6. How does the Socialist leadership envisage its role in the
new assembly? How firm is Mlet's control over the party? Will he
be obliged to adjust his policies to retain the support of his own
extreme left? Will he be obliged to move left to compote with the
Communists? Can he move toward the right and pick up support there
if he loses some on the left? What will be the most difficult problems
for the Socialists to deal with if they remain in the government?
What will be their policy if the Mollet government falls?
7. , That is the present condition of the Radical Socialist group?
What are Mendes-Francels probable intentions? Might the Radicals
withdraw- from the Socialist-Ld government and work out some alter-
native arrangement with the other groups of the center and moderate ?
-right?
8. What arc the roles now being played, or likely to. emerge, .
in the National Assembly by the MRP, Moderes and other groups of the
center and moderate right?
9. What is the gneral public reaction to the new assembly?
What is the parliamentary situation likely to develop? What will
be the,eff-ct on public order?
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10. What are the chances for early new elections? Constitu-
tional reform? A right-wing coup d'etat? A Popular Front Govern-
ment? A violent swing to the left?
II. ECONOMIC TRENDS
1. What changes have occurred in the economy since the last
estimate? What are the prospects tor continued economic growth and
for financial stability?
2. What will be the effect upon the budgetary problem of the
increased leftist strength in the Assembly? Are greater social
benefits likely? More nationalization? Tax reform? Reductions in
any significant budgetary items?
3. Is any large-scale economic reform program likely?
4. What are the significant factors in the economic relations
of North Africa to France? What importance does each side attach to
them? What will be the effect upon France and North Africa of
possible changes in those relations?
5. What is the effect of US dollar aid and expenditures in
France upon the French economy? What will be the effect of re-
ductions in receipts from these items?
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6.. What will be the effect of probable economic developments
and government economic policy upon social and political trends?
MILITARY TRENDS
. What changes in French military capabilities have occurred
since the last estimate?
2. What forces are presently committed outside France? Is
any shift of forces between the metropole and overseas territories
likely to occur? What is the state of morale and discipline among
native troops? What will be the effect apon France's NATO commitments
of a failure to settle the North African controversies?
What has been the reaction of the French military establish-
ment to the new NATO strategic concept? What is being done to imple-
ment it?
4. What is the o,blic attitude toward NATO? Toward its military
objectives? Toward expanzior of NATO's political and econOmic aSpects?
What political obstacles exist toward luplet:entstiora of NATO-mili-6ry
policies and toward the expansioa of its activities in the pelitlial
and economic field!
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S. What wild be the reaction of the French military leaders
and French forces toward an increase in international tension, including
the imminent danFer of var? In the event of a further reduction in
internAional.tension?
6. \Oat military olicies is the French government likely to
adopt in the event of an increase in international tension? In the ?
event of a. further reduction in international tension? In the light
of present trends in the nuclear capabilities of the great powers,
what policies are likely to emerge in France toward the NATO military
alliance and the announced nuclear .stratey of 11.110?
IV. PROBLBLE DEVELOPMENTS
1. What is the likely course of internal French politics during
the next year or two? During the next four to five years? Will there
be any dramatic shift to the right or left? If so, will constitutional
government be abandoned in the process?
2. In view of the probable development of internal French
politics,. and Public opinion, ?and in view of French problems in the
international and colonial sphere ,what policies is France likely to
follow retarding:
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a. National defense;
b. International disarmament;
c. The cold war;
d. The Soviet Bloc;
e. The North Atlantic Alliance;
f. Western European integration;
g. The German problem;
h. The Saar;
i. The North African territories;
j. French west and central Africa;
k. Middle Eastern questions, especially the Arab-Israeli
affairs; and
1. Far Eastern questions, i.e., Vietnam, Taiwan,
recognition of Communist China?
3. In light of all of the above, what will be the position of
France in the Free World four or five years hence? Will progress have
been made toward stability, Greater internal unity, greater ability
to meet her commitments, and the capacity to play a more effective
(though perhaps lesser) role in the Free World?
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V. POST MOTITEM
What major deficiences, if any, exist in our intelligence coverage ,
of France?
VI. VALIDITY STUDY
Briefly, assess the validity of NIE 22-55.
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