MEXICO AS A SOURCE OF DRUGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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6
The
Latin American Times
Volume 8 Number 9
Mexico as a
source of drugs
The relationship between the United States and Mexico is
notoriously complex. but is increasingly influenced by the
two countries differing perceptions of the drug problem.
Throughout Latin America. but especially in Mexico and
Colombia, there is a tendency to argue, which US of
resent, that the availability of heroin and marijuana in the
United States is a problem for the inited States itself ?
and by extension is thus not a Mexican problem. It is
caused by increased US demand, rather than by height-
ened Mexican supply.
This is an age-old debate. reminiscent of controversies
surrounding. for example, the salacious newspapers. Such
media proclaim. when pressed. that they merely meet the
insatiable demand for tawdry features and stories ?
whereas in practice if the publications were not in
circulation, then the demand might not exist. The
counter-argument to this is always the same, and is, of
course, familiar in the arms market: if we don't meet this
demand, then it will be met by sonic other supplier. Thus,
the theory of markets lets the suppliers of a socially
undesirable or harmful product 'off the hook': and exactly
the same observation can he made about Latin American
Governments which argue that the US drug problem is
essentially a problem for the United States alone.
It is tempting to add that this rationale, so conveniently
to hand, reflects, in addition, an echo of the principle of
the forgiveness of sins. Under the Roman Catholic
dispensation. a sinner who repents formally, is absolved
of his sins and may be required to do no more than offer a
modest penance. This principle allows the 'perpetuation
of misdemeanours, although its purpose is fundamentally
to correct them. But it is essentially the religion of 'the
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blind eye'; and a clear link between this ingrained attitude
and the approach of certain Latin American governments
to the drug plague, can be discerned.
Mexican officials dealing with the American drug
agencies also speak of programmes such as the drug
eradication scheme as unilateral policies. This enables
officials to display their resentment of persistent Amer-
ican attempts to influence the activities involved. Hence.
Washington has been obliged to direct increasing diplo-
matic pressure on the Mexicans. in a long-term attempt to
persuade Mexico City that the anti-drug campaign in
which both countries are formally involved has extensive
and mutual benefits and advantages. These issues are now
at the top of the agenda in prospective discussions
between the two countries. in view of the recent change of
president in Mexico, and the unavoidably abrupt and
pervasive change in the personnel administering the
Mexican drug cont nil programme.
Corruption endemic
Officials from the US State Department and from other
US anti-drug agencies have testified before Congressional
Committees in recent years that corruption within the
Mexican law enforcement administrations has been hav-
ing a detrimental impact on the implementation of
formally sponsored Mexican drug eradication policies.
and that in particular. corruption has led to increased
tolerance of poppy cultivation outside the scope of the
eradication programme. It has emerged recently, for
example. that US drug control officials operating in
Mexico have observed some opium and marijuana fields
marked with flags. They concluded that the purpose of
these flags was to mark fields which were somehow off-
limits to the spraying activities undertaken in collabora-
tion with the United States.
Hence. Mexico remains a primary source for the heroin
and marijuana consumed in the United States. and
US official statistics indicate that the availability of
Mexican heroin and marijuana is increasing. Despite
years of eradication activity and significant bilateral
funding, the aerial eradication programme has not kept
I-MCC with cultivation and. during the past two years, it
eradicated less than -WA, of the estimated total cultivation
of opium poppy and marijuana. In addition. growers have
not abandoned traditional growing areas, implying the
frustrating and costly prospect of endlessly spraying the
same growing regions season after season.
It is clear, therefore, that simply maintaining aerial
eradication at current levels will not eliminate Mexico as a
major source of heroin and marijuana. Without improved
eradication results, the gap between cultivation and
eradication will probably expand further. Indications that
implementation of agreed anti-drug policies under former
President Miguel de la Madrid were, at best, no more than
half-hearted, have discouraged senior US officials. For
example. American experts have routinely been excluded
from nightly meetings held by Mexican drug eradication
zone co-ordinators and military commanders to decide
where the next day's spraying operations might occur.
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Volume 8 Number 9
The
Latin American Times
Mexico initiated its aerial drug crop eradication prog-
ramme in the late 1970s. At that time, the opium poppy
and marijuana were grown in large, open fields, easily
accessible to specialised aircraft. The scheme managed to
eradicate large numbers of opium poppy and marijuana
fields and, for a few years, was considered one of the most
successful in the world. However, the aerial eradication
programme has not kept pace with cultivation, and
Mexico is currently a primary source of the heroin and
marijuana available in the United States. This state of
affairs is considered highly unsatisfactory in Washington,
given that no less than $118 million of US taxpayers'
money was spent on drug crop eradication in Mexico
during fiscal years 1984-87 alone.
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), Mexico emerged as a prominent source of heroin
to the United States in 1974, when growers stepped up
production to fill the void left by the suppression of heroin
supplies from Turkey in 1972. Although opium poppy and
marijuana cultivation is illegal in Mexico, its growth
has paralleled demand for heroin and marijuana in the
United States. However, a National Narcotics Intelli-
gence Consumers Committee (NN1CC) report prepared
in 1985-86 stated that Mexico was in the early stages of a
national drug abuse problem, with marijuana among the
most commonly abused substances. 1Note: The NN ICC
was established by the US Government in 1978 to
coordinate foreign and domestic collection, analysis,
dissemination, and evaluation of drug-related intelli-
Source
Year
Metric tons
Mexico
Southwest
Asia
Southeast
Asia
1980
3.70
37
52
11
1981
3.90
36
54
10
1982
5.47
34
52
14
1983
6.04
33
48
19
1984
5.97
32
51
17
1985
6.00
39
47
14
Table 1: Heroin available in the United States, 1980-85 (%).
Source: US Drug Enforcement Administration.
gence. Membership consists of the US Coast Guard;
Customs Service; Departments of Defense, State, and
Treasury; DEA; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Immig-
ration and Naturalization Service; Internal Revenue
Service; National Institute of Drug Abuse'; and White
House Drug Abuse Policy Office. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency and National Security Agency participate
as observers.j
According to the US State Department, crop control is
a cost-effective and efficient element of any narcotics
control strategy, because it minimises the amount of
drugs that can enter the international market and reduces
the potential for corruption which often accompanies
enforcement activities. Chemical eradication of opium
poppy and marijuana is preferred to manual eradication,
and aerial application of herbicides is preferred to
application at ground level.
SIGNIFICANT OPIUM POPPY AND MARIJUANA CULTIVATION AREAS
San Luis
Potosi
Ouanajuato
Veracruz-Llave
Opium poppy cultivation areas
Marijuana cultivation areas
11111 Mixed cultivation areas
Michoacan de
Ocampo
Source: DEA.
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The
Latin American Times
Volume 8 Number 9
Initial Mexican narcotics control efforts emphasised
manual eradication, which proved to be insufficient. In
late 1975, the government of Mexico decided to spray
herbicides from aircraft to eradicate illegal plantings of
the opium poppy and marijuana. This created a need for
new equipment and technical and managerial experience.
The United States provided funds to Mexico to purchase
spray and support aircraft, construct forward bases,
install a communications system, provide salary supple-
ments to pilots and technicians, and hire aviation advi-
sers for the campaign.
Overall responsibility for US international narcotics
control efforts rests with the Secretary of State in
Washington. The Department's responsibilities, carried
out by its Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
(INM). include policy development and programme
management. diplomatic initiatives, bilateral and multi-
lateral assistance for crop control, interdiction, and
related enforcement activities. It also negotiates and
manages narcotics control agreements with foreign gov-
ernments.
INM is represented in Mexico City by the Narcotics
Assistance Unit (NAU), directed by a senior US Foreign
Service officer and staffed with aviation advisers under
contract with I NM. The DEA also has about 4() staff
members stationed in Mexico. They are involved primari-
ly in investigation and intelligence liaison activities:
however. they also serve as US observers on eradication
veriqation flights.
SOURCES OF HEROIN AVAILABLE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1980-86)
%
100-
^
80-
60-
40-
20-
0
80 81 82 83 84
85 86
Southwest Asia E3 Mexico 0 Southeast Asia 0
Note: The percentages for 1986 are for January through June of that year.
Source: DEA Heroin Signature Analysis Program.
Both the Mexican Attorney General's Office, or the
Procuraduria General de la Republica (PGR), and the
Mexican army are involved in narcotics crop eradication.
The PGR concentrates on aerial eradication and has a
roster of about 600 pilots, mechanics, administrative, and
support personnel. The army concentrates on manual
eradication and has a reported commitment of more than
25,000 troops. The PGR's aerial eradication programme
is directed by the Deputy Attorney General, with field
operations under regional zone coordinators.
Last year, the Mexican aerial eradication fleet con-
sisted of 43 Bell 206 helicopters. 12 Bell 212 helicopters,
21 Cessna 206 aircraft and seven other planes. About 70
of these aircraft had been bought solely with US funds.
The Procuraduria General also bought a further 14 Bell
206 helicopters for delivery in the course of 1987. A few
aircraft in the Mexican fleet are known to have been
confiscated from drug traffickers.
One serious problem encountered by US officials in
recent years seems to be the fear that Mexican reports of
eradication claims are sometimes less than accurate.
Eradication claims are based on visual observation by
pilots and navigators or on calculations based on the
amount of herbicides used during the spray missions.
Calculations based on herbicide consumption tend to
overstate the number of hectares eradicated unless
allowances are made for those instances when pilots spray
fields more than once to ensure total destruction. Esti-
mates of eradication by PG R helicopters are based on
visual observation and estimates of eradication by new
Turbo Thrush aircraft, piloted by US contract instructor
pilots, are basedon herbicide consumption. Not surpris-
ingly, the accuracy of all estimates has been debated:
some US officials
believe the visual estimates are too
low and that PGR personnel understate eradication by
the Turbo Thrushes because of a disagreement between
Mexico City and Washington about the appropriateness
of that aircraft for use in Mexico.
The difficulty in estimating the extent of eradication
accomplished in Mexico has been compounded by the
Mexican army's claims of manual crop eradication. The
army reportedly devoted over 25.000 troops to manual
eradication campaigns and published impressive claims of
its efforts: in 1986 it reportedly
destroyed more than 6.000
hectares of opium poppy and 8.439 tons of marqUana.
These claims exceeded the US State Department's
estimate of total cultivation of these narcotics in 1986.
Statistical data concerning the narcotics eradication
programme are not encouraging. The availability of
Mexican heroin and marijuana in the United States has
.increased in recent years despite increased programme
funding and heightened eradication. The traditional
growing areas in Mexico's tri-state region of Sinaloa,
Durango, and Chihuahua remain the major source of
illegal narcotics from Mexico. Cultivators have changed
their growing patterns in response to aerial spraying,
making eradication more difficult.
The amount of Mexican heroin available forconsump-
tion in the United States has fallen dramatically from its
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Volume 8 Number 9
The
Latin American Times
9
peak in the mid-1970s due to the joint eradication
programme and unfavourable weather. In December
1978, NNICC stated. that successful opium eradication
campaigns in Mexico reduced the flow of Mexican heroin
to the United States from 6.5 tons in 1975 to about 3 tons
in 1977, while the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia
increased from one to two tons in the same period.
Because the production and distribution of illicit narcotics
is illegal, there is of course little reliable information upon
which to base estimates of the quantities of drugs
involved. The available statistics are reflective of the
quantities of drugs which were seized and not those which
were consumed.
Cultivation and production in Mexico have increased as
farmers have become more sophisticated, fragmenting
and/or concealing their fields and using irrigation. The
State Department emphasises the impact of Mexico's
deteriorating economy on the expansion of illegal cultiva-
tion. The Department also notes that the spread of
cultivation beyond traditional growing areas caused the
PG R to disperse its air fleet and support services over a
much larger geographical area and that the increasingly
complex logistics have contributed to reductions in
performance .
Table I shows Mexico's growing share of the US heroin
market in relation to the other major supply regions of
Southeast and Southwest Asia during the period 1980-85.
Based on data available for the first six months of the
year. NN 1(1' estimates that 41% of the US supply of
heroin in 1986, or 2.8 metric tons, originated in Mexico.
The percentage of heroin attributable to specific regions is
determined by heroin signature analysis, which identifies
and quantifies selected heroin characteristics. Using this
data, heroin samples can be classified according to their
manufacturing process and geographical source.
Marijuana supplier
It has been estimated that Mexico supplied about 37%
of the US supply of marijuana in 1977, but only 3% in
1981 due to the successful eradication scheme imple-
mented that year. In 1984, Mexico re-emerged as a
prominent supplier of marijuana and by 1986 it had
passed Colombia as the major foreign supplier, to provide
37% of all imported marijuana, or 30% of the total US
supply. The Department of State estimated that 4,000 to
6,000 metric tons of Mexican marijuana were exported to
the United States in 1986. These estimates are thought to
have been reasonably accurate, since they were based on
in-country reports rather than on seizures, as is the case
with some other estimates.
In addition to the 83 aircraft permanently assigned to
the eradication programme, the United States has pro-
vided fixed-wing Turbo Thrush aircraft on an experimen-
tal basis to increase eradication results. The United States
Government retained title to the aircraft. Turbo Thrush
testing began in 1983, and Department of State officials
believed the planes were a success. According to official
reports, Turbo Thrushes eradicated 517 of the 3,405
hectares of opium poppy and marijuana destroyed
Quantity
Total
supply
Country/indicator
(metric tons)
(%)
Mexico
3,000-4,000
30
Colombia
2,200-3,900
26
Jamaica
1,100-1,700
12
Belize
500-500
4
Domestic (US)
2,100-2,100
18
Other
800-1,200
9
Gross marijuana available
9,700-13,400
100
Less US seizures, seizures in transit
and losses
3,000-4,000
Net marijuana available
6,700-9,400
Table 2: Probable sources of marijuana available in the United
States during 1986.
between June 1986 and January 1987, for example.
Nonetheless, the PGR disputed the appropriateness of
the Turbo Thrushes for the eradication programme in
Mexico. One recurring point of contention was a lack of
pilots qualified to fly the Turbo Thrushes, which conse-
quently had to he flown by US instructor pilots under
contract to the State Department. In addition, the PGR
contended that because of their speed the Turbo
Thrushes oversprayed illegal fields and sprayed legitimate
crops, were unable to spray marijuana fields to ensure
destruction of the entire plant, and were unsafe in
mountainous growing areas. Then one of the Turbo
Thrushes Hew into a mountainside in the tri-state area,
killing both the PGR navigator and the US pilot. The
crash abruptly terminated all discussions on the aircraft's
FUNDING FOR THE JOINT AERIAL ERADICATION PROGRAM
US$ million
EjUnited States
1-7 Mexico
Notes: Expenditures were calculated by NAU using the following con-
version rates: 1984, 167.77 pesos=$1; 1985, 256.96 pesos=$1; 1986, 611.35
pesos=$1; and 1987, 1,100 pesos=$1.
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The
Latin American Times
Volume 8 Number 9
prospective future role in Mexico.
One of the most significant trends in the heroin market
during the 1980s has been the emergence of Mexican
'black tar', a crudely processed, highly potent form of
heroin. While the purity of most heroin on the street
ranged from nearly 4% to more than 6% over the 1980 to
1986 period, purities of 60% to 70% for 'black tar' were
common. The demand for the drug reflects its low price as
well as its high purity. 'Black tar' is growing in availability
and has been especially common in the Western United
States. Some drug experts believe the drug may be a
significant factor in the increased number of heroin-
related hospital emergencies noted in the United States in
recent years.
The heroin consumed in the United States comes from
the opium poppy, cultivated primarily in Mexico, South-
east Asia (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), and Southwest
Asia (primarily Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan). These
three areas yielded approximately 1,500 metric tons of
opium in 1985. Of this amount, about 60 metric tons were
used to produce the nearly 6 metric tons of heroin
available in the United States that year. In 1986, total
estimated opium production was increased for these three
areas, with estimates ranging from 1,680 to 2,815 metric
tons. Most Asian heroin is smuggled into the United
States by commercial air passengers and air cargo.
Mexican heroin is typically smuggled across the US-
Mexico border in vehicles or by pedestrians.
Chemical analysis of heroin has revealed that of the
samples analysed in the first six months of 1986. Mexican
heroin accounted for 41%, Southwest Asian heroin for
40%, and Southeast Asian heroin for 19%. Comparing
these figures with earlier years shows that the amount of
PROBABLE SOURCES OF COCAINE
AVAILABLE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1985-86
Cocaine is derived from the coca plant, which is grown
mainly in the highlands of Peru and Bolivia. Colombia is
the primary location for laboratories that convert coca
base and paste into cocaine hydrochloride powder.
However, cocaine-processing laboratories are spread-
ing in other South American countries, and they are
also being found in the United States; 23 labs were
seized in the United States in 1986.0
15/ Bolivia
75% Colombia
*Note: Including Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador.
heroin supplied by Mexico was higher than at any time
during the 1980s. In other words, under President de la
Madrid, the problem became steadily more intractable.
Marijuana continues meanwhile, to be readily avail-
able in most areas of the United States, with a trend
towards increased potency levels. In 1986, approximately
82% of the marijuana was smuggled in from foreign
countries, with Mexico (30%) and Colombia (26%)
remaining, as in earlier years. the principal sources. In
1982, 6% of the US supply came from Mexico and 57%
from Colombia.
US Federal law enforcement agencies report that
traffickers often smuggle marijuana in huge quantities,
and they frequently employ non-commercial marine
vessels. Mexican marijuana, however, typically enters the
United States in overland vehicles, with smaller loads
than marine vessels.
US domestic supplies
Cultivation within the United States accounted for an
estimated 18% of the marijuana available in 1986.
Despite Federal assistance to the states with measures to
help eradicate marijuana, domestic supplies in the United
States still increased between 1980 and 1986. Cultivation
takes place in all 50 states of the Union. To avoid
detection. US marij liana growers are moving their
operations indoors and are growing smaller and more
scattered plots out of doors.
With the drug problem in the United States clearly a
high-profile issue in this year's presidential election
campaign, the prospect of more vigorous drug enforce-
ment legiSlation emerging from Congress in 1989 is rated
higher than at any time since the beginning of this decade.
However, many years of struggling with this problem,
essentially to no avail, have left Washington experts
baffled and demoralised. The extent of official discour-
agement was clarified on 29 April this year, when Dr Otis
R Bowen, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
told President Reagan and his fellow Cabinet Officers
that he could no longer accept the Administration's
optimistic accounts of progress being allegedly made in
the war on drugs. Speaking at a meeting of the National
Drug Policy Board, Dr Bowen said:
'Generally speaking, Mr President. I prefer optimism to
pessimism. as von do. But today. I don't know how I can
honestly he very optimistic about the war on drugs.'
Dr Bowen then took the highly unusual step of
instructing the Department of Health and Human Servi-
ces to release the full text of his remarks at the private
White House meeting. It reflected this respected official's
desperation at the dimensions of the problem, and of
course a certain element of pre-election issue-shuffling.
However, Dr Bowen's reputation stands high among drug
problem experts, and they evidently believe that much
more support is needed at the highest levels in future
administrations, if the United States is to turn the tide in
this losing battle. On this issue, above all others, the
quality of the future relationship between the United
States and Mexico will increasingly depend.
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