TALKING POINTS FOR D/NESA 19 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10C00522R000100830001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Talking Points for D/NESA
19 October 1983
Egypt
We see no immediate threat to Mubarak's government unless
economic conditions unexpectedly deteriorate to the point of
sparking civil unrest.
The legal opposition is ineffective and radical elements
have largely been contained.
Egypt's largest and potentially most threatening Islamic
group, the Muslim Brotherhood, is maintaining a truce
with the government.
Military and security forces appear loyal despite
some economic hardships with civilians.
sharing
The government's major vulnerability is the troubled state
of the economy and the lingering perception that Mubarak has done
little to improve the situation.
-- Cairo is moving toward a foreign debt crisis and we
believe this situation will deteriorate in the months
ahead.
-- Austerity measures, if imposed, could have an adverse
domestic impact and increase opposition activities.
Mubarak has gained some respect over the past year by
improving relations with other Arab states and refurbishing
Egypt's nonaligned credentials.
Cairo has developed informal ties with most Arab
countries except Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.
Relations with Israel seem likely to remain cool for the
foreseeable future although the peace treaty is not
threatened.
-- Relations with Moscow have thawed somewhat since 1981 but
Cairo seems in no hurry to exchange ambassadors.
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Sudan
President Nimeiri has made a number of extremely
controversial decisions this year that have weakened his domestic
position.
-- The division of Sudan's predominantly non-Muslim southern
region into three smaller administrative units was
unpopular in the south and pushed some southern
politicians into antiregime activity.
-- The recent imposition of Islamic law won the continued
support of the Muslim Brotherhood but alarmed many
Sudanese, especially in the south.
Opposition to the regime lacks a focus, and Sudanese
security services seem effective in uncovering anti-government
plots.
-- Outlawed political parties range from Communist to
conservative, and their only common goal is Nimeiri's
ouster.
-- Southern opposition groups are divided by tribal and
personal rivalries and disagree on whether to seek
greater autonomy or complete independence.
Sudan's overall economic situation remains serious but
generous foreign debt rescheduling and aid packages have won a
temporary respite for the government.
-- Urban consumers continue to suffer from inflated prices
and shortages of necessities such as food and fuel,
however.
-- These economic hardships are enerating additional
complaints about Nimeiri.
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Israel
Domestic Situation
Prime Minister Shamir's government is widely seen as a
transition government which will probably not last until the next
scheduled elections in November 1985.
-- Israel's economic problems will severely test Shamir's
leadership abilities. Many of his coalition partners are
reluctant to accept the tough austerity measures the
government is proposing and some are threatening to bolt
the coalition.
-- Shamir must also contend with other divisive
issues--particularly on religious matters--which could
threaten his coalition. His promises to the ultra
Orthodox Agudat Israel--whose four Knesset seats are vital
to the survival of Shamir's government--are certain to
offend more secular members of his government.
-- Shamir lacks former Prime Minister Begin's reputation for
toughness in dealing with coalition wrangling and it is
likely that he will have to a ree to early elections,
perhaps by next spring.
Foreign Policy
We expect little signifigant change from the foreign
policies pursued by Begin. Shamir has kept on Defense Minister
Arens, who was the Begin government's leading decision-maker on
Lebanon, and has indicated that he will follow Begin's lead on
ties with the US and the peace process.
We expect the Shamir government's policy on the West Bank
to be even tougher than Begin's, however. The presence of
Herut hard-liner Yigal Cohen-Orgad as finance minister
will add to hawkish sentiment in the government. More
settlement activity is likely.
Other differences are likely to be marginal. Shamir, as
foreign minister, played a significant role in Israeli
efforts to restore ties with Black Africa and Western
Europe and we expect these areas to receive more attention
than they did from Begin.
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PLO
Arafat's pre-eminent position has been destroyed, probably
permanently.
-- Rebel demands for more militant policies and close
PLO-Syrian cooperation have widespread support even within
Arafat's Fatah.
-- Only issue now is whether Arafat will be allowed to
as at least a titular leader, but the burden is on him to
compromise or face a further erosion of his support.
remain
Radical domination of the PLO means there is no longer a
credible Palestinian leadership willing to seek a negotiated
solution to the Palestinian issue.
--A settlement of the Palestinian issue separate from a
com ehensive Israeli-Syrian agreement seems unlikely.
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Lebanon
President Gemayel is planning to proceed with a rump session
of the national reconciliation talks at Beirut International
Airport this week, but pro-Syrian conferees are refusing to
attend. If talks eventually get underway they probably will make
little progress and ultimately break down because of conflicting
demands among confessional groups.
Syria will urge Muslims and Druze to press for their
maximum demands.
Maronite Christians--particularly the Phalange Party and
Lebanese Forces militia leaders--will resist reforms that
significantly reduce Christian influence.
The Lebanese Army continues to exchange sporadic fire with
various militias; the Druze in the Shuf, and the Shia Amal
militia in Beirut's southern suburbs. The heavy shelling of the
Alayh ridgeline on Tuesday and the attack on Army positions
around Suq al Gharb on Wednesday demonstrate that the cease-fire
is crumbling.
If negotiations lead
out again.
nowhere, major fighting could break
The Army acquitted itself well during the recent fighting in
the Shuf, but its ability to hold together remains a prime
concern.
-- The confessional divisions of Lebanese society at large
are reflected in the Army.
-- The officer corps is about 55 percent Christian and
45 percent Muslim, while the enlisted ranks are about
55 percent Muslim. Among the Muslims, Shias probably are
the majority.
The Gemayel government, as long as the Lebanese Army holds
together, probably will retain control over the greater Beirut
area.
It will have to contend with efforts to create autonomous
Maronite and Druze heartlands and continued Syrian and
Israeli occupation.
It would be hard pressed, however, if it tried to assert
control over Beirut's snnthprn suburbs now dominated by
the Shia militias.
The threat of a Shia uprising will keep much of the Army
pinned down, and make it impossible for the government to launch
an offensive against Druze positions in the,Shuf Alayh districts.
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Syria's key goals in Lebanon are a pro-Syrian government in
Beirut and the minimizing of Israeli influence in the country.
Damascus will continue to support its allies and
surrogates in Lebanon to weaken the government and force
it to reach an accommodation with Syria.
Assad almost certainly believes he can attain his
objectives wifhniit inificant direct Syrian military
involvement.
Assad appears willing to tolerate a prolonged de facto
partition of the country. He almost certainly calculates that
time is on his side and that Israel will ultimately falter.
Israel's primary goal in Lebanon is to protect the security
of its northern border and prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian or Syrian presence in southern Lebanon.
We believe Israel can maintain its current positions in
Lebanon with minimum force--about 8,000 troops.
Although the Israelis hope to avoid military involvement
north of the Awwali River, they will respond to specific
Palestinian or Syrian provocations with air strikes or
artillery.
Only Syrian drive on Beirut or the reappearance of large
numbers of PLO fighters there could lead to an Isaeli
military move back into the Shut or Beirut area.
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Jordan
King Hussein is still interested in pursuing the Reagan
initiative, but he feels blocked by the PLO crisis and the
problems in Lebanon.
He is hoping Arafat will reconsider working with
Jordan. He has maintained contacts with senior PLO
officials, but he refuses to receive Arafat in knnan
until he is willing to endorse the agreement the two men
reportedly reached prior to April 10.
Hussein has announced that if the PLO becomes a tool of the
Syrians, Jordan would no longer be bound by the 1974 Rabat Summit
agreement that declared the PLO the sole legitimate represent-
ative of the Palestinian people.
If that happens, Hussein hopes to develop an alternative
Palestinian voice on the West Bank, but we believe he is
unlikely to succeed given West Bank reluctance to take a
stand independent of the PLO.
Hussein also would need the explicit backin f other
Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Although Jordan has enjoyed over ten years of prosperity and
stability, there is a potential for unrest, particularly within
its Palestinian and tribal communities. Palestinians still face
discrimination in education and employment and the bedouin tribes
are increasingly concerned that they are losing influence with
Hussein.
A change in government is expected soon in Jordan.
PM candidates include former PM Zayd Rifai, CinC Bin
Shaker and Chief of the Royal Court Ahmad Lozi.
A new PM may result in a change in Jordan's foreign
policy toward a closer Syrian/Jordanian or PLO/Jordanian
relationship.
Rifai's selection probably would si
strained relations with Syria.
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Syria
Assad's grip on power in Syria remains firm and we believe
he faces no domestic political constraints on his current foreign
policy preoccupations.
The watershed of opposition activity against the regime
came in February 1982 when the military crushed a Muslim
Brotherhood-led uprising in the provincial city of Hamah.
Since that event, the cost of opposition activity has
been raised so high that the Syrian population has been
forced into sullen acquiescence to Assad's rule.
We cannot rule out the possibility of a coup or assassination
attempt, but we have detected no signs of a significant challange
to the regime.
Syria has come back from defeat and isolation following the
fighting in the summer of 1982 to achieve a major role in the
current Lebanese crisis and an increasingly prominent role in the
Arab world.
Syria is trying to assert total control over Palestinian
activity in Lebanon and to press Arafat to give in to the demands
of the Fatah rebels linked to Damascus.
With the Fatah loyalists cornered in Tripoli, Assad now
effectively imposes a veto on independent Palestinian
activity in Lebanon and gains insurance that Arafat will
not regain a major political role in the country.
Damascus will keep pressure on Arafat to prevent a
further PLO flirtation with the peace process independent
of Damascus.
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North Africa
The moderate, pro-Western regimes of North Africa are secure
for the near term but face future challenges that concern us. In
Algeria, a more flexible leadership has adjusted its foreign
policy to include a more open approach to the US, a more moderate
constructive role in Middle East politics, and an effort at
containing Libyan trouble-making.
In Morocco, King Hassan is facing a deteriorating economic
situation, coupled with rising expectations among a burgeoning,
youthful population.
Rabat's financial position has been severly weakened by
its heavy dependence on foreign petroleum, several poor
harvests, a depressed world market for phosphates (the
country's priary export), and the continuing conflict in
Western Sahara.
The heavy foreign debt has significantly reduced the
nation's creditworthiness; growing debt service costs
have forced Morocco to stiffen austerity measures to
secure a new IMF standby loan and to seek debt
rescheduling.
Over the next year, these austerity measures are likely to
cause popular unrest and may force the government to resort to
stricter security measures.
For Tunisia, the question of succession to President
Bourguiba continues to dominate domestic politics.
Although a successor regime would retain Tunisia's
basically pro-Western orientation, there are forces in
the country--principally Islamic fundamentalists--that
could militate for dramatic changes in the post-Bourguiba
era.
-- Moreover, the Tunisian economy is stagnating, with the
overall growth for 1982 of only 0.8 percent.
-- In addition to a host of financial problems, unemployment
and underemployment are running at about 20-25 percent.
These economic strains and the uncertainty that almost
certainly will accompany succession politics could in time
destabilize the country.
Under Algeria's pragmatic President Chadli Bendjedid, the
Algerians are introducing some tactical flexibility into their
previous strict ideological posture.
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They have sought broader economic and political ties with
the US and assumed a much more constructive role in
solving outstanding North African and Middle East
problems, particularly with regard to the Western Sahara
conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Palestinian
problems.
Although Algeria has by no means moved completely into
the moderate Arab camp or given unqualified support to US
negotiation efforts, the change in its posture is
dramatic as compared with only a few years ago.
Benjedid's pragmatism is also reflected in a reorientation
of the economy which has involved decentralization of the
national industries and greater openings for private sector
participation.
Normalizing relations with Morocco is the linchpin of
several of Benjedid's new policy initiatives.
His hope is to gain economic benefits for Algeria and the
other North African countries through greater economic
cooperation, to seek a political solution to the Western
Sahara, and to establish a regional political framework
that will help contain Libya by making it answerable to
its neighbors and more invested in stability.
Libya's Qadhafi has weathered financial setbacks brought on
by the soft oil market and the humiliation of losing the OAU
chairmanship--which for awhile has curbed his trouble-making.
His intervention in Chad and the strong US and French response
have been his major preoccupation.
He now has a secure hold on the northern third of Chad
and has been relatively interested in finding a political
solution in conjunction with the French, but will
probably insist on maintaining control of the Azou Strip
and installing a new government in Chad that will be
responsive to Libya's interests in the area. Qadfhafi's
trouble-making elsewhere--in Sudan, West Africa, and more
recently Latin America--continues albeit at somewhat
erratic levels. We see no serious challenges to
Qadhafi's regime at this time, althou h he remains
vulnerable to assassination.
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SUBJECT: Talking Points for D/NESA
NESA M# 83-10 2 71
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - D/NESA
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
1 - NESA/AI/L
1 - NESA/AI/E
1 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/
(19 Oct 8 3 )
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