THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000200320001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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OrIFIDENTM?
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1 February 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL RECIPIENTS OF SE 5
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
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031454
CIA ne 110.
THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US
DECISION TO GRANT OR DENY MILITARY
AID TO PAKISTAN
SE-55 S ( o - s'y
Approved 12 January 1954.
Published 15 January 1954
00 .r...".1r,tn1 .111117,,F7
?

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The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
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THE PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US DECISION TO
GRANT OR DENY MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the repercussions, particularly in India and Pakistan, of (a) a US
decision to grant a modest amount of military aid to Pakistan and (b) a US decision
not to grant such aid.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. That a military aid program for Pak-
istan would be of modest proportions and
from a realistic military view point would
not threaten India's present military pre-
ponderance in the subcontinent.
2. That the military aid agreement would
not involve establishment of US military
bases or a formal US?Pakistani mutual
assistance commitment.
3. That the US would (a) make every ef-
fort to reassure India that aid to Pakis-
tan was not directed against it; and
(b) undertake. to discourage Pakistani
military aggression against Indian-held
territory.
4. That a decision on military aid to Pak-
istan would not be announced before 23
January, when the Korean POW's will
presumably be released from the custody
of India in Korea, but would be an-
nounced shortly thereafter.
CONCLUSIONS
5. A US decision to extend military aid to
Pakistan would have the following
effects:
a. It would increase the Pakistan Gov-
ernment's prestige at home and tend to
consolidate the government's present
friendly relations with the US.
b. It would arouse grave concern and
indignation in India and lead to increased
tensions in the subcontinent. US efforts
to mitigate these reactions are unlikely to
have any significant effect.
c. It would lead to an intensification of
existing differences in US?Indian rela-
tions and possibly to more friendly Indian
relations with the Bloc, but would prob-
ably not lead to any major change in In-
dia's foreign policies.
d. Over the course of time the violence
of Indian feeling would, in the absence of
exacerbating circumstances, tend to sub-
side. However, there is a danger, that
frictions and disagreements between the
US and India might be aggravated as a
result of continuing resentment. Such a
development would make it easier for In-
dia to drift into an eventual position of
isolation from Western friendship and
support, in which it would be more sus-
ceptible to Communist pressures.
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6. A US decision not to grant military aid
to Pakistan would have the following
effects:
a. It would mean a loss of US prestige,
since India has protested violently
against such aid and the USSR and Com-
munist China have registered objections.
b. It would cause grave disappointment
to the Pakistan Government, weaken the
position of pro-Western moderate ele-
ments now in control, and possibly lead to
cabinet changes even including the Prime
Minister. It would probably not, how-
ever, result in the present ruling group
losing control of the government. The
Pakistan Government would feel strong
2
resentment toward India, since Pakistani
leaders would ascribe a negative US deci-
sion to Indian pressure.
c. The US would not bank any endur-
ing credit with India, nor would there be
any improvement in present Indian?Pak-
istani relationships. Moreover, Indian
leaders might be encouraged to use pres-
sure tactics against the US on other occa-
sions.
7. The reactions of other governments to
a US decision concerning military aid to
Pakistan would probably not be such as
to involve any major changes in present
policies.
DISCUSSION
I. PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US
DECISION TO EXTEND MILITARY AID
8. A US decision to grant military aid to Pak-
istan would be welcomed by the Pakistan Gov-
ernment, would bolster the government's
prestige with the Pakistani public, and would
tend to consolidate the government's friendly
relations with the US. These effects might,
however, be somewhat reduced by disappoint-
ment over the small amount of aid contem-
plated. The governments of Turkey, Ceylon,
and Thailand have indicated that they would
favor such a decision, and that of Iran would
probably also approve.
9. The USSR and Communist China have
already protested to Pakistan against the
granting of any US military aid. They would
view such a US decision with concern, con-
sidering it as one more step in the US policy
of "encirclement" and as a prelude to the
establishment of US bases in Pakistan. How-
ever, we believe that they would confine their
reaction to violent propaganda attacks on the
US, efforts to exploit neutralist and anti-
colonial sentiments in the area, and attempts
to cultivate closer relations with India.
10. Afghanistan has expressed its concern, but
indications are that this is largely for public
consumption. It has indicated that it too
would like military aid, and no change in the
traditional Afghan policy is likely to result
from aid to Pakistan. Reactions of the Arab
States would vary. The governments of Iraq
and probably Saudi Arabia would approve.
Egypt probably would feel slighted unless it
received comparable military aid. Further-
more, it would feel that Pakistan would even-
tually be unable to support the Arabs on such
issues as Palestine and Morocco. In none of
the other countries of the Free World is the
reaction of their present government likely to
have any adverse effect on relations with the
US or Pakistan, and in some cases the reaction
is likely to be favorable.
11. The most significant reaction from the
standpoint of US interests would be in India.
India regards Pakistan as the country most
immediately threatening India's interests and
ambitions and believes that Pakistan's pri-
mary purpose in seeking US military assist-
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ance is to strengthen its position vis-a-vis
India. India would, therefore, view the grant-
ing of such assistance to Pakistan with grave
concern and indignation. The Indian Gov-
ernment would consider the granting of mili-
tary aid to Pakistan as the first in a series of
steps leading to a significant increase in the
military power of Pakistan and an unwelcome
involvement of South Asia in the cold war.
India would regard the US action as an open-
ing wedge in the return of colonial powers to
the area and as a challenge to India's concept
of "a third area" of neutral nations in which
India would exercise leadership. It would
fear that initiation of US-Pakistan military
cooperation would: (a) usher in a policy of
even greater US "favoritism" toward Pakistan
vis-a-vis India on such issues as Kashmir; (b)
lead to a dangerous increase in Pakistan's
military strength; and (c) sooner or later in-
volve establishment of US bases in Pakistan.
12. US efforts to mitigate India's fear and
resentment are unlikely to have any effect on
Prime Minister Nehru or Indian opinion gen-
erally. Since the Indians object in principle
to any military aid to Pakistan, they are un-
likely to be much influenced by such measures
as direct US reassurances to India, the exac-
tion of non-aggression pledges from Pakistan,
or the provision of the aid within the context
of Pakistan defense arrangements with Tur-
key and other Middle East states. Over the
course of time the violence of Indian feeling
would, in the absence of exacerbating circum-
stances, tend to subside. However, Indian
apprehension regarding a Pakistan military
build-up and the establishment of US military
bases in Pakistan would probably continue,
and Indian resentment toward the whole con-
cept of US-Pakistan military cooperation
would almost certainly persist.
Effect on Indian Policies
13. India's resentment over a US military aid
program for Pakistan would lead at least tem-
porarily to a worsening of US-Indian relations.
Indian leaders and the Indian press would be
more critical of the US and of US policies.
In its diplomatic activities, both in and out
of the UN, India would probably be more dis-
posed to undercut and embarrass the US.
3
India would probably increase its efforts to
develop a strong neutralist bloc in the UN and
might be more difficult to deal with on Korea
and other Far East issues. In addition it
might curb US information activities and re-
fuse to go ahead with negotiation of a Treaty
of Friendship and Establishment. American
activities in India, both official and private,
would encounter increased difficulties with
government officials and the general public.
14. India would tend to become confirmed in
its attitude that the greatest immediate prob-
lem in South Asia comes, not from Communist
imperialism, but from the "unreasonable"
policies of the apparently military-minded
West and Pakistan's identification with it;
India might become convinced that its aims
as an independent state are incompatible with
those of the US. The possibility of eventual
cooperation between India and the US in
establishing a common front against Commu-
nist pressures in Asia would become even more
remote. There is also a danger that intensi-
fied frictions between the US and India, if
allowed to persist, would make it easier for
India to drift into an eventual position of
isolation from Western friendship and sup-
port, in which it would be more susceptible to
Communist internal and external pressures.
15. While India would probably be inclined to
harass the US, it would almost certainly seek
to avoid a clear-cut break with the US and its
allies, to whom India looks for markets and for
economic aid. Except possibly as a result of
a cumulative series of frictions and disagree-
ments, India would be unlikely to refuse US
economic aid. However, there is a continuing
possibility that India might be faced with pos-
sible loss of US aid through failure to comply
with the Battle Act, and there is some slight
chance that if might further risk loss of US
aid by cutting off export of strategic mater.als
to the US. Despite possible irritation over
British failure to oppose US military aid to
Pakistan, India would remain in the Common-
wealth, at least for some time to come, if only
to avoid further loss of influence there.
16. Resentment against the US would prob-
ably increase Indian interest in trade with the
Communist Bloc and strengthen India's con-
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ciliatory attitude toward Communist China on
such questions as Korea. However, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that India would make sig-
nificant political concessions to the Commu-
nists, enter into arms agreements with them,
or otherwise go further than it is now pre-
pared to go toward associating itself with the
Bloc. Such moves would strike at the very
foundations of India's policy of non-involve-
ment.
17. Thus, we do not believe that Indian re-
sentment and increased US?Indian tensions
would, by themselves, cause any major altera-
tion of Indian foreign policies. As long as India
continues to pursue its basic policy of inde-
pendence and non-alignment in the cold war,
it has little additional room for maneuver.
Since India has already felt obliged to express
itself on the numerous international issues on
which it dissents from US policy, there is vir-
tually no major act of reprisal India could
undertake against the US without jeopardiz-
ing its own interests. This we believe the In-
dians would be unwilling to do.
Effects on Stability in the Subcontinent
18. India's reaction to a US decision to extend
military aid to Pakistan would also lead to
increased tensions in the subcontinent. Lead-
ership elements in India are almost unani-
mous in opposing US military aid for Pakistan.
Within India, agitation against the US deci-
sion would lead to an increase in popular bad
feeling toward the US and Pakistan and to an
increase, possibly of dangerous proportions, in
Hindu-Moslem communal tension and in anti-
Christian agitation. However, widespread vio-
lence is unlikely to break out unless the Indian
Government makes a serious miscalculation in
its efforts to demonstrate that it has public
support. The Communists would, by asso-
ciating themselves with the opposition to US
military aid to Pakistan, have an opportunity
to gain prestige and to pursue their united
front tactics.
19. Existing strains in Indian?Pakistani offi-
cial relations would once again be intensified.
India would remain unwilling to accept any
compromise on Kashmir, and its reluctance to
4
cooperate with Pakistan on such other issues
as that of joint development of the Punjab
watershed would be reinforced. There might
also be a new round of minor reprisals be-
tween the two countries, but we do not believe
that increased tensions would lead to a de-
liberate resumption of hostilities.
II. PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF A US
DECISION NOT TO EXTEND MILITARY
AID
20. It is widely known that the US has been
considering military aid to Pakistan. Since
India has protested violently against such aid
and the USSR and Communist China have
registered objections, a US decision not to ex-
tend such aid would mean a loss of US pres-
tige. It would be a grave disappointment to
the Pakistan Government, which has almost
certainly come to believe that the US is com-
mitted to giving it military assistance. More-
over, Pakistan's leaders would conclude that
the US had decided that India's good will was
more important than that of Pakistan and
that it would be unwilling to offend India on
other matters involving South Asia. These
leaders might later try to reopen the aid ques-
tion, but they would be bitter at what they
would consider relegation to second-class
status in South Asia and in the future would
have less confidence in the US and possibly
also the UK. The Pakistan Government
would feel strong resentment toward India
since Pakistani leaders would ascribe a nega-
tive US decision to Indian pressure. However,
we believe that Pakistan would not abandon
its fundamentally anti-Communist and pro-
Western outlook.
21. Within Pakistan, the effect of the decision
would be to weaken the position of the pro-
Western moderate elements now in control.
Failure to obtain military aid would deprive
the government of a major political asset and
would expose it to more severe attack on other
issues. A negative US decision would
strengthen the reactionary religious elements
which oppose close ties with the West and
favor a more militant policy regarding Kash-
mir, and might lead to cabinet changes, in-
cluding even the Prime Minister. However,
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the pro-Western moderate elements probably
would not lose control of the government.
22. US denial of military aid to Pakistan
would be looked on in India as a reluctant
concession to Indian pressure. While it would
remove a source of friction, the beneficial ef-
fect on US?Indian relations would probably be
negligible. India would be pleased by the de-
cision. However, it is unlikely to be significant-
ly more cooperative, and might actually be
less so, regarding the various issues on which
it now dissents from US policy. In fact, India
would probably be encouraged to use similar
pressure tactics against the US on other occa-
sions. India's attitude toward a Kashmir set-
tlement would not change and its reluctance
5
to bargain with Pakistan on other issues
would increase.
23. A negative decision with respect to mili-
tary aid for Pakistan would probably encour-
age those Middle Eastern political elements
which oppose close ties with the West. By the
same token, a negative US decision would dis-
courage political elements in the Middle East
which are now inclined toward closer ties with
the West, and the government of Ceylon,
which apparently wishes to avoid Indian hege-
mony in South Asia. However, the reaction
in most South Asian and Middle Eastern coun-
tries, in the longer run, would depend largely
on the other aspects of US policy toward the
area.
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