THE OUTLOOK IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A020700010001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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--SECRET_ 2310 NIE 12.4-62
14 MAy mg?
9 May 1962
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Number 12.4-62
The Outlook in East Germany
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
9 MAY 1962
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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DATE: REVIEWER: 1615/41
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The following following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
and NSA.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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THE OUTLOOK IN
EAST GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
To assess the outlook in East Germany in the short run,
with particular reference to the likelihood of serious internal
disorders and the effect on internal stability of certain con-
tingencies.
SCOPE NOTE
This paper supplements other SNIE's on East Germany
(SNIE 12-4-61, "The Stability of East Germany in the Berlin
Crisis," dated 15 August 1961 and SNIE 12-4-60, "The Situa-
tion and Prospects in East Germany," dated 3 May 1960),
which deal in some detail with certain aspects of the East
German situation and outlook not treated here, or treated
only briefly. The main intent of this estimate is to assess
the outlook for internal stability, with emphasis on resistance
potential, especially as affected by the erection of the Berlin
wall.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Popular discontent in East Germany, enhanced by eco-
nomic grievances and disappointments, has increased since
the closing of the Berlin sector border last August. However,
there is no evidence of significant organized opposition. It
is possible that a major revolt could develop from local out-
breaks, especially if the regime's authority appeared to the
populace to be breaking down. On balance, however, we
believe that the presence of Soviet military forces and the
memories of their use in past repressions will deter the people
from rising up in revolt unless they have reason to expect
decisive help from the West: In any case, we believe that
the Ulbricht regime could suppress any disturbances except
a widespread uprising, in which case the Soviets would pro-
vide active assistance.
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THE ESTIMATE
I. GENERAL SITUATION
2. East Germany, despite the abrupt solu-
tion of its critical refugee problem by the
closing of the Berlin sector border, continues
to constitute Moscow's prime headache in
Eastern Europe. Estranged from the people
and unable to marshal their nationalist senti-
ments behind its programs, the regime con-
tinues to rule and to reconstruct society in
East Germany along Communist lines by re-
pressive methods. Moreover, the fact that
vital Soviet interests are here in open con-
frontation with those of the West impels Mos-
cow to maintain 20 divisions of Soviet troops
in the country. For the Soviets, stability in
East Germany is of great importance, both
because of the struggle with the West over
Germany and because Moscow is aware that
an uprising in East Germany could spread
eastward to threaten the entire Soviet posi-
tion in Eastern Europe.
3. To manage their East German Satellite,
the Soviets have for many years relied on the
capabilities of the redoubtable Walter Ulbricht.
The Soviets are aware that he is an object of
revulsion to the German people, and as such
is a serious political liability. Nevertheless,
his skill in coping with factions and rivals in
the Socialist Unity Party (SED) , and his
agility in adapting himself to the changing
winds of policy and doctrine coming from
Moscow have made him virtually indispen-
sable as boss of the East German regime. No
individual or group in the SED at present is
capable of effectively opposing him, even if dis-
posed to do so. His presence is of great im-
portance to the stability of the regime. While
the Soviets may at some point wish to replace
him by a person less unattractive to Germans,
both East and West, we believe that they are
unlikely at this juncture to risk his removal.
4. Ulbricht's party apparatus is not an
altogether reliable instrument, especially at
the local level, where functionaries are fre-
quently loath to inflict the regime's disagree-
able policies upon the people. On the whole,
however, it is adequate, and we see no evidence
at present of the kind of party disunity that
existed in Poland and Hungary prior to the
upheavals of 1956. The regime has felt better
able to enforce harsh discipline upon the
populace since the closing of the Berlin sector
border made large-scale emigration impossible.
However, the closing of the border, by denying
escape to the more disaffected and rebellious
elements of the population, has also compli-
cated the regime's control problems.
5. We believe that the East German security
forces could suppress almost any disturbances
short of a widespread popular uprising of
major scale. Since the closing of the sector
border the frontier and alert police have been
augmented in strength, and efforts have been
made to improve their reliability and effec-
tiveness. In addition, the six well-equipped
army divisions would be a factor in any serious
internal crisis, but the regime would probably
be reluctant to employ them against the popu-
lation because of doubts as to their reliability.
?The Ministry of State Security, through its
informer network, keeps a careful watch on
all these forces, and could detect at an early
stage any attempts to organize significant
dissident action against the government.
However, the regime's control of the country
rests in the last analysis almost entirely on
the population's awareness of the presence of
Soviet force. If a large-scale uprising should
occur, Ulbricht would almost certainly have
to call on the Soviets for active assistance.
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Economic Factors
6. Economic grievances and disappoint-
ments add a substantial reinforcement to the
basically political disaffection of the East Ger-
man population. To be sure, the general
standard of living in East Germany is still the
highest in the Bloc. During the 1950's con-
sumption increased steadily, and workers' in-
centives were maintained not only by the
actual improvement in living conditions but
also by expectations of further improvements.
During the last two years, however, increases
in consumption have slowed down, the de-
mand for quality foods has increased faster
than the supply, and the distribution of food
has become more irregular and more inequi-
table. At the same time the supply of other
consumer goods, especially better quality
clothing and consumer durables, has lagged
far behind demand. Moreover, there is little
prospect of improvement in the near future.
The regime itself has finally had to admit that
it could not make good its promises of raising
the standard of living, but must instead stiffen
labor discipline, restrict wage increases, raise
prices, and extend food rationing.
7. The failure of Ulbricht's inflated plans
for economic growth not only has contributed
to popular dissatisfaction, but also has sig-
nificantly impugned his leadership in the SED
and in Moscow. Industrial growth has been
far slower than planned. Agricultural pro-
duction has declined, in large part because of
the effects of forced collectivization in 1960.
Ulbricht, who had disregarded the advice of
economic experts in framing his plans, must
now bear the responsibility for their failure.
It is clear that there have been important dis-
agreements within the party over economic
issues. These disagreements have made Ul-
bricht even more dependent than he was
before on Soviet support.
8. Because of Ulbricht's stubbornness, and
to protect their economic interests, the Soviets
had to intervene to set aside his extravagant
plans for economic growth. As a result of
this intervention and Soviet material assist-
ance,' the immediate difficulties are being
overcome and a transition to more realistic
planning is being undertaken. The close in-
volvement of the Soviet Union in East German
economic policies and planning, however, has
further impaired the prestige of Ulbricht in
Moscow and the picture of East Germany as
an increasingly strong and self-sustaining na-
tion that had been promoted by the regime.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR RESISTANCE
9. The closing of the Berlin sector border
had a major psychological impact on the East
German people. The immediate shock at the
loss of their escape route and their ties with
West Berlin and West Germany was accom-
panied by further disillusionment with the
West over its failure to react. This has since
given rise to an increased feeling of hopeless-
ness, as demonstrated by an increase in the
suicide rate. At the same time, it has resulted
in a substantial increase in popular hostility
to the regime, manifested by passive resist-
ance, restlessness and grumbling, and in spo-
radic acts of sabotage, especially in rural
areas. This attitude has sharpened the dis-
couragement already brought about by the
regime's harsh economic policies, by food
shortages, and the disappointment of expecta-
tions that living standards would improve.
Thus the erection of the Berlin wall in one
important respect had an effect opposite that
anticipated by the SED leaders, who expected
that as a consequence of the action of 13
August the population would be more malle-
able to its will.
10. The Workers. Since the events of 13
August the industrial workers have been sub-
1 For 1962, aid of $310 million has been promised
East Germany in the form of goods, roughly double
the aid which we estimate it actually received in
1961.
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jected to heightened pressure for greater pro-
duction efforts without wage increases, and
at the same time have encountered privations
in day-to-day life. Nevertheless, the regime
has had little trouble from the workers, who
have the German's traditional respect for au-
thority and obligatory attitude toward work.
There is some evidence of passive resistance,
strikes, and even occasional sabotage, but no
sign of organized opposition. In any case,
mindful of the key role played by the workers
in the 1953 uprising, the regime is particu-
larly attentive to their mood, and would be
likely to take some action to alleviate discon-
tent among the workers before serious opposi-
tion developed.
11. The Professional Classes. Among the
professional classes, whose ranks were already
severely thinned by emigration prior to 13
August, resentment is particularly strong be-
cause of the severance of ties with their coun-
terparts and fields of specialization in the
West. Isolated instances of open but unor-
ganized opposition have been reported among
teachers and university professors. The re-
gime continues to offer inducements to the
professionals to cooperate, but we believe that
it will be no more successful in the near future
than in the past in enlisting significant sup-
port from this group.
12. The Youth. Antiregime sentiment is
more virulent among youth and students than
any other segment of the populace with the
exception of the farmers. It was apparent
even before 13 August, but it has been en-
hanced by the curtailment of the refugee
flow, which had regularly included a substan-
tial proportion of youth, and by the harsh
measures taken to tighten control over the
population since that time. Nevertheless, the
regime has encountered only minor and scat-
tered resistance from youth to the conscrip7
tion law, and no major campaign to boycott it
has materialized. Moreover, the government
has moved speedily and ruthlessly against
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youthful leaders of antiregime manifestations
and thus far has been able effectively to fore-
stall any organized activity in this group. In
the absence of conditions more propitious for
organized or widespread opposition, we believe
that the youth will be unable in the next few
years to coalesce into a significant challenge
to the regime.
13. The Peasants. Discontent has been
strong in the countryside in the wake of the
forced collectivization of 1960 and the unre-
lenting pressure on the peasants since that
time. The uncooperativeness of the peasants
has been an important factor in the decline of
agricultural production. In addition, since 13
August, incidents of open defiance, though
sporadic and unorganized, have been frequent
in the rural areas?especially such acts as
the burning of farm buildings, and the im-
proper feeding and illicit slaughter of live-
stock. The regime has been so concerned
about the attitude of the peasantry that it
has sent hundreds of agricultural specialists
and party and government functionaries to
the collective farms to exhort the peasants
to greater efforts, though this measure is
likely, if anything, to increase peasant resent-
ment. The countryside, however, is not suit-
able for organizing active opposition on a
large scale, and we believe that the regime
should have little trouble, with its security
forces, in keeping the rural populace under
control.
III. THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN UPRISING
14. Despite the resentments of the popula-
tion, sustained by the oppressive measures of
the regime, we believe that a general uprising
occurring spontaneously is unlikely. It is
always possible that local incidents could
spread into an outbreak of considerable mag-
nitude, but such developments are not possible
to predict with precision. The condition most
conducive to such a development would be the
popular impression that the authority of the
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regime was faltering or breaking down. This
could occur if the regime's behavior was un-
certain or contradictory, as was the case im-
mediately prior to the 1953 uprising. We also
believe that certain outside events, such as a
power struggle in the USSR, an intense crisis
in relations between the Communist states,
or greatly. sharpened East-West tensions over
Berlin would considerably increase the likeli-
hood of a general uprising in East Germany.
On balance, we believe that the presence of
Soviet forces and the memory of the repres-
sions in 1953 in East Germany and 1956 in
Hungary will continue to act as effective de-
terrents to a mass uprising. In the absence
of unusual external developments, as outlined
above, the people of East Germany are not
likely to engage in rash action on a large
scale unless they believe that decisive aid from
the West will be forthcoming.
IV. THE EFFECT OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES
15. Greatly sharpened tensions over Berlin
would arouse the regime's apprehension with
respect to popular unrest. In such an event,
we believe that the Soviets and the East Ger-
man regime would considerably increase in-
ternal security measures as a precaution.
Such measures would be likely, in turn, to
cause the populace to be more cautious in
taking actions which might provoke ruthless
repression.
16. If, in response to Soviet actions threat-
ing the Western presence in Berlin, the West
launched limited military operations to main-
tain access, the East German populace would
probably not rise against the Communist re-
gime. But hopes of liberation would be
aroused and in the confusion the purpose of
Western action might be misconstrued.
There probably would be local demonstrations
of defiance, and it is possible that these would
expand into an uprising on a considerable
scale, especially if the military operations con-
tinued and were enlarged. In any case,
ground operations in the vicinity of the fron-
tier would probably be regarded by many East
Germans as an opportunity for escape, and
attempts to do so would probably occur on
a mass scale. In such an event, efforts by
security forces to prevent breakouts could re:.
suit in open outbreaks of resistance which
might become widespread.
17. We believe that Western attempts to
organize or stimulate an uprising in East
Germany would not be successful unless
launched in conjunction with Western mili-
tary operations. Even in the absence of West-
ern military operations, some elements of the
populace would probably respond to appeals
for active resistance by undertaking sabotage
and other local acts of defiance. As long as
these acts remained localized, however, we
believe that the regime would have little diffi-
culty in suppressing them. On the other
hand, there is a good chance that appeals for
passive resistance would receive a wide re-
sponse, particularly under conditions of in-
creased tension in which the West was firmly
resisting a strong Soviet challenge to its posi-
tion in Berlin.
The Effect of Ulbricht's Departure
18. The inherent weaknesses of the SED,
and its heavy dependence upon the 68-year-old
Ulbricht, will make the succession problem
especially difficult in East Germany. His
death or incapacitation would almost cer-
tainly bring into question, not only in the
population but also within the party, the
durability of the hard-line policies with which
he is so thoroughly identified and perhaps
even the stability of the regime itself. The
Soviets at this juncture would be greatly con-
cerned to head off a crisis of authority. While
they are in a strong position to do this, the
loss of Ulbricht would face the Communist
regime with a severe test, and it is possible
that overt manifestations of unrest would
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19. The USSR, in addition to issuing pointed
reminders that the regime is guaranteed by
Soviet force, would almost certainly intervene
actively to head off any dangerous factional
struggles among Ulbricht's lieutenants. Some
form of collective leadership would be likely,
at least as an initial measure. Thereafter,
if stability still seemed to be threatened, the
Soviets might bring to the fore a successor
whose capabilities, like those of Ulbricht, lay
primarily in the area of intimidation. They
would probably prefer, however, to develop a
more moderate East German leadership better
equipped to pursue conciliatory domestic poli-
cies and to make the regime a more acceptable
partner for the confederation schemes which
the USSR regularly urges upon West Ger-
many.
20. If the Soviets decided to remove Ul-
bricht, the problems of the succession would
be far more complicated because of the dan-
gerous confusions that would appear in the
party and the population. This would be an
operation of such political delicacy that the
Soviets would be unlikely to attempt it with-
out a prolonged period of careful preparation.
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