NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00390R000300280012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 15, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONPNT IAL 1-4 -Ta
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET OS REGISTRY
SUBJECT: (Optional) 15 APR 1988
National Operations Security Program
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
OS 8-5546
Policy Branch/PPS
Office of Security
DATE
i APRIL.
Icl VII
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
.
C/Policy Br
C/PPS
BO/OS
13AP1*--?'
0
6
4.
D/OS
,
0 S
get_
1J
?
.
.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14
15
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS CON NTIAL
1-79
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* U.S. Government Printing Office: 1985-494-034/49156
STAT
S TAT
STAT
STAT
CONFIDENTIAL
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6 APR
1988
OS REGISTRY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Executive Director
1 5 APR 1988
VIA:
Deputy Director
for Administration
FROM:
Director of Security
SUBJECT:
National Operations Security Program
REFERENCE:
National Security Decision Directive
Number 298, dtd 22 January 1988
1. The attached memorandum requests each Deputy Director
to provide written comments to the Office of Security
indicating how a formal OPSEC program might be implemented in
the Agency and what current applications are being utilized
within their directorate. As the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) member to the Interagency Group for Countermeasures
(Policy) [IG/CM(P)], my Office will serve as the focal point
for coordination within the Agency.
2. It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum
addressed to the Deputy Directors.
Attachment
!OS/PB/PPS
!Distribution..
Orig - Adse!
8
2 - DDA!
? 1 - ER!
1 - C/CI Staff/DDO!
- OGI!
- OC!
- NIO/FDIA!
SMS/DDS&T!
- D/OS Chrono!
- PPS Chrono!
(4 Apr 88)
OS 8-5546
CONFIDENTIAL
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LyNriuhNTiAL
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
FROM: Executive Director
SUBJECT: National Operations Security Program
STAT
1. The attached National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) Number 298, entitled "National Operations Security
Program," was approved by the President on 22 January 1988.
This Directive establishes a National Operations Security
Program (OPSEC) and calls for each executive department and
agency substantially involved in or supporting national
security missions with classified nsitive activities to
STAT
establish a formal OPSEC program.
2. It is requested that addressees provide written
comments to the Policy and Plans Staff, Office of Security
(PPS/OS), Room 6S17, Stafford Building, indicating how a formal
OPSEC program might be implemented in the Agency and what
current applications are presently being utilized within your
directorate. Additionally, it is requested that your response
include the name and secure telephone number of a designated
focal point officer for thi subject. Questions may be
directed to C/PPS/OS, on extension
(secure).
Attachment
cc: Comptroller
James H. Taylor
CONFIDENTIAL
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S TAT
STAq
STAa
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SYSTFM Ti
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 22, 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO.41HE UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEFAYST4FF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISZANT TO THE PRESIDENT FO % POLICY DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, J: INT CHIEFS-00 STAFF
CLEAR REGULATORVCcMM SION
':RATQR, AGENCY FOR INTERJATrONAL
DEVE4?PMENT
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DIS NT AGENCY
DIRECT O'FICE OF SCIENCE AND TE NOLOGY POLICY
-
ADMINIPA CR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
DIRLCTORJ ITED STATiSINFORMATIeN AGENCY
ADMINIS , NATIoNAL-AE4Tuarrics AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY41130ARD
CHAIRMAN,ORESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOReeINFORMATION,SECURI,TY OVERSIGHT OFFICE
DIRECTOR, WRITE HOUSE/MILITARY OFFICE
,-- `3
SUBJECT: National Operations tectrity,Progtam
?
The President has app ve the at curity
Natio
Decision Directive (N D) stab1iin.2 Nati alperations
??:4,
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Security Program (OPSEC)4*Phis unclasfiTied Ngbp calls for each
Executive department ancVagfncy substentiaMy involved in or
supporting national securi4, mission*wi1 CIAissi*ied'or
sensitive activities to establish a ?f0,r4,41 OPIEC,dorogram. While
the NSDD cannot be circulated, a Fact SheetcOntaining identical
information shouldApe given the widest distribution possible
within your agency/department. The DCI should provide copies
the appropriate committees of Congress.
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachments
NSDD
Fact Sheet
olin . Pow 1
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
STAT
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WASHINGTON.--
, ,
.1
... : January 22,-088
./
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 298
OBJECTIVE
NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM
Security programs and procedures already exist to protect clas-
sified matters. However, information generally available to the
public as well as certain detectable activities reveal the
existence of, and sometimes details about, classified or
sensitive information or undertakings. Such indicators may
assist those seeking to neutralize or exploit U.S. Government
actions in the area of national security. Application of the
operations security (OPSEC) ,process promotes operational effec-
tiveness by helping prevent the inadver? ?romise of -
sensitive or classified U.S., Governmenteactivit capabilities,
or intentions.
OPSEC PROCESS
The operations sec
tion of critical inforinAtio"
vulnerabilities, assesspent
priate counter1neasures.V Th
of the totality of an a' iv.
unclassified evidence of4 cik
ss involves five?
f thre
f ris appl
proces
y to d
sified
be s w
rm
light of the known collet?ob capabili
vity co
?
a
identifica-
nalysis of
of appro-
examinat ion
loitable but
be acquired in
ential adver-
saries. Such evidence Usti-illy derives fr.' enly available
data. Certain indicators may be pieced together or interpreted
to discern critical information. Indicators most often stem from
the routine administrative, physical, or technical actions taken
to prepare for or execute a plan or activity. Once identified,
they-are analyzed against the threat to determine the extent to
which they may reveal critical information. Commanders and
managers then use these threat and vulner,444.4y analyses in
risk assessments to assistA;n the selec4Onnaadoption of
countermeasures.
,
OPSEC thus is a systemntic
Government and its s1Iport
adversaries informOlon
identifying, contrAgaill
evidence of the planne
activities.
nd prove
contra
t capabilities
protecting. gene
execu f sens
ich the U.S.
to potential
ntions by
nclassified
Government
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APPLICATION
,
_
Indicators and vulnera4ilities,are best identlfied through
, . .
_ .
detailed OPSEC planning before activities statt. .They may also
be identified during/orafter the conduct of routine functional
activities by analyzing,how.functions are actually.performed and
the procedures used. ,Planning and analysis proceed from the
adversary's-perspective. To assist inOPSEC planning and
analysis, OPSEC planning guidance mOst'te develbpedjointly by
those most familiar with the operational-.aspeCts of a particular
activity together with their supporting intelligence elements.
??.2
OPSEC planning guidanceshouid take account of-those aspects of
an activity that should be protected in light of U.S. and
adversary goals, estimated key adversary questions, probable
adversary knowledge, desirable and harmful adversary apprecia-
tions, and pertinent intelligence threats. OPSEC planning
guidance should also outline OPSEC measures to complement
physical, information, personnel, signals, computer, communica-
tions, and electronic security measures. OPSEC measures may
include, but are not limited to, counter.i,maggu, cover, conceal-
ment, and deception.
In the OPSEC process,
analysis of threat a
implementation, on
OPSEC measures ar
analyses, but ultim
commanders, supervis
aspects of a program o
maker with ultimate res
resource management mu
where and how OPSEC wi
important.7 toidia
vulnerability the
othe . RecoMMend tion
joint operationa
ions on implement:
program gers
vity to,be rotect
onsibilityiformissio
h e complkautIty
applied.
POLICY
sh between
and, and
the use of-
ligence
re made by
ermine the
he decision-
...1.
accomplishment and
r determining
A National Operations Security Program is hereby established.
Each Executive department and agency assigned or supporting
national security missions with classified or sensitive activi-
ties shall establish a formal OPSEC program with the following
common features:
Specific assignment,r responsib y fo.SEC direction
and implementation
Specific requirements o plan
anticipation aVan ere app
agency activit.,_
Direction to use 0 analyt
identifying vulne ties a
measures.
nt OPSEC in
g department or
assist in
priate OPSEC
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Enactment of measures to ensure that all personnel, commen-
surate with their positions and security clearances, are
aware oehostile intelligence threats and understand the
OPSEC process.
Annual review and evaluation of OPSEC procedures so as to
assist the improvement of OPSEC programs.
Provision for interagency support and cooperation with
respect to OPSEC programs.
Agencies with minimal activities that could affect national
security need not establish a formal OPSEC program; however, they
must cooperate with other departments and agencies to minimize
damage to national security when OPSEC problems arise.
ACTION
Heads of Executive departments and agencies assigned or support-
ing national security missions.
Heads of Executive departments or agencies
e -1
missions shall:
?110
Establish organizational OPSEC
, .
Issue, as approprzatei
planning guidance? and
- '41 I
Designate departmental and
A ;
Further, they shall advi,is4the Nati
OPSEC measures required of4other Exe
agencies in order to ach and main
with national security
ams;,,
OPSEC policiesW1pocedures, and
%
lanners
ectii i t y Co u nc i 1 (NSC) on
ive departments and
16-Cive operations or
activities. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
advise the NSC of the impact of nonmilitary U.S. policies on the
effectiveness of OPSEC measures taken by the Armed Forces, and
recommend to the NSC policies to minimize any adverse effects.
for OPSEC.
Chairman, Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I).
Consistent with previous Directives, thOlqjG7I has responsibility
for national OPSEC policy formulation rsolutTion of interagency
differences, guidance Mitional-1 1 OC *caning, technical
OPSEC support, and advrCello indivi41alxectitive departments and
agencies. The National Oplrations city Aqviiory Committee
(NOAC), as part ofele,SIGI structednd fUnctioning under the
aegis of the Inter4.9endy Group for Counteriii4i6ur4,s (Policy),
will:
-
-- Advise the SIG-I tr ture on res fot re ucing OPSEC
vulnerabilities Ad propose corredttmemeasures;
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As requested, consult'with, and provide advice and recom-
mendations to, the variousdepartments,and agencies concern-
ing OPSEG vulnerabilities. and corrective measures;
On an ad hoc basis, chair meetings of representatives of two
or more Executive departments or agencies having competing
interests or responsibilities with OPSEC implications that
may affect national security interests. Analyze the issues
and prepare advisory memoranda and recommendations for the
competing agencies. In the event NOAC fails to resolve
differences, it shall submit the issue, together with its
recommendation, to the SIG-I for resolution, which may
recommend a meeting of the Policy Review Group (PRG) to
consider the issue;
Bring to the attention of the SIG-I unsolved OPSEC vulner-
abilities and deficiencies that may arise within designated
programs and activities of the Executive branch; and
Specify national-level requirements for intelligence and
counterintelligence OPSEC support to.,.-ttke SIG-I.
-
Director, National SecuritY Agency.
4 ...
The Director, Natio Security Agency ,-igated Executive
t,
Agent for interag OPSEC training,n t. Apacity, he has
responsibility t s..i4t Eiecutive departm i--a agencies, as
needed, to establiS OPSEC1programs; develop 'fb d p ovide inter-
agency OPSEC training courses, anfficelablish d 04intain an
Interagency OPSEC Supp4rtaff (Igps)f whos empership shall
include, at a minimum,* representative._ ,f, DeArtment of
Defense, the Department oflEnergy,-tlw C611 al Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of InvestIllation, and4the General
Services AdministrationfiLTIle IOSS wiItftlaggW.
Carry out interagency, national-level, OPSEC training for
executives, program and project managers, and OPSEC
specialists;
Act as consultant to Executive departments and agencies in
connection with the establishment of OPSEC programs and
OPSEC surveys and analyses; and
-fr
Provide an OPSEC techincal
Nothing in this directive:i
staftrforthe SIG-I.
4
_
Is intended to,infrinsie on the
ties of the Diiector!4f Centr
intelligence sourdesRnd meth
the Intelligence Commdnity as
No. 12333; or
authorI4ts and responsibili-
,,4
telligglaceco protect
nor those 0 any member of
fied Executive Order
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Implies an authority.b? the part ofthe SIG1-I Interagency
Group for Countermeasures (Policy) or the NOAC to examine
the facilities or Operations of any Executive department or
agency without the approval of the head ox such Executive
department or agency.
cv-isLeK
'411
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