LETTER TO MR. BRIAN V. KINNEY FROM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 22, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

CENTRAL INT?ELLIG E'F& AGF4CY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
,Nov llaV SECRET W 22 April I9
Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Mr. Kinney:
In response to the letter of 1 April 1982 from the OSD Records Administrator,
we have reviewed the six attachments thereto, under the provisions of paragraph
3-401, Executive Order 12065, with the following findings:
a. CIA has no objection to declassification of the following:
(1) Paper, Undated, Subj: Intelligence on Attitudes of Afghanistan
Government Toward Middle East Regional Defense Pact and Soviet Communism;
(2) Paper, 22 Mar 54, Subj: CIA Proposed Amendment to Draft.
Conclusions Re Agricultural Surpluses; and
(3) Paper, 17 Mar 54, Subj: Surplus or Deficit Position of Various
Countries in Major Agricultural Commodities Available for Export from the
United States/w 1 Attachment--Chart, EIC-P-9.
b. CIA has no objection to declassification of the following provided
the Department of State concurs:
(1) Paper, Undated, Subj: Possible U. S. Courses of Action With Regard
to Afghanistan;
(2) Paper, 25 Jan 54, Subj: Notes on South Asia; and
(3) Memo, Feb 1, 54, Re: Comments on the Philippines Draft, TS-78035.
Chief, a-5ica Lon Review ivision
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
Enclosures:
1. Paper, Undated
2. Paper, Undated
3. Paper, dtd. 25 Jan 54
4. Paper, dtd 22 Near 54
5. Paper, dtd 17 Mar 54
6. Memo, dtd 1 Feb 54
SECRET
Distribution:
Ori ressee w encl_____ __
-
Liaison w/DoD w/encl 2, 4, & 5
)
Unclassified when
Separated from
Enclosures
i nrnnn 1M! n I-11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Alp proved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
Possible U. S. Courses of Action With 'Regard to Afohanistan
The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan notes
certain dangers from intensification of Soviet interest in Afghanistan as
evidenced by the recent Afghan-Soviet agreenst:nts. The NIF, believes a
gradual drift toward the Soviet orbit is a probable result although
openly aggressive action by the USSR is viewed as unlikely because of
the danger of strong anti-Soviet reactions elsewhere in the Arab-Asian
bloc,
The U. S. and its allies probably do not have a major stake in the
continuance of Afghan freedom from Soviet dominance. However, an advance
of Soviet ascendancy to the southern borders of Afghanistan would entail
certain undesirable consequences: Soviet military access to the borders
of Pakistan and the port of Karachi would be enhanced with consequent
greater strain on the defensive burdens of Pakistan while such Soviet
subjection of another free area would be viewed bar werld opinion as a
defeat for the West and the U. S. with consequent dana.ne to our own
prestige and the morale of our friends, particularly if Soviet control
were achieved in spite of U. S. exertions to repel it.
Courses of action for countering the trend of increasing Soviet
influences in Afghanistan may be divided broadly into three categories:
some form of military assistance to Afghanistan or its adherence to a
Middle-East security system,, increased economic assistance to kfghanistan,
and some form of merger or union of Afghanistan with Pakistan. Choice of
any course of action would be influenced by our estimate of Soviet
intentions,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
Military Assistance
Given the gradual procedures of the U. S. Government for conclusion
.e d fulfillment of arms aid agreements, it would prob bly be i possible
to deliver military equipment to Afghanistan with the promptness or of
a-gnitude sufficient to counterbalance the effects of adverse Soviet
reaction. Similarly the adherence of Afghanistan to a Middle-East defense
system even after the latter had reached an advanced stage of development
might merely add a weak and exposed member who would create a liability to
other participants not justified by Afghanistan's contribution nor even by
real gain in Afghan security. An attempt to include Afghanistan in a
still developing security system would entail the risk or immediate
Ct.urr,i.a. reaction worsening the position of ifghanistan and weakening the
Security system itself.
"[n recent weeks Afghan spokesmen have pleaded their great need for
small arms and have uuggested that perhaps these might be purchased with
S. credits quietly extended so as to lessen chances of Russian counter-
action. 'fhi.s would not be easy to arrange. i;owever, the need for small
arson may weld. be quite genuine. Their acquisition might fulfill a
desirable end in strengthening Afghanistan's military and internal
security .forces. The Pakistanis could be expected to object strenuously
to such deliveries. And in fact there would be great difficulty in
assuring that small arms delivered to the Government of Afghanistan
would not find their way into the hands of tribesmen bent on harassment
of Pakistani borders. In the light of our present relations with
Pakistan anything we undertake should be with the knowledge and consent of
f=,-kistan.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
Stepped up economic aid to Afghanistan mif,;ht serve several purposes,
depending to some extent on its characters size and conditions of delivery.
The afghans feel that their economic difficulties require additional
foreign assistance and they are thus easily tempted by Soviet offers of
help.
Oar primary objective should be to provide aid whose net effect would
be to slow or stop the growth of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Our
program should act as propaganda to offset admiration for Soviet achieve-
meats, and it should also aim at meeting the long-range development needs
of the Afghan economy. Further, we should aim at meeting such urgent
capital and technical needs of Afghanistan as are likely targets for
additional Soviet offers, (the airfield at Ka-1.1ishar and Afghanistan's
telecommunications system, for example). Such a program, particularly
if it sought to foster real strides in .Afghanistan's economic development,
might well involve amounts eight or ten times our current rate of investment.
Vithout advising the Afghans in advance, we might be ready with measures
to assist Afghanistan to extricate itself through suitable commodity or
financial aid from Soviet threats and interference consequent to any
Afghan inability to meet barter or other Soviet contract demands.
Additional U. S. aid might be conditioned on or held out as an
inducement to Afghan agreement to certain desirable political objectives,
for example acceptance of a reasonable. settlerient of the Fushtunistan
problem. Afghan pride and sensitivity provide form-idable barriers to
acceptance of such conditions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
7
Increase of economic aid would entail certain disadvantages. The
Afghans might well find advantage in trying to play one side off against
the other for their own gain. Similarly, stepped-up U. S. aid might
bring sharper Soviet reactions detrimental to Afghan independence.
Confederation with Pakistan
kith no clear concept in mind on either side, discuselon and thinking
of the two parties has ranged over a wide variety of possibilities from
simple cooperation in a few economic projects alonp the common border to
abolition of the e fglanistan-Prakistan boundary and installation of the`
Afghan King as constitutional monarch at Karachi.
The greatest advantage of the broader concept would be its promise
of settlement of the Pushtunistan dispute which has weakened both countries
and made difficult cooperation between them. However, complete integration
of Afghanistan with Pakistan would in effect create a much larger but
prob,xbly weaker Pakistan with an extended Soviet border. Pakistan defenses
and administrative talent would be spread even more thinly than at present
with a probable increase in the urgency of Pakistani demands for U. S.
military assistance. Strong adverse reactions from the US R. and India
could be expected. Afghanistan's Foreign Minister has told us of his
interest in confederation although we have no clear indication of the
attitude of his more powerful brother, Prime Minister Daud. In time,
however, a new nation more capable of resistin;= Russian pressure might
be created given considerable amounts of outside military and economic
assistance.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
j)LUtUI- a %MIIOF
A start might be made towards merger through some limited forms of
cooperation in economic matters, for example in development of hydro-
electric schemes near the common border. Si.mrzi.lr rly, there might be
cooperative effort in construction of highways, in the establishment
of a free port at Karachi and in improved arrangements for marketing
fruits in Pakistan. The Pakistanis have expressed impatience with the
vagueness and inconstancy of Afghan proposals but they indicate definite
interest in modest cooperative efforts which they envisage as':ieading
eventually to more important moves, for example a customs union.
U. S. economic assistance might be directed toward a significant
role in encouraging closer relations bet+tren the two countries-, particu-
larly in cooperative economic endeavors.
Afghan inflexibility on Puchtunistan continues with little apparent
prospect for modification in the Afghan attitude. Gradual progress towards
confederation would provide promise of creatiag better political and
emotional conditions for settlement of the Pustitunistark. question.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
`. V V i'~"E J r V ~~
22 111 h 1954
OIL~~P1 -Po ANENDt N? I3 ~~
T CONCLUSIONS III AORIC , ,L SURPLUSES
Amend paragraph 3, $ to read$
?d. Aside front the meant diseased above' the r cpt
by the Soviet and Eurapen sate .alit* peopl of fl agriculttwa1
a irpl es is small amounts could Involve no clear eeCxw.t'
advantage or diaattvantaa!t -to the US. even Vtot these peoples
havo tit been able bt ter se to obtain frm their Soviet,
masters sufficient ., ctr l c edittee.7 1here ;,h
be i secx3 disadvantage to the VS if the 5oviet8 obtain
r tids of ealected IbS &E.21.6ultura2 pEAuats suffiofe'rt to
psresit a 6i0ifioaiit improvemextt in the con ion le j
pax tioulAr of those dairg and i it l projtacts I.V ich tk X
a ''Cte m03t S d8fICIOnt-11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85BOO236ROO0200190002-1
ECONCP(IC INTELLIGENCE sMITTEE
SUBCc1MITTEE ON AGHICULTURE
EIC-P-9
create major surplus disposal problems for the U.S. economy,
b. could be made ava3.lable, if desired, in sufficient quantities
to be potentially important economic or psychological factors
in the struggle between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World
include the following t
Commodity
Wheat
Butter
Cottonseed Oil
Linseed Oil
Cotton
Dried Milk
Rice
Estimated
Volx of U.S. Stocks
Jui 19
83D minion bushels
. 4e5 " powtds
1,080 "
580 #
9,800 thousand bales
63,5 million pounds
1400
2,& Attached is a tabulation wring U.S. and other Free World
surpltses of these products with a generally deficit situations in
the Soviet Bloc and in bordering!V countries.
1/ This is a preliminary euen?sry of an ETC Working Paper under prepara.
of Agriculture, and it has not yet been reviewed or approved by
COMMODITIES AVATLABLE FOR EXPORT FROM THE UNITED 'STATES
1. The principal U.S. agricultural commodities which:
tion by the FIC Subcommittee on Agriculture. It is based on material
prepared by a small working group from CIA and the U.S. Department
A .tlh only bordering non-.Bloc importers aria discussed in this
sui wy, all major Importers or exporters are covered in supple-
mentary appendices.
.material can be reviewed by the EIC.
either the ETC or its Subcommittee on Agriculture. While its am-
olusions reflect the best data available, they are subject to minor
modifications - particularly in detailed statistics. It is planned
to Issue a fuller, agreed Working Paper as soon as the working group
S-E -C.R-U-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85BOO236ROO0200190002-1
 YTER
OIL
RILL :`L+ Ids
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
MAJOR SURPLUS CCIIMO:7IT IN Ti U )ITuf) STATES WITH SURPLUS OR PIOII3 PGsr2ION
SPEC ' V CO
UaS. stocks
June 30,
1951
(Vi 13 uns)
SURPLUS COUNTRIES
Soviet Bloc
Probable Exoorte
Non-1310C
Probable f its
830.0
USSR
61.3
Canada
300.0
Australia
.0
85
Areeny4dna
?
8
125.0
1325.0
USSR
20.0
Zealand
. Now
3115.3
Denmark
2613.6
Australia
83.0
Argentina
20.0
615.0
USSR
N
New Zealand
95.4
Netherlands
1
9 15.0
Australia
60,0
1,080.0
China
150.0
Anglo ,gy Sudan
130.0
Uganda
2010
Pakistan
0
20.0
53o.o
China
15.0
Argentina
300.0
Canada
100.0
9.8
USSR
1.0
mrgt
1.5
Brazil
1.3
Pakistan
1.1
Mexico
0.9
1,00.0
Chian
1,322.8
Thailand 2,854.0
BLUM& 13,180,,4
Soviet Bloc
Probable Ivorts
Czechoslovakia
113.7;
V. GermwW
E. GermarV
18.7
Austria
Yugoslavia
India
Japan
Czechoslovak9a.
20,0
1,'. Germazr
E. Germany
130.0
Finland
Austria
ism
Ind a
USSR
350.0
W1 Oermax
C. Germazr
10.0
Japan
Czechoslovakia
5.0
India
USSR
330.0
it. GerwW
Czechoslova
60.0
Japan
Poland
135.0
India
Iluzary
16.0
China
0.3
1'1. Germarq
Czechoslovakia
0.3
Yugoslavia
Poland
o.S5
Sweden
2. 0e
0.3
Japan
India
213.0
3.5
1.8
50.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
q ~?4./0
28,0
6o.o
1.2
0.1
0.1
2.4
0,13
Ceylon 1,21010
India 2,200,0
Japan 2,865.0
;;ya zOL5.0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
(,
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
Ile Individual Co nodity Positions
1. Wheat. The USSR and its- European satellites have traditionally
been heavy gain exporters, although increasing populations and redis-
tribution of agricultural emphases have greatly reduced f 'rrmer wheat
surpluses. Now only the USSR itself is a substantial wheat exporter,
having shipped some 60 million bushels over the past year. Past Germany
and Czechoslovakia, hoover, must import wheat; so that the net Bloc -
surplus for 1953-54 was only about 40 million bushels, loth the USSR
and its European satellites have recently initiated vigorous progress
to increase wheat production.
The Bloc clearly will ordinarily be self-sufficient in wheat over
the rext 15 months, and may be in position to increase its own exports
to bordering non-Bloc countries, Of these, West Germa , India, Pakistan,
Japan and Yugoslavia have the heaviest import deficits, Canada, Austra-
lia and Argentina are major exporters,
2. Butter. Most of the non-Bloc countries of the world are more
adequ ately snip ied with edible rats and oil, generally, than are
Soviet countries. Butter supply, as such,, is particularly deficit in
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the USSR itself. Although per capita
butter consumption in the USSR is only 4.4 pounds per annurm, the Soviet
has been obliged during the past year to ship 150 million pounds to
East Germany and Czechoslovakia to relieve food shortages there, No
Soviet Bloc countries have any surplus butter and thei generally Aq.,
adequate butter supplies are not expected to improve over the next 15
month s,
Among Free World countries west Germany, Finland and Austria are
heavily deficit in butter while New Zealand, Denmark, Austr Zia and
Argentina are important exporters.
3. Dried milk. Of Bloc countries only the USSR uses substantial
quantities of dried milk, all of which is produced internally for
domestic consumption. Of bordering non-3loc countries only Japan and
India are significant importers. Since there is rather limited con-
sumer acceptance of powdered milk, it is doubtful if any Bloc or
bordering non-Bloc countries could be particularly interested in obtaining
large quantities,
Other Free World exporters include.New Zeaiands the Netherlands and
Australia. Significant changes in levels of adequacy of dried milk
supply are unlikely over the next 15 months - especially in view of the
elo ss with which consumer acceptance would seem subject to change,
Li. Cotes ed oil. In the Soviet Bloc this is of major im.
ports-ice rw so - e nce palm and cocoanut oils are difficult for them
to obtain,, any do not have adequate technical facilities to use
cottonseed oil freely as an edible oil, During the current year the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
Yr
S-E-C-R-E-T
USSR is expected to import (principally from China) the/equivale t of
China's export surplus, estimated at 150 million pounds'; while East
Oernax*q and Czechoslovakia- will import an additional 15 million pounds
frcmm non?t3loc sources. In general, the Bloc (exclusive of China) will
probably attempt to import as much cottonseed oil as possible during
the next 15 months as part of the over-all plan to increase consumer
goods,
It is estimated that U.S. stocks of cottonseed oil will approximate
1,080 million pounds by July 19511 - representing some 80 percent of
Free World stocks, (Bloc stocks will probably be negligible.) Other
important non-Bloc exporters will probably bet
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Uganda (East-central Africa)
Pakistan
West Germ arW
Japan
India
~. Linseed oil. In Soviet Bloc countries the principal use of
li.nse? d o ' s?or aking paints - although It also has limited utilization
AOL for edible purposes. The USSR and its European satellites are inadequately
supplied with linseed oil and other industrial oils generally. Their
1953/n levels of e;~e ports of linseed oil will about equal their own in-
digencus productinam USSR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are the prin.
cipal Bloc consumers of industrial oils and should import some 365 million
pounds this year from non-Bloc sources. In addition, China is expected
to sell the other Bloc countries most of its own surplus of 15 minion
pounds .
The USSR is planning a sharp increase in linseed oil production in
1954/55 and may be in a position to reduce her imports by that date.
Offsetting this factor will be the increased consumer demand for paints.
astern Germany,, Japan and Sweden are the only significant peripheral
country importers.
The major non-Bloc ex orters during 1953/54 will be Argentina'
Canada and the United States. These countries will have July 1955 stocks
of linseed oil far in excess of the negligible stocks which will, be avail..
able in the Bloc at that time. U.S. stocks alone exceed the estimated
industrial cormoption of linseed oil-1W a entire diet Bloc.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
tries. purthermore 01st Gina will import an estimated 300#000
baUs from non-Bloc sources in 1953, .
a
European satellites ? which produce only limited quantities domestically
Soviet?B]at- as a whole remains an important net importer of cotton.
Raving achieved self-sufficiency at very low per capita levels, the US3Et
nds 44 necsasary to ship about me million balsa aramal1y to the
S
S-E-.C-R-V.-T
.,o
l~f Cotton. Despite intenr Pied production in the , the
the next 15 months any USSR success in further increasing
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
lWor peripheral none-Bloc importers over the next 15 amthe win
probably be Japan, India, Ceylon and Malaya - while Burma and Thailand
Bap a
present meager supplies of cotton textiles; and they accordingly
be vnWer strong preasurea to increase imports from non-Bloc sources.
Principal peripheral (non-Bloc) Importers Include Japan,, West GeznwWv
India., Austria, Sweden and lhgoslavi a. Major non-B c exporters an
t# Pakistan, Brazil and Max1co.
7. Ries. C d st China i s the only l erg t i ty dealer in
rice in et Moo, producing and consuming over 98 percent of
total Bloc output. Although rice provides some, 55 percent total calorie
intake in China (perhaps 80 percent in such of South China), its con-
t1-on in the USSR and European satellites is urdnportant, - except in
a f isolated localities. Actually it is expected that Comvxdst China
may sport relatively wall quantities of rice in 1953/54 (perhaps 6W,O0O
toms of nearly 50 million tans producticca), probably to the Moo (possibls
divervi.ons, to forces in Indo-China are not known), No specific estimates
are f ble for met Chinese rice stocks as of July 1955# although
they two ted to be substantially 1ower`ian those of important non-
cotton production will tend to be offset by pradeed increases in con-
tion of textiles. In any event neither China nor the &wqDean
aatel7Citea can depend on Bloc productio to support an Increase in
will be the principal Free World exporters.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review
During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and
Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for
Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned
up the attached document(s).
The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information
for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise
of interest to you.
It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and
recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or
lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies. If your
agency is recommending continued classification, in accordance with Para-
graph 3-401, Executive Order 12065, it is requested that an authority for
continued classification be specified, along with a date for the next review.
The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all
OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume
of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your res-
ponse within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance
with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to
have referred to you in the future.
Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please
return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Head-
quarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon
completion of your review.
Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.
E. E. Lowry,
DEPA ME 1j o7e SE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
. April 1, 1982
Attachments (6)
Tnv cTr.Ur
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS
1.
Paper, Undated, Subj: Intelligence on Attitudes of Afghanistan Government
Toward Middle East Regional Defense Pact and Soviet Communism (TS)
OK
2.
Paper, Undated, Subj: Possible U. S. Courses of Action With Regard to 0< _5tatt
Afghanistan (S)
3.
Paper, 25 Jan 54, Subj : Notes on South Asia (TS) C)K- iT..tt
4.
Paper, 22 Mar 54, Subj: CIA Proposed Amendment to Draft Conclusions Re OK.
Agricultural Surpluses (S)
5.
Paper, 17 Mar 54, Subj: Surplus or Deficit Position of Various Countries
in Major Agricultural Commodities Available for Export from the United
States/w 1 Attachment--Chart, EIC-P-9 (S)
e k
6.
Memo, Feb 1, 54, Re: Comments on the Philippines Draft, TS-78035 (TS)
U `tv~e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190002-1