SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003000210001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTRODUCTION
The USSR, having applied all but the final touches to its Eastern
European Satellites, appears to be preparing for a final assault against
Czechoslovakia. With the exception of Finland? Czechoslovakia is the only
country bordering on the USSR which has thus far escaped the full Soviet treat-
ment. Czechoslovakia has considerable independence in the conduct of its
internal affairs; the, individual still has a measure of personal freedom and
a freely operating parliamentary government rules the country.
The extent to which Czechoslovakia can resist the expected Soviet onslaught
will have important repercussions throughout Europe and may be a barometer of
the future trend of US USSR, relations. The course of events in Czechoslovakia
which will., determine whether a Socialist state can function successfully in
poet-war Europe without falling, prey to the Communists, may forecast the trend
in western Europe. Failure of the USSR to mould Czechoslovakia completely into
the Soviet pattern would be a severe strategic and ideological blow to the
grenlin and would increase the will to resist of the non-Communists in Western
Europe. Conversely, if Czechoslovakia ngoeon, the USSR will,have taken another
significant westward step which will further demonstrate the unlikelihood that
a working compromise with the Communists can be achieved in Europe. Moreover,
a Canmunist Czechoslovakia would further curtail trade between Eastern and
Western Europe, materially increasing the need for US aid to the European
recovery program. 77-~""~-- ?ox fasmuoocr
The present National Front Government in ~3xr twos .~' ,
? :
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established in March 1945# and in May 1946 free national elections were held,
Five parties of major importance emerged: Communist (324 seats in Parliament),,
Social Democrats (37), National Socialists (55), Peoples (46), and Slovak
Democrats (43). The Commuyiete became the strongest single party,, and
together with the Social Democrats gave the Leftists a slim parliamentary
majority over the moderate parties. All parties agreed upon the broad prin-
ciples of the government's domestic program,.. including extensive nationalization
of Industry, but lively controversy developed over the application of these
principles. The Communists have adhered until recently to parliamentary rules
in their disagreements with the moderates and during the first year and a half
under the present .government, neither aide gained any significant advantage
over the other: The Czechoslovak government's foreign policy, however, has
been more subservient to the Kremlin than its domestic policy. Committed to
a 20-year alliance with the USSR and nearly surrounded by Soviet-occupied
areas, Czechoslovakia has been forced for security reasons to follow the USSR's
foreign policy line.
Elements of CoMnuniet Strength
The Czechoslovak Communist Party emerged from World War II with power
and popular support second only to Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe. In addition
to the Premiership., the key ministries of Interior, Information and Finance,
and the Under secretaryship for Foreign Affairs are held by Communists, who also
control the Security Police and many local governing bodies in Bohemia and
%ave.
Moravia. Communist infiltration and effective control of the Ate bee been
achieved through close collaboration with the USSR, a promotion policy favoring
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officers trained in the USSR and the appointment of top ofticiet:$ympathetie
to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the ComrmM ist Parby wields effective control
over labor through its domination of ROH, the national trade union organization.
Supplementing these tangible levers for gaining control of the government]
the Cosmmaniata have exploited the constant threat implicit in the presence of
Soviet troops nearly encircling Czechoslovakia. on the propaganda front, too]
the Communists have had a powerful weapon in their ability to point to the
Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia+e chief protection against a resurgent Germany.
Elements of ton-Coctnist Strength
Despite the Czechoslovak Communists' apparent power to follow the lead
of their colleagues in Eastern Europe, the non-Communists today are as strong
--o and in some respects stronger - than they were two years ago. The
explanation for the CaiumusiateI failure to take advantage of their position is
found in a coatinatiorr o? internal and external factors which have forced the
USSR to treat Czechoslovakia with considerably more circumspection than it hag
the other Eastern European countries.
The political climate in Czechoslovakia militates against the establish-
merit of a Communist suite. in comparison with the people of other countries
in Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovaks are politically mature and strongly imbued
with Western ideals of democracy. They poesevB a high standard of living and a
love for individual freedom: While many Czechoslovaks favor friendly relations
with the USSR, and are sympathetic with theoretical communism, they instinctively
resist totalitarian authority and police-state techniques. They are a practical
people adept at resolving political crises by negotiation and compromise and
thus better able to deal with the Co=uniste than some of their more mercurial.
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and devious Eastern
neighbors. Moreover, Czechoslovak nationalism is highly
developed and deeply entrenched. The average Czechoslovak Communist is loyal
first to his country and secondly to Moscow to a degree not found in any other
Eastern European country. Conversely,, there are few Moscow-trained prewar
Comintern Com=nists in Czechoslovakia.
Political factors,, therefore,$ place Czechoslovakia in atatsgory different
from that of the other nations bordering on the USSR. The economics consequence
of complete subjugation to the Cc$tuniste would further intensity political
resistance. Rapid integration of the highly industrialized Czechoslovak
economy with that of the USSR and the imposition of the drastic controls
necessary for complete communization of the economy wouldt (1) reduce
Czechoslovak trade with the West upon which Czechoslovakia is completely.
dependent for many raw aateriale and machinery; (2) further diminish economic
productivity by provoking widespread economic sabotage; (3) result in a con-
siderably lower standard of living throughout the country. The USSR's
immediate post-war need for Czechoslovak industrial products has been in part
responsible for its present maoft" policy.. An all-out drive for power by the
Communists] therefore, would indicate that the USSR had sacrificed economic
for political considerations..
Since the country's liberation, the Cownunist Party has steadily lost
popular support. Events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated to non-Coannusists
in Czechoslovakia that, regardless of national intereste, the Communist Party
is merely an agent of the Kremlin. Even in Czechoslovakia, the Communists
have tipped their hand sufficiently to make the moderates detect the guiding
hand of the Kremlin and stiffen their anti-Comminiet stand accordingly.
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Consequently, a Comatunist coup would be more difficult now than it would have
been two years ago and would probably require the support of Soviet troops..
By providing such support; the USSR would risk grave international complica-
tions..
RECENT CQi)iUNISx ACTIVITY
Soviet efforts to take over Czechoslovakia, reflected in an increase of
Coigrauniet activity, accelerated markedly after Czechoslovakia embarrassed the
USSR by its initial acceptance of the invitation to participate in the Paris
Conference on the European recovery program. The USSR's flagrant interference
In Czechoslovak affairs by forbidding Czechoslovak acceptance indicated that
the USSR is reads to force its satellites to sacrifice economic benefits for
compliance with the Kresz3.infs foreign policy. Recent Communist activity
further suggests that the USSR is no longer content with partial control of
the country and may be conten{plating the use of extra legal methods to seize
absolute control. Since July, the political atmosphere has remained tense as.
a !result of security police arrests, violent attacks by the.Co=uziate on the
Slovak Democratic as well as the National Socialist parties, and a series of
Communist-inspired cabinet crises threatening the National Front.
Securitr.Polio e Arrests
Arrests by. the Communist-controlled National gecurity Corps (SNB) he
increased during recent weeks and taken on a different character. Originally
organized on a volunteer basis in 1945 to round up collaborators and investigate
the German minority, the SNB soon came under the control of the Communist
minister of Interior and was given a legal basis in July 1947. Althovah
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potential.ly:a conveniieit means of political coercion, open criticism by non-
Communists of the SN8es methods of operation and its predominately communist
staff have largely restricted it to its recognized functions such as criminal
investigation, customs controls air patrol and passport superai.sion. In
September and October, however, SUB officials uncovered in Slovakia two alleged
plots against the state,. and rounded up several hundred people of whom 237 are
now being held for trial, They also raided the Prague office of Deputy Prime
Minister# Jan Ursiny, a Slovak Democrat; and subsequently arrested. four of his
subordinates. The SttB is now reportedly concentrating its efforts on securing
evidence for treason trials against the state] with particular emphasis on
connection between Czechoslovaks and US intelligence representatives. This
activity, if energetically pursued, may be an attempt to emulate the highly
effective "treason" trials used by the Conmmists in other Eastern European
countries.
Attacks on Slovak Democratic PartF
The Slovak Democratic Party# organized only in Slovakia,, is the focal
point of Cam:sunist activity against the opposition. The Party is a logical
choice as the Connunistse first target because of its vulnerability and its
dominant position in Slovakia (61.5 per cent of the votes in 1946). out-
spokenly oonservativej'and supported by the Catholic Church,, the Slovak Democrats
have not given vhole-hearted support to the Governmentfs program and have
opposed any curtailment of Slovakian autonomy. The Communists are exploiting
the Slovak Democratic Party's lack of homogeneity which results from the strong
antagonism between its Protestant and Catholic adherents. The Party has also
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became a refuge for rightist elements in Slovakia, many of wham had questionable
connections with Tiso'a pro-German regime during the war, .
Despite this vulnerability, recent Cawauniat efforts to oust the Slovak
Democrats from their Majority position in Slovakia have failed. The Camrcunist
attack began with a vituperative. press campaign against the Slovak Democrats,
This was followed by the arrest of several Slovak Democratic leaders on
charges of sedition. The attack culathated with a demand that the Slovak
Board of Casissioners be purged and reorganized in order to give the Communists
and Cc nmist-dominated groups effective control of the Councils These
elaborate preparations, including veiled threats of further police action, did
not intimidate the Slovak Democrats,. or the Czechcmoderate parties which ranted
to their support. The resulting purge of several areaetionaries? from the
ranks of the Social Democratic Party actually strengthened the Partyrs ability
to resist Communist attacks, The failure of the Cosa anists to gain control of
the Slovak provincial goverment indicates that the Ccmnuniste must use more
ruthless tactics to gain control in Slovakia,
Attacks on the fitional Front
The Como mists have not confined their attacks to the Slovak Democrats,
During the past months they have pursued a policy apparently designed to under-
mine the unity of the National Front government, characterized by attacks upon
the other parties and by deliberately engineered cabinet crises,
The National Socialist Party has been bitterly attacked, Because it is
the largest non-Communist party within the National Front and has taken an
increasingly tint anti-Corwnuniet stand, the National Socialist Party is the
greatest obstacle to Communist aspirations. Moreover, since the elections the
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Party has gained new adherents principally disillusioned Communists, right-
wing Social Democrats, and some members of the Peoples Party who became die-.
heartened by their party's weak role in the National Front. The National
Socialists are-non-Marxist and stand far to the right. of the Social Democrats
and the Communists. They advocate moderate socialism within the framework of
Czechoslovakian nationalism and cooperation with.both the East and the West
in the interests of national security. The Communists accuse the National
Socialists of harboring collaborationists and demand a purge of the party.
They also assert that the National Socialist Party is not socialist but is in
fact becoming the spokesman for the traditional capitalist order. A recent
Communist outburst accused the National Socialists of "defending the interests
of millionaires, big landowners black marketeers, and collaborators" as well
as "boosting foreign reaction against the interest of fzechoolovakiar-
national inddpsndence."
the Communists have also broken the National Front post-war honeymoon by
a aeries of deliberately instigated cabinet crises. In addition to their attempt
to gain control of the Slovak government -- a battle which was actually waged
among the major parties in Prague - the Communists nearly split the coalition
Government over two issues.
The first crisis developed out of a Communist proposal for a millionaire's
tax to provide funds for farmers who had suffered looses from las` summer's
drought. in the face of solid opposition by all non-Communist parties, the
Commmmiete launched a smear campaign against all Ministers who had voted
against the proposal. So vicious was the attack that Foreign Minister Jan
Masaryk, who normally remains aloof from domestic issues, published a special.
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statement identifying himself as a millionaire and recoeding his vote with the
elevOn other Cabinet Ministers who had voted against the Codmunniste. The
Communists threatened to can a general strike of all industrial workers to
force acceptance of their proposal. Lausman, then Social Democratic Minister
of Industry, submitted his resignation in protest against Communist party
interference in nationalized enterprises and the irresponsible provocation of
strikes.
About a week after the millionaire tax proposal, the National Front was
again threatened when three leaders of the Social Democratic Party; without the
knowledge of the Social Democratic Party executive body, signed a pact with the
Communists reaffirming the "socialist bloc" within the National Front: The
pact came as a complete surprise to most of the Social Democratic party
leaders. The party Executive approved the pact on the ground that having been
signed it could not be disavowed, but emphasized that the pact did not constitute
a merger between the Communists and the Social Democrats. Moderate Social
Democrats,, however, were strongly opposed and the National Socialists refused
to join the bloc. The Communist Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald# undoubtedly
brought great pressure to bear on the three Social Aemocrate to sign the pact.
The Costtnists hoped by this maneurer to (l.) force continued adherence of the
Social Democrats to the Communist program and.forestall efforts by right-tiring,
social Democrats to steer a more independent course; and (2) embarrass the
National Socialists by forcing them to choose la+iwrsr a more leftist. policy
mo eact WA accusdYtow
or b&-neaund of deserting the cause of the working man as represented by the
united Communist and Social Democratic parties. The maneuver, however,
boomeranged., since at a subsequent social Democratic Congress control of.the
party was wrested from its left-wing elements. Moreover, the prestige of the
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National Socialists actually increased as a result of their denouncement of
this flagrant Communist attempt to split the National Front.
CONCLUSION
Increased Communist activity during the past few months was designed
partially as a trial balloon in preparation for the national elections
scheduled for May 1948. In addition to strengthening their pro-electoral
positions the Co vmmiete hoped to test the strength of their opposition. The
reaction to these maneuvers has shown that a Communist electoral victory in
May is by no means certain. It has also demonstrated conclusively that
stronger measures will be necessary if the Ccrnrmuiiats are to obtain concessions
by intimidating the Moderates,
Faced With this strong opposition and the necessity for a victory in Mays
the Comnuniste must now determine their future courss. They can work toward
their goal either by caigpaigning for a legal victory in a tree election or by
intensifying their attacks on the non-Comm piste in the hope of achieving
victory through extra-legal measures. The ultimate decision, howevers con-
cerning future tactics of the Czechoslovak Communists, will be made in Moscow.
It appears unlikely at the present time that the Kremlin win order an
early Commmist coup. The risk involved outweighs the immediate advantages to
be gained., Such a coups in addition to endangering Czechoslovakia+s important
eoonomic contributions to the USSR) would probably necessitate the use of
Soviet troops to rescue the Communists. This the USSR is not yet ready to do
in view of,poeiible UN action. Moreoverp the USSR will await the result of
the present crises in France and Italy. If these two countries fall to the
Communists, there is no need for haste in Czechoslovakia. On the other hands
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if the London Ct3 Meeting results in a eta].emate,i if the European recovery
program shoos signs of'succeeding and if partition of Germany and Austria
becomes lmminenty then the USSR may feel it necessary to seal the situation
in CaechoLlovakia in order to avoid a potential astern salient in an other-
wise Communist. Eastern Europe.
Pending these developmentsa the Commanietsin Czechoslovakia will make
vigorous attempts to insure victory in the May elections. As a result of their
recent rebuff9 they will probably begin the campaign with apparent sincerity
in the hope of winning popular supports Maximum political capital will be
made of such developments as the recent Soviet offer of grain, As the campaign
nears its close, however# the Communists can be expected to resort to more
ruthless tactics. Attempts will be made to intimidate the non-Communist
leaders, Reepionnagen or Rtreaeonn trials will be instituted,, secret police
activity will be increased and every form of pressure will be applied in order
to gain governmental controls which will make victory certain. If by May,,
the Communists are still not confident of victory at the polls, they may find
some excuse for postponement of the elections.