WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 25

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Number 25
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class.
EC,ASSIEIED
lass. CHANGED TO: TS S U
DDA Memo, 4 Apx 77
Auth: DD P. 77/1 6
Date: By:
CENTRAL - INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
HIGHLIGHTS ....................... 1
UNITED NATIONS ................. 2
WESTERN EUROPE ................ 3
EASTERN EUROPE ................ 7
NEAR EAST - AFRICA ............. 9
FAR EAST ..........................11
WESTERN HEMISPHERE ........... 13
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' R I G H L
G H T S
The Berlin dispute, which has increasingly become
the symbol of all the underlying differences between the
USSR and the western powers, continued during the past
week to sharpen east-west disagreements in the Paris
UN sessions. The indefinite continuation of the dispute
has, however, spurred the western European union coun-
tries into taking several constructive steps toward an
integrated western European defense system (see page 3).
Premier Stalin's recent PRAVDA interview may have been
intended as a warning, both to the Soviet people and to the
world, that the USSR may take further unilateral action in
Germany, possibly including the establishment of an east
German state (see page 7). However, a Soviet military
withdrawal from Germany during the next six months
would certainly result in the lose of Soviet control over
eastern Germany (see page 4). Meanwhile, the Soviet
Union's problem of controlling the eastern German populace
has probably been made more difficult by deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions in the Zone (see page 5).
The last stage of the long-continuing disintegration
of the Chinese National Government may now be at hand.
A strong Communist drive on Nationalist forces at Bsuchou,
the last remaining defense line before Nanking, appears
likely within the next few days (see page 11). Besides
imminent military disaster, Chiang Kai-shek is now
faced with added demoralization within the National Gov-
ernment, whose leaders had counted heavily upon the
campaign promises of increased US aid which were made
by the Republican Party presidential candidate (see page 11).
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UNITED NATIONS
The present east-west power sligament in the
UN may be threa Intensified Soviet efforts to
obtain. UN membership for its Satellites and by the dis-
lntegration of the Nationalist position in China. In
seeking admission for its Satellites, the USSR will pro-
bably revive the proposal that the General Assembly
grant blanket admission to all twelve applicants for UN
membership. Such a proposal,, which may be supported
by those nations favoring the ` universality? principle
of membership, would result in a gain of approximately
the same number of votes for both the east and the west.
Proportional Soviet strength in the GA, however, would
rise from approxmately 11% to 17% of the total. More.
ever,, admission of Outer Mongolia would provide the USSR
with a pretext for demanding admission of possible newly-
created Asiatic Satellites. The Soviet position in the UN
also may improve as a result of events in China. Com-
plete victory by the Chinese Communists or the establish-
ment of a Communist-dominated coalition government for
all China would: (1) increase Soviet strength is the Security
Council to three; (2) deprive the western bloc of its pre-
sent propaganda opportunities to force unilateral Soviet
vetoes; and (3) exercise a magnetic influence on UN members
adjacent to China such as Siam and Burma.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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!4l uQh a western EurM has not yet
become an effective military force, the framework for an
integrated western European defense system has developed
as a result of increasingly critical east-west relations and
of insistence by the US upon a defense organization to which
it could lend material support. The five Brussels pact
powers--the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg--have established a combined command and
apparently have prepared an estimate of necessary US
military aid. In addition, the western European union
Consultative Council has agreed in principle to the forma-
tion of a North Atlantic defense pact which would include
the US, Canada, and certain peripheral countries and
which would provide the US with a means of associating
itself with the western European union. Certain western
union members, however, fear that the formation of such
a broadened security bloc would divert manpower and
materials to the production of armaments at the expense
of the European recovery program. Moreover, other
nations will become more interested in joining such a
bloc in the hope of securing US military aid. Some western
union members are reluctant to include these other coun-
tries which they consider to be military liabilities and
which might compete for US aid.
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GERMANY
An arlual withdrawal from eastern Ger many
during the next six months, without loss of cor-trol over Owl
territory, is impossible. Although the framework for adequate
Communist administrative and control orgam.zations now exists
in eastern Germany,, the formidable problem of staffing these
organizations with " reliable"` Germans cannot be ss.-~ived d:tling
the next few months Under the :Nazis in 1939, the t?o itrol
mechanism in the eastern zone area comprised apias o iimaiel.y
180,000 troops and police of various sorts ti addition,, the
Nazis operated a number of political and social organizations
which exercise: control over virtually all the Germans in the
area In co ntr:asi, the total strength of the Communist-con-
trolled Gerr . police force in eastern Germany is mow esUznat-
od as approximately 85,00QQ Soviet troop number 344,700
Communist ,aaternpts to build up civiban control organizations
similar to those used by the Nazis have failed to receive appre-
ciable popular support,. If the Nazis, with strong nationalistic
support, required A. control force of 180,000 police and troops
as well as mater-flocking social control orvaa zations, the UNa5R
would probably need approximately 500,000 "reliable" police in
order to maintain Sovaet control in eastern Germany after with-
drawal of Soviet fro p'. In addition, It may be expected that
shortly after F vt,c withdrawal a substantial number of the
Germans sbdiflr,g the Communist control police would probably
desert ;To es Communism in favor of German natlona.liism. Ai
though actual :'wet withdrawal is thus not an imminent possi-
bility, the Kremlin may at any time renew its proposals for
quadripartite withdrawal Such proposals would be offered in
the belief that their certain rejection by the western powers
would provide the USSR with effective propaganda in Germany.
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GERMANY
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Deterior UM economi conditions 3a the ,Soviet, Zane
of Germany may inrther increase the USMt's problem,of con-
trolling the dissatisfied populace. Despite the objections and
warnings of German Communist leaders concerning the adverse
effect of these deteriorating conditions upon the German people,
the USSR has taken little constructive action. Meanwhile,
Soviet efforts to increase food crops have not improved the
food ration, and Soviet methods of collection have antagonized
farm elements. Because of continued dismantlings, repara-
tions, and requisitions by the USSR, industrial production
within the Soviet Zone has not reached levels which can
satisfy domestic requirements. The importation of supplies
from western zones has been reduced by interzonal traffic
restrictions, and efforts to promote trade with the Satellites
have proved unsuccessful, largely because of Soviet unwilling-
ness to part with acceptable Soviet Zone commodities in
exchange for coal and raw materials.
FRANCE
The a Government having decided to govern
rather' 1W govern fitful-fears of every Communist
strike threat, has indicated its firm intention to contain the
"rotating strikes" in transportation, steel, and docks. As a
consequence, the Communists will probably conclude the coal
strike during the next two or three weeks, in order to avoid
further weakening of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT)
or increased loss of face with the French public. Growing
Government optimism regarding its ability to solve future
labor problems and to correct the price-wage disparity is
based upon the strong popular support evidenced for the
Government's forceful "clearance ' of the coal fields. Al-
though the Government has established itself more firmly by
its handling of the coal strike, it is still confronted with legitimate
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FRANCE
claims of French labor for relief from the hardships caused
by the inflationary dislocation of prices and wages. Despite
the Government victory over the Communist-dominated CGT
which called the coal strike, these inflationary difficulties
have been increased by the substantial Communist achieve-
ment in disrupting the French economy. Economic losses to
date are estimated to be slightly more than $ 100 million,
which equals 7% of the US aid program to France.
AUSTRIA
The recent Soviet order requiring the Austrian
Federal Railways to turn over 540 locomotives and 5A75
railway cars by December 1948, if fulfilled, would seriously
reduce Austrian carrying capacity and would interfere with
the implementation of ERP. To avoid the possibility of
further hardening the Soviet attitude, the Austrian Transport
Ministry does not favor submitting the Soviet order to the
Allied Council and is trying to moderate the demand by direct
negotiation with the USSR. Foreign Minister Gruber, however,
intends to submit the matter directly to the Allied Council as
a deterrent to further Soviet claims.
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EASTERN EUROPE
SOVIET UNION
P r e m i e r 8t s recent PRAVDA inte rview apparently
indicates some shift in the Kremlin's estimate -of its capabili -
ties for achieving its immediate objectives in the Berlin dispute.
The USSR probably still wants a negotiated settlement of the
Berlin issue on terms' which would permit ultimate Soviet con-
trol of Berlin and Commnmist penetration of western Germany.
The Kremlin apparently believes, however, that such terms
probably cannot be obtained from the western powers under
present circuces. Stalin's interview may therefore have
been intended to prepare the ground, both within the Soviet
Union and abroad, for further unilateral action on Germany,
possibly including partition and the establishment of an east
German state. The Soviet people have never been told of the
real gravity of the Berlin situation and therefore need to be
prepared for any step as drastic as the renunciation of "co-
operation" with the western powers. As Soviet propaganda
designed for foreign consumption, the Stalin interview reiterates
the allegation that the western powers are responsible for pres-
ent world tension and warns the West that the USSR may proceed
unilaterally in Germany. The uncompromising stiffness of
Stalin's remarks therefore suggests that in the absence of a
facesavmg compromise, the USSR is prepared to accelerate
preparations for the formation of an east German state.
Soviet amparati ons for the annual celebration
of the October Revolution sharply contrast with the extravagant
preparations being heralded throughout the world at this time
last year. The less than a dozen news items about the anniver-
sary which have appeared may reflect Kremlin preoccupation
with the world situation. This ear's slogans which will be used
to define the Communist "line" during the next twelve months
represent little change from the pattern of themes emphasized
last year.
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GREFXE
MMMM is being
planned by the Greek Government. response to UP refusal
to grant additional fun is for expanding the armed forces and
US insistence that more effective use be made of Greece's
present armed strength, the Government is planning to revive
the prewar office of Commander in C6iei of the Army in the
person of General Papagos, who held the post during the 1941
Albanian campaign. The elderly Papagos, who enjoys wide
prestige in Greece and has never been associated with politics,
appears willing to accept the responsibility, provided he is
not subjected to political pressures and is granted increased
powers both to prosecute the anti-guerrilla war and to suppress
subversive elements in general. N the new command is given
sufficient authority, Greek Army morale may be improved
and more successful Monet" action against the guerrillas
may result.
-8-
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Showing Israeli Conquest of Central Galilee
PALESTINE
Central Galilee area seized by
' Israeli Army (30-31 October)
~? Approximate line between Arab-
controlled and Israeli-controlled
areas
Unconsolidated Israeli gain in
the Negeb
A Jewish settlement in the Negeb
Parlitp Boundary (es xtAePted by the United
Nations General Assembly, Nw, 1947)
--?-?- International Boundary
--------- District Boundary
-+--+--~- Standard Gauge Railroad (411w1
Narrow Gauge Railroad (315w9
First Class Road
- - - - - - - Second Class Road
Oil Pipe Une
Intermittent Stream
p Jewish Communal Area
0 Q an M Mnss
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AMn..27:500.000. 0w. {Tab and aen.1539
A \` S. ,.r PAn ,.,heu. Men 1:500,000
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