THE IMPACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 12, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
C T A
OPEYAT1 S CFNhR
SITE A
W4.4FAX WSSAGE RECEIPT
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
Analysis of S. 1721
STAT
12 iNOV 1981 V
C[.ASSIFICATIQN UNCLASSIFIED
PACES
5
SENz TO:
Dn.IV 70:
D'I __
RON
James
Collins
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Room 300 } Old Executive-Office Bldg.
_
395-3334
300
s
R!MARXS:.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
This paper analyzes the issues raised by S. 1721 for the Intelligence
Community. The paper covers both issues raised in the DCI opening statement
to the SSCI on the bill and those other issues not addressed in the opening
statement. The issues covered are presented in the order they appear in the
bill.
?501 General Provisions
(a) This subsection places a statutory obligation on the President to
keep the Congress fully and currently informed of intelligence activities.
The subsection also states that President or his representatives ordinarily
shall consult with the intelligence committees prior to initiating an
intelligence activity. The Section-by-Section analysis makes clear that the
President also should consult with intelligence committees on proposed
findings prior to their approval by the President.
Position of Community: We would oppose legislating a requirement to
consult. Rather, we suggest Congress would be better served by pursuing
the President's offer in his 7 August letter to consult in advance on
important decisions affecting our national security. Issue further
discussed in DCI opening statement.
[The position of the White House on placing a statutory obligation on ..he
President to report is not known.]
(b) This subsection would impose on the President the duty to ensure
reports are made to the intelligence committees of illegal intelligence
activities or significant intelligence failures. The obligation currently
rest with DCI and agency heads. The section also would eliminate the
discretion to report such activities in "a timely fashion." Third, the
obligation to report is no longer qualified by reporting with due regard tc
protecting classified information or information relating to intelligence
sources and methods. Finally, the reporting requirement would no longer have
to be consistent with "applicable authorities and duties, including those
conferred by the constitution upon the executive and legislative branches of
the Government."
Position of the Community: We would object to the elimination of the
ability to report in a timely fashion. The intelligence agencies should
not be required to report intelligence failures or illegal activities
instantly . Time is sometimes essential to gather the facts necessary
before a report, if any, is made. -Second, we are concerned that reporting
obligation is not qualified by the need to protect sources and methods.
While we do on occasion provide source information with respect illegal
intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures, we wish to
preserve the right to withheld this information in necessary cases.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
[Position of the White House on making the President responsible for
ensuring the reporting of illegal intelligence activities or significant
intelligence failures or eliminating the recognition in current law of the
President's constitutional privilege to delay notification of illegal
intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures is not known.]
9502. Reporting Intelligence Activities other than Special Activities
This provision would for the first time explicitly state that DCI and
heads of other agencies shall report significant intelligence collection
activities to the oversight committees prior to the initiation of the
activity. Such a requirement exists in current law, but is not stated as
explicitly. In addition, the provision does not allow for the reporting of
sensitive intelligence collection activities to the the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of SSCI, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the HPSCI, the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate (the "gang of eight"). Lastly, the
provision provides that reporting shall be done with due regard for the
protection of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
Position of Intelligence Community: This provision should be amended to
allow the DCI to report sensitive intelligence collection activities to the
"gang of eight." In addition, the clause providing that reporting shall be
done with due regard for the protection of classified information relating to
sensitive intelligence sources and methods may be too narrow. There are other
types of classified information--such as military information and information
bearing on the foreign relations of the U.S.--that also must receive
appropriate protection in the context of briefing on intelligence activities.
The language of the existing law, which provides reports should be made with
due regard for protecting from unauthorized disclosure classified information
and information relating to intelligence sources and methods, should be
retained.
?503. Approval and Reporting of Special Activities
(a) This subsection explicitly provides legislative authorization for the
President to conduct special activities. In addition, it would impose a nee:
requirement that the President determine that the Finding is "necessary to
support the foreign policy objectives of the United States."
Position of the Community: No objection to explicitly giving the
President the authority to conduct special activities. [The additional
deterirination that must be made by the President needs further study by the
State Department on whether it is acceptable.]
(a)(1) This paragraph would require findings to be in writing, unless
time does not permit a written finding, in which case it must be reduced to
writing within 46 hours.
Position of the Community: No objection.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010015-1
J
(a)(2) This paragraph would prohibit findings retroactively sanctioning
special activities which have already occurred.
Position of the Community: No objection.
(a)(3) This paragraph would require that each finding identify the other
government agencies funding or participating in any way in the activity. It
would also require that employees of other agencies participating in the
activity be subject to the policies and regulations of the CIA, or written
policies or regulations adopted by such agency, in consultation with the DCI.
Position of the Community: We would object to requiring that each
government agency that assists CIA in carrying out a special activity be
named in the Finding regardless of how routine that assistance actually
is. There may be instances were insignificant assistance is required, but
which under the terms of the bill cannot be given if the government agency
that will give the assistance is not named in the finding.
(a)(4) This paragraph would require that the finding specify any third
parties, including any foreign country, that funds or participates in any way
in the special activity.
Position of the Community: We object to identifying the foreign countries
that will assist in a special activity since this will make it much more
difficult to protect the confidentiality of their assistance. Issue
further discussed in the DCI opening statement. In addition, we do not
believe it is necessary to identify whether a foreign country or third
party is assisting in the conduct of a special activity where such
assistance is minimal or routine. The bill is vague in its requirement
that a party be identified if it participates "in any way" with the
activity. It is not clear whether this would cover situations where U.S.
and other countries run parallel operations that benefit one another, but
that do not technically involve joint funding or participation.
(a)(5) This para