PCC MEETING ON SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01243R001200440001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
DCI
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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Compt
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D/OCA
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D/PAO
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NIO/AF
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D/ALA14411)
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C/AF/DO
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SUSPENSE
Date
Nmmrits
NIO/AF received advance notice of this
PCC meeting.
ER 89-2650
STAT
Executi?e Secretary
28 Jun 89
Date
3637 (1041)
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MEMORANDUM TO:
S/S 8914680
Uniteel States Department of State
ER 89-2.6.50
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 27, 1989
MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Affairs Advisor
The White House
MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
for National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MS. MOLLY HAGEBOECK
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development
MS. EMILY WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: PCC Meeting on Sudan
Please transmit the attached meeting notification and discussion
paper to principals of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Africa.
Attachments: As stated.
IIIPAO ,
"/
J. Stapleton Roy
xecutive Secretary
-7-EaRrTntINT-1.44_
DECL: OADR
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CONFIDENTIAL
United States Department of State
-
Washington, D.C. 20520
TO: PCC PARTICPANTS
FROM: Herman J. Cohen, Chairman I
'
PCC on Africa
SUBJECT: PCC Meeting on Sudan
A meeting of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Africa will
be held to discuss PCC for Sudan, as follows:
DATE: Wednesday, June 28, 1989
TIME: 3:30 P.M.
LOCATION: Room 3519 (AF Conference Room)
AGENDA: o Review of Key Trends and
Developments in Sudan
o U.S. Interests and Policy Objectives
o Near-Term Decisions on Policy Focus
and Assistance Issues
Principals only are invited to attend the meeting. Participants
should phone their attendance to Ms. Valis, telephone: [phone].
Discussion will be based on the attached paper, which we submit
for your review and comments.
Attachment: As stated.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
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SUDAN POLICY REVIEW
This is a stocktaking exercise to review whether the
current set of evolved policies constitutes the most effective
mix. The purpose is not necessarily to reach any new policy
decisions.
During the past year, Sudan's political dynamics have
evolved significantly -- especially related to peace and
relief. US domestic considerations have become more important
to our Sudan policy due to wide media exposure and strong
Congressional interest. At the same time, our non-emergency
aid levels are teetering close to zero due to Khartoum's
inability to keep up with Brooke payments and PL-480 arrears.
Our leverage on Khartoum, limited in recent years in any event,
now relies heavily on moral suasion and jawboning.
BACKGROUND FACTORS
Peace and Political Dymanics
Sadiq is now into his fifth coalition since coming to
power in 1986. He formed the current government with the
pro-peace Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in March under heavy
pressure from the military and unions, which threatened to
overthrow him unless he took decisive action to end the war,
either by seriously engaging in peace negotiations or providing
enough backing and supplies to the military to win.
Sadiq went both directions. He reached agreement with
Libya -- now Sudan's chief military supplier -- to provide
perhaps $250 million in military assistance. On peace, he
endorsed the DUP/SPLA peace accord, took certain steps to
implement it and has supported the Government's Peace Committee
discussion with the SPLA to implement a cease-fire and prepare
for a constitutional conference.
The most promising opening for peace discussions is now.
Khartoum and the SPLA met on June 10 - 11 to review substantive
issues and set the framework for the constitutional
conference. They agreed to follow-up talks on July 4 and to
start the Constitutional Conference on September 18, assuming
the November accord is first implemented. There was also an
informal agreement to let relief operations continue until the
July talks, and the SPLA extended its unilateral cease-fire
until the end of June. Main hang-ups on substance remain
Libyan military supplies to Khartoum and freezing hudud
(Islamic corporal punishments) by legislation.
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While this is the best shot at a peace process that
has yet developed, odds are slim that it will hold together.
There is a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust and both sides have
been grudging about meeting.. Sadiq remains under heavy
pressure from the National Islamic Front (NIF) which strongly
opposes the peace accord because of its position on Islamic
law. Garang may be right in his analysis that the DUP
negotiated peace accord is against Sadiq's interest; its
success would help the DUP ride the peace wave to victory in
the 1990 elections. Finally, it is doubtful that Sadiq would
be willing to cut ties with Libya sufficiently to satisfy the
SPLA.
On the other side, the SPLA is flush with military
victory, having taken 16 garrisons this year and now
controlling nearly all of Eastern Equatoria and much of the
other two Southern provinces. The SPLA sees itself gaining
international recognition as a result of Garang's recent tour
to Europe and the US. Garang is therefore taking a very tough
line on the terms of the November peace accord, demanding the
legislated freezing of the September Laws (nearly impossible
for Khartoum politically) and announcing that the SPLA's bottom
line in a constitutional conference is that hudud cannot be
part of Sudan's penal code. We find credible the Soviet
analysis that it is not in Garang's interest to negotiate
seriously any time soon; he cannot match his military success
with political success because there is no consensus among the
SPLA's half dozen or so factions about the end game for peace.
Relief
The record on relief by both sides has improved
significantly over the past year, largely due to international
pressure under US leadership. We began pressing both sides in
late 1987 to adopt a plan of action to provide relief in
approximately equal amounts to non-combatants in need on both
sides of the war zone. This is being done through the ICRC
program which became operational last December. It started
with three relief sites on both sides of the war zone and has
since expanded to 10 government-controlled sites and nine
SPLA-controlled sites. In March, a UN/GOS emergency relief
conference resulted in a comprehensive program under the UN
umbrella called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Both sides
agreed to establish nine relief corridors to preposition
supplies wherever needed. Despite numerous operational
problems resulting in target shortfalls, the program has been
successful and still continues. Both sides are on record as
supporting relief operations for as long as necessary.
A number of serious operational problems remain which
require constant intervention and monitoring. With the
exception of the ICRC program, relatively little food has been
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prepositioned from the North because of obstruction by local
government authorities. The two most visible examples are the
difficulties in getting relief trains to Aweil and the failure
to move barges to Malakal. It is unclear whether Khartoum
lacks adequate commitment or is unable to exert control. While
relatively more relief has moved cross-border into SPLA-held
areas, the SPLA's and SRRA's restrictions on PVO movement and
activities are also significant impediments.
Economic Conditions
The Sudanese economy continues to deteriorate. Annual
inflation has reached triple digits and is accelerating.
Foreign debt is $13 billion -- twice GDP -- and IMF arrears
have reached $1 billion -- nearly a third of the Fund's
arrears. Khartoum made a clumsy effort at economic reform in
December, sharply raising prices of sensitive, subsidized
commodities such a sugar and bread, and offering modest pay
raises. Ensuing riots posed the most serious threat to the
Government since Nimeiri's ouster, which happened under a
similar scenario. Khartoum quickly backed off and plans to
stand down on economic reforms until after the 1990 elections.
The pay raises were retained, further exacerbating the
Government's budget deficit.
Multilateral lending institutions and traditional donors
agree that serious reform will not be possible until the war
ends. The World Bank, which solicited an economic reform
package from donors in late 1987, is holding up its
reform-related lending until agreement on an acceptable reform
program is reached. It has, however, agreed to support a $475
million medium term rehabilitation program to repair damages
caused by the August floods.
The direct cost of the war is estimated to be about $1
million a day, not including the disruption of critical inputs
such as fuel and the disincentive to invest.
U.S. Assistance
Sudan has suffered from chronic pressure to repay US
official debts which are continually escalating. Khartoum
struggled to keep up with Brooke and PL-480 payments until this
year. But that may have changed since the net cash flow is now
turning permanently negative. Current Brooke arrears (almost
all of which were generated from old FMS sales) are about $14
million and will reach $25 million by year end. Payment would
release $10 million in DFA and $12 million in ESF. The
calculations are similar for PL-480. A $30 million Title I
program has just been signed for FY 89 ($20 million in wheat
and $10 million transport) after Khartoum reached a settlement
on $14 million in dollar arrears and about $30 million in local
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currency. ($6 million in dollar arrears is still due.) Next
year's Title I program request is $20 million. Since
repayments will be probably be in excess of $30 million and
will continue to increase in following years, the GOS may well
abandon the Title I program next year.
Domestic Interest in Sudan
US domestic considerations have become significant inputs
in our policy deliberations on Sudan due to wide press coverage
and related Congressional interest. Public concern focussed
first on the perception of government failure (both ours and
Sudan's) to address relief needs adequately. When OLS was
announced, most of the criticism shifted to the UN's handling
of relief operations. Congressional interest has also been
stimulated by a stream of congressional visits to both Northern
Sudan and SPLA-held areas. The latter have increased stress on
our relationship with Sudan and pressured us to become more
active in SPLA-held areas. The SPLA has attempted to take
advantage of this by trying to engage us and other donors in
activities which imply recognition of its de facto
government.
We have muted much of the domestic criticism of our Sudan
policy with statements on Sudan by the President, Secretaries
Shultz and Baker, and other administration officials. The
approach has been that neither side is doing enough on peace
and relief, and humanitarian concerns should be paramount. The
Secretary and Deputy Secretary have also met with Congressional
members about Sudan and have received high marks -- even from
traditional critics -- for their concern and active approach.
There have been a half dozen congressional hearings this year
in which Sudan was raised; two were exclusively on Sudan. The
focus has been on relief, peace, and human rights.
THE CURRENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
State of Relations
Our longstanding, friendly relationship with Sudan is
cooling. We are frustrated with Khartoum's bureaucratic
paralysis, the obstruction of peace by bickering among the
three Northern parties, and Sadiq's myopic personal agenda
which places life and death issues near the bottom. The
Sudanese see our relationship worn thin by declining aid levels
(in their view a barometer of friendship), our "witholding"
aid, our stream of tough public and private messages,
Congressional visits to Kapoeta, our support of relief
operations in SPLA-held areas and Garang's visit to Washington.
But our relationship is still productive on the key issues
of peace and relief, and we continue to enjoy unlimited access
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to all Sudanese political players at the highest levels.
Khartoum's acceptance of the ICRC and UN relief operations, and
Sadiq's engagement on peace largely resulted from US - led,
outside pressure. Our effectiveness is confirmed by the NIF's
recently fizzled attempts to break the November peace accord by
fanning anti- US sentiment.
Conversely, neither we nor other traditional friends of
Sudan have been able in recent years to influence Sudan's
foreign relations (especially with Libya), economic reform, or
improvement on human rights.
U.S. Interests in Sudan
We have two paramount interests in Sudan: relief for
non-combatants and peace. Ideally, it should be formally
implemented. In a broad context, we have an interest an
interest in Sudan to the extent that it can affect stability of
the region, either positively or negatively. Sudan is
particularly important to Egypt because of water interests and
the potential for expanded Libyan influence and a more volatile
strain of Islamic fundamentalism.
Our secondary interests in Sudan -- still important --
include: continued support for democratic institutions,
reducing human rights violations, moderating Sudan's foreign
policy (especially regarding Libya), promoting economic reform,
resolution of Sudan's debt problem and supporting appropriate
GOS treatment of refugees and displaced persons.
Direct strategic interests in Sudan are negligible:
occasional overflights and small military exercises once or
twice a year.
Given the current state of the Sudanese economy, there are
minimal US economic or development interests in Sudan. Chevron
has a 300 million barrel proven reserve in the South which
cannot be exploited until peace returns. Other US oil
companies are exploring in the North and in the Red Sea, but
they have not yet made commercially important discoveries.
With the exception of programs included in the Brooke wind-down
plan which should not be shut down abruptly, there are no
development programs which require sustained US input.
PROGNOSIS FOR SADIQ'S FUTURE
It is impossible to predict how long Sadiq will remain in
power. Despite growing dissatisfaction in Sudan over his
failure to deal effectively with any key issues, he has
consistently outmaneuvered his political opponents -- even
surviving a showdown with the military in February - March and
uncovered coup plot in December 1988 and June 1989. It is
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still possible that the military will oust him for failing to
restore peace but senior officers appear reluctant to move
against him. A junior-level or factionalized coup, as appeared
to be in the works in June, is unpredictable.
Another scenario for Sadiq's departure is loss of in the
1990 elections. Sadiq is under political attack from all sides
and support is eroding in constituencies which have
traditionally backed him. But there are no apparent leaders in
other parties with sufficient stature to win. If Sadiq loses,
he would probably be replaced by the DUP-led coalition of
moderate UMMA members and southerners. If he wins, he could
well slip back in league with the NIF.
FUTURE U.S. POLICY
How Should We Relate?
With limited US interests, Sadiq's uncertain future and a
myriad of intractable problems, we should limit ourselves to
dealing with issues on which we still have some influence. We
should continue to operate from the premise of supporting
Sudanese democracy. This may be at the expense of meeting
specific US objectives since Sudan's democratic system tends to
diffuse the Government's energy for effectively dealing with
serious issues.
Our principal goals in Sudan should remain peace and
relief. Since peace has been so elusive for the more than
three decades of Sudan's independence, we should break out
sub-objectives to work toward, such as: establishing and
preserving a formal cease-fire, a sustained peace dialogue
between the two sides, disarming the militias and taking prompt
and effective action in response to human rights violations.
On relief, we should press for progress on specific components
of Operation Lifeline Sudan: the ICRC program, PVO's, a
high-level, effective UN coordinating role, and -- even more
specific -- moving barges to Malakal, relief trains to Aweil,
etc.
On the political front, we should continue to encourage
neighboring states such as Kenya, Uganda and Chad to remain
neutral and not to supply military support to either side which
fuels the war. (There remains no practical possibility of
working with Libya or Ethiopia in this regard; and Egypt is
already firmly committed to withholding military support.) We
should also consider the UK suggestion that the permanent
members of the Security Council consult on ways to reduce'
tension in the Horn.
The best strategy for implementing this approach is to
continue to win acceptance from the GOS and SPLA/SPLM for
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specific, attainable items in which performance or
non-performance is clear. These objectives would be extension
of the de facto cease-fire, continued commitment to a peace
dialogue, movement on relief, etc. We should publicize the
commitments both sides make on these issues in order to set
relatively unambiguous, achievable performance benchmarks under
the eye of international public opinion. We should also
continue to work behind the scenes to cajole, reassure and work
toward new agreements/points of consensus which can be surfaced
publicly as performance benchmarks.
There is no practical way to influence effectively the
outcome of the secondary issues of relations with Libya,
economic reform or debt until peace is restored. While we
should continue to complain about Libya, Sadiq won't be talked
away from his Libyan relationship until another country steps
into Libya's shoes to provide needed arms and economic
assistance. That is unlikely until peace is restored. On the
economic front, there is general recognition that any effort to
resolve Sudan's economic problems would be useless while the
war continues.
With regard to economic assistance, we should make it
clear to Khartoum that our continued support will be mainly
relief-oriented until peace is restored. A decision which must
be made is whether the US would offer appreciable assistance
for economic rehabilitation if a durable peace accord is
reached. Absent payments owed on Brooke, a Presidential waiver
would be required to continue program assistance. (There has
never been a Presidential waiver on Brooke.) We must also
decide whether/how much economic conditionality should be
attached.
Leverage for relief, peace and economic reform could be
multiplied by enlisting other friends of Sudan -- especially
donors -- to work toward these limited objectives in a
coordinated approach.
This focus on limited, key objectives with multilateral
support would likely be acceptable to Congress. This would
further mute Congressional criticism and send a clear signal to
Sudanese on both sides of the war.
Assistance Problems
It is important to keep our aid program alive to work this
approach effectively. If either Brooke payments or PL-480
arrears fall behind for another year, Khartoum is likely to go
so far in the hole we will be unable to restore these programs
without taking unprecedented steps: a Brooke waiver and debt
relief.
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For the moment, we should extend the Brooke wind-down plan
for as long as possible to keep our basic aid infrastructure in
place. We should also consider the possibility of disbursing
FY85 ESF (which has already been obligated) for essential
commodities to facilitate Khartoum's repayment of Brooke.
Sudan would then be in a better position to take advantage of
program assistance in 1990 if political conditions are more
favorable. The coming year is especially critical due current
peace discussions and the 1990 Sudanese elections.
We should also attempt to keep Khartoum up on PL-480
repayments to keep the Title I program intact. Wheat is the
most effective leverage point we have on Khartoum in terms of
assistance.
Military Assistance
There is currently $12.4 in programmable MAP
expenditures. The includes $4.6 million in recoupable funds,
$2.2 in MAP balance and $5.6 million in uncommitted FMS
credits. Of the $12.4 million, $6.6 million remains
uncommitted and $5.8 million is in pending cases, most of which
relate to spares for vehicles. There is also $1.3 million for
aircraft maintenance, and $765,000 is for ammunition. We are
currently witholding lethal equipment shipments on grounds that
would be used against the SPLA. Use of the uncommitted $6.6
million has been a moot issue because of Brooke requirements
have prevented its expenditure. We should continue to withhold
lethal equipment even if Sudan overcomes Brooke until the war
ends. IMET programs should be continued to maintain access and
influence with the military.
The SPLA
Our objectives with the SPLA are to keep it focussed on
cooperation on relief, preserve the cease-fire and continue
talking on peace. There is also need to enhance the
effectivness of SRRA relief activities and improve monitoring
capability in SPLA-held areas. We need to consider if this can
be accomplished best through visits to SPLA-held areas by AID
officials or hiring contractors to work with the SRRA in
SPLA-held territory, specifically Kapoeta, to help it become a
more effective relief organization. The use of such options
should be based on minimal security risk to personnel involved,
and continued avoidance of any activity which implies our
recognition of the SPLA as a de facto government.
We have no effective leverage on the SPLA. We should
press the SPLA publicly not to be the first to falter on peace
and relief.
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