WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000500090001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 26, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 MAY 1987
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
INTRODUCTION
WITH THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL
SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985, THE POLITBURO SIGNALED ITS
RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE --
ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY
RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY
POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW
ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR
GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A
SITUATION IN WHICH AFTER NEARLY 25 YEARS OF SLIGHTLY NARROWING
THE GNP GAP WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR HAD ONCE AGAIN
BEGUN TO LOSE GROUND ECONOMICALLY AND CONFRONTED A STEADILY
WIDENING GAP TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE
QUALITY OF LIFE WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
THE LEADERSHIP ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE
PAST QUARTER CENTURY PRODUCED IMPORTANT CHANGES IN SOVIET
SOCIETY.
-- THANKS TO MODERN COMMUNICATIONS, THE POPULATION HAD
BECOME LESS ISOLATED AND THUS ABLE TO REACT TO REGIME
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PROPAGANDA MORE CRITICALLY AND TO COMPARE THEIR LOT
WITH THAT OF OTHER PEOPLES ENJOYING A HIGHER STANDARD
OF LIVING.
EXPANDED EDUCATION BROADENED THE HORIZONS OF MANY
SOVIET CITIZENS, TRANSFORMING AT LEAST A PART OF THE
TRADITIONALLY PASSIVE AND INERT MASS INTO A PUBLIC OF
CITIZENS WITH DIVERSE INTERESTS AND INDIVIDUAL
IDENTITIES.
-- IDEOLOGY DIMINISHED AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY. THERE
WAS A GENERAL INCREASE IN CYNICISM ABOUT THE REGIME AND
ITS POLICIES, AND SPREADING SOCIAL MALAISE.
MORE AND MORE CITIZENS BEGAN TO DROP OUT OF PUBLIC
ACTIVITIES TO PURSUE PRIVATE ACTIVITY SUCH AS
TRAFFICKING ON THE BLACK MARKET. THE UNOFFICIAL
ECONOMY BURGEONED.
-- THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN THE ALIENATION OF
SOVIET YOUTH AND INCREASING NUMBERS OF YOUNG PEOPLE
BEGAN TO ENGAGE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF UNACCEPTABLE
BEHAVIOR.
AS A RESULT OF THESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS, THE
POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK
THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED
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AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHO COULD REVITALIZE
THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET
STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
IN GORBACHEV THEY HAVE GOTTEN MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED
FOR. THE EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE OF HIS INITIATIVES, HIS ENERGY,
AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES, HAS PROMPTED
DEBATE NOT ONLY AT HOME BUT IN THE WEST AS TO GORBACHEV'S
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. WITH ALL THE SPECULATION, IT IS WORTH
TAKING A BRIEF LOOK AT WHAT IS GOING ON -- WHAT HE ACTUALLY HAS
DONE AND WHAT IT MEANS.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
A STRONG MAJORITY OF THE POLITBURO CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
NEED FOR MODERNIZATION AND GORBACHEV'S LEADERSHIP. EVEN SO, HE
HAS HAD ENORMOUS DIFFICULTY MAKING CHANGES IN THE POLITBURO --
WITH HIS MOVES PROMPTING NEAR REVOLT IN THE MOSCOW PARTY
STRUCTURE AND A VIOLENT RESPONSE IN KAZAKHSTAN. AT THIS POINT,
ONLY THREE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO CAN BE REGARDED AS TRUE
GORBACHEV LOYALISTS. MOST OF THE OTHERS, WHILE IN BASIC
SYMPATHY WITH THE NEED TO MODERNIZE, HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT
POWER BASES AND UNDOUBTEDLY DISAGREE AT ONE POINT OR ANOTHER
WITH BOTH THE PACE AND THE SCOPE OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSED
REFORMS.
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REJUVENATION OF THE ELITE
BELOW THE POLITBURO LEVEL GORBACHEV HAS JETTISONED THE
BREZHNEV POLICY OF PROVIDING JOB SECURITY TO VIRTUALLY ALL
OFFICIALS IN THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AND HAS SIGNIFICANTLY
RAISED THE STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE EXPECTED OF THOSE
OFFICIALS. THERE HAVE BEEN LARGE SCALE PERSONNEL
REPLACEMENTS.
-- OF THE ELEVEN OTHER PARTY SECRETARIES, NINE ARE NEW
GORBACHEV APPOINTEES.
-- 59 OF 105 MEMBERS OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ARE
NEW SINCE GORBACHEV ASSUMED POWER.
-- HE HAS APPOINTED TWELVE NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OUT OF FOURTEEN.
-- 47% OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE AGRO?INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
HAVE BEEN REPLACED.
THE MOST SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO GORBACHEV APPEARS TO BE IN
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHERE, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE TURNOVER,
MOST MEMBERS STILL ARE BREZHNEV?ERA HOLDOVERS WHO FEEL
PERSONALLY THREATENED BY GORBACHEV'S CHANGES. BEYOND A SENSE
OF PERSONAL JEOPARDY, HOWEVER, MANY BELIEVE HIS POLICIES ARE
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INHERENTLY MISTAKEN AND BAD FOR THE COUNTRY, THAT THEY ARE NOT
IDEOLOGICALLY SOUND, AND THAT THEY COULD THREATEN PARTY
CONTROL. GORBACHEV HAS COMPLAINED PUBLICLY ABOUT ATTITUDES IN
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BEING A BRAKE ON PROGRESS. HE IS
ATTEMPTING IN SEVERAL WAYS TO CURB THIS OPPOSITION, INCLUDING
THE CONVENING OF A PARTY CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR WITH THE POWER TO
CHANGE THE COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
TO SAY THE LEAST, GORBACHEV'S VIEW THAT MODERNIZATION OF
THE ECONOMY CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT REVITALIZATION OF THE
PARTY AND LEADERSHIP IS IMMENSELY THREATENING TO MILLIONS OF
SOVIET BUREAUCRATS GROWN COMFORTABLE AND COMPLACENT IN THE
BREZHNEV YEARS.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION, ACCORDINGLY, HE SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO
MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE. MANY OF HIS REMARKS OVER
THE PAST YEAR SHOW INCREASING FRUSTRATION OVER THE LIMITS
IMPOSED ON HIS FREEDOM OF MANEUVER BY THE STALINIST?ERA COMMAND
ECONOMY DOGMA HE HAS INHERITED.
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GORBACHEV'S VIEW OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION, IN MY OPINION,
HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THAT OF PETER THE GREAT:
-- ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IS VIEWED FOREMOST AS ESSENTIAL
TO INCREASING RUSSIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.
-- MODERNIZATION OF OTHER ASPECTS OF SOCIETY IS SEEN AS
NECESSARY TO ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION.
-- TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ARE NEEDED FROM THE
WEST.
DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES INTENDED TO FACILITATE
MODERNIZATION ALSO SERVE TO DIMINISH THE CHANCES OF
WESTERN CHALLENGES DURING A DIFFICULT TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD.
MODERNIZATION AND EVEN REFORM ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH
LIBERALIZATION. THE STRUCTURES OF AUTOCRACY (AND
TOTALITARIANISM) ARE LEFT IN PLACE AND EVEN
STRENGTHENED.
-- THE WEST IS ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT INTERNAL CHANGES
MEAN RUSSIA IS AT LAST EVOLVING TOWARD A EUROPEAN?STYLE
SYSTEM OF GOVERNING.
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UNLIKE PETER THE GREAT, LENIN OR STALIN, GORBACHEV CANNOT
USE MASS TERROR AT WILL TO IMPOSE HIS PROGRAMS WITHOUT LOSING
HIS JOB. HE APPEARS TO BELIEVE HE WILL BE IN POWER LONG ENOUGH
THAT, OVER TIME, HE WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME RECALCITRANT POWER
CENTERS, INDIVIDUALS AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM TO CARRY
OUT THE FULL SWEEP OF MEASURES TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY.
ESSENTIALLY, WE SEE A TWO STEP APPROACH. INITIALLY,
GORBACHEV IS RELYING ON A COMBINATION OF MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN
PARTY CONTROL, IMPROVE WORKER ATTITUDES, AND WEED OUT
INCOMPETENCE -- WHAT HE REFERS TO AS "HUMAN FACTOR" GAINS, THE
MOST VISIBLE AND DRAMATIC PART OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN HIS
CAMPAIGNS FOR DISCIPLINE AND AGAINST CORRUPTION AND
ALCOHOLISM. THESE MEASURES HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT AND ARE
INTENDED, ONE MIGHT SAY, TO "KICK START" THE ECONOMY -- TO
INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND GNP SIMPLY THROUGH HARDER AND MORE
DISCIPLINED WORK FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS UNTIL MOMENTUM CAN BE
SUSTAINED BY THE SECOND STEP -- GENUINE IMPROVEMENTS IN
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY'S
PLANTS AND EQUIPMENT.
IMPROVED WORKER DISCIPLINE AND PRODUCTIVITY, AS WELL AS
GOOD LUCK, MADE 1986, THE FIRST FULL YEAR OF GORBACHEV'S
STEWARDSHIP, A GOOD ONE IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.
5).et SOVIET GNP GREW BY MORE THAN 4%, THE HIGHEST RATE IN A DECADE.
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INDUSTRY, THE FOCUS OF HIS MODERNIZATION EFFORT, ALSO RECORDED
ITS BEST GROWTH IN A DECADE. THERE WAS RECORD FARM OUTPUT,
INCLUDING THE LARGEST GRAIN HARVEST SINCE 1978.
AT THE SAME TIME, A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONS AND PROBLEMS
HAVE BECOME APPARENT THAT LIKELY WILL SPELL TROUBLE FOR
GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM OVER THE LONGER TERM. FOR
EXAMPLE, DESPITE NEW LAWS AND POLICIES THAT HAVE BEEN PASSED
AND ARTICLES THAT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN, MANY OF HIS INITIATIVES
HAVE NOT GONE BEYOND FLOATING IDEAS. OTHERS HAVE RECEIVED
EITHER NO NEW RESOURCES TO MAKE IMPLEMENTATION POSSIBLE OR HAVE
BEEN UNDERTAKEN AS EXPERIMENTS OR RESTRICTED TO A FEW NARROW
CATEGORIES. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO VIABLE, INTEGRATED PLAN
FOR MODERNIZATION. RATHER, WE SEE MANY INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS
BEING ADVANCED, EACH DEALING WITH A SINGLE ISOLATED FACET OF
THE ECONOMY AND WITH LITTLE ATTEMPT TO COORDINATE THEM.
MOST IMPORTANT, SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE TO HIS EFFORTS HAS
SURFACED IN THE MASSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY BUREAUCRACY,
PARTICULARLY AMONG ENTERPRISE MANAGERS WHO COMPLAIN THAT THEY
ARE BEING ASKED TO CARRY OUT CONFLICTING GOALS SUCH AS RAISING
QUALITY STANDARDS AND PRODUCTION AT THE SAME TIME. INDEED, THE
NEW QUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS ALREADY ARE PROVING ENORMOUSLY
AND PERHAPS PURPOSELY DISRUPTIVE, WITH STATE INSPECTORS
REJECTING AS MUCH AS 80% OF PRODUCTION AT SOME FACTORIES, THE
MESSAGE TO ENTERPRISES IS THAT THE OLD STYLE OF MANAGEMENT WILL
NO LONGER WORK.
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GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM APPEARS TOO AMBITIOUS ON A NUMBER OF
COUNTS:
A HIGH GROWTH RATE AND IMPROVED QUALITY ARE NOT READILY
COMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GOALS,
FOR EXAMPLE, ARE TOO HIGH TO ALLOW FOR A SLOW DOWN IN
PRODUCTION TO INSTALL NEW MORE TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED
EQUIPMENT.
DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE.
-- A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNING IN 1986
(THE RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION
OF THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED
IMPORTS FROM THE WEST.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE WERE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK IN 1986. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER
DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE
STORES AND RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS.
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WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL OF THIS? GORBACHEV HAS
HAD SOME ECONOMIC SUCCESS, BUT HIS ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD AND
PROMOTE SUBSTANTIAL MODERNIZATION IS HIGHLY UNCERTAIN. IN MANY
WAYS HE HAS ALREADY MADE THE EASY GAINS IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
AND PERCEIVES THAT THE CAUTIOUS CHANGE THUS FAR UNDERTAKEN WILL
BE INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS. THUS, HE IS LIKELY TO TAKE
MORE AND MORE RADICAL MEASURES AND DISRUPTIVE REFORMS IN ORDER
TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS. THIS, IN TURN, WILL GENERATE FURTHER
OPPOSITION AND CONTROVERSY.
POLITICAL REFORM
THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL WRITTEN ABOUT PROPOSALS FOR
DEMOCRATIZATION WITHIN THE PARTY AND CHANGES IN PROCEDURE THAT
GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER DEMOCRACY. GORBACHEV HIMSELF,
AT THE JANUARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, CALLED FOR SECRET
BALLOTS AND MULTI?CANDIDATE ELECTIONS FOR PARTY OFFICES UP TO
AND INCLUDING THE LEVEL OF REPUBLIC FIRST SECRETARY. BUT THERE
IS NO THOUGHT OF CHANGING THE ONE PARTY SYSTEM OR OF POLITICAL
PLURALISM. IN A PUBLICIZED ELECTION RUN IN ONE REGION, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE CANDIDATES WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO
SET FORTH THEIR VIEWS BUT SAT MUTELY THROUGH THE PROCEEDINGS --
AS ONE SPECIALIST PUT IT, LIKE TWO PRIZE PIGS AT AN AUCTION.
INDEED, ONE MAJOR MOTIVE OF SUCH MOVES IS PROBABLY TO BRING
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS TO GET WITH
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THE GORBACHEV PROGRAM BY THREATENING TO RUN RIVAL CANDIDATES
SELECTED BY MOSCOW AGAINST THEM.
THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES AS WELL,
BUT THEY REMAIN MOSTLY TALK, THE SYSTEM OF ELITE PRIVILEGES
AND PATRONAGE REMAIN ESSENTIALLY INTACT AND GORBACHEV HIMSELF
HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM --
THAT OFFICIALS AT LOWER LEVELS DO AS THEY'RE TOLD BY OFFICIALS
AT HIGHER LEVELS -- REMAINS UNCHANGED.
OPENNESS/GLASNOST
GLASNOST, OR "OPENNESS," -- THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF CANDOR AND
CRITICISM IN THE SOVIET MEDIA AND GREATER FREEDOM IN THE ARTS
-- IS ONE OF GORBACHEV'S MOST INTERESTING AND DANGEROUS
INITIATIVES. I SEE SEVERAL MOTIVES BEHIND IT.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND OTHER
UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN AND
THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT
IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON
IT.
-- GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO PILLORY OFFICIALS GORBACHEV
HAS TARGETED AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO GET WITH THE
PROGRAM.
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-- IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT SOCIAL PROBLEMS HE WANTS
TO ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
BY ALLOWING UNORTHODOX CULTURAL WORKS TO APPEAR,
GORBACHEV IS HOPING TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO BYPASS
OFFICIAL ORGANS AND PUBLISH MATERIALS IN THE
UNDERGROUND PRESS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS TO
COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS AND
SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT TO
MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR CYNICISM.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER DISCUSSION OF
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN PERMITTED
HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF DOMESTIC
RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AT HOME.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE
THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF GORBACHEV
PERSONALLY, HIS LEADERSHIP, OR HIS ALLIES. SIMULTANEOUSLY,
UNDER HIS AUTHORITY, THERE HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED REPRESSION OF
UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS OF INFORMATION. WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, ONLY
THOSE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CENTRAL THRUST OF GORBACHEV'S
POLICIES ARE ALLOWED TO VOICE THEIR VIEWS. NONETHELESS, THE
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PUBLICATION OF DIVERSE AND CRITICAL INFORMATION, AS WELL AS
SOME WESTERN COMMENTARY AT VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL SOVIET VIEWS,
HAS BEEN REMARKABLE AND HAS LED TO CONTROVERSY OVER THE POLICY
ITSELF. INDEED, GORBACHEV HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE
IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST HAPPEN AT
SOME POINT.
IMPLICATIONS
LET ME CLOSE WITH SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT GORBACHEV.
FIRST, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE HAS A SENSE OF DIRECTION BUT
NO REAL STRATEGY. INDEED, HE HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT
REFORM WILL BE CONDUCTED "ON THE MARCH, AS WE GO
ALONG." HE IS FEELING HIS WAY; THERE ARE NO PRECEDENTS
OR GUIDELINES TO REDUCE THE RISKS OR HELP HIM AVOID
MISTAKES.
SECOND, IT IS EVIDENT THAT WHEN HE RUNS INTO RESISTANCE
OR TROUBLE, HE TENDS TO RAISE THE STAKES. WHILE HE
PICKS HIS FIGHTS CAREFULLY AND IS QUITE CALCULATING, IT
IS ALSO CLEAR THAT HE IS A RISKTAKER. HE KNOWS HE IS
POLARIZING THE PARTY AND IS AWARE THAT THE STAKES ARE
HIGH IN HIS STRUGGLE TO SHAKE UP THE SYSTEM.
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THIRD, GORBACHEV HAS ABANDONED BREZHNEV'S POLICY OF
GIVING EVERYONE A LITTLE PIECE OF THE PIE TO KEEP ALL
HAPPY AND INSTEAD HAS DECIDED TO FOCUS ON SATISFYING
ONLY THOSE ELEMENTS OF SOVIET SOCIETY IMPORTANT TO HIM
-- IN OTHER WORDS, A WAGER ON THE STRONG, THOSE WHO
PRODUCE.
FOURTH, BY THE END OF THE DECADE, THE COMPETITION FOR
RESOURCES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF
THE ECONOMY WILL BECOME INTENSE AND COULD ENDANGER
GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION PLANS.
FIFTH, WHILE THE ACTUAL DEGREE OF CHANGE IN BOTH THE
ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS MODEST
AT THIS POINT, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION
REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE HAS PULLED ALL
OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT
HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE
USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE
HAS SET IN MOTION ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE
AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING THE
STAGE EITHER FOR DILUTED AND THUS MARGINALLY EFFECTIVE
CHANGE OR A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE. MY PERSONAL
VIEW IS THAT JUST AS STALIN HAD TO PURGE THE PARTY TO
BUILD THE EXISTING SYSTEM, SO TOO MUST GORBACHEV IF HE
IS TO CHANGE IT -- BUT HE CAN ONLY FIRE, NOT KILL.
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WHETHER HE WILL DO IT AND GET AWAY WITH IT IS THE BIG
UNKNOWN.
WHEN YOU COME DOWN TO IT, THEN, IS IT IN OUR NATIONAL
INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL? I BELIEVE THE
ANSWER DEPENDS UPON WHAT YOU THINK ARE HIS OBJECTIVES AT HOME
AND ABROAD. AND WE CAN SAY A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THOSE OBJECTIVES
FROM WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS DONE.
FIRST, HIS ACTIONS ABROAD.
DURING A PERIOD OF CHANGE, TENSION AND SOME
VULNERABILITY AT HOME, GORBACHEV CLEARLY IS TRYING TO
KEEP THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT BENIGN FROM THE SOVIET
STANDPOINT. IT IS A REFLECTION OF HIS PERSONALITY AND
INGENUITY THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO DO THIS THROUGH AN
AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY, WITH AN AMAZING ARRAY OF ARMS
CONTROL INITIATIVES, NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES AIMED AT
NEGOTIATING A BORDER SETTLEMENT WITH CHINA, SHAM
WITHDRAWALS OF FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE APPEARANCE
OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT FINDING A WAY OUT OF
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE, AND OVERTURES TO ISRAEL
UNPARALLELED IN TWENTY YEARS, TO MENTION ONLY FOUR.
GORBACHEV CLEARLY HAS DECIDED THAT THE BEST DEFENSE IS
A GOOD OFFENSE.
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AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRINGENCY AT HOME, IT IS
REVEALING OF HIS PRIORITIES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS
CONTINUING TO POUR INTO ITS SURROGATES HUGE SUMS OF
MONEY THAT MAKE CLEAR ITS CONTINUING COMMITMENT: LAST
YEAR NICARAGUA RECEIVED OVER $1 BILLION IN MILITARY AND
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; CUBA CONTINUES TO GET AROUND $5
BILLION PER YEAR; THE SOVIETS HAVE PUT ALMOST $4
BILLION INTO ANGOLA SINCE EARLY 1984; IN 1986 THE
SOVIETS OFFERED VIETNAM NEARLY $1 BILLION IN ECONOMIC
CREDITS. HE HAS NO INTENTION TO ALLOW SOVIET ADVANCES
ABROAD TURN INTO RETREAT.
AT THE SAME TIME, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL YEARS
IT APPEARS THAT SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING GREW LAST YEAR
AS INVESTMENTS WERE MADE IN PLANT AND EQUIPMENT FOR NEW
WEAPON SYSTEMS. MOREOVER, SOVIET RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE
PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS HAVE EXPANDED SINCE GORBACHEV
TOOK POWER.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV'S PREOCCUPATION WITH ECONOMIC
MODERNIZATION AND REFORM AT HOME HAS NOT LED TO A SLACKENING OF
SOVIET RESOLVE TO DEFEND AND TO EXTEND ITS FORWARD OUTPOSTS
AROUND THE WORLD. NOR HAS IT LED TO A SHIFT OF RESOURCES AWAY
FROM THE MILITARY. WHILE WE EXPECT GORBACHEV TO BE CAUTIOUS IN
TAKING ON NEW THIRD WORLD CLIENTS, THE NOTION THAT HE WOULD
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FOREGO NEW OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN
BEHAVIOR AS WELL AS WITH SOVIET HISTORY.
FURTHERMORE, WHILE ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IS INTENDED TO
MAKE THE USSR MILITARILY COMPETITIVE IN THE LONG TERM, THE
SUPREME IRONY MAY BE THAT THE ONGOING PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION
WILL LIKELY BENEFIT THE MILITARY ALSO IN THE SHORT TERM MORE
THAN THE CIVILIAN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. THE DEFENSE
INDUSTRIES ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSIMILATE MODERNIZATION
THAN THEIR CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS. ALSO, THE DEFENSE
ESTABLISHMENT WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO HAVE MORE CLOUT FOR
OBTAINING HIGH QUALITY RESOURCES THAN THE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES
-- ESPECIALLY IF GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO WEAKEN THE LATTER.
AND WHAT OF GORBACHEV'S OBJECTIVES AT HOME? HIS
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND OTHER MEASURES COULD BE
ACCLAIMED IF GORBACHEV WERE INTENDING TO MOVE THE SOVIET UNION
AWAY FROM MARXISM?LENINISM AND ITS TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE, IF
TERMS SUCH AS "DEMOCRATIZATION" AND "OPENNESS" HAD ANY REAL
MEANING IN A SOVIET CONTEXT, IF PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC
DEVELOPMENT MEANT THE BETTERMENT OF THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN
THE SOVIET UNION AND LESS FOCUS ON MILITARY. FORCES. NOTHING IN
SOVIET HISTORY NOR IN GORBACHEV'S BACKGROUND OR PERFORMANCE TO
DATE SUGGESTS HE HAS THESE OBJECTIVES IN MIND OR COULD. ACHIEVE
THEM EVEN IF HE DID.
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WHILE THERE ARE MANY EXAMPLES OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
EVOLVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY -- SUCH AS WE HAVE SEEN REPEATEDLY IN
SOUTH AMERICA IN RECENT YEARS -- THERE ARE NO SUCH EXAMPLES OF
THE SAME KIND OF CHANGE IN A TOTALITARIAN COMMUNIST STATE, NO
MATTER HOW SMALL. INDEED, THE EFFORT TO MODERNIZE IN HUNGARY
AND CHINA ARE INSTRUCTIVE. IN BOTH CASES, THE TOTALITARIAN
STRUCTURE HAS REMAINED IN PLACE AND REFORM HAS GROUND TO A HALT
WHEN IT REACHED THE POINT OF CHALLENGING THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S
MONOPOLY ON POWER. GORBACHEV PRESENTS TOTALITARIANISM WITH
SOME LIMITS AND WITH A HUMAN FACE BUT IT IS STILL ESSENTIALLY
TOTALITARIANISM. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD OURSELVES OR ALLOW
OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING OTHERWISE.
THAT SAID, THERE IS MORE OPEN POLITICAL CONFLICT AND DEBATE
IN THE SOVIET UNION NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN A GENERATION.
ADVOCATES OF SLOW CHANGE AND ADVOCATES OF FORCED MODERNIZATION
ARE CLASHING IN A STRUGGLE FAMILIAR IN RUSSIAN HISTORY.
GORBACHEV IS, IN MY JUDGMENT, CUT FROM THE HANDFUL OF RUSSIAN
AND SOVIET LEADERS OVER THE CENTURIES DETERMINED TO MODERNIZE
ImLad:44,1/4 w4i.441.04.
THAT VAST COUNTRY) THE AS YET UNANSWERABLE QUESTION IS WHETHER
HE HAS THE POLITICAL SKILL, MANAGERIAL TALENT, AND ABOVE ALL,
THE RUTHLESSNESS TO CHANGE THE HOUSE THAT STALIN BUILT AND HOW
MUCH HE CAN CHANGE IT BEFORE THREATENING THE PARTY ITSELF.
HOW THEN DO I ANSWER WHETHER IF IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR
GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL? I BELIEVE THAT TO THE DEGREE HE
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IS EVEN MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL -- AND HE IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS --
THE UNITED STATES WILL FACE A FAR MORE DYNAMIC AND DANGEROUS
ADVERSARY IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND: A MILITARILY MORE POWERFUL,
DOMESTICALLY M_E!VITAL AND POLITICALLY MORE ADROIT SOVIET
UNION WHOS4A1GRESSIVE OBJECTIVES ABROAD AND TOTALITARIANISM AT
HOME REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. WE ARE IN FOR QUITE A RIDE;
SEEING REALITY CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE
DANGERS -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
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