NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 28 DECEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010091-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: December 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
Top Seciet
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
28 December 1983
28 December 1983
Copy ' or,
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Contents
South Africa-Angola: South African Attacks
Suriname: Labor Strikes
El Salvador: Military Activity
Algeria: Results of Party Congress
Costa Rica: New Foreign Minister
Sweden-USSR: Soviets Expelled for Espionage
Special Analysis
Morocco-Algeria-Western Sahara: The War Grinds On 8
28 December 1983
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The pace of fighting in southern Angola appears to be quickening.
The South Africans said on Monday that they had moved some
140 kilometers into Angola in a preemptive attack on a dispersed
SWAPO force they claim totals some 1,400 guerrillas. Pretoria says
that guerrilla units are protected by Angolan and Cuban forces and
that some 200 SWAPO personnel had sought shelter at the garrison
in Cahama.
The South African defense chief has publicly asserted that, while
South Africa does not want to engage Angolan or Cuban troops, it
would do so if the Angolans continue to protect SWAPO or interfere
in South African operations against SWAPO. The Angolans ortedly
did intervene last week in a clash near Caiundo.
Luanda announced on Monday that the South Africans had
captured the town of Kassinga and had launched combined air and
ground operations against Cahama, Cuvelai, and Caiundo. Angola
claims to have shot down four South African aircraft. Pretoria denies
losing any aircraft, but it confirms that SA-8 missiles were fired at its
planes during operations over the weekend.
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Violence is likely if the military intervenes to stop a week-old strike
among bauxite workers.
The wildcat strike protesting proposed tax increases has spread
to Suriname's other major bauxite facility. According to the US
Embassy, the government's failure to address the workers' demands
prompted frustrated strikers to shut down a major source of electric
power to the capital yesterday.
Meanwhile, the government announced that it decided to make
some unspecified concessions on taxes. It is also willing to negotiate
some of the other demands of the strikers with the labor unions.
The strikers presented a list of 13 grievances to government
ministers at a meeting last week.
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Comment: The government's delay in dealing with this crisis
indicates that Army Commander Bouterse wants to avoid a
showdown and that he probably is looking for a way to calm the
situation. Although Bouterse's first step has been to offer concessions
to strikers, if the situation continues to deteriorate or causes
widespread social unrest, he probably will not hesitate to act forcibly.
The absence of military action so far suggests Bouterse may try to
appease the workers, even at the expense of the faltering economy.
Meanwhile, the continuing strike will lead to losses in tax revenues
and foreign exchange earnings.
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EL SALVADOR: Military Activity
Fighting continued over the weekend in the east and the north,
and both sides are planning more operations.
Government sources say the Army has killed at least 200
guerrillas in northern Morazan, while the insurgents claim at least 30
government troops were killed near Ciudad Barrios
The government plans to continue operations during the holiday
period. the elite Atlacatl battalion
will sweep central Usulutan, and the US defense attache reports that
the offensive in Morazan is ending. The Army also will increase
security measures to protect the sugar harvest in the central part of
the country.
Comment: The Army's decision to sustain operations is a sign of
a more aggressive strategy, particularly in the east. The insurgents,
however, apparently plan to take advantage of the concentration of
government forces in that region to strike elsewhere. They also may
hope that renewed offensive activity near the capital will provide them
with a more secure base of operations, which they are likely to use to
disrupt the presidential election scheduled for late March
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ALGERIA: Results of Party Congress
Algeria's only political party, the National Liberation Front,
reelected President Bendjedid as secretary general at its fifth
congress last week, making him the sole candidate in the presidential
election scheduled for 12 January.
The congress strengthened the role of the Front in policy matters
and called for improving and expanding the private sector of the
economy. It gave agriculture the highest priority for development
funds and imposed new and more rigorous standards for state
officials. Changes in the Central Committee-the key decisionmaking
body-strengthened the positions of Bendjedid and of the top
military command, which provides key support for the regime.
Comment: The congress marked a watershed for Bendjedid.
After five years of low-profile leadership, he is making substantial
doctrinal and personnel changes that should quicken the pace of his
liberalization of the regime's policies.
Algiers presumably will continue to pursue regional stability and
to develop relations with the West. It will reduce the socialist
restraints that have kept economic policy focused on heavy industry
for almost 20 years. The regime also will try to cultivate public support
by giving more attention to social and consumer needs and by
reducing security controls.
Several leftist party stalwarts-notably the head of the Front's
foreign affairs committee-failed to be reelected to the Central
Committee, as did many lesser leaders with close associations to
members of previous regimes. The housecleaning represents the final
phase of Bendjedid's slow and judicious consolidation of personal
power. It should strengthen the policymaking apparatus of the party,
which Bendjedid has regularly circumvented because of pockets of
resistance to his new course.
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COSTA RICA: New Foreign Minister
President Monge has named Justice Minister Gutierrez to head
the Foreign Ministry. Gutierrez replaces anti-Sandinista hardliner
Volio, who resigned last month. At a press conference yesterday
Gutierrez said there will be no changes in foreign policy.[
Comment: The appointment of Gutierrez should reassure
Monge's conservative backers that Volio's resignation did not
portend a relaxation of Costa Rica's tough stance toward Nicaragua.
Gutierrez has taken a firm line in negotiations with the Sandinistas,
and he has been a competent participant in the Contadora peace
process. Nevertheless, he probably will be less aggressive than Volio
in his public posture toward Nicaragua. Monge is under pressure from
the left wing of his party to maintain the channels of communication
with Managua.
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SWEDEN-USSR: Soviets Expelled for Espionage
The Swedish Government last week expelled three Soviet
citizens, including two diplomats, because of their involvement in
espionage. A brief government statement, which did not name the
expelled Soviets, stated that Swedish interests would have been
damaged if the Soviets had continued their activities. The Soviet
Embassy spokesman in Stockholm has denounced the charges as
groundless.
Comment: Stockholm's discreet handling of the expulsions is
designed to restrict the damage on already cool relations.
Nonetheless, this latest incident-along with previous submarine
incursions into coastal waters and the interception by Swedish
officials of sophisticated computer equipment bound for the USSR-
will dampen Prime Minister Palme's hopes for normalizing ties.
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- - N Moroccan defensive
barrier (berm)
Proposed defensive
barrier
Area of Polisario
base camps
Railroad
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
Canary Islands
__, (Sp.)
Tarfaya
Western
Sahara
AdDakhla._}--
Pddrik
r'Zoudrat
Spain
,GibraltariU K
Ceuta
(SP
"Khouribga
Midelt
Benguerir
Morocco
Mauritania
Algeria
Mali
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28 December 1983
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Special Analysis
The chances of a political resolution of the eight-year-old war in
Western Sahara, which were increased somewhat by a rapprochement
between Morocco and Algeria earlier this year, have diminished in
recent months. As the deadline for an OAU-sponsored referendum
this month runs out, the disputants have stiffened their positions. King
Hassan remains under pressure to find a solution to the conflict,
however, and Algeria is anxious to keep alive prospects for a
settlement.
Hassan tacitly accepted an OAU resolution last summer that
named Morocco and the Polisario Front as the parties to the conflict,
but he has steadfastly refused to hold public talks with the insurgents.
In a recent letter to African heads of state, Hassan reaffirmed his
willingness to hold a referendum in Western Sahara. He insisted,
however, that the OAU first has to arrange a cease-fire. F_~
The Algerian Position
During the past year, Algeria has begun to direct its policy in
North Africa away from confrontation with Morocco in an effort to
promote stability in the region.
A high-level Algerian Government official reports that Algeria no
longer favors an independent Saharan state because it could
introduce a new element of instability in the area. Instead, the official
suggested that the solution to the Western Sahara problem could be
found in some kind of confederation scheme with Morocco and
Mauritania. Another Algerian official has said that Algeria is willing to
assist in negotiations by "working on the Polisario."
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Algerian President Bendjedid, however, is constrained by the
,Army and other less conciliatory elements in the government and by
Algeria's longstanding commitment to the principle of self-
determination for the territory. As a result, Algiers will continue to
support the Polisario's position that Rabat deal directly with the
insurgents rather than through Algeria, as Hassan would like.
While the recent fifth party congress of the National Liberation
Front strengthened Bendjedid's authority, he is still unlikely to adopt
policies that offend the Army-his main power base.
In any event, Algiers is unlikely to take any new initiatives in the
next several months. Among other things, the Algerians are
increasingly preoccupied with the presidential election to be held next
month.
African states are anxious to see progress in settling the conflict
before the OAU summit scheduled for May in Conakry, Guinea. The
interim Secretary General of the OAU says the Polisario leaders have
agreed not to attend a ministerial conference in February to avoid
further disrupting the organization. He expects, however, that the
insurgents will insist on attending the summit and claiming a seat.
Morocco's moderate African supporters, who thus far have gone
along with Rabat's insistence that the Polisario not be seated at the
OAU, are restive over Morocco's position on implementing the OAU
resolution. If the Polisario's self-declared "republic"-recognized by
.27 of the OAU's 50 members-is admitted as a member state at the
summit, only a few other members would be likely to follow Rabat in
its probable walkout.
Rabat's serious financial difficulties, which are caused in part by
the cost of the war, may eventually add to the pressures on Hassan to
compromise. Although acquisition of Western Sahara remains a
popular cause among Moroccans, the continuation of economic
austerity measures could cause political problems for the King.
Aid from Saudi Arabia, which earlier had helped offset military
expenses, has dropped off over the past two years. In recent months,
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solution to the conflict in the interest of regional unity.
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Military Outlook
Polisario insurgents are likely to continue the sporadic but well-
organized military attacks they began in July in the hope of forcing
Morocco into direct, public negotiations. Their tactics have included
efforts to breach the Moroccan defensive barrier, but they do not
have the ability to hold territory actively defended by Moroccan
forces.
The guerrillas also probably will increase harassing attacks with
the intention of luring Moroccan forces outside the barrier. In
addition, they may continue efforts to shoot down Moroccan aircraft,
which frequently attack Polisario camps in Western Sahara.
to the Mauritanian border will further frustrate the Polisario and
reinforce its determination to fight on. Without increased support,
however, the Polisario is unlikely to be able to put enough milit
pressure on Morocco to force it to compromise any time soon.
Algeria probably will not increase substantially the Polisario's
military capabilities or loosen the controls that inhibit the insurgents'
access to Moroccan territory. On the other hand, the Algerians are
likely to have approved heightened guerrilla activity in the past six
months. They may calculate that Rabat will not be ready for a
compromise solution until after Moroccan resources have been
strained further by the conflict.
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