NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 13 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020099-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 99
• Publication Date: October 13, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIG
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
13 October 1983
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Contents
Japan: Implications of the Tanaka Verdict .............................. 2
North Korea-South Korea: Possible New Strategy ................ 3
Nicaragua: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks .............................. 4
Chile: Week of Protests .......................................................... 5
Poland: Party Central Committee Plenary Meeting ................
Warsaw Pact: Foreign Ministers Confer on INF ......................
Western Europe: Labor Statement on INF ............................
Norway: Impending Challenge to INF .....................................
Central America: Regional Council Reactivated .................... 10
International: New Tactics at the IAEA Meeting .................... 10
USSR-Iraq-Iran: Commentary on French Aircraft Sale .......... 11
UK: Criticism of Thatcher ........................................................ 11
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JAPAN: Implications of the Tanaka Verdict
The guilty verdict in the bribery trial of former Prime Minister
Tanaka probably will not threaten Prime Minister Nakasone's political
Lawyers for Tanaka have appealed the conviction, and he will
remain free pending resolution of the appeal, a process that could
take years. Tanaka says he is innocent and is determined to fight the
decision of the court. Many members of the Tanaka faction are
rallying around their leader.
All the opposition parties released statements calling for Tanaka
to resign from the Diet. They are expected to seek a vote on a
resolution against Tanaka that indirectly attacks Nakasone.-The
media uniformly demand Tanaka's retirement from politics.
Nakasone, who relies heavily on the support of the 119-man
faction led by Tanaka, has tried to remain aloof from the controversy.
He says the legal system should be allowed to take its course as
provided for in the Constitution. The Liberal Democratic Party still has
a commanding majority in the Diet, and none of Nakasone's rivals in
the party is prepared to challenge his leadership now.
Comment: Nakasone, strengthened by his strong standing in the
polls, will try to divert public attention by focusing Diet debate on
politically popular measures such as a tax cut. Initial public reaction
has been calm, and recent polls suggest the public is tired of the
issue, which has dragged on since 1976.
Opposition parties will find it difficult to boycott the Diet, as they
have threatened if the Liberal Democratic Party refuses to participate
in any debate over Tanaka's fate. If Nakasone cannot contain the
controversy, Tanaka is likely to resign to spare the party further
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NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: Possible New Strategy
Indications of North Korean responsibility for the bombing in
Rangoon-though still not conclusive-raise the possibility that
P'yongyang is adopting a more aggressive strategy toward South
Burmese security authorities yesterday apprehended a third
Korean suspect. South Korean investigators in Ran oon reportedly
have been given permission to interrogate him.
Comment: P'yongyang largely avoided highly visible terrorist
actions during the late 1970s. It viewed talk of US troop withdrawals
and the growth of political unrest in South Korea as favorable
responsible for these trends.
South Korea, as host country to a number of impending
international events, is achieving considerable worldwide recognition
and prestige. The US-South Korean security relationship has been
reaffirmed and strengthened. P'yongyang may have viewed Chun's
visit to Rangoon as an opportunity to remove the one individual most
consolidated control since taking power.
developments.
Since South Korean President Chun took office in 1980, North
Korean President Kim II-song has been dealt a series of setbacks in
his efforts to reunify the peninsula on his terms. Chun has firmly
ample time to plan such an operation.
Tight security in South Korea virtually rules out a successful North
Korean terrorist strike against Chun and other high-level officials.
Security precautions in Rangoon, on the other hand, are less
stringent, and the North Koreans have an established presence in
Burma. Chun's trip was first announced in June, giving P'vonavang
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facility
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NICARAGUA: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks
The attack on the fuel storage facility at Corinto has dealt a
psychological blow to Sandinista leaders, who are debating on how to
respond.
Nicaragua delivered an official protest to the US Embassy
yesterday, charging Washington with direct responsibility for the raid.
The Sandinistas report that five fuel storage tanks have been
destroyed and 25,000 residents of the port have been evacuated. A
US oil company official valued the initial fuel loss at more than
$2 million and says it will cost about $1 million to replace the largest
Comment: Managua may retaliate for the attack by sponsoring
terrorist raids in Honduras and perhaps Costa Rica. Nicaraguan
leaders have backed away from recent statements by Defense
Minister Ortega that the Sandinista military would engage in hot
pursuit of insurgents into neighboring countries. The Sandinistas
reportedly have conducted raids on insurgent camps in Honduras,
however, and unpublicized attacks on tar ets near the border
probably will continue.
The Sandinistas are likely to increase efforts to strengthen air and
coastal defenses. Cuba and the USSR are unlikely to agree to a
Sandinista request for MIGs at this time, but they may provide
additional antiaircraft artillery, hand-held surface-to-air missiles, and
coastal patrol boats. The Sandinistas probably will seek fighter
aircraft from other sources-such as Li , which tried previously to
deliver L-39 jet trainers.
The Sandinista leadership probably will judge that offering any
political concessions now would be viewed as a sign of weakness.
Coming soon after the sabotage of the oil import facility at Puerto
Sandino and a series of insurgent air attacks, however, the raid could
again prompt the Sandinistas to tell US officials they are willing to
negotiate all issues. This would include their support for Salvadoran
insurgents.
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likelihood of leftist-inspired violence today and tomorrow.
government and its withdrawal from protest activity increasp_q the
The suspension of the democratic opposition's dialogue with the
have announced they are not formally participating in these activities.
The antigovernment rally in Santiago on Tuesday, organized by a
new leftist coalition, was authorized by the government and was
generally nonviolent. Plans for additional protests and marches,
including a large demonstration tomorrow night, do not have
government approval. Leaders of the moderate Democratic Alliance
The Democratic Alliance on Monday said it was suspending the
dialogue because the government had not responded to its demands.
Alliance leaders believe they are losing
leftist groups.
ground in their attempts to extract concessions from the government
and fear possible dissolution as members leave to join more active
Comment: The democratic opposition will lose credibility if it
refuses to engage in protests. On the other hand, it risks alienating its
moderate elements and jeopardizing hopes for accommodation with
the government if it becomes embroiled in leftist-inspired violence.
sides.
The leftists' determination to undermine the dialogue and the
regime's resolve to discourage protests also make further violence
more likely. Serious turmoil this week would harden attitudes on both
commission on political laws to salvage the dialogue.
seize on the government's apparent willingness to forma mixed
Groups in the Alliance are divided on strategy but probably have
not yet ruled out resuming talks with the government. Moderates may
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POLAND: Party Central Committee Plenary Meeting
The long-delayed party Central Committee plenary session on
ideology that is to begin tomorrow will discuss a new policy on middle-
level leadership and may be the scene of maneuvering over personnel
changes, but Premier Jaruzelski's position as party first secretary
an open struggle is unlikely between
Jaruze s i ana is opponents. On the other hand, Jaruzelski wants to
place moderate Vice Premier Rakowski on the Politburo and the
Secretariat, despite objections from party hardliners and the Soviets.
Comment: The repeated postponement of the meeting since
early this year probably reflects Jaruzelski's preoccupation with
security issues and his concern that he could not contr
discussion of such a contentious to ic. Soviet pressure
helped prompt Jaruzelski to hold
the central Committee session now. Moscow probably considers a
new ideological program essential to rebuilding the party.
Jaruzelski probably is confident that his critics cannot challenge
his control of the party. The successful conclusion of the papal visit in
June and the ease with which the regime handled the small
demonstrations by Solidarity on 31 August have strengthened his
position. He may also believe that recent criticism of the church in the
government press will refute charges that he is too lenient with the
opposition.
Rakowski's recent uncharacteristically harsh attack on the US
may be intended to improve his standing with the Soviets, who
criticized him in May. Failure of Rakowski's candidacy could indicate
there are still significant constraints on Jaruzelski's power.
It is unlikely that the Central Committee will unite the party behind
an ideological program. The party's proposed policy on middle-level
leadership, announced in August, probably did not go down well with
hardliners. The new policy would provide for the appointment of more
nonparty people to managerial posts in the economy and in the
government, and hardliners-fearful of losing their jobs-argue that
the party should have a monopoly on these posts.
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WARSAW PACT: Foreign Ministers Confer on INF
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers convene in Sofia today to consider
responses to NATO's plans for INF and to discuss new ways to fan
Western fears that deployments will further damage East-West
West to gain military superiority.
communique has been coordinated by all the Pact members except
Romania, which late last month was uncertain whether to concur. The
draft also calls for agreement at Geneva, reviews past peace
initiatives by the Pact, and repeats the warning issued after the
Warsaw Pact summit last June that member states will not allow the
a strongly anti-US and anti-NATO draft
Foreign Minister Gromyko, following the ministerial meeting, will
meet with West German Foreign Minister Genscher in Vienna.
Genscher has indicated publicly that INF will be a major theme of their
talks, which were to hav een held during the UN General Assembly
session
is planning to visit Moscow late this month.
Gromyko reportedly also has invited other West European foreign
ministers to meet with him. Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen
of countermeasures to INF deployment.
Comment: The USSR presumably has sought to bring the
Romanians into line. If they acquiesce, the Soviets may be
encouraged to try to convene another Pact summit before INF
deployments begin in December to try again to secure endorsement
airliner shootdown.
Gromyko and other Soviet and East European officials will take
this hard line with their West European counterparts. In this
connection, the Soviets may now regard the cancellation of some of
Gromyko's UN consultations as a blessing in disguise, as rescheduled
meetings will be less affected by the incident of the South Korean
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WESTERN EUROPE: Labor Statement on INF
The executive committee of the European Trade Union
Confederation today will consider a draft statement urging the US
and USSR to reach an arms control agreement on INF and criticizing
their failure to do so thus far. The draft demands a greater European
role in negotiations and asks that French and British systems be
included in the talks. The Confederation asserts that, if the talks show
no progress by late November, European labor will consider stronger
action. The organization plans to deliver its statement to the US and
Soviet delegations in Geneva after the peace demonstrations set for
22 and 23 October.
Comment: This draft is more critical of the superpowers than the
Confederation's resolution of April 1982 and reflects the growing
involvement in protest activities of key labor groups in the INF basing
countries. French labor representatives, however, are likely to oppose
the draft's references to French nuclear systems. The Confederation
is the umbrella organization for 35 national labor groupings covering
a rather wide political spectrum. Its affiliates are not obliged to act on
the statement, but might join a short Europe-wide work stoppage if an
INF agreement is not reached.
NORWAY: Impending Challenge to INF
Prime Minister Willoch probably will face a major parliamentary
challenge on INF this fall. Willoch is fairly confident he can retain a
parliamentary majority in favor of INF deployments. The opposition
Labor Party, which did well in local elections last month, is
coordinating its efforts with other social democratic parties in
Western Europe and is following events in West Germany closely.
Meanwhile, Norway's well-organized peace movement is planning to
stage demonstrations this month.
Comment: The two parties that formally joined Willoch's coalition
in June are likely to provide enough votes to keep the government in
power. Willoch will try to exploit divisions on INF in the Labor Party
and deflect its ability to attack the government's economic policies.
The demonstrations are unlikely to be either massive or unrulv. in part
because Norway is not an INF basing country.
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Regional Council Reactivated
Defense Ministers from Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and
Panama are planning a second meeting in Tegucigalpa next week to
try to revive the Central American Defense Council. During a meeting
in Guatemala on 1 October, the Ministers agreed to present a united
front against Nicaragua and to warn the Sandinista government not to
involve itself in other countries' affairs. A Guatemalan military
spokesman asserted, however, that the Council's mission would be
"defensive" and that it would not seek to destabilize Nicaragua. The
Ministers hope their governments will officially endorse the
organization and issue a statement of its political principles.
Comment: Guatemalan Chief of State Mejia, who heads the
Council, hopes to establish a strong Guatemalan role in regional
affairs. He probably wants the Council to take a more assertive
position against Nicaragua's support of regional revolutionaries than
the Contadora group has. If Panama becomes an active member,
Council leaders will point to the presence of one of the four
Contadora countries as indicative of the Council's nonaggressive
posture. That could be offset by Costa Rica's decision not to
participate because of its neutral position in regional conflicts
INTERNATIONAL: New Tactics at the IAEA Meeting
The US Mission at the IAEA in Vienna reports that Iraq has
offered a draft resolution at the IAEA General Conference calling for
the termination of all scientific cooperation between the IAEA and
Israel. Egypt and several black African states are circulating a similar
resolution prohibiting IAEA technical assistance to South Africa.
These resolutions require only a simple.maiority. The votes on these
resolutions could take place today
Comment: Baghdad's resolution suggests that the Iraqis have
abandoned plans for a more direct attack on Israel's membership
status and for challenging Tel Aviv's credentials to attend the .
conference. The Iraqis can count on support from many developing
nations. They will not be disposed to weaken the resolution, since it
represents their minimum demands. The votes on the Iraqi resolution
and on the one on South Africa are likely to be close.
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USSR-IRAQ-IRAN: Commentary on French Aircraft Sale
A Soviet television commentator on Tuesday said the Iranian
reaction to the reported delivery to Iraq of five French Super Etendard
aircraft could lead to the involvement of other countries in the war. He
claimed that the "greatest danger" is that the US would use such an
escalation as an excuse for "armed interference." The commentator
repeated the USSR's longstanding appeal for a negotiated settlement
and said the olutely against" outside military
interference.
Comment: These remarks, although not especially authoritative,
are Moscow's first response to the reported delivery of the aircraft
and Tehran's threat to close the Persian Gulf. His focus on the
possibility of US military involvement suggests concern about an
increased US military presence in the region. For the Soviets, such a
prospect probably outweighs the potential benefits of the temporary
disruption of Western economies that may follow an interruption in oil
UK: Criticism of Thatcher
wide publicity.
Prime Minister Thatcher probably will have little difficulty in
weathering the current spate of political and media criticisms. The
major focus of media attention has been Trade Secretary Parkinson,
who has admitted that his former secretary is carrying his child out of
wedlock. Various commentators also have discussed the
government's supposed lack of clear direction following Thatcher's
landslide reelection in June. In addition, a series of disputes between
the Treasury and other ministries over spending levels have received
her position.
Comment: Thatcher's problems in demonstrating strong
leadership reflect the customary summer political lull, her absence
from center stage following eye surgery, and a sense that a large
majority allows the Tories to indulge in squabbles among themselves.
The "Parkinson affair," coming on the eve of the Conservative
conference, is embarrassing to Thatcher, who has often stressed
family values. While there is no clamor for Parkinson's resignation,
the Prime Minister is monitoring Tory sentiment and probably would
not hesitate to remove him if she believed the matter were a threat to
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