NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 30 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010206-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 206
• Publication Date: September 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Director of
Intelligence
25X1
2,85
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Focus on the MNF
Chile: Political Momentum Shifting
USSR: Economic Performance
Guatemala: Mejia Placating the Right
Bulgaria: Change in the Leadership
East Germany-West Germany: Relations Improving
France-Africa: Summit Meeting
Nicaragua-Costa Rica: Border Post Attacked
USSR-Vietnam-China: Soviets Replay Vietnamese Attack
Special Analysis
Nigeria: Shagari's Second Term
Top Secret
30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
The withdrawal of the Multinational Force probably will be a
principal Syrian goal at the proposed national reconciliation talks.
Foreign Minister Khaddam, in
interviews during the past week, has called for withdrawal of the MNF
and criticized the presence of US Marines in Beirut.
Meanwhile, the security committee tasked with maintaining the
cease-fire agreed to reopen Beirut International Airport yesterday.
The committee members also exchanged lists of persons who were
kidnaped or captured during the past weeks of fighting.
Comment: Syrian President Assad almost certainly believes the
US support will strengthen President Gemayel's ability to avoid
concessions to Muslim and Syrian demands. He probably fears that
renewed fighting could lead to US-Syrian clashes. Damascus also is
likely to be laying the groundwork for adding an MNF pullout to its
preconditions for eventual Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
Earlier this week Druze leader Junblatt had made the reopening
of the airport conditional on the achievement of a comprehensive
security agreement. He has now dropped his demand probably in
order to appear more reasonable than Gemayel. Junblatt probably
expects that Gemayel will not make substantial concessions and then
will have to bear the onus for the failure of negotiations.
Top Secret
1 30 September 1983
25X1
25X1
25X1
9X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
CHILE: Political Momentum Shifting
The political dialogue with the opposition Democratic Alliance
remains suspended while conservative supporters of President
Pinochet's government are forming a new party and gaining
momentum.
The new conservative political movement, the Democratic
Independent Union, supports Interior Minister Jarpa's initiatives on
political liberalization. It favors advancing the date of congressional
elections and keeping the President's term unchanged.
Comment: The indecision over tactics and the expected rotation
in the presidency of the Alliance in the near future could temporarily
reduce the pressure on the government to liberalize the political
system. In coming weeks these factors also may help shift the political
initiative to more conservative groups.
Top Secret
2 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
USSR: Percentage Growth of GNP
Ave rage annual rate of growth.
h Projected.
Top Secret
1 -1
30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Economic performance in the USSR improved during the first
eight months of 1983 in almost all sectors, and GNP probably will
grow by 3.5 to 4 percent by the end of the year-well above the
2-percent annual growth rate achieved in 1981-82.
Comment: The biggest improvement has been in agriculture,
and total farm output could reach a record level. The grain harvest
probably will be the best in five years, other crops are doing well, and
livestock production is at an all-time high.
Growth of industrial production is likely to reach 3 percent by the
end of the year. Although this would be higher than rates achieved in
the past few years, it largely reflects a short-term recovery from the
performance registered in early 1982.
Performance in the consumer sector has been mixed. Food
supplies were greater through August than during the same period
last year, and a record high in per capita meat consumption should be
achieved if recent high levels of imports continue. The consumer has
fared less well in the availability of nonfood items as production of
these goods continues to increase slowly.
The anticipated higher growth levels this year are unlikely to
continue throughout the decade. Much of the improvement,
particularly in agriculture and transportation, is the result of the mild
winter of 1982-83 and favorable growing conditions so far this year.
The factors constraining growth since the late 1970s-smaller
additions to the labor force, sluggish growth of the capital stock, raw
materials shortages, and transportation bottlenecks-probably will
not be resolved soon. These same factors are likely to keep average
growth for the 1980s below the levels achieved this year.
Top Secret
3 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
25X1
2bX1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
GUATEMALA: Mejia Placating the Right
Chief of State Mejia's decisions this week on elections and tax
reforms will help mollify the political opposition, but they are likely to
increase concern that he is being influenced by rightwing parties.
A government spokesman recently said Mejia may call soon for
constituent assembly elections, although he did not indicate whether
they will be advanced from the scheduled date of July 1984 as urged
by rightwing parties. He also said Mejia intends to turn power over to
an elected civilian government by July 1985. The government has
canceled a program to issue new identity cards designed to reduce
electoral fraud, ostensibly because it would have prolonged the
The survival of the quasi-legislative Council of State-set up by
former President Rios Montt and long opposed by the rightwing
parties-was ordered dissolved yesterday. Mejia removed the
Council's president earlier this month and had not consulted it on his
policy initiatives.
In another move favored by rightwing political forces, press
reports state the government will reduce the rate of a controversial
value-added tax from 10 to 7 percent.
Comment: Mejia may not be ready to move up the election date.
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an autonomous body set up to
oversee and legitimize the election process, publicly opposes
changing the schedule. An early call for elections will create problems
for some 20 new political parties, however, especially if it requires
them to collect beforehand the 4,000 signatures necessary to be
The Council of State is the only political institution in which
Guatemala's Indian population is represented, and its abolition will
further alienate the Indians from the political process. Mejia's recent
decisions are likely to increase the fears of moderate political and
labor organizations that he is bowing to pressure from the political
right.
Top Secret
4 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
BULGARIA: Change in the Leadership
Alexandur Lilov's removal from the Bulgarian leadership, the first
major political change in Eastern Europe since the Soviet succession,
may portend presuccession maneuvering.
The Bulgarian press reports that earlier this week the party
Central Committee relieved Lilov of his posts in the Politburo and
Secretariat "at his request." Lilov-formerly the secretary for
ideological affairs and a Politburo member since 1972-is believed to
be extremely pro-Soviet and was at one time considered a possible
successor to General Secretary Zhivkov. Last year the US Embassy in
Sofia reported rumors from East European sources that Lilov had
fallen out of favor with Zhivkov but that Zhivkov had abandoned
attempts to remove him because of Lilov's strong Soviet support. F
Comment: The move reaffirms Zhivkov's control over the
leadership. It also will be seen as Zhivkov's desire to emphasize
Bulgaria's autonomy over its internal affairs before General Secretary
Andropov's visit to Sofia next month.
Lilov's downfall may be the result of his criticism of economic
reforms for focusing on pragmatic economic issues at the expense of
ideological orthodoxy. He also may have supported conservative
efforts to reverse the liberal cultural policies associated with Zhivkov's
daughter, Lyudmila, who died in 1981.
Milko Balev-a Politburo member, Central Committee secretary,
and longtime Zhivkov loyalist-has appeared and traveled with
Zhivkov extensively since being promoted to the Politburo last year.
He now appears to have strengthened his position by assuming
Lilov's important ideology portfolio. Zhivkov, who is 72, may be
preparing for his own eventual departure by grooming Balev as his
Top Secret
5 30 September 1,983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
EAST GERMANY-WEST GERMANY: Relations Improving
Humanitarian concessions by East Germany could lead to more
near-term improvements in relations with West Germany.
The press reports that the East Germans, since early September,
have been dismantling automatic firing devices and possibly some
mines along the border with West Germany. The West German
Government has told the media that it has indications that East
Germany will remove all the firing devices but not the mines.
East Germany recently announced new legal provisions for family
reunification and marriages of East Germans to foreigners, implying
more East Germans will be allowed to move to the West. In addition,
East Berlin has abolished the minimum currency exchange
requirement for Western visitors under age 14.
Comment: The West Germans presumably will continue to ask
for further concessions and portray the concessions made so far as
only the beginning of substantial improvements in bilateral relations.
The East German moves will help Bonn to justify its earlier loan
guarantee and allow it to facilitate similar loans to East Germany in
the future.
The West German Government wants East Germany to have
enough financial support to avoid economic and social instability that
could cause it to impose severe restrictions on contacts between the
two Germanies. Bonn wants East Berlin to make some concessions to
help it maintain domestic backing for economic cooperation with East
Germany.
Despite their popular appeal in West Germany, the East German
measures will cost little in financial terms and will not reduce tight
border controls. East Berlin probably hopes its moves will help its
prospects for new loan guarantees and direct financial support from
Bonn. At the same time the East Germans may be trying to convince
Bonn that additional improvements in relations are possible and that
such opportunities could be lost if INF deployment proceeds.
Top Secret
6 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
FRANCE-AFRICA: Summit Meeting
The French will work for a diplomatic solution in Chad during the
annual Franco-African summit meeting in Vittel, France, next Monday
and Tuesday. Presidential adviser Penne told US diplomats that
France hopes for a consensus urging the Libyans to withdraw as a
condition for opening negotiations. Representatives of over 35
nations will be present, including observers from several non-French-
speaking countries.
Comment: Paris is not pushing a specific plan, but it wants to
encourage an African solution that would help keep the Chadian crisis
from becoming a superpower confrontation and allow France to
maintain its influence. The French still appear to be looking for
alternatives to the current rival leaders, President Habre and
dissident chief Goukouni. Moderate Francophone leaders, who count
Habre within their ranks, will balk at a solution that entails sacrificing
Top Secret
8 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Nicaragua
*MANAGUA
Top Secret
30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
New attacks in Nicaragua by Eden Pastora's insurgents may
result in another crackdown by Costa Rican security forces.
The
border reportedly has been closed. Nicaragua has protested the
attack, and Costa Rica has convened an emergency meeting of its
State Security Council to discuss the incident.
Comment: The attack comes at a precarious point in relations
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which have been deteriorating as
a result of activities by Pastora's forces. San Jose sought to restore
credibility to its neutral status earlier this month by arresting a large
number of Pastora's men and by indicating its intent to prevent
military operations in the border region. Costa Rican officials now are
likely to intensify these efforts.
Top Secret
10 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
USSR-VIETNAM-CHINA: Soviets Replay Vietnamese Attack
After a delay of three weeks, Pravda has published the anti-
Chinese statement Hanoi sent Moscow in response to the latter's
National Day message. The message is notable for its harsh criticism
of alleged Chinese collusion with the US and its open reference to the
recent discussions between Soviet and Vietnamese party leaders
about their mutual strategic interests. The Pravda item broke a
monthlong moratorium on high-level Soviet media criticism of China.
Comment: The publication of the statement during Secretary of
Defense Weinberger's visit to China suggests that it was intended as
a warning to Beijing against moving closer to the US. In addition, the
USSR may have been trying to reassure Vietnam of continuing Soviet
political support. Moscow has not publicly endorsed the recent white
paper on Thailand issued by the Vietnamese-backed regime in
Kampuchea. The white paper, which charged that Bangkok has
''expansionist designs" on Kampuchea, appears to imply a much
tougher approach by Vietnam toward Thailand.
Top Secret
12 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Nigerian Distribution of Political Power by State, 1983 Election Results
Party presidential candidate having received
at least 25 percent of the vote.
National Party of Nigeria
Unity Party of Nigeria
Nigerian People's Party
People's Redemption Party
Top Secret
30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Special Analysis
NIGERIA: Shagari's Second Term
President Shehu Shagari begins his second term on Saturday
facing lingering opposition resentment over the National Party's
sweep of the elections in August. Charges that Shagari's party stole
the elections continue, and the President needs to proceed with
balanced policies that will reassure opposition ethnic groups. He also
has to contend with a sluggish economy, the need for more severe
adjustment measures and IMF aid, and growing concern about how to
reduce corruption. Shagari is unlikely to veer significantly from the
moderate, generally pro-Western foreign policies that characterized
his first term.
The US Embassy reports that, while the elections were more
orderly and less violent than expected, they were troubled by
procedural inefficiencies, and, in some cases, massive vote
tampering. The poor showing of the major opposition parties in the
two western states caused violent protests that led to bans on
demonstrations and the delaying of legislative elections there.
Despite their postelection rhetoric, losers have thus far been
content to wait for the courts to resolve election challenges. The
courts have overturned some results, including two of three
gubernatorial races where opposition party incumbents at first
appeared to have lost.
Shagari's northern-based National Party clearly remains the
country's most broadly popular party. It made substantial inroads in
some southern states normally controlled by Yoruba leader
Awolowo's Unity Party and Ibo leader Azikiwe's Nigerian People's
Party. In addition, Shagari's party won an absolute majority in the
federal senate and house of representatives and control of 11 of 19
state governorships.
Continuing Political Rivalry
Domestic political concerns will preoccupy Shagari as his term
unfolds. The constitution requires Shagari to appoint an ethnically
balanced cabinet, and he has promised an extensive shakeup of the
government to give it a new nationalist cast.
Top Secret
13 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Shagari will have to move adroitly with appointments to help
assure opposition ethnic groups that they still have an important
economic and political stake in preserving civilian institutions. How
extensively Shagari alters his cabinet and resists pressures to include
corrupt and incompetent figures will be an early indicator of his
political confidence and future policy directions.
The President's skill in maintaining National Party discipline could
be taxed by powerful factions bent on capitalizing on the party's
victory. If Shagari proves unable to rein in these groups, his ability to
carry out promised reforms will be limited and the party itself could
split.
Political infighting among potential successors to Shagari, who
is constitutionally barred from a third term, already has begun.
Southerners claim that party rules require that the next presidential
nominee be a non-northerner.
25X1
25X1
Opposition parties will try to regroup, but there is little likelihood
that they can overcome longstanding ethnic and personal differences
to form a united front. Pressures will mount for perennial candidates
Awolowo and Azikiwe to stand aside in favor of a newer generation of
politicians better able to bridge ethnic and regional divisions.
Considerable party realignment is likely. Minor parties that were
badly defeated in elections could be absorbed by larger parties
seeking to broaden their tribal appeal.
Tough Economic Choices
Shagari is pledged to continue austerity measures that in the past
year have significantly reduced imports, increased unemployment,
and slowed development projects. The willingness of Western
commercial banks to extend new loans and reschedule more debts
will hinge on the government's ability to complete current
negotiations with the IMF.
Even with an agreement, however, rapid economic recovery is
unlikely. Pervasive corruption and chronic inefficiency will weaken any
effort to follow through on systematic economic reform.
The President has committed himself to curbing corruption. He is
aware, however, that too vigorous an attack risks unsettling powerful
vested interests-including many in his own party-that depend on
corruption to solidify political loyalties.
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Lagos is likely to concentrate on strengthening its nonaligned
positions and continuing generally moderate policies, rather than
embarking on a more activist foreign policy. Nigeria's ambitions for
African leadership, however, occasionally will require criticism of the
West on such issues as southern Africa and a negotiated settlement
in Chad. Shagari will remain alert to any efforts by Libya to stir up
Muslim fundamentalists in northern Nigeria.
Shagari's political acumen will be tested further as he tries to
calm ethnic tensions, reorganize his government, and create a
political consensus that attracts opposition participation. He now has
a legislative majority, and he will no longer enjoy the luxury of blaming
Nigeria's problems on opposition obstructionism. Public support
could begin to wane if it appears that the President has not taken
charge or that no real changes are in the offing.
Moreover, if Shagari diverges from his evenhanded approach, the
Yoruba and other frustrated ethnic groups could begin to withdraw
their support for civilian institutions. Initially, opposition parties will
have little opportunity to influence policy at the national level, and
they are likely to concentrate on shoring up their support in traditional
ethnic strongholds. Opposition state governors will be quick to exploit
politically any economic adversity by blaming the federal government.
There is no current evidence of extensive support in the military
for a coup, although there has been increased grumbling among
some middle and junior grade officers from states where opposition
parties faired poorly. If Shagari's policies seriously increase ethnic
grievances and general economic hardship, however, these officers
could start plotting out of conviction that civilian rule no longer works
and that the public would support a return to military rule.
Lagos will look to Washington for economic and political support
for its fledgling democracy. It probably sees little economic advantage
Declining economic condition almost certainly would prompt
requests for US economic help, especially food aid. If the current IMF
negotiations become bogged down, or if IMF terms appear too stiff,
Lagos also could seek US intercession.
Top Secret
15 30 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010206-4