NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 29 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 202
• Publication Date: September 29, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Intelligence
a, Central
I UP Secret
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
29 September 1983
TO
MD 89-229JX
iffs a m x
Cove la r.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Contents
USSR-US: Andropov's Remarks on Foreign Policy
USSR-US: Potential for a Naval Incident
Lebanon: Cease-Fire Violations
Brazil: Figueiredo's Eroding Control
Israel: Efforts To Form a Government
Persian Gulf: Combined Military Exercise
Netherlands: Peace Movement's New Approach
USSR-Bulgaria: Possible Visit by Soviet Leaders
Canada: Problems With Interceptor Force
Argentina: Military Issues Warning
Spain-UK: Study Commissions on Gibraltar
Special Analysis
9
9
10
Philippines: Short-Term Political Outlook 13
Top Secret
29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
USSR-US: Andropov's Remarks on Foreign Policy
General Secretary Andropov, in an emotional and highly defensive
statement released yesterday, led off with a direct personal attack on
President Reagan in an attempt to counter the impact of the
President's address at the UN and appealed to West Europeans to
oppose US INF deployments.
Andropov dismissed as illusory any expectations that the US
Administration would change its "militarist" policy. He called the
airliner incident a provocation and an example of "extreme
adventurism" by the US. Andropov assured the Soviet people that the
USSR's defenses were such that anyone would be "ill-advised" to
test them.
In a more moderate tone, the Soviet leader also suggested that it
would be in the self-interest of West European politicians to reject
deployment of US missiles. At the same time, however, Andropov's
statement contained no threat to walk out of the negotiations at
Geneva and only a highly generalized allusion to Soviet
countermeasures if INF deployments proceed on schedule.
Comment: Andropov's statement appears designed to offset the
impact of the shootdown incident and the President's offer on arms
control by portraying the USSR as the less intransigent party in the
Geneva talks. His curt dismissal of any prospects for a change in US
policy-his most emphatic statement on that score to date-
suggests an effort to reinforce this message. His insinuation that
Soviet military power serves to check US "adventurism" may have
been aimed in part at justifying to the Soviet public the downing of the
The statement also probably was intended to demonstrate that
Andropov is firmly in charge. Until now, the civilian leadership's
silence on the airliner crisis had been broken only by brief
restatements of Moscow's official position by Defense Minister
Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko. This prompted speculation in
the West-and perhaps also in the USSR-that there was uncertainty
or disarray in the leadership.
Top Secret
1 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Harassment by Soviet naval ships, which have been aggressively
monitoring US search efforts in the Sea of Japan for the South Korean
airliner's flight recorders, increases the possibility of an incident. F-
Over 20 Soviet surface ships have moved since Tuesday from
their previous search area into the area where US naval vessels are
trying to locate the airliner's recorders.
The Soviet Defense Ministry on 17 September called in the US
naval attache to protest that US ships were maneuvering dangerously
close to Soviet vessels in the area. The Soviet military newspaper Red
Star on Tuesday took a similar line in criticizing US naval activity. It
condemned US statements that Soviet ships were trying to thwart US
Comment: Movement of the Soviet ships into the US search area
probably reflects Moscow's anxiety that the US may retrieve the
recorders with their potentially damning evidence. The Soviets
apparently have had no luck in recovering any major pieces of
wreckage or equipment from the site.
Moscow could be trying to provoke confrontation in the hope
that the risk of armed conflict would cause the US to abandon the
recovery effort. The Soviets also may calculate that they could
persuade world opinion that any showdown was caused by
provocative US naval activity close to Soviet territorial waters. Their
diplomatic demarches and statements in the press suggest that they
already have begun to build such a case.
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
BEIRUT
F-
BEIRUT
1 *
Israel
BEIRUT
INTERNATIONAIT
AIRPORT
Suq at
Gharb
Top Secret
29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
*DAMASCUS
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
The number of cease-fire violations increased yesterday, and
Druze threats to retaliate militarily apparently prompted the
government to delay plans to reopen Beirut International Airport.
Druze gunners shelled Army positions at Khaldah. Shia Amal
fighters also exchanged gunfire with Army units in Beirut's southern
suburbs. The 180 Army soldiers taken captive by Shia Amal
militiamen over the weekend were released Tuesday night.
A well-informed source of the US Embassy in Damascus says that
Syria ordered Palestinian fighters to leave the Shuf region when the
cease-fire went into effect on Monday. Rebel PLO units that
participated in the fighting at Suq al Gharb have reportedly moved to
the town of Shtawrah in the Bekaa Valley, just outside the Shuf.
Meanwhile, the security committee charged with supervising the
cease-fire held its first meeting yesterday. Representatives of the
Lebanese Army and the various militias agreed to establish a joint
liaison center to oversee the truce, but no decisions were taken
concerning the selection of neutral observers.
Little progress has been made in organizing the national
reconciliation conference. The government has proposed that the first
meeting be held in Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis are reluctant to host
the conference.
Comment: The reopening of the airport would give the
government an important psychological boost. The Druze evidently
want to prevent a return to business as usual. They presumably hope
to keep pressure on President Gemayel until progress is made on the
political issues that were not resolved by the cease-fire agreement.
Although the Army apparently has maintained control of the
checkpoint whose location precipitated the Amal militiamen seizing
the 180 soldiers, the incident underscores the ability of the Shia Amal
to exercise their power pending a general political settlement.
Syria is anxious to maintain control over Palestinian units. It
probably hopes that, by ordering the Palestinians out of the Shuf
region, it can prevent them from breaking the cease-fire.
Damascus also does not want Palestinians present when neutral
observers move into the region. The Palestinians, however, almost
certainly will return to Suq al Gharb if fighting resumes.
Top Secret
3 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
BRAZIL: Figueiredo's Eroding Control
Protests against austerity are making it increasingly difficult for
President Figueiredo either to enforce economic stabilization or to
manacle the accelerating process of political liberalization.
The Congress last week repealed a government decree limiting
wage increases, its first veto since the military takeover in 1964.
According to the US Embassy, Congress probably will overturn the
key wage law that is essential to the IMF-mandated austerity program
when the law comes up for review next month.
Labor, which has been divided and ineffective for the past several
years, is resisting austerity. A walkout by as many as 250,000 sugar
workers began on Saturday, and 50,000 other persons attended a
Church-sponsored protest against unemployment on Sunday. In
addition, a new militant group has called a general strike for late next
The conflict over economic policy is affecting the President's
control in other areas. Vice President Chaves broke with tradition and
declared his candidacy for the presidential election in 1985, rather
than wait for Figueiredo's blessing.
Federal Deputy Maluf, who has a good chance of winning the
ruling party's nomination against the President's wishes, recently
boasted that he could prevent congressional repeal of the remaining
austerity wage law. He indicated the President could not.
Comment: The administration could temporarily circumvent
Congress by substituting a slightly modified wage decree, or it could
offer political and economic concessions in return for opposition
support of wage restraint. Defeat of the remaining austerity wage law
would endanger the proposed new accord with the IMF and
jeopardize further loan disbursements from foreign banks.
The return to civilian rule is not yet in trouble, and massive social
unrest seems unlikely. On the other hand, Figueiredo probably will not
be able to name his successor. In addition, he is increasingly likely to
have to relinquish power to civilian groups that oppose austerity. F_
Top Secret
4 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Iq
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Foreign Minister Gromyko on Tuesday said the cease-fire in
Lebanon is a positive development and urged the withdrawal of
Western and Israeli troops. In addition, TASS issued an official
statement yesterday calling the cease-fire an indispensable step
toward restoring peace in the region, echoing Gromyko's emphasis
on the need for Israeli and Western withdrawals. Soviet media are
criticizing US attempts to claim credit for arranging the cease-fire and
are attributing it to Arab mediation.
Comment: Gromyko is the first high-level Soviet official to
criticize publicly recent US military involvement in Lebanon-
characteristically, after tensions have subsided. The Soviets are likely
to welcome the cease-fire because an intensification of the fighting
would have increased pressure on them to provide direct military
support for Syria's position in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders
probably are concerned that talks involving the US, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia could develop a solution to the crisis in Lebanon and
eventually facilitate US-Syrian agreement on the broader Arab-Israeli
dispute without the USSR's participation. The failure of Gromyko or
the TASS statement to mention any withdrawal of Syrian forces is
consistent with the USSR's strong support for Syria's claim that its
presence in Lebanon should not be equated with Israel's.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Press reports state that there has been little agreement between
Prime Minister-designate Shamir and Labor Party leader Peres in
their discussion of Lebanon, settlement policy, and social and
economic matters. If Labor joins the coalition, Shamir has offered to
give the party the Foreign Affairs and Defense portfolios-and
possibly Finance. According to recent public opinion polls, a solid
majority of Israelis favor a national unity government that would
include Likud, Labor, and the religious parties.
Comment: There is virtually no chance of forming a grand
coalition, but neither Shamir nor Peres wants to take the blame for
breaking off their discussions. Shamir has little room for compromise
on settlement and Lebanon policies. Peres does not want to be
associated with Likud's unsuccessful economic policies or the
stalemate in Lebanon. He also does not want to strengthen a
government led by Shamir that probably will be weaker and more
unstable than the one headed by Prime Minister Begin. Although the
talks are likely to go on for a few days, Shamir probably will begin to
concentrate on forming a narrow coalition resembling the outgoing
one.
PERSIAN GULF: Combined Military Exercise
The first combined military exercise of the Gulf Cooperation
Council states-Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the
United Arab Emirates-is scheduled to begin in the UAE on Monday
and to last for three weeks. Ground force units from all six countries
will participate, with the largest contingents coming from the UAE and
Saudi Arabia. These two states and Oman have engaged in extensive
preparations. On Monday Tehran condemned the exercise as anti-
Iranian.
Comment: The Council almost certainly will proceed with the
exercise, despite the Iranian denunciation and the heightened military
tensions resulting from developments in the war between Iran and
Iraq. As a result of recent Iranian threats, however, Kuwait has
increased the vigilance of its security forces. It might reduce its
participation in the exercise. Even if snags develop during the
exercise, the efficient transport of troops and equipment to the UAE
would represent a major accomplishment.
Top Secret
9 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
NETHERLANDS: Peace Movement's New Approach
The Dutch peace movement is adopting new tactics to try to
compel The Hague to delay its INF basing decision. The leader of the
Interchurch Peace Council says he will abandon the push for
unilateral disarmament in favor of a multilateral approach. He plans to
lobby for a postponement of the Dutch deployment decision to give
the Geneva talks more time. Prime Minister Lubbers has rejected any
delay in the Dutch decision beyond next June, however, unless there
is the prospect of a positive result in Geneva.
Comment: The softer tactics seem designed to widen the cracks
in the parliamentary faction of the Christian Democratic Appeal, the
senior coalition party. It includes a substantial antinuclear group.
Party leaders continually avoid making a commitment on their
timetable for a decision, and even Lubbers's statement has left room
for further maneuver. A heavy turnout at the peace demonstration
scheduled for 29 October, combined with the new multilateral
approach, could cause the government to continue temporizing on
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
USSR-BULGARIA: Possible Visit by Soviet Leaders
A Romanian diplomat in Moscow says Premier Tikhonov is to
accompany General Secretary Andropov on his visit to Bulgaria late
next month. The US Embassy in Moscow notes that such a joint
representation would be a marked departure from the Brezhnev years
and could be intended to emphasize that the leadership is collective.
An Asian diplomat has learned from Soviet and East European
contacts in Sofia that Andropov intends to focus his talks on INF and
on bilateral economic problems.
Comment: Tikhonov's inclusion in the delegation would suggest
that economic issues will be prominent on Andropov's agenda. The
Soviets may discuss CEMA issues and urge Sofia to bring trade with
the USSR more nearly into balance. They also may ask the Bulgarians
to shoulder a greater share of the cost of their military establishment.
Personal relations between Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov and
Andropov are believed to be cool, and they could be aggravated by
Soviet demands on economic issues.
CANADA: Problems With Interceptor Force
The US defense attache in Ottawa reports Canada has grounded
most of its CF-101 interceptors because of airframe fatigue problems.
Canada contributes approximately 40 CF-101s, or three squadrons,
to North American air defense. Canadian officials reportedly expect
that up to three-fourths of the force will be grounded. Repairs are not
expected to begin until late next month, and two to three aircraft per
month will be repaired.
Comment: The CF-101s are to be replaced with new CF-18
fighters beginning in June 1984. The Canadians probably will repair
only a limited number of aircraft with the rest continuing to operate
under restrictions or being retired early. The unavailability of aircraft
will diminish the ability of the Canadian armed forces to meet their air
defense commitments, including increasing requirements to intercept
and escort Soviet aircraft flying to and from Cuba.
Top Secret
11 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
ARGENTINA: Military Issues Warning
Government leaders have warned that continued strike activity
could disrupt the transition to civilian rule. The admonition follows
several weeks of extensive wildcat strikes by workers demanding
higher wages to keep up with soaring inflation. More work stoppages
are planned, including a general strike scheduled for Monday.
Comment: The transition probably is not threatened by the
unrest, although some military officers might support a delay of the
elections scheduled for 30 October. The unions are concerned that
the new government will impose wage constraints, and they will
continue to push for increases from the weakened military
government. The military probably will respond by trying to open a
dialogue with the unions, possibly through Church mediators, but it
will be hard pressed to make new wage concessions. The government
may decide to mollify the opposition by holding the presidential
inauguration several weeks earlier than the currently scheduled date,
SPAIN-UK: Study Commissions on Gibraltar
Madrid and London, following a meeting earlier this week
between their foreign ministers, have agreed to set up commissions of
experts to study the Gibraltar problem. A Spanish official says the
meetings will address all topics, including sovereignty. The Spanish
Foreign Ministry has stressed, however, that these talks do not mean
that negotiations over the future of Gibraltar are imminent.
Comment: Spanish officials are likely to be concerned about
Prime Minister Thatcher's recent assertion that the UK will oppose
Spain's entrance into the EC until the borders are opened. They may
use the meetings as a device to reverse their refusal to open the
border unless London agrees to begin negotiations on sovereignty.
The Spanish may have unrealistic hopes for progress because the
British want to play down the sovereignty question and Gibraltarians
remain opposed to Spanish rule. Spanish politicians could end the
whole dialogue if they were to publicize London's willingness to talk
about sovereignty at the expert level as a major concession.
Top Secret
12 29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Special Analysis
PHILIPPINES: Short-Term Political Outlook
President Marcos, in an attempt to stem growing popular unrest,
has drawn the line with his opponents and instituted new security
measures. Nevertheless, he has failed to absolve the government of
blame in the assassination of Benigno Aquino or to take conciliatory
measures that would help restore calm. If he does not act soon, it
appears increasingly likely that there will be no improvement in the
political situation before President Reagan's scheduled visit.
Sporadic incidents of violence have continued since the
mass demonstrations near the central post office in Manila on
21 September and the subsequent violent clashes between
government security forces and 10,000 marchers near the
presidential palace. Although the security situation has not gotten out
of hand, preparations by both the radical and moderate opposition
for major demonstrations timed for the President's visit are under
way.
As public disaffection with the government has intensified, new
fissures are appearing in the military and in the business
community-two of Marcos's key constituencies. The officer corps is
divided over rumors of military complicity in the assassination. A new
group of antigovernment businessmen has "passed its first test,"
according to one opposition leader, by organizing the protests in the
financial district during the last two weeks.
Tough Moves by Marcos
Marcos has abandoned the policy of "maximum restraint" that
was in evidence at Aquino's funeral. He has banned firearms and
"unlicensed" demonstrations and threatened to arrest people in the
business community, the church, and the radical opposition. Marcos
also has charged dozens of individuals with sedition, and the military
has revived security checkpoints in selected areas of Manila to check
for weapons.
Although Marcos seems increasingly instransigent in dealing with
public disaffection, he has told US officials that he is considering
several gestures of reconciliation. These include strengthening the
independent commission of inquiry into Aquino's death, liberalizing
the election code, and reporting the results of the government's own
investigation. Government officials say these measures will be put
continued
Top Secret
29 September 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Status of the Investigation
On the surface, the investigation into Aquino's assassination
appears to be at a standstill. The independent commission has
suspended public hearings, following the filing of several suits by
opposition groups that challenge its legality on the grounds of
separation of powers.
The commission may reconvene on 10 October, presumably with
several new members appointed by Marcos. The investigation being
conducted by the metropolitan police also has foundered.
Prospects for More Protests
With new security measures in place, there are no obvious
flashpoints that would produce widespread unrest in the next two
weeks. The moderate opposition remains in disarray, while its leaders
complain to US officials that radical groups, especially those allied
with the overtly non-Communist National Democratic Front, are
gaining influence through better organization.
The moderates want to strengthen antigovernment sentiment
over the near term by organizing further demonstrations, but they are
unlikely to achieve a major success. The radicals want to conserve
their resources for the President's visit.
Decisions that Marcos may make in the weeks ahead almost
certainly will dictate the course of political events. It is unclear
what information he is getting about the investigation and the
demonstrations. He recently complained to US officials that he cannot
trust the judgment of close associates, however, and there are rumors
of cabinet changes.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
i op secret
The US Embassy believes Marcos is being misled by his
advisers about public disenchantment with his government and the
investigation. This situation reportedly led to the abortive
progovernment rally on 20 September in Manila's financial district.
In any case, the President's hard line appears certain to provoke
more demonstrations. President Reagan's visit or the public
perception of a government whitewash in the investigation would
provide the impetus for additional outbreaks of violence.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000400010202-8