NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 8 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010130-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 130
• Publication Date: September 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
) Intelligence
TUP Secret
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
8 September 1983
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CPAS NID 83-211 JX
8 September 1983
Copy P% A C
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Contents
Lebanon: Druze Militia Consolidating Positions .................... 1
Western Europe: More Reactions to Shootdown .................. 2
Netherlands: Parliamentary Resolution on INF ......................
Panama: Presidential Candidate Withdraws ..........................
USSR-Western Europe: Threats of Retaliation Against INF ..
Denmark: Crucial Vote on Budget ..........................................
Ell Salvador: Guerrillas Withdraw ............................................
China-US: Trade Restrictions Lifted ......................................
Canada-East Germany: Long-Term Grain Agreement .......... 10
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Special Analyses
Lebanon: Prospects for Gemayel ............................................ 11
Chile: Fifth National Protest .................................................... 14
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LEBANON: Druze Militia Consolidating Positions
The Lebanese Army is unable to avert Druze attacks that are likely
against Christian civilians in the eastern Alayh District.
Army units, deployed within a 10-kilometer radius of Beirut,
cannot expand their area of control to oppose Druze forces advancing
on the Christian town of Dayr al Qamar. Up to 40,000 Christian
refugees are at the town, which is suffering from food and water
shortages. The government is requesting MNF protection for Red
Cross convoys sent to Dayr al Qamar.
Druze units also are moving toward Suq al Gharb. The Lebanese
Army reinforced Christian Lebanese Forces militia units there on
Tuesday.
French aircraft overflew suspected Druze artillery positions
yesterday in reaction to the shelling of the French Embassy
compound in which three French soldiers were killed.
Comment: The threat of renewed Muslim violence in Beirut is
preventing major Army deployments beyond their current positions
into the Alayh and Shuf Districts. Army and Lebanese Forces units
probably can prevent the Druze from capturing the strategic high
ground of Suq al Gharb, but the Army is not likely to attempt a move
further into the mountain region. A massacre of Christian refugees is
possible at Dayr al Qamar.
Palestinians are fighting alongside Druze militiamen. Several
hundred Palestinian fighters may have participated in the Druze
attack on Bhamdun on Monday. Syria almost certainly directed the
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West European governments continue to support the US position
on the Soviet downing of the South Korean airliner, but decisions on
sanctions are not yet firm.
The Greek cabinet refusal on Monday to join a strong
condemnation of the Soviets by the 10 EC members in Madrid or to
accept a compromise has prevented a statement on the issue by the
EC. The other nine members are continuing to urge Greece to join
with them at the CSCE in a denunciation of the shootdown. In their
speeches in Madrid yesterday, the Foreign Ministers of Spain, the UK,
Canada, and West Germany denounced Moscow for shooting down
the Korean plane.
Several West European states are expressing doubt that their
legal obligations permit them to abrogate bilateral air traffic
agreements with the USSR. Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans,
however, says that Brussels may take symbolic actions, possibly
including a denial of landing rights to Aeroflot.
Meanwhile, in response to the call on Tuesday by the International
Federation of Airline Pilots Associations for a 60-day ban on Soviet
air traffic, the national pilots' organizations of France, the UK,
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have announced that they will
participate in the boycott. West German pilots are urging Lufthansa to
join in.
Comment: West European nations will continue to castigate the
Soviets on this issue in Madrid, the Security Council, and probably the
International Civil Aviation Organization. Most West European
governments will not make final decisions on the form and extent of
sanctions or other diplomatic actions, however, until their foreign
ministers return from Madrid. Some are likely to want further
consultations with their NATO or EC partners before taking any
Some states, including Ireland-to which Aeroflot business is
significant-will be reluctant to join a government-sponsored civil
aviation boycott even for a limited period. Nevertheless, the airline
pilots' ban is preempting some official decisions, and some West
European governments may consider it more effective than
government action.
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NETHERLANDS: Parliamentary Resolution on INF
The Dutch parliament has adopted a resolution urging that British
and French nuclear systems be included in arms control negotiations.
The motion was supported by the governing Christian Democrats
and various leftwing parties. It was opposed by the Liberals who are
coalition partners of the Christian Democrats.
Dutch officials have for some time said that British and French
systems should be included eventually in arms control talks. Foreign
Minister van den Broek reiterated this position during the debate,
while continuing to oppose inclusion in the current INF negotiations.
The British have expressed concern about the motion to the Dutch
Government.
Comment: The resolution is nonbinding, and Christian
Democratic leaders apparently allowed it to pass in order to head off
a more negative proposal. The leaders probably were concerned that
the stronger motion would have drawn support from within their party
Van den Broek's comment that he would "raise the issue" of
including British and French forces in the START talks commits the
government to very little. It has probably allowed him to fend off
pressure from within the Christian Democratic Party for the moment.
Nevertheless, the vote is a further indication of the desire of Dutch
politicians to achieve an arms control agreement in order to avoid INF
deployment in the Netherlands.
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PANAMA: Presidential Candidate Withdraws
Retired National Guard Commander Paredes, in a surprise move,
has announced he will not be a candidate in the presidential elections
next year.
The prepared statement issued on Tuesday by Paredes indicated
that he sought to avoid a heated electoral campaign that would divert
attention from the country's economic problems. Paredes added that
a victory at the polls probably would be attributed to his ties to the
Guard, rather than to his own qualifications, and that a loss would
damage the Guard's standing.
Comment: Paredes-long considered the presidential front-
runner-may have been forced to reassess government support for
his candidacy following the removal earlier this week of several
cabinet officers considered loyal to him. In addition, new National
Guard Commander Noriega recently has sought to assure the political
opposition that the military will remain neutral in the coming elections,
thus implying that he no longer supports Paredes's candidacy.
In line with his major theme of national unity, Paredes had hoped
to win support for his candidacy from a significant portion of the
opposition, as well as from the government and leftist parties. The
failure of this theme to catch on, however, may have contributed to
On the other hand Paredes may merely be testing the extent of
his popular support, hoping that his withdrawal will prompt
widespread pleas that he reconsider. He also may be attempting to
draw out his potential opponents, using a temporary withdrawal as a
ploy. In the past Paredes has often retracted ill-advised or hasty
announcements when the did not secure the response he wanted.
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USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: Threats of Retaliation Against INF
In the most categorical statement by an authoritative Soviet
Foreign Ministry official so far, USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh
told the Belgian Ambassador on 31 August that the Soviets would
respond to INF deployments by "stopping" the INF negotiations. He
said they also would end the moratorium on SS-20 deployment in
Europe. In addition, they would take some unspecified "political"
action in Europe and develop a strategic response that would put the
US in the same position in which the US INF deployments put the
USSR. Bessmertnykh stated the West should not expect missiles in
Cuba or Nicaragua.
Comment: Most Allies take such threats seriously and assume
that Moscow may break off negotiations temporarily when INF basing
begins in December. West European leaders are concerned about the
effect on public opinion, but this tactic almost certainly will not delay
deployments. At the meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group
last Friday, however, the West German and British representatives
urged the US to publicize its willingness to continue talks after
deployments begin.
DENMARK: Crucial Vote on Budget
The center-right coalition government of Prime Minister Schlueter
probably will survive a special budget vote tomorrow. Influential
members of the rightwing, antitax Progress Party, which normally
supports the government, have threatened to bring it down by voting
against the reduction of subsidies to local governments. Schlueter is
threatening to call an early election if the government loses.
Comment: The one-year-old minority government has
consistently staked its existence on an economic austerity program
designed to reduce large deficits in the federal budget and in
international payments. Schlueter's chances rest on the reluctance of
most of the parties to have an election now. Nevertheless, the
government probably will offer the Progress Party a compromise,
such as an income tax reduction, in order to retain its support.
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The situation in San Miguel remains quiet, according to the US
defense attache. The Army has had to send only a small detachment
to reinforce the city. Salvadoran military sources acknowledge losses
of 19 killed and 35 wounded in the recent action, but they have
provided no information on insurgent losses.
Comment: The guerrillas apparently have withdrawn completely
from the area. The hit-and-run attack on San Miguel inflicted heavy
casualties on the defenders, destroyed three road bridges and one
railroad bridge, and gained considerable publicity. Although the
attack has not regained the military initiative for the guerrillas, it
demonstrates that the insurgents still have the resolve and strength to
strike hard at government troops and installations.
Beijing has announced that it is lifting prohibitions against
purchases of US cotton, synthetic fibers, and soybeans and
restrictions on imports of other US agricultural products. These
measures have been in effect since January, when Beijing retaliated
against US quotas on textile imports. A new bilateral textile trade
agreement was signed last month.
Comment: The Chinese have reduced their excess inventories of
fiber and probably are ready to begin buying US polyester and nylon,
although not at the level of last year, when they bought nearly
$100 million worth. China reentered the US market for small
quantities of wheat last week, the first purchases since late 1982.
Good domestic harvests, however, have reduced China's need for US
cotton and soybeans.
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CANADA-EAST GERMANY: Long-Term Grain Agreement
Canada and East Germany are to sign an agreement calling for
East German purchases of 1 million tons of grain per year for three
years beginning in 1984. Canadian officials say it has been initialed
and probably will be signed on Friday.
Comment: The agreement probably involves medium- to long-
term commercial credits guaranteed by the Canadian Government.
Such arrangements would allow Canada to sell more grain to East
Germany, largely at the expense of US sales. East Berlin has not been
able to obtain two-year financing from US bankers and has been
trying to find new sources of supply. The agreement will meet about
one-third of East Germany's annual grain import needs.
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: Prospects for Gemayel
President Gemayel almost certainly will have to offer his Druze
and Muslim opponents significant concessions-such as reducing the
political power of the Christians and possibly abrogating the
agreement with Israel-if he is to stop Lebanon's slide toward civil
war. Gemayel's prospects for remaining as President may be in
jeopardy, particularly if the Shia Amal militia in West Beirut actively
supports the current Druze offensive. Damascus almost certainly
believes that a government more amenable to Syrian views will
emerge in Beirut, and it is likely to urge the Druze to continue their
The government now has to use the Army to defeat its opponents
or yield to their demands for political reform and for changes in
policy. The Army has moved to establish a defensive line around the
Beirut suburbs to halt the Druze advance, but it will have difficulty
recovering much of the territory already lost to Druze forces.
Gemayel's fate hinges on the performance of the Army, on the
amount of pressure Syria is prepared to exert on Lebanon, and on
whether other Muslim militias join in the fighting in support of the
Since this weekend, Druze forces have driven the Christian
Lebanese Forces militia out of several towns in the Alayh District, and
they now control the Beirut-Damascus Highway from the Syrian
forward line to the town of Alayh. The Syrians have provided the
Druze with tanks and other heavy weapons. They may also have
provided artillery support for Druze operations, and they apparently
have directed Palestinian units to join in the fighting.
The Druze currently control the high ground overlooking Beirut
and the Army's positions, and they will be able to shell these areas.
The Druze also can shell the airport, disrupting airlifts to the Army.
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The Syrian Response
The Syrians almost certainly will increase their assistance to the
Druze if the Army and the Lebanese Forces make substantial
advances against the Druze in the Shuf and Alayh Districts.
For the time being, Damascus does not have to intervene directly.
By using the Druze, the Syrians believe they can force Gemayel to
accommodate their demands. On Monday the Syrians released a
memorandum to the Arab League General Secretariat that calls for
sanctions and the expulsion of Lebanon from the Arab League and
that indicates President Assad is confident he can ignore any Arab
requests that he moderate his policy.
The Muslim Response
To date, most of the fighting has been in the Alayh and Shuf
Districts. Fighting would again break out in the capital, however, if
Muslim forces decide to fight in support of the Druze offensive.
The most important Muslim force in Beirut is the Shia Amal
militia, commanded by Nabih Barri. He is already under intense
pressure from Druze leader Walid Junblatt to send his forces into the
streets.
Barri has political ambitions, and in the past he has resisted
destroying his relations with the government. Lebanese officials are
working hard to keep Barri out of the current round of fighting.
If the Army is widely believed to be fighting only to protect
Christian positions in the Shuf and Alayh, Barri probably will respond
to Syrian and Druze demands that he commit his militia. The
strongest Army units that were maintaining order in the capital have
left the city, and the temptation to seize control of West Beirut may be
too great for Shia Amal fighters, even if Bard does not order them to
Outlook
The best Gemayel can hope for now is a stalemate in the Shuf and
Alayh. The violence in Lebanon, however, will continue until the
government makes substantial concessions to Junblatt and Barri.
Gemayel, for example, could appoint a new prime minister and
cabinet that would include the two opposition leaders.
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A new cabinet would insist on significant policy changes, such as
the abrogation of the agreement with Israel. It probably would also
eventually attempt to force Gemayel out of the presidency and to
create new arrangements for sharing power that would recognize the
Gemayel could try some half measures in an effort to save his
government and to prevent civil war, for example including Bard in his
government in the hope of splitting the Druze-Shia alliance. Such a
move, however, would not alter Druze opposition to the government.
Many radical Shias already disavow Barri's leadership, and they
probably would continue to fight.
The Israelis have said they would be more helpful to Gemayel if he
established formal relations with them. Nevertheless, Israel would be
extremely reluctant to send its forces back into the Shuf and Alayh.
Any attempt by Gemayel to increase Muslim or Druze political
power would be resisted by the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces
militia. The latter is intent on preserving control over the Christian
heartland and might move to depose Gemayel rather than allow him
to make such concessions to his opponents.
If Gemayel is unwilling or unable to achieve a political solution,
Army Commander Tannous, who has continued to maintain contacts
with the Muslim opposition, may be tempted to seize power. He
apparently is willing to compromise with government opponents, and
he may be prompted to act against Gemayel if factional fighting
threatens to split his Army.
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Special Analysis
CHILE: Fifth National Protest
Recent negotiations between the government and moderate
opposition leaders on political liberalization in Chile have made some
progress. They failed, however, to head off a fifth day of national
protest today. Organizers have urged peaceful protests, but radicals
will try to foment violence in order to undermine talks scheduled to
resume in mid-September. The armed forces still support President
Pinochet while also favoring political concessions. Unless there is
massive violence, it will be difficult for Pinochet to reverse the opening
up of the political process that his Interior Minister has started.
Government and moderate opposition leaders recently opened a
dialogue when Sergio Jarpa-a conservative diplomat who was
appointed Interior Minister on 10 August-began meeting with
opposition labor, human rights, and political leaders. As a result, the
government has announced several limited concessions that have
encouraged an atmosphere more conducive to dialogue and
compromise. Even the assassination last week of Santiago's military
governor did not disrupt the negotiations.
Nevertheless, the government was unable to head off another day
of national protest. Fundamental differences on the timing and nature
of the political transition remain, and the opposition wants to build on
its momentum before Christmas and the three-month summer
vacation period in the Southern Hemisphere. The moderate
opposition also is reluctant to lose the momentum it has developed
for the sake of a compromise that could be criticized by the left as a
Strategies for September
Democratic opposition leaders will continue efforts to control
violence, broaden participation in the protests and extend them to
more areas, and maintain unity by focusing the protests on a specific
set of demands-the Democratic Alliance's platform. In view of recent
signs of flexibility on the part of the government, the opposition
probably will agree to continue to negotiate with Jarpa even after the
The government also is likely to be willing to continue
negotiations in hopes of ending the monthly protests or, failing that,
of buying time to try to divide the opposition. At the same time,
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growing concern over Communist plans to foment violence this month
probably will result in a large security police presence in Santiago and
in special precautions throughout the country. Besides the day of
national protest today, other critical days this month include the 10th
anniversary of the military coup on Sunday, Chilean Independence
Day on 18 September, and Armed Forces Day on the 19th.
Outlook
Unless the protests become so extensive and violent that the
government fears a complete loss of control-which seems unlikely-
the negotiation process probably will continue. Nevertheless, Jarpa
and the opposition will have difficulty negotiating a settlement soon.
The protests may continue for the rest of this year at roughly the same
level as those in August.
During this period, Pinochet is likely to offer some concessions on
legalizing political parties and holding congressional elections before
1989, but he would drag out the process in hopes of dividing the
opposition. Pinochet will be urged from both inside and outside the
government to speed up the transition. He will try to persuade
conservatives and the military that he has been making a reasonable
effort to meet opposition demands.
Without some progress in the negotiations, the moderates will
continue their protests while leftist terrorists will try to sabotage the
dialogue. The economy will continue to stagnate, and international
criticism of the regime will increase. These developments would be
likely to prompt the military to compel Pinochet to make major
concessions on political reforms or risk being removed from office.
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