NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 7 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010126-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 126
• Publication Date: September 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Top Secret-
CPAS N/D 83-21
7 September 1983 25X1
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p-S 6 -
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
7 September 1983
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Top Secret
? Contents
Lebanon: Gemayel Threatens To Step Down ........................ 1
International: Worldwide Reaction to Shootdown .................. 2
Panama: Cabinet Changes ...................................................... 3
USSR: Decreasing Dependence on Imported Pipe ................ 4
PLO-Syria: New Clashes .......................................................... 5
France: Mitterrand's Popularity Improves .............................. 6
Special Analyses
Zimbabwe-US: Prime Minister Mugabe's Visit ...................... 10
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7 September 1983
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..Top Secret
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Israeli withdrawal line
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LEBANON: Gemayel Threatens To Step Down
President Gemayel's threat to resign today reflects his frustration
with continued factional fighting and could be a desperate move to
exact greater US support.
He said he would appoint a Christian extremist-Maronite Monk
Bulus Naaman-as his successor. Gemayel told the US Ambassador
that his decision to resign will be firm unless the US convinces the
Syrian Government to force the Druze to accept a cease-fire.
Lebanese Army units have established control of the coastal road
between Khaldah and Ad Damur and are moving southeast toward
Aramun, evidently to reinforce Christian Lebanese Forces units there.
At least one company of the Army's 8th Brigade has been deployed
along the Beirut-Damascus highway toward Arayya.
Druze fighters have made no significant gains since Monday.
Fighting between Druze militia and Lebanese Forces units continues
around Suq al Gharb and B'aqlin. The Druze reportedly continue to
Comment: Gemayel's threat to appoint Naaman-who would be
unacceptable to most Muslim and Druze politicians-suggests that
his main objective is to encourage US action. Gemayel legally cannot
appoint his successor, who must be nominated and elected by the
National Assembly.
If the Army pushes Druze fighters farther away from Beirut, the
threat posed by Druze artillery to the airport and the city's southern
suburbs will be considerably reduced. The Army probably will be able
to maintain control of its new positions outside the capital, barring
new factional fighting in Beirut. The Army apparently does not plan for
now to move in force into the Shuf and Alayh Districts.
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INTERNATIONAL: Worldwide Reaction to Shootdown
Reaction to the US position on the Soviet downing of the Korean
airliner generally has been favorable, and public and official
indignation remains high.
A West German spokesman said yesterday that Bonn backs
Washington's demand for clarification and punishment of those
responsible, and opposition Social Democratic Party chairman Brandt
praised the moderate tone of President Reagan's remarks. Initial
British, Italian, and French media responses to the President's speech
applauded its moderation and the US decision not to interrupt the
Geneva arms talks or the CSCE process.
A delegation of the three main Dutch parliamentary parties and
the Minister of Agriculture have postponed visits to Moscow, and The
Hague has called off a visit by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Komplektov. Italy, Sweden, and Spain plan strong support for the US
initiative in the UN Security Council. The EC Ten are drafting a
statement for the CSCE meeting today.
Most national airline organizations are awaiting recommendations
by the International Civil Aviation Organization or the International
Federation of Airline Pilots Associations. The latter met yesterday and
demanded a 60-day ban on flights to Moscow. A US delegate
estimated that 14 of the 17 national associations whose members fly
Spanish Foreign Minister Moran said yesterday that Madrid will
strongly support ICAO action. The Foreign Ministers of the Nordic
countries, however, have announced that, as a matter of principle,
they will not participate in the boycott proposed by the US.
In Japan media reaction to the President's speech and Tokyo's
well-publicized role has been uniformly positive. The Chinese have
replayed the speech without comment.' Malaysia, Singapore, and
Thailand have indefinitely postponed scheduled visits.
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand have demanded that
Moscow pay compensation for their nationals killed in the attack.
Singapore is considering suspending Aeroflot service but would do so
only in concert with other ASEAN countries.
Comment: In view of the generally positive public reaction to
what is perceived as the moderate tone and substance of US policy
statements, most governments will have little difficulty agreeing with
them publicly. Although some West European governments are
raising legal objections to government-ordered sanctions against
Soviet air traffic, most would support an ICAO-mandated boycott.
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Top Secret
PANAMA: Cabinet Changes
The replacement on Sunday of several key cabinet officials
probably will help strengthen President de la Espriella's control over
economic matters and increase new National Guard Commander
Noriega's influence in the government.
Foreign Minister Amado was among the six cabinet-level officers
who resigned. His successor is Oyden Ortega, a former Communist
and ardent nationalist, who is a member of the Panama Canal
Commission. De la Espriella has assured US officials that he intends
to take a more direct role in foreign affairs, implying he will limit
Ortega's influence.
Comment: The cabinet, shifts, which apparently represent a
compromise between the President and Noriega, will provide Panama
with a conservative economic team more sympathetic and attractive
to business and investors. Noriega probably hopes the changes will
strengthen his support outside the Guard by removing ministers loyal
The resignation of Amado immediately before the latest round of
Contadora peace talks in Panama appears to be particularly ill timed.
Amado's absence may further slow the progress of the group, which
already has been forced to postpone its most recently scheduled
meeting because of the appointment of the new Guatemalan Foreign
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Top Secret
USSR: Decreasing Dependence on Imported Pipe
Soviet production of large-diameter pipe used for long-distance
oil and gas pipelines is likely to increase substantially after 1985,
redurina the USSR's almost total dependence on the West for such
pipe
Comment: Construction of a new large-diameter pipemill at
Vyksa, approximately 250 kilometers south of Moscow, has been
proceeding rapidly since 1978. The plant is partly operational and
could be producing at full capacity b 1986.
Construction of domestic oil and gas pipelines in the USSR
probably will slow considerably after the middle of the decade, as the
need for additional capacity to transport oil and gas declines. As a
result, the annual Soviet requirement for 1,420-mm pipe is estimated
to drop by roughly 30 percent between 1986 and 1990.
The reduced requirement, combined with increased production,
may allow the USSR to halve imports of the pipe by the late 1980s.
Soviet demand represents a large share of the international
market for large-diameter pipe. Substantial reductions in Soviet
imports might enable Moscow to exact certain economic
concessions. For example, Italy and West Germany, currently major
suppliers of large-diameter pipe, might be required to purchase
additional Soviet gas in order to sell pipe to the USSR.
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Fatah rebels and Syrian forces seized several positions from
forces loyal to PLO leader Arafat after a series of clashes in the Bekaa
Valley over the weekend.
Syrians.
The loyalists claim they were fired on by the
Comment: This was the heaviest fighting between the rebels and
loyalists in more than three weeks. Syria and the rebels probably
decided to increase military pressure on Arafat as a warning that he
could face more serious consequences if he refuses to adopt the pro-
rebel recommendations of the PLO mediation committee. The
committee has proposed that Arafat end the rebellion by accepting
rebel demands for more militant policies, stronger ties with Syria, and
collegial rule. Arafat apparently is continuing to maneuver for
maximum political advantage before giving his reply, which is due late
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FRANCE: Mitterrand's Popularity Improves
President Mitterrand's public approval rating has risen
dramatically in the last few weeks. According to a poll last Saturday
that was commissioned by an opposition paper, he now enjoys the
approval of 43 percent of the voting population. Polls taken by
another opposition paper during the early days of the current crisis in
Chad showed his popularity at an all-time low of 28 percent. Another
poll by a respected financial weekly, meanwhile, indicates that the
conservative opposition is declining in popularity, dropping from
58- to 41-percent approval.
Comment: Mitterrand apparently is benefiting from his strong
stand on Chad and from some recent economic indicators that
suggest his austerity program is beginning to work. The rise in
Mitterrand's popularity is likely to strengthen his hand in dealing with
leftist critics at the Socialist Party congress next month. This would
help him push through controversial new belt-tightening measures
needed to keep his economic program on track.
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Top Secret
CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: New Contacts
China, using commercial intermediaries, has proposed
confidential talks with South Korea for the return of the MIG-21
aircraft flown to Seoul last month by a Chinese defector. A senior
South Korean official says the Chinese have suggested a meeting at
the vice foreign minister level in a neutral location. He told US officials
that Seoul is willing to discuss the proposal but wants Beijing to
arrange the meeting directly through the South Korean Consulate
General in Hong Kong.
Comment: Beijing's interest probably remains much narrower
than Seoul's, as it was in the negotiations over the hijacked Chinese
civilian airliner last May. The Chinese seem mainly interested in
regaining their aircraft. Seoul still wants to use such meetings to
explore the possibility of broadening contacts with Beijing.
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Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe
Mugabe, 59, has pursued since independence in 1980
a measured, pragmatic approach to reform to avoid
the mistakes of other African nations ... deeply idealistic,
he is committed to the eventual creation of a one-party,
socialist state ... rules by consensus, but adept at balancing
competing factions within his government ... an extremely
controlled man who keeps a tight rein on his emotions.
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Special Analysis
ZIMBABWE-US: Prime Minister Mugabe's Visit
Prime Minister Mugabe probably hopes to use his visit to the US
to ease strained relations and assure continued US aid. He probably
will express unhappiness with Washington's policies toward South
Africa and Namibia, but he also will try to allay US concerns about his
coming trip to Moscow by explaining it as part of his policy of
nonalignment.
Mugabe recognizes that US development aid and investment are
vital to Zimbabwe's economic success, but he is sensitive to any
suggestion that US aid is conditional. He also resents Western
criticism of his efforts to quell dissident violence and further
strengthen the position of his ruling party. He believes reporting on
Zimbabwe in the Western press is exaggerated and biased.
Between East and West
The Prime Minister is likely to maintain that, as a nonaligned
leader, he is striving for good relations with both East and West. On a
more practical level, he hopes to diversify Zimbabwe's sources of
international assistance.
Relations with the USSR have been slow to develop, despite
Moscow's assiduous efforts to persuade Mugabe that it no longer has
ties to his political rival, Joshua Nkomo. Zimbabwe has not yet
opened an embassy in Moscow
Zimbabwe has close relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria,
North Korea, and China-states that gave the greatest support to
Mugabe's forces during the struggle for independence. Mugabe's trip
to Eastern Europe in May took him on his first visits to Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. He obtained no significant
economic aid,
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Despite Mugabe's ties with Communist states, military and
economic relations with the West, particularly the UK, remain
paramount. London shares US concerns about Mugabe's policies
over the past year but recently advised Washington that it planned no
cutbacks in its current level of aid. The UK also recently renewed its
military training program in Zimbabwe, although the size of the effort
London may reassess these decisions, however, if negotiations to
gain the release of six Air Force officers-several of whom hold dual
British-Zimbabwean citizenship-fall through. The officers were
rearrested last week immediately after they were acquitted of
participating in the sabotage of Thornhill Air Force Base last summer.
(S NF OC)
US security assistance also may be on Mugabe's agenda,
according to a Ministry of Defense official. The Prime Minister may
follow up on recent discussions held in Harare on foreign military
sales credits and Zimbabwean interest in US aircraft.
African Issues
Mugabe will want to discuss overall US policy toward South
Africa, which he views as closely tied to US-Zimbabwean relations. He
is likely to argue that the US policy of constructive engagement with
Pretoria is not evenhanded, and he will push for greater efforts by
Washington to restrain South Africa's activities in the region.
The Prime Minister will be wary of discussing the strained
relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, however, because of
the perception that Washington is too close to Pretoria. Harare and
Pretoria maintain regular contact
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through their trade missions. Nonetheless, Mugabe's refusal to
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accede to South African demands for ministerial-level meetings and
frequent anti-South African statements by Zimbabwean officials
continue to trouble relations between the two neighbors.
Mugabe may echo African criticism of US policy on Namibia,
particularly the linkage of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola with
a Namibian settlement. On the conflict in Chad, he probably will
continue to avoid any specific references to the role of the US,
France, or Libya. Mugabe has maintained publicly that intervention in
Chad's internal affairs by external forces only could make the
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Economic Concerns
The Zimbabwean leader probably recognizes that any substantial
increase in US aid is unlikely, and he will be seeking only general
assurances of continued US support. Mugabe may raise, however, his
government's recent appeal for further emergency aid to alleviate
food shortages caused by the continuing drought.
Mugabe probably will express regrets about the low level of
private US investment in Zimbabwe. Foreign investor confidence has
been eroded by the unfavorable security situation in the country, the
government's commitment to a socialist path, and Mugabe's refusal
to sign an Overseas Private Insurance Corporation agreement with
the US.
Although Mugabe is personally committed to socialism, he
recognizes the crucial role of the private sector in the economy. He is
likely to try to persuade US officials and businessmen that Zimbabwe
welcomes foreign investment.
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