NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 8 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Monday
8 August 1983
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CPAS NID 83-185JX
August-IM
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Contents
Nicaragua: Indian Insurgents' Problems ................................ 3
Upper Volta: New Regime Seeking Support .......................... 4
Libya: Improving Ties With Arab Neighbors .......................... 5
China-South Korea: Chinese Pilot Defects ............................ 6
Philippines: Church Defers Criticism of Government ............ 7
USSR: New Economic Experiment .......................................... 8
Special Analysis
Mexico: De la Madrid's Political Performance ........................ 10
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8 August 1983
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NICARAGUA: Indian Insurgents' Problems
Miskito Indian insurgent operations in the northeast are being
hindered by organizational problems, while the Sandinistas are trying
to deflect criticism of government repression of the Miskitos.
Rivalries between northern and southern Indian leaders caused
some 700 insurgents to withdraw last month from military activities
against the Sandinistas.
The Sandinistas have released 46 Miskitos accused of
counterrevolutionary activities, ostensibly at the urging of the
government's human rights commission. They claim that others of the
274 still in custody will be freed soon.
Meanwhile, Interior Minister Borge has accused Honduras of
detaining Miskito refugees by force. The Sandinistas also have staged
a press conference for four Indians who said they escaped from
insurgent camps in Honduras.
Comment: Despite their supply and organizational problems, the
Miskito insurgents have continued their attacks in recent weeks. The
forced evacuation of Miskito communities and Sandinista sweep
operations are measures of Managua's concern.
The government probably hopes that releasing the prisoners will
strengthen the reputation of its human rights commission and that
accusations against Honduras will help deflect international criticism.
Nonetheless, the Sandinistas apparently continue their harsh
treatment of indigenous communities, including reprisals against
villagers believed to be harboring insurgents. Some Miskito refugees
in Costa Rica recently left Nicaragua to escape such acts of
repression.
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UPPER VOLTA: New Regime Seeking Support
Coup leader Sankara is trying to rally domestic and foreign
support for his left-leaning National Revolutionary Council, following
his takeover last Thursday.
. Public demonstrations supporting the coup took place on Friday,
the 23rd anniversary of Upper Volta's independence from France. The
US Embassy reports, however, that the military appears to be taking a
wait-and-see approach. Several key military commanders of the
deposed government remain at large, and rumors of opposition
persist.
Sankara has told US and other diplomatic officials that he intends
to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy and cooperate with neighboring
states. In addition, he has called for improved relations with France,
Upper Volta's chief economic benefactor. A French Government
spokesman said on Saturday that the coup was an internal affair and
would not affect ties between Paris and Ouagadougou.
Comment: The new regime appears firmly in control despite the
military's reluctance thus far to back it fully. If Sankara tries to move
too far to the left, however, he could face a conservative backlash.F
reluctance to speculate on Libya's role in the takeover suggests that
Paris does not want to become more deeply involved in Upper Volta
until the situation in Chad is resolved.
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LIBYA: Improving Ties With Arab Neighbors
Libyan leader Qadhafi is continuing his effort to improve relations
with other Arab governments.
Following his setbacks in June at the OAU Summit, Qadhafi made
impromptu visits to North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.
He currently is trying to improve ties with his Maghreb neighbors.F_
Qadhafi recently visited Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria and
received a Tunisian delegation headed by Prime Minister Mzali. A visit
by Qadhafi to Tunisia, which has been postponed twice, reportedly
now is scheduled for this month.
The US Embassy in Tunis reports that the first meeting of a newly
established Tunisian-Libyan joint commission held recently in Tripoli
resulted in, agreement on some economic and commercial matters.
Both sides avoided sensitive political issues.
Last week Morocco raised its relations with Libya to
ambassadorial level, and a Moroccan ministerial commission-
agreed upon during Qadhafi's visit-traveled to Tripoli. According to
the US Embassy in Rabat, the composition of the commission
suggests the group will focus on economic matters and Western
Sahara.
Comment: As a result of Qadhafi's campaign, Libya's isolation in
Arab circles has been reduced somewhat. Although the Libyans have
not been generous with financial aid in recent years, Qadhafi may use
economic cooperation to gain more leverage in regional affairs.
Maghreb leaders hope that better relations with Libya will reduce
Qadhafi's threat to them. Consequently, they have been unwilling to
take a strong stand against Libya's troublemaking in Chad.
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A Chinese Air Force pilot yesterday flew his MIG-21 aircraft to
South Korea and requested asylum in Taiwan, according to South
Korean Defense Ministry officials. Seoul's intentions toward the pilot
and the aircraft are not yet clear. Beijing thus far has not commented
on the defection, the second by a Chinese pilot to South Korea in a
year. The South Koreans allowed the previous pilot to go to Taiwan
but were unable to come to terms with China on the return of the
aircraft, a MIG-19.
Comment: The defector almost certainly will follow his
predecessor to Taiwan. In handling the MIG-21, however, Seoul will
be wary of disrupting the current atmosphere of good will that was
fostered recently by direct official negotiations on the return of a
hijacked Chinese airliner and its passengers.
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The decision by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines not to proceed with plans to issue yesterday a pastoral
letter critical of President Marcos's policy on human rights does not
reflect a change in Church policy. The decision came after Marcos last
week replaced the Presidential Commitment Order-a legal device
that has enabled him to arrest and detain people indefinitely-with
the somewhat less harsh Preventive Detention Action.
Comment: The bishops would have had to make extensive last-
minute changes in the letter-which dealt at length with the
Presidential Commitment Order-to release it as planned yesterday.
The new detention measure preserves Marcos's basic powers to jail
people at will and is likely to become a point of further contention in
Church-state relations.
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USSR: New Economic Experiment
The regime recently unveiled a new experiment to relax some
central planning restrictions on enterprises in several industrial and
consumer sector ministries. The experiment is intended to give these
enterprises greater autonomy in controlling some decisions on
investment and to expand their role in the planning process. In April
longtime defense industry minister Afanas'yev was transferred to
head one of the two all-union ministries that is now participating in the
experiment.
Comment: Afanas'yev's involvement in the experiment supports
other indications that, to help reinvigorate the economy, the regime
wants to capitalize on the effectiveness of the defense industry sector.
Afanas'yev, a protege of Defense Minister Ustinov, was a proponent
of efforts to increase enterprise autonomy in the 1960s. Those
experiments were undermined by bureaucratic resistance, but the
Politburo may hope that Afanas'yev's participation in the current
undertaking will improve its chances of success.
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Special Analysis
President de la Madrid has demonstrated an impressive mastery
of Mexican politics, and he is beginning to restore public confidence
in the ruling party-government complex. His flexibility in carrying out
the austerity program is undercutting opportunities for the opposition
to unite. At the same time, the President's firmness in dealing with
some Communist-dominated unions and student demonstrators has
put potential troublemakers on notice to keep a lid on protests.
One year ago, the people's faith in the government had been
badly strained by the greed and corruption of the Lopez Portillo
administration. It was all but shattered when the depth of the
country's financial crisis came to light. As President-elect, de la
Madrid was widely viewed as a "technocrat" and a political neophyte.
De la Madrid's improving image as a leader reflects his growing
ease in office and his increasing acceptance of advice from well-
chosen political and technical advisers. The President has traveled
extensively, delivered important speeches, received a procession of
international dignitaries, and played a crucial role in shaping the
Contadora group's initiatives. Indictment of a high-ranking member of
the previous administration on charges of corruption also is helping to
dispel skepticism about de la Madrid's commitment to curbing
abuses of power.
The power of the presidency is paramount in Mexico, and de Ia
Madrid's personal philosophy and style have a major impact on the
public mood. His awareness of the political consequences of his
economic moves has helped to keep the system intact and to
maintain party discipline. De la Madrid's tough austerity policies
generally are regarded as fair and have not provoked unmanageable
splits in the cabinet or the party.
Key Objectives
De la Madrid's primary domestic objectives have been
restructuring the economy, strengthening the Institutional
Revolutionary Party's dominance of the political system, and
preventing social unrest. By creating jobs in the public sector and
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continuing subsidies on some basic foods and public transportation,
the President has maintained the support of key interest groups.
Organized labor-the ruling party's largest and best organized
component-supports de la Madrid, and the economically hard-hit
middle class has not caused problems.
To rebuild enthusiasm for the ruling party and justify claims that it
represents the interests of the majority of Mexicans, the President
has been trying to remedy longstanding organizational weaknesses.
His reform efforts include some opening up of the candidate-selection
process, placing younger members of the party in important
positions, and restructuring state and local affiliates.
In addition, de la Madrid is capitalizing on the ruling party's ability
to reduce disruptive tensions. Businessmen, who are increasingly
insecure about the future of the private sector, have been heartened
by moves to make direct foreign investment easier. Nationalists, who
are disturbed by Mexico's adherence to an IMF-imposed program,
have been reassured by Mexican participation in the Contadora
group.
Handling the Opposition
Opposition parties pose few challenges, in part because of
de la Madrid's success in denying them issues around which
antigovernment sentiment could build. The Communist-dominated
United Socialist Party is still badly splintered, and other small leftist
groups appear to be struggling. The center-right National Action
Party shows little evidence of having made significant inroads into the
ruling party's power bases, although it made an embarrassingly
strong showing in recent municipal elections.
De la Madrid is tolerant of those who oppose specific government
policies, but he is undercutting potential troublemakers to reduce the
chances for future challenges to the system. The use of force against
student demonstrators and the President's tough stand against
striking university workers indicate his intention to prevent unruly
antigovernment activities. To underscore further his commitment to
maintain order, de la Madrid has increased police and military
Outlook
The President's political skill has diminished the chances of
widespread opposition to the government, but the potential for
localized unrest remains high. With crime and unemployment rising,
urban squatter areas could become flashpoints for spontaneous riots.
High inflation will continue squeezing labor and the middle class.
continued
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Nonetheless, de la Madrid's promising start has established
momentum toward an economic and political revival. Sticking to the
IMF program, however, will require additional politically risky cuts in
public spending and employment. The use of such traditional
mechanisms as co-option and incorporation to control dissidents is
likely to be inadequate, given the severity of the economic situation.
The President may need to employ selective use of force to
maintain order. His early establishment of authority and his success in
reducing the atmosphere of anxiety, however, suggest that he will
remain in control of events. Easing up on austerity, however, would
cause Mexico to miss its IMF targets at the end of the year and would
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