NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 30 JULY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010232-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 232
• Publication Date: July 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
OCPAS./CZG
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
30 July 1983
CPAS NID 83-178JX
Copy 2 8 5
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Top Secret
Contents
Western Europe-US: Views on Central America .................... 1
Western Europe: Preparing for Disarmament Conference .... 3
Sri Lanka: More Violence ........................................................
Guatemala: Elections Scheduled .............................................
Israel-Syria: Exchange of Fire ................................................
France-Chad: Wavering on Air Support ................................
USSR-Cuba: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference .... 9
Special Analysis
Angola-Cuba: The Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue ................ 10
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Media reactions in Western Europe to new US military initiatives in
Central America have been divided along ideological lines, but official
government reactions have been restrained.
The major conservative and most centrist newspapers in London,
Bonn, Rome, and Paris generally have given factual reports of the
President's news conference. The leftist press has maintained that
Washington's military initiatives are increasing the chances for war in
the region and has suggested that the bipartisan commission is just a
smokescreen for "gunboat diplomacy.
Official reaction to the news conference thus far has been sparse
and cautious. French Foreign Minister Cheysson, who is visiting Latin
America, has said that US warships off the Central American coast do
not help the cause of peace in the region. The French Government,
which has spoken out against US policy in the past, has reacted mildly
to recent developments.
A West German Government spokesman declined to comment on
recent developments in US policy on Central America, saying that it
has not yet manifested itself in "concrete terms."
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Comment: The paucity of official reactions reflects the
longstanding caution of many West European governments on
Central American issues. Despite deep concern about the growing
tension, many political leaders believe that Central America holds
little economic and strategic interest for their countries. West
European leaders, moreover, fear that open support for the US will
hurt them politically.
The French reaction may indicate that Paris wants to assume a
lower profile on Central American issues. The West German
Government, which generally has shared US views on Central
America, is likely to continue to delay sending an ambassador to
El Salvador.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Preparing for Disarmament Conference
Some NATO members, now that the conclusion of CSCE is
imminent, are urging the Alliance to move quickly to map out strategy
for the European Disarmament Conference to be held in Stockholm in
January.
West German and British representatives to NATO this week
proposed that the Alliance seek rapid agreement on a nearly
complete package of confidence and security building measures that
the Allies devised in 1980. They also called for discussion of other
issues related to the conference and possible proposals that Eastern
nations and neutrals might raise.
The 35 participants in CSCE are mandated by the conference's
final document to hold a European Disarmament Conference, the first
phase of which focuses only on confidence and security building
measures. Malta now appears ready to modify its objections to the
Madrid agreement, allowing CSCE to end soon and enabling
delegates to meet in Helsinki in October for preparatory talks on the
Comment: The Allies will find it especially difficult to agree on
notification and verification procedures for military activities. They
also have not decided what mechanism to adopt to coordinate their
negotiating activities or addressed other procedural matters. Major
substantive issues include whether out-of-area military actions or
nonconventional forces should be covered and how the Disarmament
Conference would relate to MBFR and other arms control forums.
The Disarmament Conference is particularly important to the INF
basing countries and to France, which view it as a way to demonstrate
their commitment to arms control and better East-West relations
while US INF deployments proceed. West Germany and the UK have
been working individually on preparations for the conference. The
Mitterrand government probably will large) follow the blueprint it
inherited from the previous administration.____________________
EC members apparently have not yet tried to forge a joint position
on the conference, probably because the effort to wind up the
meeting in Madrid has fully involved their CSCE experts. They are
likely, however, to begin coordinating their views on the conference
within the EC's political cooperation framework.
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ISLANDS
(India)
ca
00
NICOBAR ?
ISLANDS 0
(India) 0
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Top Secret
Communal conflict has again intensified in Colombo.
Rumors of attacks by Tamil terrorists have prompted a new wave
of communal violence matching that of last Monday. Armed Sinhalese
gangs took to the streets yesterday and attacked the largest of the
refugee camps set up to house 45,000 to 60,000 displaced Tamils.F_
Security forces are not quelling the violence, the US
Embassy says that their failure to restore order reflects a decision by
President Jayewardene to give the Army free rein for three days to
"teach the Tamils a lesson." Jayewardene, in a speech on Thursday,
made no conciliatory gestures and in effect banned the Tamil political
party.
India continues to take a moderate stance toward the situation in
Colombo. Prime Minister Gandhi assured her parliament that India
would not intervene in Sri Lanka. India has withdrawn some members
of its diplomatic mission, which has been harassed by crowds.
Comment: Security forces in the capital are finding it increasingly
difficult to identify Tamil terrorists amid the growing lawlessness of
the Sinhalese mobs. Tamil political extremists and radical Sinhalese
nationalist groups are both taking advanta a of the chaos in the city
to incite sympathetic elements to violence.
The mild Indian response probably is designed to avoid
aggravating Colombo's fears of Indian interference, or even military
intervention. Gandhi so far appears to be succeeding in keeping at
bay demands-particularly by Indian Tamils-for stronger action. F
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GUATEMALA: Elections Scheduled
President Rios Montt has set July 1984 as the date for constituent
assembly elections, despite rightwing pressure for earlier balloting.
Press reports state Rios Montt has support for this timetable from
most of the 24 political groupings formed or reorganized under
political laws that went into effect in March. The centrist Christian
Democratic and Revolutionary Parties and the leftist Social
Democratic Party also support elections next year. The traditional
rightist parties, including the country's strongest, are virtually alone
among the parties in pushing for early elections.
The President also announced that the death penalty imposed by
the widely condemned secret Special Tribunals will be suspended
until modifications are made in the criminal justice system. Rios Montt
met two weeks ago with Catholic Church leaders who have criticized
In meetings with military officers, Rios Montt agreed to delegate
more responsibility for armed forces matters to Minister of Defense
Mejia.
Comment: The President's commitment to a firm and broadly
supported election schedule will help ease opposition from those
military officers and rightwing parties demanding early elections. The
timetable still gives new groups enough time to be able to contest the
traditional parties-which Rios Montt believes are not representative
of Guatemalan society-in elections. The suspension of the death
penalty will appease some of his critics in the Catholic Church and in
the political parties.
Granting Mejia a more prominent role reestablishes the military
chain of command and responds to another complaint by the officer
corps. Nevertheless, the President apparently does not intend to
remove his two military aides or evangelical advisers from their posts
as was demanded last month by the officer corps. Although Rios
Montt probably has made enough compromises to ease pressures on
him, some officers and rightwinQ parties are likely to continue their
agitation.
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BEIRUT
INTERNATIONA
AIRPORT
BEIRUT
BEIRUT
Lebanon
.fTyre ~ urn r-
i
~./~ Golan
Israel
`-Bhamdun eirut-Damascus?
Highhway
J aeli-Syrian orces
exchange small arms fine", / r
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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Exchange of Fire
Israeli and Syrian forces near Bhamdun briefly exchanged small
arms fire yesterday. An Israeli military spokesman said Tel Aviv did
not know what provoked the exchange but added that five separate
firing incidents occurred. He stated the Israeli Army did not incur any
Comment: The local Syrian commander might have been
responding to an Israeli action. Tel Aviv has indicated that small arms
exchanges with the Syrians along the cease-fire lines are
commonplace and usually result from local decisions. Nonetheless,
the exchange yesterday reemphasizes the potentially volatile situation
along the current cease-fire lines.
FRANCE-CHAD: Wavering on Air Support
The US Embassy in Paris reports that President Mitterrand's
closest advisers on Africa are divided over sending in aircraft if the
Libyans launch airstrikes against government forces about to attack
Faya-Largeau. The French continue to be concerned about the high
cost of military assistance to President Habre, which they believe may
total nearly $40 million by the end of August. French officials,
however, appear resigned to the prospect of having to remain
involved in Chad for some time to come.
Comment: The French have publicly promised to respond in kind
to Libyan involvement, and they have privately indicated that this
would include sending their own fighter-bombers. Mitterrand will
make the final decision on the use of aircraft. France probably will
continue to try to block Libyan encroachment in Chad to protect its
strategic and economic interests in the region. Paris, however, may
not necessarily view an all-out commitment to the Habre regime as its
only long-term alternative.
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USSR-CUBA: Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
The USSR reportedly is seeking Cuba's assistance to discourage
certain members of the Nonaligned Movement from trying to disrupt
preparations for the Non-Proliferation Review Conference in 1985. A
Mexican diplomat says the Soviets have asked the Cubans-who
chair the movement's special coordinating committee for nuclear
cooperation-to keep tight control over the activities of certain
committee members. Moscow is concerned that Argentina, India, and
Yugoslavia will join forces and take the nuclear supplier states to task
for their restrictive export practices and the nuclear weapons states
for failing to make more progress in arms control.
Comment: Moscow's concern is well founded, because the
special coordinating committee formulated the negotiating position of
the developing countries at the last Review Conference in a way that
contributed to its failure. Although Cuba is unwilling to adhere to the
Treaty, it has not joined other developing countries in criticizing the
nonproliferation regime that the USSR, the US, and other major
nuclear supplier states want to preserve.
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UNITA'S Presence and Recent Actions in Angola
UNITA Claims UNITA Actions
Controlled 1982 Major action
Controlled 1983 Ms Most intense
Influence guerrilla activity
Expansion
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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South African
buffer zone
? Angolan/Cuban
garrison
Zairle~.
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Special Analysis
ANGOLA-CUBA: The Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue
Luanda has not yet provided the US with a promised timetable for
a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Decisions emerge slowly
from the faction-ridden Angolan leadership, but in this instance
President dos Santos and some of the other more moderate officials
may share the reservations of Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners
about sending the Cubans home. Recent military gains by the South
African-backed UNITA insurgents probably have increased fears
among all factions that UNITA would win major-and perhaps
decisive-victories if the Cubans departed.
In addition to the UNITA threat, dos Santos's uneasy position in
the divided regime inhibits him from reaching a decision on a Cuban
withdrawal. Although the President recently appears to have
strengthened his position somewhat' through personnel changes in
the government and the rulin party, his freedom of action is still
limited.
Dos Santos has to contend with the continuing influence of the
hardliners and of a more moderate black nationalist group that is
larger than the hardline faction but lacks outside backing. Moscow
and Havana probably are encouraging the hardliners to resist a
Cuban withdrawal, which would be widely viewed as a setback for the
USSR.
Insurgent Gains
Luanda currently is preoccupied with the continued pressure from
UNITA's forces. Major guerrilla gains during a rainy season offensive
between November and April have been followed by further
successes in several parts of the country.
In the north, which is outside UNITA's traditional areas of
operation, the insurgents are trying to gain control of a stretch of
territory running north between Malange and Saurimo to the Zairian
border. They hope to undermine Luanda's control of the economically
important northeast.
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The guerrillas have been increasing raids and sabotage
operations in this region.
The guerrillas also continue to attack population centers and
transportation links in central Angola, long a major area of UNITA
activity. A number of government positions, including the key
provincial capital of Huambo, remain isolated.
In the past month the insurgents reportedly have overrun several
towns north of Huambo. They have not yet engaged major Cuban
units, however, and they have not attacked heavily defended main
garrisons manned by Cuban troops.
Optimism in Pretoria
The insurgents' gains have encouraged a belief among a growing
number of influential South African officials that UNITA can win the
war without a Cuban withdrawal. The chief of the South African police
recently said that Savimbi "could take it all" in the next three months.
The South Africans probably are overly optimistic about UNITA's
ability to defeat the Cubans, at least in the short term. Nonetheless,
UNITA's recent successes suggest that Pretoria has increased its
already substantial material assistance to the insurgents.
Luanda's Alternatives
With the hardliners in Luanda apparently continuing to hold a veto
power over key decisions, the regime has shown little inclination to
negotiate with UNITA. Although Savimbi continues to assert that he
favors negotiations aimed at establishing a coalition regime, his
military successes may lead him to demand tougher terms for a
settlement.
The Angolan Government, despite its apparent unwillingness to
pursue a settlement with UNITA, clearly is anxious to obtain relief
from the array of military and economic pressures it faces. One
alternative in which it has shown interest is a limited disengagement
pact 'with South Africa.
Such an arrangement would involve a withdrawal of South
African, Cuban, and Namibian guerrilla forces from southern Angola.
Although it was the subject of Angolan-South African talks at Cape
Verde in December and February, no agreement was reached.
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Luanda probably anticipates that, under a disengagement
agreement, Cuban and Angolan forces now tied down in defensive
positions near the South African-occupied zone in southern Angola
could be transferred to other areas of the country where UNITA is
more active. Nonetheless, Pretoria's own awareness of this
possibility-coupled with its growing optimism about UNITA's military
prospects-probably would lead the South Africans to drive a hard
bargain in any new talks.
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