NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 26 JULY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010216-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 216
• Publication Date: July 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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CPAS NID 83-174JX
Director of
Central
Intelligence
(DC~'AS/CIC
~o~-seer~-
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
26 July 1983
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Top Secret
Contents
Iran: Effort To Counter Unrest ................................................
3
USSR-East Germany: Announced Exercise Begins ..............
4
Sri Lanka: Communal Riots Disrupt Capital ..........................
Colombia: Growing Financial Pressures ................................
6
6
China-South Korea: Movement Toward Further Contacts ....
7
USSR-Cuba: Soviet Delegation .............................................. 8
Special Analyses
Cuba-Central America: Havana's Political Worries .............. 9
NATO: Views on INF Basing .................................................... 12
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26 July 1983
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The government is cracking down on profiteering and hoarding in
an effort to prevent additional public protests similar to those that
occurred earlier this month in Tehran and other cities.
President Khamenei and other senior officials have announced
that the regime is taking firm action to stop business practices that
lead to shortages and higher prices. The measures include tighter
controls over official prices and restrictions on inventories of basic
commodities. The government reportedly has threatened violators
with severe punishment.
The demonstrations have protested high prices and shortages of
water and electricity. The standard of living for most Iranians has
shown little improvement, despite the increase in economic growth
resulting from rising oil revenue. Food prices have gone up in recent
months, following the removal of controls on rice.
Comment: Tehran's response reflects its concern that the lower
income groups in the cities-the regime's strongest supporters-
were in the forefront of the recent protests. The urban unrest also is a
sign of growing weariness with the human and economic costs of the
war and of frustrated consumer expectations. No major disturbances
have been noted in the countryside, however, and staples apparently
are still in adequate supply outside the major cities.
The government controls probably will not be effective. Tehran
lacks an efficient bureaucracy to administer the regulations, and the
bazaar merchants will bribe officials and exploit loopholes in the new
measures.
Top Secret
3 26 July 1983
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USSR-EAST GERMANY: Announced Exercise Begins
Foreign observers have not been invited, an
temporary travel restrictions have been imposed in central and
southern East Germany to hinder observation by Western military
officers from the liaison mission in Berlin.
Comment: The exercise is the highlight of the Soviet training year
in East Germany, and-like several earlier exercises-it was
announced in compliance with the Helsinki Accords. Warsaw Pact
Commander. in Chief Kulikov may attend and might be joined by
Defense Minister Ustinov. The field training, involving troops primarily
from the 8th Guards Army, is intended to exercise several divisions in
combined-arms operations. It may run concurrently with
defense exercise by Soviet and East German units.
Top Secret
4 26 July 1983
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I~VF7 ~7C4fC1
Sinhales
rioting
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P.ak~stao`' ' China
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Bay of Bengaf
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SRI LANKA: Communal Riots Disrupt Capital
Communal violence in Colombo will complicate President
Jayewardene's recent efforts to accommodate the demands of
moderates among the Tamil ethnic minority. The government has
called up reserves and imposed a curfew to halt mob attacks by the
Sinhalese ethnic majority against the Tamil community. The violence
erupted on Sunday after an attack on an Army patrol in the
predominantly Tamil north, where terrorism by Tamil extremists has
been increasing since last summer. Thirteen soldiers were killed in the
attack, for which the Tamil Tigers, a separatist terrorist group, claims
responsibility.
The US Embassy reports that the widespread rioting in the capital
is aimed at Tamil-owned shops and homes and has resulted in several
deaths. Elected Tamil members of Parliament fear for their safety if
they continue to work with the Sinhalese to ease tensions between the
two communities.
COLOMBIA: Growing Financial Pressures
Tightening credit and balance-of-payments problems are
jeopardizing Colombia's status as the only major South American
country to avoid debt rescheduling.
the U Embassy reports that most len ers are unwi ing
to extend additional short-term credit. The shortage of cash is
becoming more severe because of declines in agricultural exports,
capital flight, a drop in tourism receipts, and fewer remittances from
Comment: At the current rate, liquid reserves will be depleted by
the end of the year. Without $600-800 million in new loans, Colombia
probably will have to join other South American countries in
rescheduling its external debt under IMF auspices.
Top Secret
6 26 July 1983
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CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Movement Toward Further Contacts
Beijing and Seoul have agreed on a formula for avisa-on a
Chinese document rather than a South Korean passport-that for the
first time will permit a South Korean official to visit China. The South
Koreans have accepted China's condition that no publicity be given
the visa, which is being issued to an official participating in a UN
agricultural training program.
Comment: South Korea probably views the action as an
indication of China's willingness to move slowly toward additional
contacts-at least within the framework of international
organizations. The agreement is likely to strengthen sentiment in
Seoul for firm handling of the detained Chinese hijackers, whom
China does not want treated leniently. Beijing presumably also hopes
the move will enhance its credentials for hosting UN events. China's
insistence on no publicity, however, reflects its determinate
protect its carefully cultivated ties with North Korea.
Top Secret
7 26 July 1983
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Top Secret
USSR-CUBA: Soviet D?legation
Politburo candidate member Solomentsev, who heads the party's
control committee, leads the Soviet delegation at the Revolution Day
celebrations today. He holds about the same rank as the
representative sent last year.
Comment: Moscow apparently intends to demonstrate continued
support for Cuba without increasing the USSR's commitment.
Solomentsev's current position suggests he also may have been
selected to hold talks about corruption and inefficiency in the.Cuban
Communist Party, a subject of past Soviet concern.
Top Secret
8 26 July 1983
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Special Analysis
CUBA-CENTRAL AMERICA: Havana's Political Worries
Cuba's uneasiness over political trends in Central America has
intensified in recent weeks, prompted by concern about the direction
of the Contadora discussions, criticism from the Socialist International,
uncertainty over the positions of Mexico and Panama; and a sense of
growing isolation in its support of Nicaragua. President Castro may
use his speech today on the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution to try
to recapture the political initiative and evoke sympathy for the
Sandinistas. If he does, he will probably try to make Cuba seem
"reasonable" while again accusing Washington of causing regional
tensions.
The increased US military presence in the area is likely to have
strengthened Havana's concern that Washington will intervene if a
war breaks out between Honduras and Nicaragua. Moreover, the
failure to date of the Salvadoran insurgents to recover from their
recent setbacks adds to Cuba's uncertainty.
President Rodriguez, speaking last week at the fourth anniversary
celebrations of the Sandinista revolution, welcomed the recent call by
the Presidents of the Contadora states for Havana and Washington to
join them in efforts to avert war in Central America.
Rodriguez emphasized that Cuba was like other Latin American
nations in its support for negotiations and peaceful solutions. He
contrasted this stand with alleged US insistence on "militarv solutions
under the pretext that Communism must be defeated."
Moves by the Socialist International
President Castro evidently has been apprised of the meeting in
Madrid on 8 July of the Socialist International directorate. As a result
of that meeting, former Costa Rican President Oduber reportedly was
sent to Havana to ask Castro to end support for the Salvadoran
Tee Secret
9 26 July 1983
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guerrillas, collaborate in persuading the Sandinistas to undertake a
"correction of course," and reduce Cuban "intervention" in
Nicaragua.
Oduber later informed the US Ambassador in San Jose that
Castro had maintained that he agrees with the Socialist
International's concerns and that he will "see to it" that the
Sandinistas comply as much as possible. The US Interests
Section in Havana reports that Cuban officials are keeping a tight lid
on what occurred but that Castro probably will respond publicly in his
speech today.
Panamanian National Guard Commander Paredes's charge on
1 July that Cuba and Nicaragua are responsible for subversion in
Central America also has evoked concern in Havana. Cuban leaders
apparently believe that Paredes has abandoned his earlier "support"
for the Salvadoran insurgents and the Sandinista regime.
On the eve of the recent meeting of the Contadora Presidents,
Panamanian President de la Espriella informed the US Ambassador
that Castro had written to complain about Paredes's remarks and to
suggest bilateral talks. The President said he told the Cuban
Ambassador that Central American problems would be soly if
Castro stopped exportin revolution.
Castro's Next Moves
Cuba already has announced its "formal" acceptance of the
proposals made by the Contadora Presidents for urgent action to
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10 26 July 1983
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avert war in Central America. Castro could use his speech today to
underscore his support
In addition, Castro may invite the Contadora Foreign Ministers to
visit Cuba or offer to send his Foreign Minister to New York for talks
with them under UN auspices. He might take a more dramatic tack by
suggesting that he is willing to neg i I wi h the Contadora,
Central American, and US leaders.
Castro also is likely to endorse the recent Nicaraguan peace
proposal, which Havana probably urged upon the Sandinistas. He
almost certainly will seek to contrast Managua's speedy and
"flexible" response-and his own-with Washington's "silence."
The Cubans probably will continue, however, to set forth
preconditions for negotiations. These could include demands that the
US withdraw its military advisers from Central America, end its
training and other military aid, and stop making "threats" against
Cuba.
In return, Castro may offer to withdraw Cuba's "few dozen"
military advisers in Nicaragua. He is likely, however, to reiterate his
claim that Cuba is not providing direct military aid to the Salvadoran
insurgents. Moreover, he probably will argue that the recent
mobilization and heightened training exercises in Cuba were only a
response to "US invasion threats.'
Top S?cr?t
11 26 July 1983
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Special Analysis
NATO: Vieevs on INF Basing
The West European Allies are continuing preparations for INF
deployments in December, while simultaneously putting pressure on
the US to explore all possible avenues to reach an agreement with the
USSR before basing begins. Starting today, the Allies will use more
frequent meetings of NATO's Special Consultative Group as a means
of consulting with the US on ways to demonstrate negotiating
flexibility at Geneva. They will seek a way to deal with the Soviets'
insistence that British and French nuclear forces be taken into account
at Geneva. The UK in particular, will urge a common approach for the
public handling of INF matters.
The West German Government is increasingly worried about the
likelihood of large-scale and possibly violent anti-INF demonstrations
this fall. Government leaders recently mentioned again the
compromise INF formula worked out last year by US and Soviet
negotiators-the "walk in the woods" approach. Statements by-
Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher, and Defense Minister
Woerner probably were designed to.assure the West German public
that Bonn was making every effort to encourage agreement at
Geneva that would make missile basing unnecessary.
In addition, the Kohl government is probably hoping to push the
US into breaking the deadlock at Geneva. Government spokesmen
have stressed, however, that the statements do not mean that West
Germany is backing away from its commitment to deploy Pershing II
missiles.
Top Secr?t
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British resolve on INF is firm, and the planned deployment of
cruise missiles at Greenham Common should occur as scheduled in
December. The government is worried, however, that a delay in initial
deployments in West Germany could undermine NATO's policy on
INF. Prime Minister Thatcher expressed her concerns to Kohl earlier
this month, and she also told US officials that she is more concerned
than the Chancellor about the implications of the debate in the
Bundestag.
Italian Foreign Minister Colombo last week stressed to Norwegian
Foreign Minister Stray that Italy's next government would go ahead
with the deployments as scheduled in March, unless agreement at
Geneva made basing unnecessary. Socialist Party leader Craxi is
likely to head the next coalition government.
Public opinion polls show that there is more opposition in Italy to
INF than in other basing countries. If opponents of INF succeed in
bringing the basing issue to a parliamentary vote, the government
could find it difficult to manage the challenge. Pressure from leftwing
Socialists has already been blamed for Defense Minister Lagorio's
recent statements that hinted at an INF initiative by a Craxi-led
government and gerhaas at an interest in the "walk in the woods"
Dutch, Belgian, and Fr?nch Positions
The governments in the Netherlands and Belgium have not yet
made a final INF basing decision, but they recently have taken steps
to keep the question of deployment open. The Dutch have announced
that Woensdrecht is their proposed cruise missile site. The Belgians
are likely to confirm Florennes as their cruise missile site this week,
and preparations at the base probably will become evident to the
public in August.
The Hague and Brussels hope that initial basing in West Germany
and the UK will weaken domestic opposition to INF. This fall, however,
they will closely watch antimissile demonstrations in West Germany. If
the expected peace marches are accompanied by widespread acts of
civil disobedience or violence, or if West German deployments are
somehow delayed, the two governments will be even more reluctant
to make a final decision on basing.
A French Foreign Ministry official says President Mitterrand is
unwavering in his support of INF deployment, despite a public
statement last month that the "walk in the woods" proposal had been
a reasonable one. He reports that Paris opposes the proposal
because it would eliminate Pershing II deployments and tend to
equate Soviet SS-20s and French IRBMs. Mitterrand has rejected
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13 26 July 1983
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Top Secret
including French nuclear forces in arms reduction talks, and only the
French Communists have accepted Soviet arguments on this point.
Public Handling
The British have taken the lead in seeking a coordinated public
position in the Alliance on deployments to prevent confusion in the
months ahead. They probably will push even harder for Allied
coordination, as a result of the recent statements from Bonn and
Rome suggesting renewed interest in the "walk in the woods"
formula.
Other NATO members also are concerned about public handling
of INF. They believe that NATO should take steps to ensure that the
USSR shoulders the blame for lack of progress at Geneva.
Special Consultative Group Issues
The Allies will use the Special Consultative Group meetings to
consult with the US on additional ways to move toward agreement at
Geneva. They almost certainly will want the US to have worked out
positions on shorter range missiles and aircraft and on regional INF
limits before negotiations resume in Geneva on 6 September.
Some Allies may see the idea of regional limits for US and Soviet
INF deployments as a way to deal with Moscow's insistence that
British and French nuclear weapons be taken into account at Geneva.
They may suggest privately that equality between the US and the
USSR should be established in Europe but that the USSR should be
permitted additional SS-20s on its non-European territory to
compensate informally for the British and French forces. Alternatively,
some NATO countries might favor taking British and French systems
into account in expanded START talks.
Top Secret
14 26 July 1983
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