NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 16 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010083-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: June 16, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
16 June 1983
Top Gem et
Copy 2 8 5
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16 June
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Tog) Secret
Contents
USSR: Party Plenum Ends
Chile: Growing Opposition
Israel-Lebanon: Economic Pressure
EC: Summit Preview
Egypt-USSR-Eastern Europe: Arms Purchases
USSR-China: Soviets Criticize Chinese Premier
Special Analysis
Spain: Gonzalez's Prospects
Top Secret
16 June 1983
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USSR: Party Plenum Ends
The Central Committee concluded its two-day meeting yesterday
with a major speech by General Secretary Andropov and announced
personnel changes that indicated a strengthening of his political
position.
Andropov's speech set forth ideas to be considered in a revised
Party Program covering all aspects of policy for the long term.
Andropov appeared to be preparing the party and the people for
"inevitable" change in many areas of economic and social life. For
example, he seemed to be calling for greater flexibility in reassigning
workers in accord with national labor requirements and in rewarding
risk-taking by managers who now are penalized for adopting new
technologies that do not show an immediate profit.
On foreign policy, Andropov emphasized the inherent strength of
the USSR and its allies, the favorable nature of political trends in the
Third World, and the continued presence of "realistic" politicians in
the West who support peaceful coexistence in the face of US
"aggressiveness."
The plenum approved the appointment of Leningrad party chief
Romanov to the party Secretariat and the reassignment of Premier
Solomentsev of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to
head the party Control Committee. A newcomer, regional party
secretary Vorotnikov, was made a candidate member of the
Politburo. Two members who are in disgrace for involvement in
corruption scandals were removed from the Central Committee.
Comment: Andropov's views on the Party Program amount to a
major political and social platform that will be likely to dominate
public discussion for some months to come. It probably will put
Chernenko in a secondary role as ideological spokesman.
The shifts in personnel assignments improve Andropov's position,
primarily by diluting Chernenko's authority in the party Secretariat.
Andropov probably arranged Romanov's move to the Secretariat,
which will make Romanov a senior party leader.
Vorotnikov's promotion strongly suggests that he will replace
Solomentsev as Premier in the RSFSR, where he earlier had served as
first deputy premier. The removal of the two disgraced Central
Committee members-a rare action-underlines Andropov's
intention to pursue his anticorruption campaign.
In his discussion of economic changes, Andropov appeared to be
referring to a recasting of priorities in the existing system rather than
a shift to market forces.
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CHILE: Growing Opposition
The widespread support for the "Day of National Protest" on
Tuesday and the government's slow pace of transition to civilian rule
will encourage more opposition activities in coming months.
Press sources report at least one person was killed and 644
arrested in Santiago and other major cities. The National Workers'
Command, a coalition of labor confederations led by Copperworkers'
President Seguel, organized small street rallies and business and
school boycotts. Leftist youths are believed responsible for the
10 bombings.
The two leading political coalitions of right, center, and moderate-
left parties publicly supported the protests. Air Force General Leigh-
a retired junta member-and trans ort workers and wheatgrowers
also endorsed the demonstrations.
President Pinochet attributes the agitation to the Chilean
Communist Party and to Soviet influence. He says the constitutional
timetable will not be changed and vows the government will stand
firm. The government has announced that Seguel, who already is
being prosecuted for organizing protests on 11 May, has been
arrested.
Comment: The organizers of the protest probably will continue to
push their demands-ranging from an end to the state of emergency
to establishment of a congress-by organizing similar protests next
month. Demonstrators were more successful in organizing activities
outside the capital and among professional groups.
The extent of the demonstrations will increase public doubts
concerning Pinochet's assertion that opposition activites are the
result of Communist efforts. Vigorous prosecution of Seguel is
likely to provoke immediate protests and may lead to a strike by the
copperworkers or a general strike.
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BEIRUT
BEIRUT I'1l~
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT i~/fff
Shia
Myslim$
Sidon.
Israel
Golan
Heights
rNi 1'cuP FdI
Top Secret
16 June 1983
Lebanon
I
Syria
UNDOF
1. zone
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Israeli actions in occupied southern Lebanon that have provoked
local strikes are seriously depressing the economy.
The US Embassy reports Israeli forces are preventing farmers in
the area from marketing their goods by stopping trucks carrying
Lebanese produce to Beirut. Trucks carrying Israeli produce to Beirut,
however, are permitted to pass without incident. A Lebanese press
report states that, under a new Israeli regulation, merchandise
coming from Beirut or elsewhere in Lebanon is barred from the
Israeli-controlled area unless the Israeli military commander has given
prior approval.
In Sidon, Israeli forces recently retaliated against a general strike
by merchants by briefly detaining local business leaders and warning
strikers that their shops would be forced to remain closed for a
month. Earlier this year the head of the Chamber of Commerce in
Sidon tried to compile a list of Lebanese businessmen violating
Lebanese law by trading with Israel. He stopped after receiving a
warning from Israeli military headquarters.
Israel has routinely violated its pledge given last year not to
export agricultural items that compete with local produce. Shias in the
south charge that President Gemayel has done little to stem the flow
of such Israeli produce, which has captured a large share of the local
market. The Shias say that Christian merchants in East Beirut receive
and sell the bulk of the imports from Israel.
Comment: Israel's regulation of commercial traffic is aggravating
the already depressed economy of the south. The Israelis appear
determined to gain an economic foothold in Lebanon and probably
will adopt additional restrictive measures.
Gemayel cannot prevent Israeli products from entering Beirut. His
failure to do so, however, strengthens Shia suspicions that he would
sacrifice the south to preserve the interests of Maronite Christians.
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The three-day EC Summit that begins in Stuttgart tomorrow will
address the EC budget, the Solemn Declaration on European Union,
and enlargement of the EC. but no major breakthroughs are likely on
The 10 heads of government will consider a plan by the
Commission to ease the budget squeeze by raising the share of
national value-added taxes allotted to the Community. The plan
proposes to deal with the British payments problem over the long
term by placing more of the financial burden on the wealthiest EC
states and on the primary beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural
The Solemn Declaration is a weakened version of a proposal
made in 1981 by West German Foreign Minister Genscher and Italian
Foreign Minister Colombo for a European Union. Among other things,
it calls for a common EC foreign policy, qualified majority voting in the
EC Council, and exr)anded powers for the European Parliament.
A senior West European diplomat reports that the 10 leaders will
announce a deadline for concluding negotiations on Spanish and
Portuguese accession to the Community. Accordin to the diolomat,
the date may be as early as 1 January 1985.
Comment: Agreement is unlikely on budget reform. Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg-which would pay proportionally the
most under the Commission's proposal-probably will resist linking
contributions to per capita income and agricultural production.
The Solemn Declaration would do little to further EC political
integration. The deadline for negotiations on Spanish and Portuguese
accession may not be met. Nonetheless, it should increase pressure
on the EC Commission and on Madrid to settle the economic
questions connected with Spain's entry.
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Egypt during the past six months has increased military
purchases from the USSR and East European countries, reflecting its
improving relations with them.
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Except for Romania, the Warsaw Pact stopped selling arms
to Egypt in 1975.
Comment: The purchases appear largely intended to prolong the
life of Egypt's inventory of obsolete Soviet equipment. East European
members of the Warsaw Pact coordinate arms sales policies with
Moscow, and all the deals have Soviet approval. Egypt continues to
look toward the West, especially the US, for most of its weapons,
particularly those employing advanced technology. This preference,
however, will not deter Cairo from concluding deals that could extend
the life of much of its Soviet equipment and improve relations with
Communist countries.
Pravda and Izvestiya on 9 June carried a TASS article attacking
the report by Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to the National People's
Congress. TASS accuses Zhao of making a "slanderous assertion"
about the USSR's threat to China, of repeating "hackneyed
accusations" against Vietnam and Kampuchea, and of
misrepresenting Soviet attempts to defend Afghanistan from
"imperialist aggression." It notes, however, that Zhao had "admitted"
that neither side benefits from prolonged tensions and that "both
peoples" are interested in a normalization of relations.
Comment: This is the first attack in the Soviet media on a
Chinese leader by name since the resumption of the Sino-Soviet
dialogue last fall. Other recent Soviet articles have criticized the
Chinese stand on Mongolia, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. The
Soviets seem to be cautioning against unrealistic expectations for a
dramatic improvement in relations. Moscow also seems to be trying
to make it clear that, while it will continue to work for better ties, it will
not make large unilateral concessions on key issues.
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Prime Minister Gonzalez
Age 41 ... Spain's most popular and charismatic
politican ... secretary general of the Socialist
Party since 1974... specialist in labor law .. .
appears committed to democracy and social
justice ... leadership style is both collegial and
authoritative.
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Special Analysis
SPAIN: Gonzalez's Prospects
Prime Minister Gonzalez, who will visit Washington next week, is
still enjoying a political honeymoon with the public seven months after
coming to power. He shows every sign of holding to the moderate
domestic course he set at the outset of his tenure. Gonzalez also
seems intent on continuing a foreign policy that balances close ties to
the West with independent diplomatic moves. If he is unable by the
end of the year to show real progress toward reducing unemployment
and entering the EC, leftist demands could increase and some of his
political support could erode.
The Socialist Party's centrist platform contributed substantially to
its election victory last fall. Since then, Gonzalez has adopted
predominantly middle-of-the-road policies, in part to hold on to his
moderate constituents. The Prime Minister's efforts to reduce
inflation, contain the budget deficit, and increase exports also
conform to his views of what is best for the country.
This approach, however, carries some costs. Unemployment has
climbed to 18 percent since the Socialists took power. Leftwing
Socialists are disconcerted by the government's approach but have
not yet begun to blame Gonzalez for continuing problems.
Gonzalez's continuing political success-as demonstrated by the
Socialists' near sweep of the local regional elections in May-has
chastened potential critics on both the left and right. The Communists
have carefully hedged their opposition because they do not want to
appear to be undermining the first left-of-center government in nearly
50 years. The military has been impressed by the Socialists' popular
support and pleased by the government's purchase of the F-18
fighter-bomber and its tough stands on terrorism and the recovery of
Gibraltar as Spanish territory.
There are signs that Madrid is increasingly aware of the benefits
of full military integration. Last month Gonzalez supported the
Alliance's decision on INF deployment, and Defense Minister Serra-
a principal backer of NATO-has pledged publicly that Spain will
participate in Alliance military maneuvers.
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In addition, Spanish ministers attended both the Defense
Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council meetings earlier
this month. Pressure from Foreign Minister Moran and other
members of the Socialist left, however, forced the Spanish delegates
to both meetings to reaffirm that Spain has not yet made a final
Gonzalez's public remarks on INF and his statement that the
Socialist Party's long-promised referendum on NATO might be put to
the public indirectly appear to have been a first step toward moving
both his party and the country toward acceptance of NATO.
Nonetheless, Gonzalez will not be able to press much further on
integration until the economy rebounds and increases his political
capital with leftist voters. He also has informed Western officials that
at least limited progress on Madrid's bid to recover Gibraltar will be
necessary to swing Spanish opinion behind the Alliance.
Progress in Spain's negotiations to enter the EC is crucial to the
integration issue.
The US Ambassador reports that Gonzalezl moved Kohl
to launch a diplomatic campaign to speed Spain's accession to the
EC. A major obstacle to Spanish entry, however, is the potential
burden it poses for the Community's budget. The Ambassador
believes that both Madrid and the EC may try to reduce that cost by
pressing the US for concessions on the exports of vegetable oils to
the Community.
Latin America and the US
During his recent trip to Latin America, Gonzalez strongly
endorsed the peace initiative in Central America by the "Contadora"
countries-Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama-and
criticized US policy. He also suggested that US and Cuban
intervention in Central America magnified regional tensions by
transforming them into East-West disputes. Although Gonzalez
acknowledges the undemocratic character of Nicaraguan and Cuban
regimes, he believes that US opposition has increased their
dependence on Moscow.
Gonzalez's independent stance on Central America is a blend of
political expediency and personal conviction. Activist policies toward
Latin America are popular with many Spanish voters, and taking issue
with the US about the problems in that region reduces some of the
misgivings Spanish leftists have about Madrid's close defense
relationship with Washington.
continued
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16 June 1983
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There are probably limits, however, on how far Gonzalez will ush
his line on Central America.
Outlook
Public support for Gonzalez could begin to soften by the end of
this year if the economy fails to improve and he has not made
progress on EC accession or achieved some other foreign policy
success. At that point, the call by Communist trade unions for more
expansive policies could begin to strike a responsive chord in
Socialist unions and among the working class generally.
The Prime Minister, however, is a skillful and determined
politician. Even a substanial increase in leftist pressure would not
easily budge him from his middle-of-the-road course.
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