NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 15 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010079-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: June 15, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of -T01 seffet
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
15 June 1983
Copy 2 3 5
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15 June
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Contents
El Salvador-US: President Magana's Visit ............................
Honduras-US: Concern About Training Center ......................
Lebanon: Problems in the South ............................................
USSR-Afghanistan-Pakistan: Soviet Inflexibility .....................
USSR: Chernenko Addresses Party Plenum ..........................
Lebanon: Withdrawal Agreement Approved ..........................
Nicaragua: Crackdown on the Opposition ..............................
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2
3
4
5
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6
Iran-Iraq: Mediation Efforts Collapse ......................................
Iraq: Gallup of Kurdish Draftees ..............................................
7
7
Netherlands: Catholic Bishops on INF ....................................
8
East Germany: Warning to the Peace Movement ..................
9
Special Analysis
West Germany: Standing Fast on INF .................................... 10
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15 June 1983
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President Alvaro Magana
Magana, 57, is a prominent attorney and
economist ... for more than two decades he
acted as a behind-the-scenes adviser to presidents
and juntas ... became provisional president in
April 1982... he has been an able arbitrator
among contending political groups .. favorably
disposed toward the US ... holds a Master's
Degree in economics from the University of
Chicago, where he studied during the 1950s.
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15 June 1983
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EL SALVADOR-US: President Magana's Visit
President Magana, who arrives in Washington tomorrow, will cite
his political successes as he tries to obtain more US aid.
The US Embassy reports that Magana will point to the amnesty
program, under which nearly 500 political prisoners have been
released, as one of his government's foremost accomplishments.
Only about 50 guerrillas have turned themselves in, however, and
most of them are camp followers. According to the head of the
program, the amnesty may be extended beyond its current deadline
of 15 July
Magana also plans to stress progress on the new constitution. He
expects the first draft to be completed within a few days, and the
head of the drafting commission believes that the document will be
approved by the Assembly by the end of next month. As another sign
of progress by his administration, the President will focus on the
government's call for a dialogue with the left.
Defense Minister Vides, who will accompany the President,
believes that the delegation will come under fire for lack of progress
on cases involving the deaths of US citizens. He also says unfavorable
publicity may result from a current campaign by the military to round
up prominent leftist supporters
Neither Magana nor Vides expects any serious problems during
their absence from the country. Nonetheless, both reportedly are
anxious not to be away any longer than necessary.
Comment: A strong showing in Washington would improve
Magana's standing among El Salvador's divisive political factions,
some of which are rumored to be dissatisfied with his performance.
The President's concern that dissident elements will use his absence
to intensify criticism is reflected in his desire to return home as soon
as possible.
Magana's difficulties are complicated by increasing concern over
the accelerated election timetable. Moreover, the political parties and
the military are beginning to grow uneas as the possibility for talks
with the insurgents increases.
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HONDURAS-US: Concern About Training Center
Honduras wants a long-term commitment from the US for
increased military and economic aid in return for the political risks it is
incurring in sponsoring Salvadoran troop training at the US-staffed
Regional Military Training Center.
Honduran Armed Forces Commander Alvarez and Foreign
Minister Paz Barnica plan to emphasize in their addresses to the
Honduran Congress this week the domestic benefits that may accrue
from the new training school. Many Congressional deputies of
different persuasions plan an open debate following Paz's
presentation today. The principal objection is the danger that
Honduras might become more deeply involved in a regional conflict
as a result of training foreign troops, especially Salvadorans.
Meanwhile, plans are being completed for a meeting between the
Honduran and Salvadoran Presidents to expedite the resolution of
the longstanding border dispute between the two countries. The
meeting is tentatively scheduled for some time later this month.
Comment: Alvarez is likely to stress to the Congress the benefits
that may result from his trip last week to the US, during which he
requested compensation in the form of tangible military and
economic aid. Nonetheless, Honduran legislators probably will be
generally hostile to the decision on the trainina centers
Tegucigalpa may expect the US to urge the Salvadoran
Government to make concessions on the border delineation. A
favorable settlement would help reduce widespread opposition to the
presence of Salvadoran troops in Honduras.
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The growing frustration of Lebanese in the south under Israeli
occupation presages continued attacks against Israeli forces and
difficulties for President Gemayel if he tries to extend government
authority over the region.
In recent weeks there have been numerous demonstrations in the
south and attacks on Israeli forces there. Lebanese Shia Muslims,
who comprise 80 percent of the region's population, are incensed by
what they view as Israel's heavyhanded attempts to extend its
influence and by Beirut's seeming indifference. Several Israeli-backed
local militias have intimidated area residents into cooperating with
Christian militia leader Haddad and Israeli forces.
Amal-the major Shia political organization-has not officially
condoned the violence against Israeli soldiers, but Shia extremists are
responsible for many of the attacks.
responsible for some of the attacks.
al ian auerrollas also
re
Comment: Southern Lebanese fear that the central
government-which historically has neglected the south-will
abandon the region to the Israelis. If Tel Aviv withdraws its troops
from any part of the area, Gemayel will not easily regain the trust of
local residents.
The southerners will be particularly wary of the Lebanese Army's
performance. Many doubt that the Army will disarm local Israeli-
backed militias.
Israel is increasingly frustrated by the violence. The Israelis
cannot crack down on the perpetrators, many of whom are Lebanese,
without further aggravating tensions. Amal leaders have warned,
moreover, that a partial Israeli withdrawal would result in more
attacks against Israeli soldiers.
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Soviet Inflexibility
The UN-sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan resume tomorrow
in Geneva, but the chances of major progress are slim.
Pakistani officials say that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
repeated longstanding demands last week when he met with Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan in Moscow. Gromyko reiterated that Soviet
troops cannot be withdrawn until all outside interference has ended,
adding that there can be no mention of withdrawals in the draft UN
document. He was equally firm in rejecting any change in the regime
in Kabul
Yaqub was impressed by the difference between Gromyko's
remarks and the views of UN officials on progress at the round of
talks in Geneva in April. Although Pakistan will ask the Soviets to give
dates for a troop withdrawal, the US Embassy in Islamabad believes
that Yaqub is going to this round expecting to accomplish little more
than to keep the negotiations alive.
Comment: Moscow's conditions for a political settlement virtually
require Soviet troops to remain until there is no more armed
opposition to the Marxist regime. Gromyko's refusal to allow mention
of withdrawals in the UN draft is an apparent change from earlier
Soviet positions. Pakistani and UN officials believed they had already
secured this concession from the Soviets in February.
If the Soviets stand firm on these issues, the dialogue could break
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USSR: Chernenko Addresses Party Plenum
General Secretary Andropov opened the Central Committee
plenum yesterday, and Politburo member Chernenko delivered the
main report on current aspects of the party's ideological and mass
political work. Chernenko lauded Andropov's leadership and cited his
pronouncements several times. On international affairs, Chernenko
criticized US policy as "adventuristic" and asserted the USSR's
continued interest in "peaceful coexistence and detente." Domestic
themes in the address included the need for discipline among workers
and for candor and openness in discussing the problems of Soviet
society.
Comment: Chernenko's report clearly bore the stamp of
Andropov's ideas, and the allusion to Andropov's leadership of the
party-including a rare reference to his "heading" the nominally
collective Politburo-will further strengthen the General Secretary's
authority. Chernenko was the logical person to deliver the report
because he is the Soviet party secretary overseeing ideological
matters, and his renewed prominence after a long absence
strengthens the impression of some observers that he might be
difficult to remove from the leadership. The plenum probably will hear
a concluding address by Andropov today. High-level personnel shifts,
which are widely anticipated, are customarily announced without
discussion as the last item of business.
LEBANON: Withdrawal Agreement Approved
The National Assembly's overwhelming vote yesterday approving
the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement reflects unusually broad
support for the government on the issue, especially among the
important Sunni Muslims. Two further steps remain in the ratification
process-signature of the resolution by President Gemayel and the
exchange of ratification documents with Israel.
Comment: Gemayel probably will sign the resolution shortly. He
may delay the exchange of ratification documents, however, hoping
that this would help persuade the US to influence the Israelis to
withdraw completely from Lebanon.
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NICARAGUA: Crackdown on the Opposition
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The Sandinistas are using the recent expulsion of three US
diplomats and continuing insurgent activity as pretexts for tougher
measures to quell domestic dissent. Most of the nine people who have
been arrested in connection with the alleged plot to assassinate
Sandinista leaders are Democratic Conservative Party officials. The
US Embassy reports that the Sandinistas also have dismissed a
number of dockworkers and have arrested six union leaders to
prevent them from joining an independent labor confederation. In
addition, the government has confiscated the company of a
prominent business leader who formerly headed the Red Cross and
who has been an outspoken critic of the junta.
Comment: The Sandinistas increasingly are portraying anyone
not on their side as being against them. Although security officials
announced that they were not filing charges against the Conservative
Party itself, the Sandinistas have become highly suspicious of it since
a party leader joined the insurgents' political leadership last year.
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IRAN-IRAQ: Mediation Efforts Collapse
Attempts by the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to mediate the
war between Iran and Iraq and to resolve the Persian Gulf oilspill
issue collapsed last week, according to a senior official of the United
Arab Emirates. Iran broke off negotiations and refused to allow
mediators to return to Tehran because of Kuwaiti public statements
linking the talks to an eventual cease-fire. Iranian spokesmen had
warned that the talks had to be confidential and limited to the oilspill
problem. In a s eech on 4 June. A atollah Khomeini ruled out any
negotiations.
Comment: There has never been a consensus in Tehran for
peace negotiations, and President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker
Rafsanjani, and other leaders who favored mediation were undercut
by Kuwait's public announcements. Officials in the Persian Gulf
states, who were misled by statements from a senior official in the
Iranian Foreign Ministry, overestimated Iran's flexibility on
negotiations.
IRAQ: Callup of Kurdish Draftees
The Defense Ministry announced on Sunday that it is resuming
the callup of Kurds for military service, including Kurds previously
demobilized. This reverses the policy announced last December
exempting Kurds from serving in the armed forces.
The exemption of the
Kurds from military service was resented by many non-Kurdish
conscripts, particularly Shias.
Comment: The callup probably is part of a larger operation to
control the Kurds that Iraq is undertaking with Turkey's cooperation.
Baghdad evidently believes it will be easier to control the Kurds if they
are in the military, and the Army needs additional men to fill its
conscription quotas. Nonetheless, many Kurds already demobilized
almost certainly will go into hiding rather than return to their units.
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NETHERLANDS: Catholic Bishops on INF
The pastoral letter issued on Monday by Dutch Catholic bishops
opposing deployment of INF and neutron weapons in Western Europe
probably will have its greatest impact on Prime Minister Lubbers'
Christian Democratic Party, which is divided on the INF issue. The
letter also calls on the Soviets to withdraw their intermediate range
forces from the European USSR. Press reports say that the letter
accepts nuclear weapons in general as a "temporary deterrent" while
arms control negotiations continue.
Comment: Opponents of INF will stress the letter's apparent
rejection of INF regardless of the outcome of arms control talks.
Supporters of INF will point to the bishops' conditional acceptance of
nuclear weapons in order to argue against any unilateral Dutch
actions. The Liberals support deployment and Labor opposes it, and
most members of these parties are unlikely to change their positions
as a result of the bishops' stand.
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EAST GERMANY: Warning to the Peace Movement
The recent expulsions of peace activists to the West show that the
regime's tolerance of the most militant nonofficial peace groups is
wearing thin. In the last three weeks more than 25 people from the
southern city of Jena, including families, have been expelled. Jena's
"peace community" is tied less closely to the Lutheran Church and is
more active and publicity-conscious than its counterparts elsewhere
in the country. US Embassy contacts in the peace movement
anticipate a nationwide crackdown late this year as INF deployment
begins in West Germany and Luther Year celebrations end.
Comment: The expulsions could lead some peace groups to
become more militant, which in turn could provoke the regime to take
tougher action. The government's actions also probably will intensify
divisions in the peace movement because many activists still favor
working more quietly within the system. They have little hope,
however, that the regime will moderate its policy.
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Special Analysis
WEST GERMANY: Standing Fast on INF
The West German Government, with the approach of Chancellor
Kohl's trip to Moscow and the initial INF deployments, is increasingly
firm and vocal in its support for the dual-track decision on INF and on
the US negotiating position in Geneva. Kohl would still prefer an arms
control agreement precluding the need for deployments, but he now
apparently accepts that progress in the negotiations is unlikely before
the first deployments begin. Officials in Bonn remain worried about
possible problems in maintaining public order as a result of opposition
to the deployments.
During a major address to the Bundestag last week, Kohl took an
unusually strong stance on INF. While indicating his government's
interest in arms control and improved relations with the USSR, he
blamed the lack of progress in Geneva entirely on Moscow and
warned it that threats of countermeasures are useless. Kohl defended
the flexibility of the Western negotiating position, asserting that the
negotiations are bein conducted "seriously and energetically."
The Chancellor emphasized that consideration of French and
British nuclear systems has no place in the Geneva INF talks. Any
agreement, he said, has to be verifiable and based on equality of
numbers, and no agreement is acceptable that could allow an
increased Soviet SS-20 threat in the Far East. Kohl and members of
his government probably will press these points during a two-day
debate on security issues in the Bundestag beginning today and
during the Chancellor's visit to Moscow beginning on 4 July.
This blunt policy statement followed weeks of conflicting press
reports in West Germany and the US about the government's
position. Unnamed senior West German Government officials were
variously quoted as saying that the government endorsed the informal
US-Soviet proposal made last year to limit INF missiles or that Kohl
wanted Washington to give him some indication of further Western
negotiating flexibility to take to Moscow. Some alleged that Bonn
would prefer that the US forgo Pershing II deployments and instead
deploy ground-launched cruise missiles in December.
These statements may have been made to demonstrate that the
West Germans want the negotiators to show greater flexibility in
Geneva and to test Washington's reactions. Kohl has wanted to avoid
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involving himself in the details of INF issues, and he probably has had
differences with the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry is controlled by the
Free Democrats and has wanted to examine all possible negotiating
approaches.
Whatever the intent of the statements, they have embarrassed
Kohl and caused him to assert himself at a cabinet meeting on 1 June.
The Chancellery now might take the lead on INF matters, a move that
could help clarify West Germany's position.
Kohl's resolve on INF probably has been strengthened by:
- His own and Prime Minister Thatcher's election victories.
- Recent affirmations by the Alliance of unity on INF, which
Kohl can use to justify his government's policy.
- The Social Democratic Party's retreat on INF in a manner
undermining its own credibility.
- Soviet threats of countermeasures, including a possible
deterioration in intra-German relations.
Preparing for Deployments
Bonn appears to be preparing the public for deployments. The
media are reporting that site preparations are in progress.
Most West Germans hope to avoid the deployment of additional
nuclear weapons in their country, and the government at the least
wants the Soviets to be blamed for any failure of the Geneva talks.
Officials in Bonn recently expressed concern to US officials that
demands might grow to support the informal proposal of last year
unless a way can be found to demonstrate that the US consulted the
Allies and was not responsible for rejecting the proposal.
The government probably would agree to any INF accord
acceptable to the US. Any agreement precluding the need for
Pershing II deployments would be easier to sell to the public and
would even have a chance of winning endorsement by the Social
Democrats.
Statements by top officials in Bonn indicate, however, that they
believe the deployment schedule has to be maintained. They also
favor a mix of Pershing Its and ground-launched cruise missiles. The
officials believe that West Germany has to deploy some missiles later
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this year to prevent support for deployment from dissipating in other
basing countries.
The Opposition to INF
The government remains nervous about maintaining public order,
although the vast majority of West Germans would not sanction
violent demonstrations. A few extremist factions probably will try to
provoke violence and blockade deployment sites.
While the problem appears manageable, officials fear that some
unpredictable incident-such as the shooting of a demonstrator by
police or possibly by US guards-could galvanize opposition to INF.
They also are concerned because the government's legitimacy could
be undermined if it were to crack down too hard on protesters.
Most West Germans will go along with INF deployments if Italy
and the UK also proceed with preparations. They view INF as a test of
West Germany's commitment to NATO.
A poll conducted since the election in March shows that a large
majority now is more concerned about other issues. Another poll
shows that, if another election were held now, Kohl's Christian
Democratic Union would do even better than in March, despite its
staunch support for the NATO decision.
The Social Democratic Party now appears certain to oppose INF
deployments in the absence of an agreement in Geneva. The
vehemence with which some Social Democrats oppose INF is partly
motivated by sentiment against the US administration and by the
frustrations of being members of a party in disarray.
The Social Democratic Party, however, is damaging its own
credibility through its haphazard retreat from the security policy of
former Chancellor Schmidt. It has become vulnerable to charges of
being anti-US and less than firm in its commitment to NATO.
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