NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 31 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 31, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIG
Top Secret
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
31 May 1983
Top Seere!
31 May 1983
Copy 285
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Contents
Ell Salvador: Terrorist Campaign ............................................ 4
Chad: Dissident Attack Expected ............................................ 5
India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations ........................................ 6
Poland: Party Plenum .............................................................. 7
USSR: Death of Politburo Member .......................................... 7
Canada: New Tack on Disarmament Policy ............................ 8
Peru: Insurgent Attacks in Capital .......................................... 9
Belgium-USSR: Expulsion of Soviet Official .......................... 10
Uruguay: Constitutional Talks Interrupted .............................. 11
Indonesia: Cutbacks in Defense Procurement ........................ 11
Special Analysis
Iran-Iraq: Debate in Tehran on the War .................................. 12
Top Secret
31 May 1983
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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31 May 1983
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EL SALVADOR: Terrorist Campaign
The largest and most radical of the five Salvadoran
antigovernment factions may be stepping up its terrorist tactics.
The Popular Liberation Front has claimed responsibility for the
assassination of Commander Schaufelberger in San Salvador last
(guerrillas executed
a number of government soldiers who surrendered during an
insurgent attack on a bridge in San Vicente Department last week.
More than 40 of the 82 defenders reportedly died as a result of the
Comment: The Front may be seeking revenge for the deaths of its
two top leaders in Managua last month. The insurgents publicly
blamed the US for the killings, although reports indicate an internal
feud led to the murders. After the deaths, the Front apparently
murdered several captured soldiers after taking Cinquera in central El
Salvador.
By killing the US adviser, the insurgents probably hope to bring
new attention to the US military presence in El Salvador and stimulate
opposition in the US to any increase. They may attempt similar killings
in Honduras, where the US plans to send more advisers in
conjunction with the opening of a new center that will train
Salvadoran units in counterinsurgency tactics.
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4 31 May 1983
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CHAD: Dissident Attack Expected
Chadian Government officials are concerned about the threat of
direct Libyan support to the northern dissidents.
Senior officials continue to expect a major attack before the
anniversary of President Habre's takeover on 7 June. They are not
confident that government forces can hold the northern outposts of
Faya-Largeau and Fada if the rebels strike with Libyan air support.
Habre's efforts to defend the north continue to be frustrated by
logistic problems and lack of adequate training for his troops,
according to the US Embassy
Comment: Government forces should be able to repel a rebel
attack unless it is effectively supported by direct Libyan air and
ground forces. The dissidents have so far shown no desire to move
against government outposts. If they do attack, Habre's troops
probably will attempt to ambush them in the open desert-a tactic at
which his troops are skilled and experienced
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5 31 May 1983
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LAKSHADWEEP
ISLANDS
(India)
Chin
se
e
dine of Indian
?control, claim
ISLANDS
(India) ?
NICOBAR
ISLANDS 0
(India) 0
China
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Troubled Relations
India's Foreign Minister goes to Islamabad tomorrow for the first
meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission, but neither side
expects much progress.
Relations between the two countries have dipped since the Joint
Commission was established last March. New Delhi has been
annoyed over press coverage in Pakistan of the massacre of Muslims
in Assam, and the Indian press has accused Pakistan of providin
arms and training to Sikh secessionists in Punjab.
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, campaigning for elections in the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, repeated earlier charges that
Pakistan might start another war with India.
Comment: Gandhi is nervous about the recent violence in Assam
and Punjab and probably is using the "Pakistan threat" to
consolidate domestic support and to warn Islamabad against
assisting Sikh extremists. If India raises the issue of interference,
Pakistan will counter with charges of Indian assistance to AI-Zulfikar
Both sides will try to maintain the appearance of better relations
at their meeting, but neither will give ground on major issues.
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6 31 May 1983
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POLAND: Party Plenum
Polish hardliners could touch off some heated debate at the
Central Committee plenum today, although they are unlikely to
damage party chief Jaruzelski's position seriously. A long overdue
session on divisive ideological questions had been scheduled for mid-
May,
Since the Soviet journal New Times published criticism of
Polish moderates early this month, there has been frequent
speculation in Poland that Jaruzelski's policies and even his party
position are under increased attack.
Comment: The plenum is not likely to ease the frustrations of
hardliners who believe Jaruzelski has been too lenient with the
regime's opponents and has paid too little attention to party affairs.
Although there could be some personnel changes, Soviet and
domestic criticism may force Jaruzelski to postpone moving
additional military men into significant party positions.
Arvid Pelshe, who died on Sunday, had been Chairman of the
Party Control Committee since 1966 and helped to bring the Baltic
area under Soviet rule. His job was to oversee the party's disciplinary
apparatus and review the cases of those punished or purged.
Comment: General Secretary Andropov could enhance his
disciplinary program and his authority in the party by replacing Pelshe
with a vigorous ally. Some Politburo members probably would see
such a move as contrary to their interests, however, and might prefer
to entrust the party control post to an elder as has been past practice.
The replacement for Pelshe could be announced at the Central
Committee plenum that is expected in about two weeks.
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7 31 May 1983
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CANADA: New Tack on Disarmament Policy
Top Secret
Prime Minister Trudeau's reported objections to language in the
Williamsburg Summit arms policy statement exempting British and
French nuclear forces from consideration at the Geneva disarmament
talks mark an apparent reversal of his previous position, probably in
part a recognition of the developing strength of the Canadian peace
movement. In a parliamentary debate last month Trudeau was firm in
his support for the anti-inclusion positions adopted by the US, UK,
and France. Trudeau had sought to appease the Canadian peace
movement by demanding that the US be more flexible at Geneva as a
prerequisite for Canada's agreement to allow cruise missile testing
over its territory. The peace movement, however, has coalesced
around the testing issue and, according to the US Embassy, has been
inundating the government with mail opposing the tests and urging
Ottawa to promote an accord on nuclear arms.
Comment: Trudeau's position at Williamsburg probably is a
further attempt to placate the peace movement, this time by giving
greater precision to his definition of the necessary degree of US
flexibility in the arms negotiations.
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PERU: Insurgent Attacks in Capital
Terrorist attacks in Lima on Friday, the second major insurgent
action in a week, have forced the government to declare a state of
emergency and suspend individual rights for 60 days. The Sendero
Luminoso group blacked out much of the capital for over an hour,
seized and destroyed a chemical plant worth several hundred million
dollars, and placed generally ineffective bombs near numerous other
buildings, including the US Embassy and.the presidential palace.
insurgents are proving to be better organized and more potent than
generally believed, which will increase the pressure on the
government to improve its counterinsurgency effort.
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9 31 May 1983
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BELGIUM-USSR: Expulsion of Soviet Official
the director
of a joint Soviet-Belgian trading company that handles the import and
export of computers and electronic components for the USSR has
been asked to leave Belgium. He is accused of engaging in espionage
aimed at acquiring programs and information affecting industrial and
military areas. The company is an organization that engages in the
illegal acquisition of embargoed electronics.
Comment: There are about a dozen wholly or partially owned
Soviet organizations in Belgium that may operate as conduits for
illegally acquired technology. almost
40 percent of the personnel at the Soviet Embassy and in other
officially credited agencies are intelligence officers.
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10 31 May 1983
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URUGUAY: Constitutional Talks Interrupted
Military authorities last Friday decided to interrupt the
constitutional discussions with the political parties-begun earlier this
month-which are a critical phase in the transition to civilian rule
scheduled for 1985. The officials gave no reason nor any indication of
when the discussions might resume, but more details are expected
later. Earlier the regime had closed an antimilitary Blanco Party
weekly.
Comment: The armed forces probably reacted to reports that the
Blancos were considering a postponement of the talks. By taking the
initiative, the military reasserted its control over the political process,
denied the parties the publicity they would have gained by stopping
the talks, and may have forced them to proceed with greater caution.
Thus far neither side has demonstrated the flexibility necessary to
complete the talks, but restiveness may result if the military fails to
announce a resumption in the near future.
Indonesia has canceled plans to purchase new armored vehicles
from France and instead intends to approach the USSR for spare
parts for its aging Soviet equipment. Armed Forces Commander
Murdani says budgetary constraints-not a desire for improved
relations with Moscow-are behind the move.
Comment: Indonesia's deteriorating economy has forced it to
make large reductions in defense expenditures, and the defense
budget this year probably will decline by about 7 percent in real
terms. The government recently shelved plans to purchase an
advanced fighter aircraft, and the Army Chief of Staff has indicated
that only half of the Army's planned acquisitions of equipment this
year will be possible. Indonesia will be likely to seek more liberal
terms and increased assistance from the US and other foreign arms
suppliers. The USSR probably will be willing to provide the parts if
they are available.
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11 31 May 1983
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Special Analysis
IRAN-IRAQ: Debate in Tehran on the War
Iran evidently is preparing another attack against Iraqi lines amid
continuing debate within the Iranian leadership over growing war
weariness among the people. Troop recruitment is becoming more
difficult, and the military situation argues for limited attacks and a war
of attrition. The decisive factor in resolving the debate, however, will
be the wishes of Ayatollah Khomeini, who shows no sign of backing
away from an aggressive military strategy.
Declining Morale
for the first
time small antiwar demonstrations have taken place in cities near the
front.
ar weariness has grown noticeably in the military
In recent months desertions and unauthorized retreats from
frontline units in combat increasingly have involved Revolutionary
Guard and militia personnel, supposedly the regime's most highly
committed troops.
Since mid-1982, moreover, a number of reports suggest the
government is having difficulty recruiting troops for the front. Last
September Arm Commander irazi stated that drives for volunteers
were faltering
Late last year high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officers publicly
claimed that the lack of volunteers was hampering military operations.
Khomeini was forced in November to issue a religious decree making
it incumbent on every Iranian to give first priority to volunteering for
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12 31 May 1983
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Debate Over the War
Substantial casualties and declining morale have intensified a
growing debate over the war among Iranian leaders, but the precise
positions of the various leaders is not known. Early this month
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, Khomeini's personal representative on
the Supreme Defense Council, stated in a speech to Army officers
that Iran would no longer invade Iraq "because the lives of our
combatants are more precious than anything else." In March he made
a similar point on the need to avoid heavy casualties in explaining the
delay in launching an offensive.
Rafsanjani is the only senior leader to link publicly Iran's high
casualties to a change in war strategy.
Rafsanjani is joined by Prime Minister Musavi,
ie o Staff Zahirnezhad, and some senior military officers in
arguing against more large-scale offensives. President Khamenei,
Rafsanjani's main political rival, also a ears to support a different
approach to the war.
Ayatollah Montazeri, who is Khomeini's heir apparent;
Commander of the Revolutionary Guard Reza!; and Army
Commander Shirazi are likely to prefer a military solution.
Khomeini, however, will have the final word. There is no sign that
President Saddam Hussein.
Khomeini recently rejected proposals y a group o Iranian officials
favoring an end to the war
Rafsanjani asserted in a major speech on 24 May that successful
prosecution of the war was Iran's overriding priority. His statement
suggests those who favor stopping the fighting again have been
forced to back off, at least temporarily.
Another offensive could recover small pockets of Iranian territory,
but almost certainly will not be able to push deep into Iran
The Iranians also have been unable to develop tactics to break
through ,Iraq's extensive fortifications, and they are unlikely to acquire
soon the arms neede e Baghdad's enormous advantage in
firepower.
Iran's last two offensives along the Doveyrich front were cut short
after its initial attacks resulted in heavy losses. This pattern is likely to
be repeated in any new offensive
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Another defeat would strengthen the arguments of those in the
Iranian regime who view the war as a liability. They probably would try
again to persuade Khomeini. The Ayatollah is unlikely to approve
negotiations to end the war, however, until he becomes convinced
that the Iraqis cannot be defeated or that the prolongation of
hostilities would threaten he Iranian revolution.
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14 31 May 1983
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